Did Stalin plan to steamroll Europe in 1941?

This is a bit of a spinoff from the Hitler-topic above, especially Kraxis comment. It poses the question if Stalin planned an attack on the western front, which is a hotly debated one, especially since the book "Icebreaker" came out. Very understandable as many fear this could somehow justify the german attack of the Sovietunion or even allow the Nazis to be somehow remembered as the ones who save Europe from the red wave.
IMHO Hitler long planned to attack Stalin, so nor an agressive nor a peaceful Sovietunion would have changed much, but anyway what our your opinions relative this delicate topic?

Cheers
OA

This topic is news to me - anyone care to summarise the argument of "Icebreaker"? I'd understood Stalin to have been completely surprised by Barbarossa and unwilling to believe Hitler's aggression. That doesn't quite fit with someone who was planning similar action of his own. Add to that the Red Army's very limited capabilities, having lost much of its officer corps to the purges, and a "steamroller" plan does not seem very plausible. I've always regarded Stalin and his successors as essentially defensive in posture, despite their large arms spending.

Unlikely,

Gutting the army through purges seems to be a less than optimal way to prepare a steamroller.

Well I will try to do so, although the book lives mostly from the sheer number of details...

- the training of a huge number of paratroopers, vastly more than all other countries togheter
- the destruction of defenselines and the construction of roads through them
- the development of a tank able to throw of it's chains -> very unpractible on russian territory, but perfect for the western roadsystem
- the use of standard motors instead of diesel ones, even if the latter were superior -> all fuelstations in western Europe were only prepared for the first type of fuel
- the dissolution of "partisan"-units, trained for the guerillia warfare
- the construction of frontlines and artillery positions very similar to the german ones
- the concentration of the troops directly near the frontline -> only suited for offensive warfare
- the construction of light attack bombers similar to the Stuka
- the preperation of a russian-german booklet very similar to the one used by the germans in Russia, containing many question for german civilists

and so on...

I've read it some time ago, and was highly sceptical. But even I hated to do so I had to admit that it all seemingly makes sense. In any case here seems to be a more or less sensible article about it. I have also read the sole answer to it and it couldn't dismiss the points per se IMHO
You understand why this thesis is dangerous when you see how many neo-nazi sites rejoice, I really hurts one to even think that the book might be right... :embarassed:

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articl..._18342993/pg_1


Passages like the following are quite stunning:

"First of all, we report the results of an important recent article by another Soviet military-historical writer, V. I. Semidetko. He came to a conclusion about Soviet military behavior in early summer 1941 that he appears hardly to have expected when he began his research on "Results of the Battle in White Russia."

Semidetko was in all likelihood wholly unaware of Suvorov's work when he wrote. Yet he concluded, writing in the Soviet magazine Military-Historical Journal (Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal), in 1989, after research on the early months of the Soviet-German war in newly opened Soviet military archives, that the reason the German army had so easily sliced eastward through the Red army on the central, White Russian front in June 1941 (where both armies, attack and defense, were of approximately equal strength) was that the latter was in an attack position.(14) This is, of course, the very discovery central to the argument Suvorov made several years earlier to explain that same military debacle. The Red army, Suvorov then said, was positioning itself to attack west, hence wholly out of its defensive positions. Because of the Kremlin's longstanding doctrinal emphasis on assault, those positions had, in any event, long been neglected. The Red army was, therefore, totally vulnerable before the onrushing Germans who, anticipating Stalin's attack, attacked first." ~:handball:

@Appleton: The Fins, polish and baltic people surly don't remember Stalin as a peaceful dictator and neither do the millions of his own people who died thanks to him, like the ones in the great famin in the Ukraine when they Stalin exported their crops for foreign money...

This however doesn't shed a good light on the author of the "Icebreaker":

http://www.tau.ac.il/taunews/96winter/russia.html

Cheers
OA

it was my impression of the events that it wasn't that the red army was in a defensive position, it was more like in a strategic marching column position and thats why it was vulnerable to attack. the whole point for stalin to take over eastern poland and eastern romania was so that he could push the soviet defensive works further from russian territory, and closer to the threat [nazi germany]

its just that, like everyone else, the soviets were surprised by the rapid nazi defeat of britain and france and instead of having years to transfer the defensive border to the new western boundaries of the soviet empire, the red army found itself [strategically speaking] caught between the old defenses they had abolished and the new defenses they were building up but were far from complete.

I think Nazi Germany did more to win the cold war than anything America did.
The Germans essentially hamstringed the Russian economy and labor force, thus preventing the Russians from winning an economic/military arms race with the U.S in the long run.

@Orleander: sorry, but the fate of Stalin's own people or the Ukraine famines has precious little to do with whether he planned to invade Germany or Western Europe. Yes, the man was a callous butcher and more than a little mad towards the end, but you need to look at the question dispassionately. Here in the West, we had decades of propaganda that the Soviet empire, because it was so "evil", was going to invade the West. It was and is a non sequitur[1].

As far as I can see, Stalin and his successors were rather cautious in foreign policy - ruthlessly exerting dominance over neighbouring areas that they perceived as their zone of influence - unfortunately including the Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states. But Stalin and his successors were too shrewd to venture on the kind of risky adventurist aggression of Hitler.

I may be wrong, not having read "Icebreaker", but nothing in the synopsis you helpfully provided seems terribly convincing to me. Most of the stuff on military technology sounds like Russia was just preparing to fight fire with fire (dive bombers, paras, robust tanks etc) and although there was a disastrous false start, she actually did pull that off after 1942.

[1]Actually, you might take it the opposite way - look at the way Stalin slowly established power domestically, rather like a nasty kid methodically pulling legs of an insect, and ask yourself whether such a person would plan to attack a frighteningly powerful neighbour only a year after they had seemingly effortlessly smashed the combined might of two Great Powers in a few weeks...

Quote:

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Originally Posted by nokhor

the whole point for stalin to take over eastern poland and eastern romania was so that he could push the soviet defensive works further from russian territory, and closer to the threat [nazi germany]

its just that, like everyone else, the soviets were surprised by the rapid nazi defeat of britain and france and instead of having years to transfer the defensive border to the new western boundaries of the soviet empire, the red army found itself [strategically speaking] caught between the old defenses they had abolished and the new defenses they were building up but were far from complete.

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This has been the interpretation I've seen as well. Stalin had his forces positioned farther forward because of the annexation of other states as result of his agreement with Hitler. I don't get the impression that Stalin was a great military mind--resolute, utterly ruthless, and insightful at times, but Barbarossa caught him with his pants around his ankles. If memory serves early in Barbarossa Stalin did not want to cede territory even when his armies were being flanked and risking encirclement. Combining this with holding out in places like Stalingrad later on indicates an unwillingess to cede any ground, even if necessary at times. So I doubt he believed that defense in depth within traditional Russian territory was the key. I suspect that he believed having armies so far forward would serve as a deterrent, as well as keeping the war out of Russia should it come. And Stalin had to prepare for war eventually, because he must have known that the Nazis would inevitably turn towards the large land mass next to them.

Between the officers purges and the lack of adequate comminications, the Russian forces were an ideal target for a German blitzkrieg strike. Stalin probably thought his massive air force (roughly 9,000 aircraft available for their Western Front) would help prevent such a strike, or at least provide some cover and slow any invader down, but the Luftwaffe destroyed much of the VVS strength in a few weeks (1,200 on day one.)

I've read the Red Army was in the middle of a sort of double reorganization around the time Barbarossa began. See, the thing was that during the interwar period the Soviets had been doing a whole lot of military R&D, much of it serious breakthrough material (pun intented; they pioneered the idea of massed tank formations for "blitzkrieg" moves) and a fair bit of it jointly with Die Reich.

The two countries may have been in principle mortal enemies for ideological reasons, but they were also both pariahs in the international field and found it convenient to pool their efforts. Makes you wonder if the Germans pulled a world-class cloak-and-dagger stunt by managing to convince Stalin of his officers' potential disloyalty on the side, you know...

Anyway, domestic politics in Stalin's court swung in a direction that sent the proponents of blitzkrieg tactics into the camps, and the Red Army was organized like most of its contemporaries - namely, the tanks got spread out among other troops for support, the same scheme nigh everybody but Germany initially used. The Germans shrugged at this and did things their way.

Once the Germans blitzed through Poland and France (and Zhukov whipped the Japanese in Siberia by same methods) Stalin caught the hint and ordered the tanks to be reorganized along the lines of the 'German' model - and at that point the army was only halfway through the previous organization spree... There was also a lot of minor bugs to be worked out which had been painfully revealed in the brief and unsuccesful but casualty-heavy Winter War with Finland (though this fiasco also convinced Hitler the Soviet military would be a pushover). Combined with the fact Stalin's purges had lobotomized the military and ripped its spine out (probably realted to the assasination of Trotsky in Mexico around the same time; Trotsky had pretty much built the Red Army from scratch during the Civil War and the vetran officers had served under him, so for all of its self-fulfilling aspects Stalin's paranoia may have been justified), it's clear the military was one huge and confused mess when the Germans attacked.

In his excellent Age of Extremes Eric Hobsbawm suggests Stalin made the same mistake as the Western leaders in his dealings with Hitler - he assumed the man to work on rational, pragmatic grounds, which he notoriously didn't. Unlike the opportunistic and cautious Stalin Hitler really believed his own grandiose propaganda, and Stalin duly failed to comprehend he wouldn't be content with the Molotov-Ribbentrop partitions. He settled down for the long haul and likely did not expect the Germans to attack anytime soon, although he probably assumed they'd have to butt heads sooner or later. He'd naturally have preferred "later", given the amount of reorganizing and general fixing up the Red Army had to do, and preferably "never" when it came down to that.

Risk-taking never really was the man's strong suit, and once the Germans had been dealt with (and he'd suddenly gotten a whole lot of new territory) he was quick to demobilize the military. By 1950 the Red Army didn't have more than something like one-tenth of its peak wartime strenght under arms...

Doesn't sound exactly like a man given to military adventurism without good odds, you know.

Thanks for the replies, keep it coming. I will answer as soon as I've enough time.

@Appleton: I mentioned it primaly because it was this foreign money that was used to build up the soviet industry, including the warindustry. Finland, Poland and the Baltic states just show that Stalin had an agressive foreign policy, albeight only against presumed weak states...

Cheers
OA

The Soviet Union was in no state capable of an offensive war with Germany in 1941, and that was not the plan either, Stalin was desperately trying to keep the peace in the last months. The good old Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty was meant to keep Germany at bay while Stalin reformed his army.
When Germany attacked the Red Army was in the process of phasing out its lousy old tank for the newer ones (you know which), it was forming large tank armies, prior to Germany doing so.
But Stalin feared a strong Germany more than anything. And it seems that the reinvigourated Red Army would be able to launch capable offensives in the summer-autumn of 1942, and it would be very capable in 1943 when all the reforms were ment to be finished.

I believe there are archived discussion in the high ranks of the Soviet Union about what to do with Germany since it was getting so strong. While no plans were laid out there was an agreement that something active would have to be done about it.

Just some short remarks:

I want to stress a bit Watchmans point about the intensive cooperation bewteen the Reichswehr and the RKKA. From 1922 to 1933 Germans and Russians made joint operations of all kinds (tanks, airforce ..) in the Sovietunion. Special training camps for the Germans were established in the UdSSR, obviously under watchful soviet eyes. Man like H. Guaderian learnt there.

Germans delivered technology, experience, strategy and tacitcs and received ressources, warmaterial, strategy and tactics. Everybody was interested in a good coperation although keen to not easily slip military secrets; Still the great benefit for both lead to a very consist quantity two-way transfer of all things related with warfare.

The treaty of Rapallo in 1922 and the election of Hitler 1933 mark the bounderies of this intensive cooperation...

A good read is "The Red Army and the Wehrmacht" by Yuri Dyakov and Tatyana Bushuyeva, as it contains a great deal of original documents.

Cheers
OA

As they say, "politics make strange bedfellows". But then again, the more recent examples of the phenomenom include the Iran-Contra mess, Israeli support to Hamas, and God knows what else... :dizzy2:
Glad I'm not a bigwig politician. ~D

I tend to believe that Stalin would eventually make his mover westward, but not earlier than 1944. The geopolitical buildup of the world at that time (with the "capitalist" side fragmented and at war with each other, and with the Germans having sweeped over Europe) was favoring an USSR invasion, but they lacked the sheer power to do so (especially in the offensive - the lessons taken by the Soviet-Finnish war were quite fresh too). He knew though all too well that the tenderness with Germany could not last forever - and that he would've eventually to face them. But he didn't expect that before 1943 at worst - and that's why Barbarossa caught him completely off guard.

Stalin was preparing an aggressive for the somewhat distant future but I seriously doubt he would've gone as far as taking "the whole of Europe". I assume he would aim for the countries he got post WW too (eastern Europe) and perhaps a little more.

YES. Stalin was preparing an invasion, actually when the germans turned his attack to russia, as I have already said in the Hitler therad, it was Hitlers only chance to defeat Russia withoug engaging in defensive battles, Most of the heavy military equipment was already on the border, artillery, tanks, most of the airforce. Everything except the soldiers, most of them were making their way to the front when the germans attacked.

So, despite the fact that the numbers of soldiers were similar, the germans destroyed/captured most of the heavy weaponry right in the first few days, and once the soldiers were mobilized, the technology available was much lower than the amout available to the germans. During the first weeks of war, destroying 1 german tank was a glorious achievement, as the means available were hand rifles and machine guns, and no heavy specialized weaponry.

BTW, the info is based on Victor Suvorov and Ivan Kolos.

Stalin was a shrewd operator.

But it is known though from statements by his Grandson that Stalin viewed the treaty as "buying time to defend the motherland"...

It seems clear that he was planning to deal with Nazi Germany but was not yet ready to do so and so played for time with the non-agression pact.

I think Stalin would have continued on through Europe after Germany was defeated. This is because of the fact that during the civil war that followed the October revolution, western nations sent forces in to support the "White Russians" against the "Reds". This gave Lenin and Stalin a big mistrust of the west as they though that they would do everything it could and embrace any ally to defeat Communism...

If Hitler didn't attack and was later defeated by a prepared and agressive USSR, it seems probable that Stalin would have pushed onwards into France and so on, claiming the mantle of "Liberator" from the remnants of the scattered German occupation army, and setting up local Communist regimes much like the Eastern Bloc... there would have been little military resistance in the West after Germany itself fell, and any nationalist rebellions following any fall of Germany would have been outgunned.

At any rate, when the victorious Allies met in Berlin one of the representatives approached Stalin and Congratulated him saying, "it must be good after all of this to be standing in Berlin"

Stalin then coldly replied... "Tsar Alexander got to Paris".

Quote:

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Stalin then coldly replied... "Tsar Alexander got to Paris"

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Answer: Are you playing to be the "tough guy"?

I have to say its a good answer tho. ~D

Quote:

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Answer: Are you playing to be the "tough guy"?

I have to say its a good answer tho.

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Well next time we track down someone who has ordered the deaths of over 21 Million people and conquered half of Europe, you can ask him that... ~;)

Nice Replays

It may be interesting to expand Swordmasters point that in this first critical days the Soviets had a far larger amount of tanks, over 10000 to maybe 3000 germans, far more artillery and more fighters than the germans , although the actual number of men was quite similar or leaned toward the german side depending on which author one depends. Aleksander Semenovic Orlov points out however that many of this ressources coud not be fully used, as the logistic of the Red Army and the training let was not up to the job.


The coordination of the different branches (tanks, infantry, artillery and airforce) was cleary a weak point in Finland as the great lack of capable officers, due to the Stalinist terror; I hardly think that even with it's hefty superiorty in heavy gear it could have rolled over the german army in this state.

So while with a mobilization the Soviet army would have had in very few time far more men on the front than the Germans could ever hope to have, the lack of training made IMHO a quick strike in 1941 quite unlikely.

A

What still does stun me is the huge number of paratroopers in the RedArmy; even in official armylist one can see just how many Para-divisions were later regrouped into Guard-infantry divisions. How do you comment that? Is it a clear sign of a long term strategic goal?

BTW, an article which has as all taken with a . of salt
...

http://www.amersol.edu.pe/_dmunro/ib/articles/ww2_6.htm

Cheers
OA

See, the problem with most capable and experienced officers was that they learned their jobs in Germany as Russia was destroyed after the civil war. That immediately made them suspicious to Stalins eyes and many were killed, and many others locked up in concentration camps far from the action. Until Stalingrad was besieged. After that everything was thrown against the germans.

About the paramilitary: Making an educated guess, did you know that in the Red army, criminals or deserters were formed into special "death battallions". They were thrown at the enemy the first, had no rights to complain, and took the hardest of the battles. They were disposable in one word. If you demonstrated your value in the death battallion, you could get transferred into a "normal", line one. I´m guessing that you might be referring to those when you talk about paratroopers.

Hehe no Swordsmaster, thought about the Para's hopping down from airplanes ~;)

If you once get a full official list of the Red-Army before and during the War you will be hugly impressed by the huge number of "Guard" para. divisions, considered to be the elite troops of the Soviet army. IRRC I counted at least 8 Guard parachuters and 8 normal ones, but I will doulblecheck and bring the reference...

I agree with you that many many of the best officers which were in contact with the German Reichswher were executed or died in the Gulags, harmstringing the Soviet military in this critical phases...

Cheers
OA

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Red Harvest

I don't get the impression that Stalin was a great military mind--resolute, utterly ruthless, and insightful at times, but Barbarossa caught him with his pants around his ankles. If memory serves early in Barbarossa Stalin did not want to cede territory even when his armies were being flanked and risking encirclement. Combining this with holding out in places like Stalingrad later on indicates an unwillingess to cede any ground, even if necessary at times.

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It always amuses me (in a dark, depressing sort of way) that you could say pretty much the same about pretty much all the political leaders in WW2. Stalin, Hitler, Churchill, Mussolini - they all showed the same tendency to dictate to their generals and require that ground be held or taken for political purposes even where it was military madness.

Churchill was possibly worse than most, though of course he gets away with it being on the winning and non-Communist side. "Oops, election is coming up, must gain a victory - throw those green new troops at the enemy." "Holding Tobruk worked last year, let's do it again even though the strategic and tactical situation is completely different."

Sometimes I feel that the reason the Allies won is that they had the resources to withstand the various disasters their leaders inflicted on them, whereas Germany didn't. They didn't win so much as lose more slowly. Like Rome vs Carthage: "Oops, another couple of legions lost. Never mind, we killed another elephant so that's one fewer for next year's army to face: the enemy'll have run out in 20 years or so, and *then* we'll show them".

Cheers,

Pell.R.

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Factoids show that Stalin's mind was bound for the offensive. He (actually Molotov iirc) officially demanded the takeover of the NE part of Turkey from the contemporary government post WW2, which caused (or at least accelerated) the state to get on the US bandwagon (NATO).
_

Huh. That proves nothing except the man's opportunism. In a sense he operated like predatory animals do - attack the weak and infirm, leave the strong alone if you have the choice.

Oh yeah, the Soviets were indeed among the pioneers of the paratrooper concept - although the early stages were sort of odd to put it lightly. I've read the planes flew really slow and really low, and the trooper were instructed to look for soft snowdrifts, bushes etc. to jump into... :dizzy2:

Well, they refined things a bit and "desant" (a para operating behind the lines; the word is a Finnish bastardization from desanthski) was something of a four-letter word in Finland during the Continuation War ('41-'44) in particular.

Developing a strong military, even "offensive" arms such as armor and paratroopers, doesn't really yet prove hostile intent, though. Just look at present-day Western Europe - the armies are about the second or third best armed and organized in the world, but aren't going to see battlefields any time soon. It may just be "keeping up with the Joneses", ie. arms race for the sake of appearing too strong for most enemies to dare to attack.

Stalin wasn't a risk-taker, so that'd certainly fit the picture. 'Course, he was also a ruthless opportunist, so odds are the army would sooner or later have been sent to the field to gobble up conveniently weak-looking neighbors anyway... He did that enough as is, just ask us Finns or the Baltics or the Poles. But Europe in '41 ? No way. The whole thing just plain wasn't in the condition for it.

When a dictator explicitly forbids his commanders from firing at advancing Germans so as not to give them "the provocation they're after" odds are he hasn't been planning to go into war with them very soon.

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In the specific case of TR (read: Mediterranean) Stalin was simply following the traditional policy of Russia as put by Pyotr Velikiy and his successors. So, I'm confident that he wasn't just predating upon the poor and weak neighbour but making it an opportunity to advance "downwards". If it wasn't for his ex-allies that "secured" Iran and eventually Turkey, I'm sure he would act. (I'm talking about post-1945 though...)
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"Did Stalin plan to steamroll Europe in 1941?"

OF COURSE HE PLANNED maybe not in 1941, but no later than in 1942, for sure.

See this.

1.He helps or rather he ALLOWS Hitler to start the 2nd WW by signing Ribbentropp-Molotov ALLIANCE and then waits until German HQ announces taking Warsaw ( wrongly 11 days too early) even though he WAS SUPPOSED TO attack as soon as Germany.
He simply allowed Hitler to start the war he COULDN'T WIN.

2. In 1939 the Red Army started the mobilization which WASN'T CANCELLED.
More and more troops were gathered and all 35 MILLION reserves were prepared in some way for the war.

3. 23 000 tanks, 19 000 planes ( YES, not 'only' 9000) AND 100 000 CANNONS ( !!!) were prepared
for something else than defence, why ?
Strategic bombers, anti-aircraft and anti-tank cannons were not produced in large numbers - INSTEAD 3000 tanks capable to cross rivers were produced, close support and fighter planes were produced as well.
Not to fight fire with fire, certainly.

Note that this equipment was quite good or maybe Ju 87s, Hs 126s, Pz Is and IIs were not outdated ?

4. Soviet troops were equipped with anti-fortification ammo, including
famous KV 2 with 15 centimeter cannons, in 1941.

5. Soviet army was given maps of Germany, occupied Poland, Romania, Hungary, Finland and so on but HAD NO maps of the Soviet territory for field commanders in 1941.

6. Soldiers were granted with German-Russian pocket dictionaries
( Romanian-Russian in the south) - I have see the photos of these.

7. 10 CORPS of paratroopers were beeing prepared in 1941 - 5 were ready.

8. Prisoner divisions ( so-called 'black units') were deployed close to the border.

9. Soviet HQ started creating A POLISH 'LIBERATION' ARMY FROM POLISH POWs (!!!) in early 1941 ( one of the latest discoveries of polish historians).

10. Ammo and fuel supplies were transported close to the border.

11. The Red Army was deployed in the way it wasn't possible to defend anything, only to attack.

12. Soviet fleet prepared 200+ submarines, many based in recently conquered Lithuanian, Latvian and Finnish ports.
Deterrent ? Imagine USA re-deploying their navy in 1941 to... Guam.
Suicide, not a deterrent.

13. In response to German airstrikes Soviet airforces attacked... Finland and Hungary which didn't declare war yet !!

14. Soviet troops attacked in several places ACCORDING TO THE PLAN, the OFFENSIVE PLAN, not defensive i.e. Romania ( for oilfields actually).

15. Former polish trains were prepared to use, why ? Because these were usefull in western railroads, in the SU CERTAINLY NOT !

16. Entire villages close to the border were 're-settled' to Syberia in early 1941 to prepare the ground.

DO YOU NEED MORE ??

I can give more examples, various sources...


@Defensive SU

Is it a joke ?

@nokhor

"it was my impression of the events that it wasn't that the red army was in a defensive position, it was more like in a strategic marching column position and thats why it was vulnerable to attack. the whole point for stalin to take over eastern poland and eastern romania was so that he could push the soviet defensive works further from russian territory, and closer to the threat [nazi germany] "

Interesting idea. I just want to remind you that when the Red Army attacked on 17 September 1939 about 40 % of the Polish army was fighting and 40 % of its territory was still free and actually Stalin helped Hitler to defeat Poland if he was so afraid of Hitler he could simply prepare more deep defensive positions ( as he did before the war in the 30s) and prepare troops to fight in such way.
He didn't, why ?

"the new defenses they were building up but were far from complete."

These new 'defences' were useless in defence, cause almost at the border. Noone is preparing defence this way, I mean NOONE.

@Simon Appleton

"you might take it the opposite way - look at the way Stalin slowly established power domestically, rather like a nasty kid methodically pulling legs of an insect, and ask yourself whether such a person would plan to attack a frighteningly powerful neighbour only a year after they had seemingly effortlessly smashed the combined might of two Great Powers in a few weeks.."

Was he ? See it this way Hitler WASN'T REALLY ABLE TO 'SWALLOW' these territories - he had forces in the whole Europe which hated him, undefeated enemy behind him ( the UK) and war in Africa and Stalin's forces are close to his ALL OIL sources ( Romania).

"Here in the West, we had decades of propaganda that the Soviet empire, because it was so "evil", was going to invade the West. It was and is a non sequitur"

Yeah, right - and more pro-soviet propaganda to support him.
And he was preparing another invasion, most likely in 1955-56.


Hitler was a murderer and started the 2nd WW, but WITH STALIN WHO WAS EQUALLY EVIL, BUT MUCH CLEVER - see how he fooled Churchill and Roosevelt to give him half of Europe and they were calling him 'uncle Joe', idiots !

He was a skillfull player, but see the entire pro-war propaganda from 1939 in the SU, it wasn't without a reason. They expected the war.
And the Red Army DIDN'T KNOW HOW TO DEFEND.

Regards Cegorach/Hetman ~:)

yeap, the rusian army didn't know how to defend but really it didn't know woh to attack, as witnessed inthe finnish war. they got creamed because of lack of tactics and commanders, not to mention the unwillingness to fight of some of the men.
maybe Stalin thought about invading europe, but I believe he was pretty clear on the fact that Hitler will eventually attack him. maybe he had read Mein Kampf, there's a whole lot there about the russians being subhuman and about the need for Liebensraum. relly, Stalin knew the storm was coming and he didnt know how to steam the tide. he tried a treaty and the division of Poland, but it was only postponing the war with Germany.
so if he was thinking of invadinf Europe in 1941 he was more of an imbecile and incapable commander than I thought. but my guess is that he just wasn't able to prepare his army for a germna attack that he must have known was in the making.

I am undecided as to whether Stalin was planning such an attack.

However...
The purges of the late 1930's destroyed the Soviet officer corp. This was seen by Stalin as something needed for other than military requirements.

His having an army lacking decent officers is not testimony to his non aggressiveness. It simply means that political considerations were more important than military ones.

Hitler made some of the same decisions even though he trusted his officers more than Stalin did, at least until they tried to kill him. This does not mean that Hitler had no intention of invading other countries.

Before the purges the Soviet Union arguably had the strongest military in the world with fully integrated mobile armoured formations and the correct doctrines to match. How well they they could have put these into practice can be argued, but not their existance.

If a 1941 plan did exist (of which I am not certain), then it ended during the purges! IMHO

@Soviet-finnish war

"yeap, the rusian army didn't know how to defend but really it didn't know woh to attack, as witnessed inthe finnish war. they got creamed because of lack of tactics and commanders, not to mention the unwillingness to fight of some of the men."

Well... You could say the same about the German army during 'Russian winters' their soldiers certainly were not able to achieve great victories in this period of time.
Actually please name the army which was able to achieve astonishing victories during winter in similar conditions.

This war proves nothing...

Also plase notice how much the army was different AFTER 1939-1940 winter. Yes it was worse than german, but better prepared to war during winter which was proven in 1941 ( Moscow) and 1942-43 ( Stalingrad).

@Purges, purges, purges...

The purpose of this was to eliminate any present opposition and disloyal to Stalin officers and commanders AS WELL AS executioners themselves ( were not necessary).

The fact shouldn't be overestimated, because this wasn't so massive as official communist sources claim ( these were 'proving' that Stalin had no idea to attack).
Sorry, but these guys were not really military experts themselves, so the lack of them cannot be treated as a decisive blow and it wasn't in reality.
The purge was to PREPARE the invasion, because later educated officers were more loyal to Stalin and it was the most important reason behind it.

@Mein Kampf

Yes Stalin did read this book, but I don't really think so that he was worried about these anti-Russian statements.
See the situation this way:

You are beeing warned that Hitler is going to invade, but you know that he isn't prepared to fight during the winter and he has roughly 4 times less tanks and airplanes than you ( lets assume that he thought that Germany have about 5000 of each one of these, which isn't correct).
Also most of these warnings are from the sources you cannot really trust - certainly not to the western countries which try to start a war between you and Hitler.


@Roads

Another idea to discuss.
When the SU attacked Poland in 1939 they entered eastern areas of my country when the roads were really in bad condition ( for western europe of course). Because Stalin wanted to invade Europe he ordered them to be modernized, also new roads were build, similar with railroads.
What was the purpose of this ?
The process started in 1939 and didn't stop to 1941 - this could only help Hitler, unless it wasn't prepared for defense.

@Russian tanks

Please don't call russian taks outdated or primitive, or at least not only the russian ones.

I just want to remind that virtually all of these were better than Pz I or Pz II which formed about 1/3 - 1/4 of the german tank units.

And I know that in the Red Army they had only 1200-1500 T 34 and KV tanks but it still was ABOUT 40 % OF THE NUMBER OF GERMAN TANKS !!!
Remember that short barrelled Pz III and Pz IV were usually almost hopeless fighting them.

@Maintanence

Honestly I don't expect that the Red Army would conquer the entire europe, but rather because it wasn's so good to achieve this goal, not because it wouldn't try !

The Red Army had more tanks, planes, paratroopers, cannons and penal units than the REST OF THE WORLD. The number was useless in defence, because even such tyrant as Stalin wasn't able to maintain it for long, the ENORMOUS cost of this kind of troops ( especially 100 000+ paratroopers) was too high even for the SU unless the army would be used in more offensive way to 'earn for itself'.

Regards Cegorach/Hetman :book:

Quote:

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Originally Posted by cegorach1

@Soviet-finnish war

This war proves nothing...

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~:confused: It proved the utter incompetence of the Russian army and air wings at the time. They weren't that much better during Barbarossa as the events have shown. (And the Finns were still kicking their tails late in the war, at least in the air, despite superior Russian equipment.)

It was geography that defeated Germany in Russia. Stalin deserves full credit for realizing that and not yielding (ignoring his failings that led to Barbarossa.) Stalin was not one to worry about casualties though, so the price in personnel could never have been too high for his tolerance level. The only person that mattered in Russia at the time was old Joe himself.

Sure, given time they would have gone on the offensive eventually, they had no choice. The question is really when. '41 was too soon--the Soviets were still not a match for the Nazi's in the air or on the ground.