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The success of the invasion of Normandy was far from certain, in fact general Eisenhower had a letter written were he took personal responsibility for the defeat. But because of Hitler holding back his division of panzer the allies ultimitly succeeded
Now my question is was the holding back of the panzers and the victory at Normandy the result of luck or the campaign of deception the allies had put into place?
The answer is not either-or-- the answer is BOTH. The Allies' victory on D-Day was due BOTH to brilliant planning AND luck.
DA
Can't say that I'm a big D-Day buff but successful operations almost always includes substantial amounts of luck (not all of it good) as well as proper planning. There was some bad luck as well...the weather in the time surrounding the invasion was not exactly what was hoped. And one reason for Hitler holding back his reserve force was a successful counterintelligence and false intelligence operation--planning and a bit of luck.
If you do proper logistical planning, you can both overcome a reasonable amount of misfortune, and capitalize on good fortune.
Planning and a bit of luck. Alot of the good luck was made by the Allies planning the landings so well. Hitler not sending the tanks is the best example. Luck-sure, he could very well have sent them, but the Allies weighted the odds in their favor with their fake preparations for landings at Calais.
They also kept Gen. G. Patton (who the Nazis considered the Allies best tank commander) back in Kent, replete with inflatable tanks and cardboard aircraft.
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Part of the difficulty in organizing forces for an invasion, and consequently the need for a deception plan, was where to physically locate the forces prior to the assault. Because the Normandy coast was the real target, forces deployed primarily in Devon and Dorset in southern England. If the invasion were to occur at the Pas de Calais, the Allied Forces would have used Kent, located in England's southeast corner, as a staging area. Ultimately, the Germans had to be tricked into believing there was an invasion force building up in Kent.
The "fictitious" invasion force was the First U.S. Army Group, commanded by Lieutenant General George S. Patton. He was an excellent choice because he was flamboyant and the German Wehrmacht regarded him highly. Even though he commanded the Third Army, he was able to create the impression needed to support the deception operation. In fact, when the Third Army moved to France to assist in the breakout, a new commander had to be identified to continue the deception. The explanation for Lieutenant General Patton's "demotion" to Army commander was that it resulted from General Eisenhower's "displeasure" at some of his "indiscretions."
Planing, luck and numbers. And the Germans made some very silly mistakes. They waited so long for this landing and then had no clue what to do. There is even a theory that some commanders intentionally.:san_shocked:
Much is made of the Pansers not being committed, but every time they moved they got hammered by the Allies from the air, so if they had been thrown forward, they would have been exposed to the Allies overwhealming air superiority. You only have to look at what happened to the German forces in the Falasie gap.:san_smiley:
Large amounts of excellent, nay brilliant planning, with a small amount of luck. Even the bad luck such as the weather as mentioned by Red Harvest, turned out to be a blessing in disguise - Rommel went home for his wifes birthday, declaring that the Tommys wouldn't be crossing the channel is that weather. Even where the Germans had "luck" on their side eg Omaha beach were a veteran infantry division had just arrived, or Rangers being landed in the wrong position, the allies overcame it and got the job done.
As for the Germans holding back the Panzers, there are several things to consider here. First it wasn't just Hitler. Yes, everyone was too scared to wake him, but there were disagreements between Rommel and the other top German general in France (someone help me out here, von Manstein?) as to how best to employ the Panzers. One wanted them held back as a strategic reserve to launch a counter-attack when the landings came, the other wanted them spread thinly around the coast so that wherever the allies landed there would be at least some Panzers there. Finally, even if the Panzers had been unleashed on the 6th, they would have been pounded from the air as they tried to move and formate for attack in daylight (the allies put 12,000 aircraft in the air on D-Day, not all fighters and attack aircraft granted, but it gives you a sense of the scale). And even then they would probly have been held back due to the German high commands belief that the landings were a diversion.
The whole FUSAG deception and everything around it, whilst as in all counter-intelligence operations relies on "luck" in the sense that you need your enemies to believe it, still must go down as one of the greatest military deceptions of the war, if not of all time.
Finally, one cannot ignore the enormous quantities of planning and preparation the allies put into this. 2 years went into the planning and training for it, an operation on monumental scale. I would heartily recommend Pegasus Bridge, as a book which describes in great detail the enormous effort, planning and training that just a few companies of men put in place just to capture one bridge. The men were so well prepared, so well trained, so motivated to get the job done. And they were just a drop in the ocean of the entire operation.
I believe it was both, however more to do with planning. I think that the deception and intelligence work that went into D-Day was brilliant, I am currently reading (though at a snails pace, only read a little at night) a book about the fall of Nazi controlled europe, D-Day - VE Day. One thing I didn't know was Hitler still believed that the Normandy landings where a diversion and the real attack force would focus on Calais even when he had heard that the first few waves where attacking at Omaha, Utah, Gold, Juno and Sword, that's a real tribute to the hard work of the Allies planning.
You are right! But it was not only the tanks. At the first day the German Luftwaffe had two fighters to fight the invasion. It may have been weakened but not that much.
The transfer of new squadrons from home to France was a complete desaster. Air fields were at the wrong place, they were not hidden ....Many planes got broken before they even saw Allied fighters.
Good planning,luck and absolute air superiority.I would say those were the key factors behind the succes of the Overlord.
A combination of several brilliant planning and execution steps by the Allies.
The deception plan with General Patton aimed toward the most obvious landing spot.
The use of Airborne troops to block several key areas - didn't go as well as planned - but it created confusion for the Germans.
THe coordination of the landing effort on the beaches.
What helped the Allies is that as mentioned several key generals were not in the area at the time. (More then just Rommell).
That the Reserves were not committed - Don't just blame Hilter - The intelligence deception was brilliant - the Germans believed that Patton would be the main effort and were hestiant to committ the reserves until they were sure. This allowed the Allies the time need to secure the beachheads and establish on the ground.
Remember that during this time the Russian's had committed several offensive operations that also helped provide concern for the German High Command.
All in all more brilliant planning then just plain dumb luck. But in warfare it does help that luck was more on the Allied side then on the German side for Operation Overlord
from what i know
it was good intelligence work (covering the invasion etc) and good resistance work
air superiority and the lack of able german commanders at that place and ofcourse the disbelieve on german side that it was a full scale invasion
if rommel was present and hitler woudnt have been so paranoia D-day may have been a disaster but atleast there would have been more casualties on allied side.
BUT i think LUCK was the greatest factor as it is in all battles youve got to be lucky
Planning, though there was luck it wasn't decisive; the planning made it possible to capitalise on luck.
I too agree that it was mostly planing but it was luck too. the allies created an effective deception but luck was on there side as much as strategy. The deception was mainly responsible and the holding back of the panzers made a huge difference. The Germans probably couldn't have stopped the attack due to the allies superior air support but, they could of probably stalled it and caused much greater casualties then they did.
Planning and luck weren't the only factors in play on D-Day. As has been mentioned before the allies had a superiority in the air that tended to make problems go away. This extended to most other areas too, off Omaha beach the allies poured the equivalent of a german panzer divison into the sea by launching their DD tanks too far from the beach. For the germans to lose that many tanks in a day would be a horrendous loss, for the allies it was a case of shrugging their shoulders and wondering how quickly they could ship replacements over.
The only account of the invasion I've ever read from the German point of view (Panzer Commander by Von Luck) made a lot more of the naval gunfire than air attacks on D-Day at least. Does anyone know how effective allied (or anyones) air support was on a tactical level at this time. I mean a lot of operations were launched with overwhelmig air support that failed to acheive their objectives. He (Von Luck) also swore blind that if allowed to set off with his armoured regiment when he first heard of the allied air landings he could have taken the above mentioned Pegasus Bridge.
To elaborate on the German panzer divisons being held back, has any one else ever heard that Rommel wanted to place the 12th SS panzer divison a few miles behind Omaha beach but was over ruled by higher authorities? Even with allied air superiority that sounds like a recipe for disaster.
@ Mout Surabachi: I think Von Rundstedt was the german overall commander in france at the time, but after a bit of looking I can only find a reference to him and rommel meeting hitler a month after the landings, so I might be wrong.
Runstedt was the commander of the Western Theatre, however he was relieved at least twice from that position through the rest of the war.
Ahh, thanks grey fox, thats what was getting me. I was pretty certain Rundstedt took over on the western front just before market garden, and couldn't understand how he could have been in charge during overlord. Mayhaps he was fired then reinstated.
Runstedt Held that position and Rommel control of the defenses. Technically Rundstedt was his superior but in reality they were about equal which caused alot of problems.
The amount of planning and the scale of the deception was immense. All German agents were either captured or turned and double agents were turned back again to make the Germans believe they were going to attack Calais.
Also for every boming raid on Normandy the Allies had 2 in the Pas De Calais as well as the invisble fleet the Allies created that showed up on German radar the Allies intentionally left standing.
On a strategic level, most of it can be put down to planning. One bit of luck on the strategic level was crucial.
In the midst of a series of nasty squalls, one 24-36 hour break developed and Ike had the stones to say yes to that small window.
Tactically, of course, luck plays a huge role throughout. The forces at UTAH beach hit the wrong beach -- but it turned out to be an easier assault point. At OMAHA, a good German division had just cycled up in place of one of the static formations -- and the 1st and 29th got whacked around for a while. The Brits couldn't come close to securing Caen (Day 1 Objective) for weeks -- but that sucked enough krauts forward to make the eventual breakout a debacle and collapse that the Germans couldn't counter until the Allies ran off the end of their logistics.
As was said before, both matter.
Yeah, the naval gunfire is another advantage the allies had - heavy artillery that can fire 10-15 miles inland is great for breaking up counter-attacks ~:)
As for the CAS, certainly once the land forces were established ashore, units had RAF and USAAF forward air controllers attatched to them to call in the Typhoons and Thunderbolts who would circle in a "cab-rank" just behind the front lines. THe US also used light aircraft as FACs to spot from the air.
You guys make far too much of the Allied aircoverage... As noted the Naval bombardment was worse. And take note of the Mortain counterattack, there the the airplanes had an almost perfect attackrun on the tanks, claimed 128 tanks, but in reality the Germans had only comitted 120 tanks, lost about 60 of which 50 were to AT-guns and artillery.
The Falaise gap is a bad example for the face that teh Germans were in full retreat, they made no attempts at covering the tanks, also they had days to bomb the Germans and on a much more congested area.
A more fair comparison would be the Anzio landing. The Allies enjoyed similar air superiority but caused the attack German tanks negliable problems, it was the Naval bombardment that eventually halted them.
Rommel had calculated with certain losses to his armorued components due to air attacks but he considered them to be less than those suffered if the tanks were further in land, and still he calculated that those tanks would be enough to sweep the beaches. Sure rip a Panzer division to pieces, but throw the Allies back into the sea.
The point is, if the panzers had reaches the beach teh Allied troops would be in trouble. Their weapons would be insufficient to halt them, the Naval bombardments would stop (FF) and their own few tanks would be too few.
Would it have ended in total defeat? Don't think so, but we should be happy they didn't lose. Or else I would likely be speaking Russian now.
I'd say the beating the Germans had taken on the eastern front, and how German troops had been diverted to Italy was the most crucial thing. The actual landing aimed at the weaknesses this had caused. Strategy is greater than tactics. I'd not say it was luck that refrained the Germans from sending in the panzers to counter-attack. I'd say it was:
- the choice of landing site. Even if I had had spies infiltrating the allied head-quarters I wouldn't trust them if they told me the main landing would be in Normandy, close to no major harbor.
- and the counter-intelligence that further strengthened this effect.
Some other great parts of the plan were:
- appropriate troop distribution. If I try to imagine how I had planned a D-Day operation, I'd probably also favor 5 landing beaches. 3 is too little, 7 too much. It's a perfect balance between casualties for establishing many bridge heads, and the risks of not breaking through at one of them. The choices that led to enough troop distribution to the British and Canadian eastern flank also, IMO was crucial. Had the British-Canadian flank been crushed, the Americans at Omaha and Utah would have been in serious trouble. The terrain prevented any fast advance at Omaha, and a minimum of German troops could have contained it, while counter-attacking Utah in force. That could have given the Germans an important tactical battle victory, but it wouldn't have changed the course of the war, with the USSR having done so well on the eastern front. The USAAF and RAF, and the allied reserves in Britain still would have kept the threat there big enough to make reinforcing the eastern front impossible. I also think the British and Canadians did a brilliant job there, although they lose morale and initiative later in the western front offensive, when Americans took over a great amount of the work. But in the actual D-Day and days shortly afterwards I think the successfulness of the British-Canadian operations were crucial, not diminishing the efforts of the USA by saying so. The Americans took the more difficult and casualty-heavy role in D-Day at Omaha, while the British took the most important role. Both fought very well.
- the air and naval support as many have pointed out was crucial. This and the anti-air balloons on the beaches. I read an article about those balloons and after it got the impression that they weren't just a joke. These three elements prevented any strong German counter-offensives. The naval superiority was of course the key. It enabled transporting, reinforcing, supplying and covering the troops. The amphibious allied tanks also were a good idea IMO, although numbers were too few. They enabled heavy support for breakthroughs even in areas where the allies didn't put their main naval and air effort. The crucial thing in the first invasion phase was the secure ground, establishing a bridgehead. Keeping killed/captured-dead/taken prisoner rates up was desirable, but not necessary. The German strategical strength in the area was too small to be able to win if the allies would establish a steady, connected frontline and fight them.
I wouldn't call it luck... 2 years of planning, and in the order of 6000 ships, 12,000 aircraft, 133,000 troops by sea and 23,000 by air... all this to open up a third front against the Germans... it was orginally intended as a second front to that of the Soviets, but Italy was quite obilging in getting invaded by the time D-Day occured... the Italian government had surrended in Sept '43 but the Germans fought on.
Also as a time line remember that Monte Cassino finally fell in May 18th 1944, just two weeks before D-Day and Rome itself fell the day before D-Day... the Germans would have been to say the least a little bit distracted with this and what the Soviets were doing... Strategically they could not dedicate enough reserves to holdback the other two fronts as they were crumbling let alone the new one of D-Day... even if they held them at the beaches or pushed them off all that would have achieved was a Soviet occupied Germany.
I agree that it wasn't luck at all. Yes, the poor German preparations and response certainly helped, but it wasn't LUCK that caused that. Hitler's refusal to commit to choose between von Rundstedt's or Rommel's plan wasn't luck, it was bad planning. His refusal to release the panzer division from around Calais wasn't luck, it was good Allied planning and bad German planning.
When it comes down to it, on D-Day the Allies simply out thought the Germans. Compare this to Anzio and you'll see the reverse. Luck comes into play with things like Remagen and the Bismarck. For most everything else on a grand scale, luck may influence the individual participants, but not the grand scheme. On a strategic level, if you need luck to win you're not a very good planner!
Having the ENIGMA surely helps ~;)Quote:
Originally Posted by TinCow
True, but cracking much of ENIGMA wasn't luck either. The Poles obtained it through skillful espionage. The Brits/Americans cracked it through sheer number crunching after devoting massive resources to the project. Yes, the various U-Boat captures during the war could be considered luck, but the ENIGMA project was never entirely dependent upon them.Quote:
Originally Posted by Franconicus
Ton of pure luck.
No more words needed...