"Gloom descends on Iraqi leaders as civil war looms"

Just ran across this bit of sunshine, and I'm eager as always to hear what the Orgiasts think.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

ANALYSIS-Gloom descends on Iraqi leaders as civil war looms

BAGHDAD, July 21 (Reuters) - Iraqi leaders have all but given up on holding the country together and, just two months after forming a national unity government, talk in private of "black days" of civil war ahead.

Signalling a dramatic abandonment of the U.S.-backed project for Iraq, there is even talk among them of pre-empting the worst bloodshed by agreeing to an east-west division of Baghdad into Shi'ite and Sunni Muslim zones, senior officials told Reuters.

Tens of thousands have already fled homes on either side.

"Iraq as a political project is finished," one senior government official said -- anonymously because the coalition under Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki remains committed in public to the U.S.-sponsored constitution that preserves Iraq's unity.

One highly placed source even spoke of busying himself on government projects, despite a sense of their futility, only as a way to fight his growing depression over his nation's future.

"The parties have moved to Plan B," the senior official said, saying Sunni, ethnic Kurdish and majority Shi'ite blocs were looking at ways to divide power and resources and to solve the conundrum of Baghdad's mixed population of seven million.

"There is serious talk of Baghdad being divided into east and west," he said. "We are extremely worried."

On the eve of the first meeting of a National Reconciliation Commission and before Maliki meets President George W. Bush in Washington next week, other senior politicians also said they were close to giving up on hopes of preserving the 80-year-old, multi-ethnic, religiously mixed state in its present form.

"The situation is terrifying and black," said Rida Jawad al -Takki, a senior member of parliament from Maliki's dominant Shi'ite Alliance bloc, and one of the few officials from all the main factions willing to speak publicly on the issue.

"We have received information of a plan to divide Baghdad. The government is incapable of solving the situation," he said.

As sectarian violence has mounted to claim perhaps 100 lives a day and tens of thousands flee their homes, a senior official from the once dominant Sunni minority concurred: "Everyone knows the situation is very bad," he said. "I'm not optimistic."

RESIGNED TO INEVITABLE?

Some Western diplomats in Baghdad say there is little sign the new government is capable of halting a slide to civil war.

"Maliki and some others seem to be genuinely trying to make this work," one said. "But it doesn't look like they have real support. The factions are looking out for their own interests."

The presence of 140,000 heavily armed foreign troops, most of them Americans, is keeping a lid on open grabs for territory by armed groups from various communities. But few see Washington willing to keep troops in Iraq indefinitely and many analysts question the new, U.S.-trained Iraqi army's cohesion.

Broadly speaking Iraq could split in three: a Shi'ite south, Kurdish north and Sunni Arab west. But there could be fierce fighting between Arabs and Kurds for Mosul and for Kirkuk's oil as well as urban war in Baghdad, resembling Beirut in the 1970s.

Officials say the Tigris river is already looking like the Beirut "Green Line", dividing Sunni west Baghdad, known by its ancient name of Karkh, from the mainly Shi'ite east, or Rusafa.

The U.S. ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Washington's top military commander issued a public appeal this week: "We call on Iraqi leaders to take responsibility and pursue reconciliation not just in words, but through deeds as well," they said.

But a European diplomat said: "I wonder if accepting there must be division, and civil war, might be the only option ... It may be unavoidable and so it's better to get it over with."

GRAVE SITUATION

In public, Iraqi and U.S. officials make no secret of the gravity of the situation, five months after the destruction of a a Shi'ite shrine at Samarra launched a new phase of conflict, with Shi'ite militias now as lethal as Sunni insurgents.

Maliki has called his national reconciliation plan, offering amnesty for some rebels and promising to rein in militias, the "last chance" for peace. Khalilzad has said the government, hailed by Bush as a major success for U.S.-installed democracy in the Middle East, has just months to prove itself.

Even militia commanders say popular anger means ordinary people, most of them armed, are ignoring calls for restraint.

Shi'ite member of parliament Takki said: "People are taking the protection of their neighbouroods into their own hands."

Maliki meets Prime Minister Tony Blair in London on Monday before seeing Bush at the White House on Tuesday. Both leaders, penalised in polls since the 2003 invasion, will expect him to tell U.S. and British voters of his hopes for a new Iraq.

He may focus on Saturday's meeting of the Reconciliation Commission, expected to feature loud public calls for unity.

In private, however, one of his top officials confided earnestly: "To be honest, it's all over. I'm just still doing this job because it's the only way to fight my depression."

This is what I think:

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Eclectic

I would argue that a strategic reallignment of all U.S. forces in Europe and the Middle East is necessary. I support permanent installations in Iraq.[/I]

We must continue to strengthen our Iraqi allies and support them in bringing an end to their low-level civil war. There are historical parallels that we have seen many times over. Look at the factors that commonly cause civil strife and breakups:

• Ethnic differences: Usually two or more, but less than five, major ethnic groups with historical animosity towards one another.
• Religious Differences: Usually two or more, but less than five, major religions with historical animosity towards one another.
• Outside Influences: Neighboring states with cultural, ethnic, and religious ties to one of the major groups in the country.
• Natural Resources: One or more unequally distributed natural resources or other strategic economic interests.

Now apply this to Iraq: We have the Kurds with Turkish Kurds to the North, Sunnis with relations to neighboring Syria, and Shia with ties to neighboring Iran. The natural resource here is, of course, Oil.

Now some historical precedent:

• Yugoslavia.
• Post World War I partitioning of the Middle East Mandates: Jordan, Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, et al.
• Post-Colonial Africa: artifical borders and the ceaseless conflicts as a result thereof.

Before we define our role, we must envision the future of Iraq. Moderate nationalist Iraqis of each relgion and ethnicity desire a unified state. Alternatively, separist Shia and Kurds each desire their own state. The Sunni desire a return to power and seek territorial unity because of the location of oil fields in Shia and Kurd dominated areas.

The United States' strategic interest lies in promoting regional stability through continuity in territorial governance. We share the vision of moderate Iraqis who desire national unity and cooperation. A successfully unified Democratic Iraq serves as a catalyst for regional cooperation and transformation- away from Islamo-fascism and despotism towards capitalism, free speech, freedom of religion, and democracy.

There exists two prime enemy against the joint U.S.-Iraqi vision:
(1) The sectarian motivation I listed previously.
(2)Extra-national Islamo-fascists that seek general regional chaos to foment the violent overthrow of established middle east governments with the goal of creating a unified Islamic theocracy global super-power. This is the stated goal of Osama Bin Laden and Co.

How we go about battling both is different, but they are linked. By engaging in heavy handed aggression, we turn Iraqi nationalists against theU.S.-Iraqi coalition and towards the sectarian aims. Even worse, we risk their loss to Islamo-fascists.

That is why our policy at the strategic, operational, and tactical level must each be persistent, even-handed, transparent, and compassionate.

Our Strategy:
(1) Support national unity by building an ethnically diverse Iraqi security force.
(2) Support Iraqi government efforts to reach out towards sectarian leaders.
(3) Distinguish sectarian violence from extra-national Islamo-fascist violence.
(4) Support the rebuilding of Iraqi infrastructure to encourage economic development.
(5) Provide humanitarian aid to the civilians who are unemployed, homeless, and wounded due to sectarian and islamofascist violence.

Our Operations:
(1) Acquire intelligence from both human and technology sources to determine sectarian and islamofascist strongholds.
(2) Conduct highly targeted tactical engagements to remove Islamofascists.
(3) Conduct security patrols to limit civilian targets of opportunity and to provide a physical and psychological deterrent to violence from any source.
(4) Support Iraqi operations in their conduct of similar operations.

Our Tactics:
(1) Strict rules of enagagement.
(2) Avoid civilian casualties as much as is possible.
(3) Employ fire and manuever on confirmed targets only.

We're doing a fine job as it is, but there is always room for improvement. In this case, the improvement is not needed in our military policy. It is in our diplomatic and humanitarian policy where we are failing. We must rebuild faster. We must provide greater humanitarian aid. We must do everything we can to make the Iraqis feel confident in a competent government and bring the Iraqi people into the community of nations.

---

And when I say "We're doing a fine job as it is", I of course say that with an understanding of our real limitations on the ground. We're doing about as good as we can do, militarily speaking. It's the diplomatic front we're getting toasted on.

I am starting to yield to some of the pessimism. The historical comparisons are not good at all, especially given that Iraq is surrounded by neighbors who are hell bent on supporting a deterioration in the country.

The best bet may be to follow the current Bosnian model; a two tier government with a generalized unity at the top, and a second almost autonomous second lower tier based on ethnic differences. This would provide all sides with the desired autonomy while allowing for mutual benefit from natural resources. The Kurds are almost autonomous as it is.

I say let them divide the country up. It will then seperate the "sheep from the goats" per se. We can then play one against the other much more effectively and openly support the groups that are most likely to "democratize". If we were to let the Sunnis have the western regions of the country and Baghdad, then they will no longer be able to hide behind Shiite civilians, or terrorize them as effectively. Once the seperation os complete, we must set up good barriers to prevent the incursion into the US occupied zones. I am assuming that the Kurds and Shiites would want us to remain. If not, then we should leave if we are asked to and let the Iraqis deal with the situation and offer our military aid to those regions which we can do business with.

Just keep your own man safe out of the town and see who's left within a week or two. Civil wars have the tendency to bring peace, all partie's will reach a point where dialogue is the best option, and reaching that point will just require some patience. No need to be shot at in the meantime, it isn't the most elegant solution, but who's got a better one.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by rotorgun

I say let them divide the country up. It will then seperate the "sheep from the goats" per se. We can then play one against the other much more effectively and openly support the groups that are most likely to "democratize". If we were to let the Sunnis have the western regions of the country and Baghdad, then they will no longer be able to hide behind Shiite civilians, or terrorize them as effectively. Once the seperation os complete, we must set up good barriers to prevent the incursion into the US occupied zones. I am assuming that the Kurds and Shiites would want us to remain. If not, then we should leave if we are asked to and let the Iraqis deal with the situation and offer our military aid to those regions which we can do business with.

---

Except the country isn't neatly divided into north = Kurdish, centre = Sunni, south = Shia, but is very much interlinked. For the results of separation, look at the partition of India and Pakistan. Over 1 million dead in the unrest, and the British are still being blamed for that today. Admittedly, the population of Iraq is much lower and hence the body count of separation may be in 6 or even 5 figures, but there is a far greater mix of population and hence difficulty in separating them, and the sectarian hatreds that drive them are pretty intense and getting more so by the day.

As Fragony says, the best course may be to let civil war happen, accept the invasion of Iraq was a complete failure, accept the consequences and the hatred that goes with it, and try not to repeat it in the future. The British have gone through a pretty intense programme of self-criticism since the end of empire, and former colonials are finding it hard to hate the mother country when they discover the natives are doing a nifty job in self-hate.

How many thousand civilians died last month? It's not a 'fine job', it's a complete mess and is making the US and allies look completely incompetant, as well as being a nightmare for an Iraqis.