Logistics

I've been wondering about logistical issues that armies faced in the antiquity. Most of the time, we focus on battles, major political events etc., but here I want to ask the experts on the subject what happened between the battles during long campaigns. Let's take a famous example - Alexander's conquest of Persia. He spent years on foreign territory, thousands of kilometres from his homeland and fought many battles. How did he reinforce the army? Were new armies created in Greece and sent to X to join Alexander's forces or did replacements arrive in smaller "blocks"? How was this coordinated? Did soldiers return to their homes in Greece periodically or were they stuck for years far away from them? What happened to the wounded who survived the battle(s), but were no longer useful as soldiers? Who garrisoned the occupied cities? Were the forces needed for that purposes significant? What about food and water - were the local reserves sufficient to sustain the army or did major quantities of food and water have to be imported? How were the soldiers able to replace broken equipment? And so on, and so on...

I don't really expect to get the answers to everything, but I would definitely like to learn more about this. I would be glad if you recommended some books about this topic, too. Note that I'm not interested in WWII or modern logistics, as it's much easier to get information about that.

From the top of my head I can tell you that eventho normally Hellenic soldiers would return to their Homestead after the campaigning season. This was not the case for Alexanders Troops which did not get back to macedon. IIRC he actually solved the Garrison problem with the same stone he solved the warcripple problem.

Just to start it off, I'm sure plenty of people here are able to help you with some sources.

Most ancient armies carried a moderate amount of supplies with them from home, but, deep into enemy territory, relied on forage after the initial cache was exhausted. Supply by land was highly inefficient and most armies procured food and water from captured sources, like cities or major farming areas. Navies, however, could easily transport sufficient quantities of supplies to forces within range of the coast or navigable rivers, and Alexander occasionally exploited the source during his campaigns. To my knowledge, Alexander garrisoned occupied settlements with the allied Greek contingents of his army, preferring to march into battle with Makedonian pike phalanxes instead of hoplites.

According to some of my research, though, land routes were a feasible source of supply based on the marching speed of an army and the quality of road connections. Roman and Persian paved roads, for instance, supported high volumes of wheeled traffic.

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IIRC he actually solved the Garrison problem with the same stone he solved the warcripple problem.

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So he used the cripples as garrison troops?

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Most ancient armies carried a moderate amount of supplies with them from home, but, deep into enemy territory, relied on forage after the initial cache was exhausted. Supply by land was highly inefficient and most armies procured food and water from captured sources, like cities or major farming areas

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That was my guess, but how did he (or other generals, for that matter) deal with scorched earth strategy, then? It sounds like sth that would be very effective. Take as much food with you as you can, burn the granaries and leave the invader's army with this mess.

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To my knowledge, Alexander garrisoned occupied settlements with the allied Greek contingents of his army, preferring to march into battle with Makedonian pike phalanxes instead of hoplites.

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Sounds like a good strategy, assuming that the troops stayed loyal. Hoplites weren't that useful on the battlefield anymore, at least not when compared with sarissa-wielding troops, but sieges are a different matter.

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Originally Posted by Cybvep

how did he (or other generals, for that matter) deal with scorched earth strategy, then?

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By marching faster than his enemies could anticipate.

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Originally Posted by Basileus_ton_Basileon

By marching faster than his enemies could anticipate.

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Superb intelligence too. Alexander often grasped the terrain and local geography better than the Persians. Darius actually poisoned some wells in the path of Alexander's advance but scouts discovered the traps and Alexander just avoided them. Not to mention the Persians hardly practiced scorched earth tactics, for some bizarre reason. The Greek general Memnon of Rhodes in the employ of the King of Kings planned to fortify Palestine, strip the land of food sources useful to the enemy and fight a war of attrition which Alexander - for all his tactical brilliance - simply could not have won. Fortunately for Alexander and disastrously for the Persians, he died of an illness before his plans matured.

foreign contigents in foreign lands to that contigent tend to remain loyal because basically they have their wifes and kids at home under the comand of the force that took them and at the same time since they are foreigners if they loose their military edge or show disunion the natives can rebel and take them out

the persians had a good road sistem and since the people that alexander took over where accostumed to law and order they just wellcomed the new masters and life continued (also the life continues part in persian meant that the maks and their allies had more food then they where normally accostumed to and also more wealth ) persia heartland was fairly easy the eastern borders with all the savages steppes and mountain warriors was trickier

also life back then was 20 km´s around your home (the distance you can travel in half a day on foot ) so for most people joining an expedicionary force wasn´t a bad career path compared to being a peasent! gave you a chance to rise in your station (or in the nobles case mantain your position before the new lords ) you got to see the world have acess to new beautifull women instead of marrying your cousin like you daddy arranged with his brother or with his own cousin ... (i mean whats new is always beautifull and we need to mix a bit more then just 20 km´s away from daddy´s farm ) so to replace soldiers wasn´t that hard aslong as you weren´t a racist xenophobic bastard (wich the makedonians where )

on that stand hannibal faced far worse against the romans then alexander because the persians where accostumed to arrive kick the hell out of whoever pissed them off and get back home in time for the new years festival and so fighting on their own land they where like wtf are we suposed to do ?

Moonburn, I find your post barely readable. Can you use punctuation? Thanks in advance.

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Originally Posted by Cybvep

Sounds like a good strategy, assuming that the troops stayed loyal. Hoplites weren't that useful on the battlefield anymore, at least not when compared with sarissa-wielding troops, but sieges are a different matter.

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If that were really the case, why were hypaspists armed and drilled as hoplites?

I think the reasons are more subtle than that. Keeping the Macedonians together makes it easier to watch them and prevents any rancor about not getting the spoils of victory. It also preserves allies doing an important, but not glorious job. They're also the sorts who have done garrison duty throughout Persia before, and won't cause as much trouble with the local population.

What I meant is that hoplites are no match for Macedonian phalangites in the open field. It would be a waste to confine the sarissa-bearers to cities, considering how essential they were to the Alexander's strategy. That doesn't mean that hypaspists couldn't be used to guard the flanks so that the main part of the army (sarissa-bearers) could keep pushing forward, though.

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Originally Posted by Cybvep

What I meant is that hoplites are no match for Macedonian phalangites in the open field. It would be a waste to confine the sarissa-bearers to cities, considering how essential they were to the Alexander's strategy. That doesn't mean that hypaspists couldn't be used to guard the flanks so that the main part of the army (sarissa-bearers) could keep pushing forward, though.

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That you couldn't use them in the centre of the line doesn't mean they're useless. The phalanx still needs solid heavy infantry to guard its flanks, and hoplites could have performed that job the same as hypaspistai.

Any heavy infantry could perform that function. I'm not even sure whether hoplites would be the best choice. Maybe more flexible units should be placed there. Anyway, by using the words "weren't that useful", I didn't want to imply that hoplites were totally useless, just that the days of their glory were gone and, well, to put it bluntly, they were no longer war-winning troops. Anyway, this is not exactly related to logistics, I think...

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Originally Posted by moonburn

the persians had a good road sistem and since the people that alexander took over where accostumed to law and order they just wellcomed the new masters and life continued (also the life continues part in persian meant that the maks and their allies had more food then they where normally accostumed to and also more wealth ) persia heartland was fairly easy the eastern borders with all the savages steppes and mountain warriors was trickier

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Exactly. The foundations of every sound military occupation in history consists of decapitating the local authority (metaphorically speaking, though often literally too) and allowing most of the governmental structure to remain unchanged. Alexander simply replaced the satraps at the top with new despots. It's precisely what the US failed to do in Iraq and the major contributing cause of the instability continuing there today.

almost also forgot on the logistic part

hoplitai where easier to train in sarissa bearing then other types of infantry because they where already accostumed to tight formations so in case of emergency and with litle drilling compared to other forçes they could be shaped into a static phallanx (even tough hoplitai where accostumed to hit with their shields and then move forward to trample down their enemies and thus the reason why even the bottom of the sarissa had bronze tips so they could smash the poor dudes already being trampled)

also as far as i recall the persians had alot of greek mercenaries working for them (maybe even thracians and other hellenized people) so after a victory it was fairly easy for alexander to arrive and just ask "wanna die or serve me ?"

and ofc mercenaries won´t fight a loosing batle after alexanders 1st victory most greeks working for the persians decided to open a door and jump sides if the oppurtunity or need arised so alexander problems was never finding men to fight for him after he won his 1st victory it was always making sure he had a proper core of men that he could rely on so as not to loose the add on´s that his allies and native conscripts added (and as phyrrus learned never have a garrison of mercenaries that outnumber your own men)

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Originally Posted by moonburn

also as far as i recall the persians had alot of greek mercenaries working for them (maybe even thracians and other hellenized people) so after a victory it was fairly easy for alexander to arrive and just ask "wanna die or serve me ?"

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IIRC most Greek mercs decided they would rather die fighting after Alexander had slaughtered the Greeks wishing to switch sides at the Battle of Granicus, out of fear they would be killed anyway. Not that big of a problem for Alexander though, since he wasn't really losing men that fast anyway. :wink:

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Originally Posted by Vilkku92

IIRC most Greek mercs decided they would rather die fighting after Alexander had slaughtered the Greeks wishing to switch sides at the Battle of Granicus, out of fear they would be killed anyway. Not that big of a problem for Alexander though, since he wasn't really losing men that fast anyway. :wink:

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quintus' account seemed to suggest otherwise... Alexandros' was impressed many times by their seeming resolve to 'fight to the death' that he gave them quite competitive wages for switching sides. Moreover, all of the greeks that served Darius switch sides after Alexandros started on his campaign to chase Bessus.

It probably wasn't black-and-white like that. Just as there were pro- and contra-Macedonian factions in most Greek cities, so there would have been amongst the mercenaries. Similarly, Alexander could be ruthless or merciful (or, at least, willing to recruit them) depending on the circumstances. One chronicler wrote that Alexander would always forgive Theban mercenaries for fighting against him (because of what had happened to Thebes).

The Greeks that remained with Darius after Gaugemala were the die-hards. They only surrendered after Darius was killed. Alexander may have chosen to recruit them because it was faster than waiting for reinforcements from Macedon, and the men were already battle-hardened,

I've read a bit about the logistics of the Roman Army during various periods and they were surprisingly sophisticated and modern in their organisation.

The Roman Legions did not provide the bulk of their logistics by living off the land (although this was an important element of their logistical doctrine). The Roman Army's standard practice for supplying its legions was the use of Supply Lines between its Army and what has been termed by historians as Strategic, Operational and Tactical Logistical Bases. In additional to these Supply Lines, the Roman Army would have large numbers of organised foraging detachments continually sweeping the area of operations for supplies such as water, grain, fodder, and firewood.

I'll outline below the general elements of how the Romans handled logistics during the Republic and later Empire

Army Baggage Train

The Roman Army almost always had its own baggage train which would consist of support personnel with mules, oxen, and wagons that held the armies immediate supplies on the march. Generally it was agreed that there was one mule to 3 - 4 legionaries depending on whether it was pre or post Marian reforms. As you can imagine, this become quite huge depending on the size of the Army.

Supply Lines & Trains

Outside of the Roman Armies own baggage train, the main supply train would be made up of thousands of mules, oxen, and wagons which would continually flow between the Army in the field and the various logistical bases which had been established as depots or strategic supply sources for the campaign.

Naval Supply Fleets

The Romans also began using Naval Supply Fleets more extensively after the First Punic War once their Merchant and Combat Fleet started to become large enough and effective enough to transport significant amounts of supplies via the sea and also be able to provide sufficient combat elements to provide security.

Strategic Supply Bases

The Roman Strategic Supply Bases were basically large cities or whole provinces which were either developed into, or already naturally structured that way, to be major supply sources to produce grain or other essential materials in mass.

Operational Supply Bases

Operational Supply Bases were locations specific to the area of operations of the proposed campaign which would be used as a fortified supply base which the supplies from the Strategic Supply Base would be sent to. The number of these depended on the size of the campaign and the size or number of Roman armies in the field. These bases were also used a lot of the time as a secure staging point for the Army as well as winter quarters. The most sort after operation bases were sea ports as this allowed for supply via a Naval Supply Fleet which was considered generally better than a land supply line.

Tactical Supply Bases

The Roman tactical supply bases served a similar function to that of their Operation Supply Bases except for the fact that they were setup very close to the Romany Army in the field (Legion camp generally) and thus also fairly close to the enemy. At the outset of the campaign operations, the Army would move out from the Operational Supply Base and setup a Tactical Base in the field which would then also be moved with the Army during the march. The previously setup Tactical Bases were then converted into Supply Depots which would be staggered along the main Supply Line back to the Operational Supply Base.

Army Foraging & Requisitioning

During campaign operations a Roman Army would also forage the local area using a large number of organised detachments to search for supplies such as water, grain, fodder, and firewood. In addition to this, the Army would also requisition supplies from local towns or cities either by purchasing them, or obtaining them by force. This method of supply was useful in support of the above logistics structure, but wouldn't support an Army of any size for very long in the field on its own.

A version of this was most likely used by Alexander during his Persian campaign to supply his army. I haven't read up in detail on his conquests other than a general outline so I can't provide any further information on that unfortunately.

The one thing that has struck me from reading various ancient military history books that deal with logistics is the sheer scale of material that was required for a standard army. The Supply Lines must have stretched for miles and miles from the army in the field.

Anyway, if you want to know more on how Rome handled it's logistics, then I would suggest reading The Logistics of the Roman Army at War by Jonathan Roth.

Edit: I just came across another good book on logistics specific to the Macedonian Army called Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army by Donald W. Engels.

The Persians did something similar for their second invasion of Greece. They spent about 5 years moving surplus food to Granaries/Naval bases in the Med from all across the empire. I believe when they crossed the Hellespont, their navy carried half their supplies and the army had the other half in their baggage trains. Because Thrace and Macedonia had been pacified or forcibly allied to the Persians, they were able to set up forward supply depots and night camps along the coast using a light infantry/cavalry vanguard.

The Persians also divided their army into three marching columns along three different routes to simplify their marching so they had some sort of system for conveying their supplies on the coast to the more inland camps.

It is very possible to do these feats of logistics. Especially directly transporting mass foodstuff instead of relying more on foraging. I want to ask if the Hellenistic Kingdoms made use of directly transporting food in large numbers for long term campaigning frequently?

I've read of Warring States China with several hundred thousand troops (Not much of an exaggeration) campaigning on both sides with mass numbers of food arriving. If the troops got their food supply cut it would mean instant disaster due to having so many men. Footmen of that time and place were trained and experienced conscripts trained with usage of long halberds, sword and shield, other close combat weapons along with missile troops. They were formed in blocks with combined missile and melee sort of like pike and shot.

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Originally Posted by BroskiDerpman

It is very possible to do these feats of logistics. Especially directly transporting mass foodstuff instead of relying more on foraging. I want to ask if the Hellenistic Kingdoms made use of directly transporting food in large numbers for long term campaigning frequently?

I've read of Warring States China with several hundred thousand troops (Not much of an exaggeration) campaigning on both sides with mass numbers of food arriving. If the troops got their food supply cut it would mean instant disaster due to having so many men. Footmen of that time and place were trained and experienced conscripts trained with usage of long halberds, sword and shield, other close combat weapons along with missile troops. They were formed in blocks with combined missile and melee sort of like pike and shot.

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I think its mentioned in Art of War. I'm sure they had a ridiculously good Logistics System as Northern China was able to send massive foot armies into Inner Mongolia where there is no such thing as forage unless you want to eat grass. They were also able to fight Muslims in the -Stan regions so that meant transporting supply across some of the most inhospitable mountains and deserts.

Or maybe Western Historians just haven't gotten around to declaring all the numbers fake and untrustworthy as they like to do.