A friend says 8 Vietcong were killed for every 1 Marine killed. I don't believe it. Could anyone give me a link or some answers?:help:
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A friend says 8 Vietcong were killed for every 1 Marine killed. I don't believe it. Could anyone give me a link or some answers?:help:
Estimated losses among the NVA and VC say more than a million (official admitted losses by the Vietnamese government say 1.1 million combatants for the communist side with a further 200,000 listed as missing yet), while the Americans lost 58,000. That is around 17:1
Of course the South Vietnamese must also be remembered and their losses ended up around 350,000.
The Marines were better than the usual grunt and also fought more intensive battles such as Khe Sanh and Huê. So 8:1 is actually a pretty low estimate. But of course many of the losses suffered by the communists were actually suffered to artillery and bombing, especially at Khe Sanh. But 8:1 losses in direct combat is not too far fetched.
USA KIA: 58,000 (Its alittle more but for the sake of ratios I round)
Viet Cong KIA: Conservative estiamnte: 1 million Libreal:2 million
Ratio aroundb 18:1 and 35:1. You are right your friend was wrong ~;)
A site that backs up Kraxis information. Gives a breakdown of casualities.
http://www.rjsmith.com/kia_tbl.html
A google search would also result in some other hits concerning better information.
My dear SFTS! You write like you are on speed pal! Ease down.:laugh4:Quote:
Originally Posted by Strike For The South
Btw, don't forget that the South Vietnamese did a lot of fighting too, so they must be attributed a significant number of the kills. Though that doesn't change much really.
Hmm. Thanks for the help guys!:2thumbsup:
35:1... good god. That's genocide.
how so?Quote:
Originally Posted by Ice
Your friend suggested a number for Viet Cong killed versus U.S. soldiers killed. The answers you've received here lump Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) together and make no distinction between the two. The NVA was the official state army of North Vietnam. The Viet Cong were the guerrilla army composed of the rebels in South Vietnam. There was some overlap between the two; but they were not the same thing. You still don't have an answer to your question. I don't think there is an answer. The official Vietnamese numbers are accurate only for the official NVA and not for the Viet Cong. No one knows how many Viet Cong there really were, much less how many were killed. Entire villages of men women and children could considered to be linked to the Viet Cong; and some villages actually were Viet Cong while others were just poor villagers trying to survive. How do you count what you can't see?
Clearly though, the difference between the numbers of U.S. dead compared to those Viet Cong and NVA dead was huge. And yet, we still officially lost. Ask yourself another question. Has any war ever fought with guerrilla tactics on one side ever been lost by the guerrillas? They have always, as far as I know, either ended in a stalemate and concessions to the rebels or an outright win for the rebels. Now think about that a bit and apply the concept to the current situation in certain countries in the world and see how the results come out in your mind.
But remember that these numbers says nothing.
For Americans every killed soldiers is important.
For Vetnamese peoples life has not been important - objective was important.
The Philippine-American war following the Spanish-American war. In fact, an insurgency will typically fail if it does not develop or work in concert with regular military forces.Quote:
Originally Posted by Aenlic
I don't agree. You should see some of the specials on the Vietcong. It's very interesting. Simple, but effective.:book:Quote:
Originally Posted by Atilius
I specifically said guerrilla warfare. An insurgency may use guerrilla tactics or it may not. I did not say that insurgencies always win; I did say that guerrilla tactics have not lost. Please use the precise terms and argue accordingly.Quote:
Originally Posted by Atilius
As to the war itself, it falls under the category of a guerrilla war which led to concessions and eventually Philippine independence. The U.S. response to the guerrilla tactics employed by Aguinaldo in the north and by the Moros in the south led to some of the worst atrocities committed by U.S. troops anywhere or any time. The results of such still resonate today in the activities of the Moro controlled south.
OK, guerrilla warfare it is.Quote:
Originally Posted by Aenlic
I disagree that the war led to concessions and independence. Effective resistance was at an end by mid-1902. Sporadic fighting in outlying areas continued until 1913. The Jones Act, promising eventual independence (without specifying when), was not passed until 1916.Quote:
Originally Posted by Aenlic
Niall Ferguson, in his recent Colossus, writes that domestic economic concerns were primarily responsible for Congress granting independence to the Philippines. He cites lobbying by sugar, dairy, and cotton producers who wished to exclude Philippine cane sugar and coconut oil from the US market, and by labor unions pressing for immigration restrictions against Filipino workers.
'Quote:
Originally Posted by Aenlic
Malayasia. The Brits won that one pretty overwhelmingly from what I've read. IIRC it lasted a really long time though, something like 10-15 years. Oh and it would've been called Burma back then iirc, that may help if you look into it more.
Again, I'll disagree. Sporadic fighting continues to this day in the south. It was considerably greater than sporadic up until 1913 and actually beyond in Moro controlled areas; only decreasing when a policy was instituted of encouraging immigration into the south by non-Muslim groups to try and "dilute" the Muslim population there. The Filipinos had numerous successes fighting with guerrilla tactics against the U.S. army. Their mistake was in trying to fight conventionally against a much better-equipped force. Their losses were almost entirely a result of such engagements.Quote:
Originally Posted by Atilius
The only thing that stopped the full-scale rebellion in the north was the capture of Aguinaldo in 1901. Aguinaldo was offered a choice, pledge allegiance to the U.S. or be executed as a traitor. He capitulated. Even so, he continued to openly support independence. The rebellion continued, unacknowledged by the U.S. for political reasons, well past 1913. It is instructive to note that Aguinaldo is considered the first president of the Philippines, with his term ending when he capitulated (concession). The Jones Act of 1919 is an obvious concession. He was still alive when the Philippine flag was allowed to be flown in 1919 (concession). The country became a Commonwealth of the U.S. in 1935 (concession). And so on...
Edit: It is correct to say, however, that racism had a large effect on U.S. policy towards Philippines, beginning with McKinley's incredibly racist Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation. Popular sentiment was against annexing the Philippines, some for racist reasons and some for ethical reasons (read Mark Twain or William Jennings Bryan on the subject).
Burma fought a series of conventional - non-guerrilla - wars frm 1824 to 1886 against the British who eventually succeeded and established Burma as a colony. The wars were actions of one government against another, not guerrilla warfare by one side in a rebellion. In much the same way as the Zulu Wars. These were large scale engagements of one military against another. That is not guerrilla war. :bow:Quote:
Originally Posted by Uesugi Kenshin
I've taken this thread way off topic. My apologies. Perhaps we should create a new thread about guerrilla warfare where we can all argue our stances. :idea2:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Aenlic
I meant when the Brits were very close to releasing the colony, it was in the late 40's and early-mid 50's iirc. I will try to find a wiki to clarify.
Wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malayan_Emergency
And I definately did mean Malaysia, not Burma, sorry about the confusion my memory was playing tricks on me.
Again, I didn't say that guerrilla warfare always wins. I said that it wins or results in concessions without completely losing.
From that same wikipedia article:
"On October 7, 1951, the MRLA ambushed and killed the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney. Gurney's successor, Lieutenant General Gerald Templer pushed for immediate measures to give ethnic Chinese residents the right to vote."
The above is a clear concession; a rather major one, since the MRLA guerrillas were made up almost exclusively of ethnic Chinese.
"His most important deal was a promise of independence once the insurrection was over."
Another concession made during, not before, the conflict. Prior the conflict, the British had intended to set up a Malayan Federation - which excluded communists (the reason for the conflict) - with still nominal British control.
"With the independence of Malaya under Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman on August 31, 1957, the insurrection lost its rationale as a war of colonial liberation."
The conflict didn't end until independence - full independence - was granted. At that point the rebellion lost its main reason for existing, in spite of other goals tied with the fact that it was mostly an ethnic Chinese rebellion and a communist led one.
I think that the idea that the British somehow won the conflict is rather dubious. They made concessions during the conflict, and the conflict didn't end until after the Brits granted one of the major goals of the conflict - independence - and left. I suppose that in contrast to the Vietnam conflict, which the French and Americans flat out lost, then the British result in Malaya was better. But a win? Certainly not. They just didn't lose outright, like we did.
Hmm, you are defining your terms pretty tightly to be sure you can't really lose this argument IMHO. First we have to find a case where guerrillas completely lose. Then "winning" is defined as getting something, anything, the guerrillas said they wanted, even if that might also have been in the interests of or a matter of indifference to the other side. that by definition rules out every gueriila war in a country that was eventually decolonialised, even though the British handling of the Malaya emergency is generally acknowledged to be a model for defeating guerillas.Quote:
Again, I didn't say that guerrilla warfare always wins. I said that it wins or results in concessions without completely losing.
What about the Boers though?http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Boer_War
I'm not defining anything narrowly to win an argument. I made the definition I was using quite clear in my first post on the subject; well before the argument started. It was to make a point that it isn't possible to truly defeat an insurgency which uses guerrilla warfare tactics with a standing conventional army. I tried to be very clear so an argument wouldn't start regarding terms; since people tend to misuse the term guerrilla war and apply it to all types of insurgencies and rebellions to which it doesn't apply.Quote:
Originally Posted by English assassin
As to the Boer War... if the Brits won then why was the official language Dutch up until 1926 and then Afrikaans up until the apartheid lovers were finally thrown out? Pik Botha doesn't sound like a particularly English name to me, among many others. They won on paper. And gained nothing from it. The country ended up being run by exactly the same people they were fighting against in the war.
But of all the examples given so far, South Africa is probably the most likely to fit the limited concept of winning by the non-guerilla side. The tactics used, however, resulted in massive changes in Britain. The conservatives were tossed out on their asses because of it. The only tactic which seems to have any success against a native guerilla conflict is the scorched earth policy used by Britain in the Boer War and by the USA in the Philippine-American War. Such tactics don't exactly endear the conqueror with the local populations, or with the home populace. Concentration camps, burning villages to the ground, destroying crops and intentionally limiting the livelihood of "potential" guerrilla sympathizers might succeed in the short term; but it always ends up in disaster. And that was all more than 100 years ago, in each case. A government trying the same tactics today wouldn't last long at home. A guerilla war certainly can't be won while trying to remain on friendly terms with the same populace from which the guerrillas originate. :bow: