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Hey,
As of Lately, I been obess with reading up on my Information about The Il lfated Raid on Octorober 3-4 1993. I just got done reading Black Hawk Down by Mark Bowden and Just brought Micheal Durant's Book, the only surivior from the 2nd crash site (and the POW).. What you guys thoughts on this?? Again, I keep my thoguhts untill the debate grows..
Well to me the whole mission seemed a tad naive. These Warlords had full scale armies and to go in with relatively small forces seems a bit optimistic. As long as those Warlords were allowed to retain power the country was always going to be a mess.
If the US seriously wanted to end the war they should have gone in full scale and disarmed the lot of the private armies. Then again it's a bit naive of me to think the US people would want to do such a thing.
Africa is such a mess politically.
I really enjoyed the movie, it doesn't tell it exactly, but its very good.
I think if America had really worried about the situation, then they would've sent in more men to combat the private armies, but like the above poster stated
Africa is politically messy
I havent read the books but from the mvie perspective, I saw it as an sad crusade on an impossible mission...
i'd agree with that, the logic of small group fighting rapid movement and heavy fire power do work brilliantly just without the firepower, cut off movement and small numbers bad things happen. Plus in all reality i don't think there was a man to take command if the warlords were taken out
They did, they used 20,000 Marines to force a ceasefire, and then after a few months brought them home. Then the fighting kicked off again and Task Force Ranger was sent in, with the objective of killing or capturing Aidid. As if getting one person would bring about a democracy.Quote:
Originally Posted by pleasy
I didn't realise so many troops were originally used. Any idea how many UN (non-US) troops were involved?
A regiment of Pakistani troops, and Malaysian APCs. The armoured column was about a mile long.
Numbers are iffy because there's been no official study done on it, at least as of 1999.
Not exactly an overwhelming force then. From my limited knowledge of the campaign (mostly gleaned from the movie and what you guys have said here) it seems to have been a bit of a botch up job entirely.
There was a superb TV documentary about Black Hawk Down, which included interviewing some of the Somali fighters today. It's a fascinating episode, at least viewed from a US perspective in dramatic or military terms. That's thanks to Mark Bowden's riveting work and the superb movie. I find it hard to think about those two sergeants who died trying to protect Michael Durant without a tear welling up. Or to hear Clinton's "we'll get the job done and then skedaddle" speech after without cursing his insincerity.
But those are emotional reactions. From a wider, political or historical perspective, the episode is rather disturbing and troubling. For example, the Somali casualties were apparently horrendous and unlikely they were all combatants. More fundamentally, it raises some important political/moral issues about "liberal humanitarian interventionism" that you could say are being writ large in Iraq and Afghanistan today. And Somalia still has not recovered from the collapse that led to the intervention.
As a liberal humanitarian, I am torn about the merits of the intervention. On the one hand, where armed thugs are messing up a country, it is not ridiculous to say that intervention can help. Sierra Leone is probably a good example of this. But the trick is knowing when it can help and when, as arguably with Iraq, it would just make things worse.
Rather you help Africa or not, that Place is a total and utter mess, and been like that for decades. Rwanda, for instance. 800,000 people killed in how long? a month or two? and UN and them just watched (go figure). Ethopiha and Somilia in the 1980's, Darfur,etc....
we went into Mog with a small force, because the mission was only suppose to take a hour or two, but it turn into a disaeatr for both sides. If we would have just sent tanks and more armor in there, nothing would have went wrong.
Considering the time constraints attached to the mission I'd be surprised if that were even remotely possible.Quote:
Originally Posted by {BHC}KingWarman888
and Ironically the Armor came in a week after the mission (a week I think,not sure) while the POW was sitll being held. could have kept waiting for a week and then went in and finish the job.
I watched the original history channel documentary when it first aired and it was very informative, apparently so informative that when re-aired the next day it was missing, iirc, a half an hour, including some of the info on the Delta’s and some of the more gruesome footage of the idiots parading around body parts of those soldiers they killed (just recalling the visuals makes me very angry for several reasons). One part of the documentary that I found fascinating was the explanation of the use of whatever drug (my memory sucks tonight) the warlord’s troops chewed and how it affected them by what time and how the US should really have paid attention to its use.
Decent movie, good documentary and yes, Africa is a mess.
The drug is locally called khat, I think it's just marijuana. The Americans knew all about how it effected the Somali's and their fighting abilities, but they decided to go in gung-ho anyways. Their eyes were bigger than their bellies.Quote:
One part of the documentary that I found fascinating was the explanation of the use of whatever drug (my memory sucks tonight) the warlord’s troops chewed and how it affected them by what time and how the US should really have paid attention to its use.
That’s the stuff! Definitely different from MJ. Here is a little description of the effects from wikiQuote:
Originally Posted by Grey_Fox
and a nice article from the BBC.Quote:
Khat consumption induces mild euphoria and excitement. Individuals become very talkative under the influence of the drug and may appear to be unrealistic and emotionally unstable.
Quote:
Islamist fighters in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, shot at a crowd angered at shortages of the mild stimulant khat, killing one person, say eyewitnesses.
Khat vendors were protesting about loss of revenue since a ban on Kenyan flights to Somalia on Monday, that has led to a shortage of imported khat.
The Islamists have subsequently burned two big khat consignments which were flown in from elsewhere this week.
The Islamic courts have tried to outlaw khat since they rose to power in June.
The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) that now rules the capital says khat encourages immorality.
Most khat, chewed by many Somali men - especially the gunmen who have fought for control of the country for the last 15 years - was flown in from neighbouring Kenya.
Wasn't it 37,000 troops to secure half the country . Which was replaced by22,000 troops and police to secure the whole country plus the apparently co ordinated but indepedent US rapid reaction force .Quote:
They did, they used 20,000 Marines to force a ceasefire, and then after a few months brought them home. Then the fighting kicked off again and Task Force Ranger was sent in, with the objective of killing or capturing Aidid. As if getting one person would bring about a democracy.
I say apparently co-ordinated since one of the funniest episodes of the debacle was when the rapid reaction force attacked a UN compound and arrested the commisioner .
Well he did have armed guards so he must have been a warlord .... :oops:
BTW with some saying about needing more tanks and armour.
Hasn't it been shown time and time again that tanks in a built up populated area are vulnerable and not very effective , plus have the a problem related to inflicting lots of needless civilian casualties .
Traditional wisdom is that an armored unit is severely vulnerable without infantry support in a built up area. This does not mean that tanks are of no use in city combat. Quite the contrary actually. In WWII the limited availability of tanks in Aachen lead to the employment of SP artillery in the role of direct support weapons, much less able than tanks. An Armored Cavalry or Armor-Infantry team was exactly what was needed to secure the country, not just the city. It was strictly a civilian Political decision which kept it from being deployed in the first instance.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tribesman
By the first instance do you mean the watered down version where only 3500 troops were authorised due to political intransigence(there was after all an election coming up) .Quote:
It was strictly a civilian Political decision which kept it from being deployed in the first instance.
Or do you mean the second first instance drawn up by a certain fellow named Colin (acting on CIA reports) where he was given 7,000 more troops than he asked for plus the option of a further 8,000 .
Or are we into the third first instance when political intransigence again kicked in , but they retained their own military independance with the option to do whatever they saw fit deployment and operations wise .
Complicted stuff this Somalia innit :sweatdrop:
I agree, Iraq War II has shown that modern heavy armour is very useful in cities, at least against a 3rd rate army (like Somali militia). But I recall it being said that the armour is so heavy, it takes much longer to deploy - it has to be shipped, not flown in. I don't know if the time factor was significant in Somalia.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fisherking
Maybe it was a political decision rather than a logistics matter. But I fear experience in Iraq and Afghanistan suggests that thinking "a team" can secure a large untamed country is a little optimistic. Secure the cities and major towns, maybe.Quote:
An Armored Cavalry or Armor-Infantry team was exactly what was needed to secure the country, not just the city. It was strictly a civilian Political decision which kept it from being deployed in the first instance.
That being said, it seems like the Ethiopians/Provisional Somali government are getting close to securing the Somali cities now even without M1 Abrams. Part of the problem with the US intervention in Somalia is that - unlike the Ethiopians today - they did not seem to have any significant local proxies they could work with. Nationalism is such that an outsider like Ethiopia (or US) intervening to back a local faction is one thing; but an outsider vs all local factions is a recipe for disaster, heavy armour or no.
There was at the time, just as there is today a stockpile of equipment at Diego Garcia. I am not sure what type of tanks were on hand at that time but getting the correctly trained troops for the equipment is not such a huge problem (M-1A1s most likely). It was more of the then secretary of defence stating that he did not want any tanks or apcs because it looked too aggressive. When the military and media cry went out for tanks Les Aspen resigned.:oops:
Armor was late arriving in Vietnam because everyone said it was not tank country but they soon found that it was desperately needed. By the end all major formations has armor available.
Armor can be deployed by air but it takes the total heavy lift air fleet to deploy one Battalion of Tanks. (54 tanks and assorted other heavy equipment totalling roughly 70 aircraft for equipment and people) That said, it does not mean that it had to be more than a platoon of 4 tanks and a company of apcs, which are far more easily transported.
Team is the current military term for a mixed force of Tanks and Infantry at company size, i.e. Team Yankee. Larger units are called taskforce *.
Armored Cavalry was a better option for deployment at the time and would have provided the security necessary for transport moving about the country side. I didn't mean that such a force would single-handedly secure the country.
The Marines had been withdrawn I believe but any Marine Corps landing team would have had a tank force available.
Les Aspen was a leading dove during Vietnam. He was from one of the few States which had no significant military bases which would have been jeopardized by his actions. Additionally he had not served in the military and was decidedly antimilitary. His appointment by Mr. Clinton to head the Department of Defence was hailed as a great thing by the press at the time but was simply a disaster waiting to happen IMO. It would be like appointing Himmler to head the Anti Defamation League.
Political appointments are usually something to cause great press without regard to what happens afterward. The military establishment it's self can not always be relied on to do the sensible thing. At the top levels it is also extremely vulnerable to political whim and staffed usually by men who want to tell you what you would most like to hear. With the changes made starting with the first Gulf War and continuing at least through our last Secretary of Defence the likelihood of future blunders has only been enhanced. Force structure is far out of balance and cooperation between the services is, or was as of a year or so ago, still a problem. Too often too much attention is paid to perception rather than results. Until the top brass and the civilians are thinking of what the troops need to do the job they are asked to do rather than how it looks to the public we still run the same risks as we did then.
Well I was thinking of two recent middle eastern examples which were more approprite to the situation in hand .Quote:
I agree, Iraq War II has shown that modern heavy armour is very useful in cities, at least against a 3rd rate army (like Somali militia). But I recall it being said that the armour is so heavy, it takes much longer to deploy - it has to be shipped, not flown in. I don't know if the time factor was significant in Somalia.
When the Isrealis decided to use ground troops without accompanying armour(though they had it in support) in the west bank to minimise the civilian casualties but still get the job done .
The foray into Lebanon where they sent in troops but withdrew much of the accompanying armour after early losses highlighted its vulnerability in an urban setting (which "officially" was clear of any civilians so they cannot have been a factor in the descision) .
Until the top brass , politicians and their nations want to be featured in the history books under events like East Berlin , Budapest , Prague or Tainnamen square then that is a risk the troops will have to put up with .Quote:
Until the top brass and the civilians are thinking of what the troops need to do the job they are asked to do rather than how it looks to the public we still run the same risks as we did then.
You forgot the qualifier of econ21's post, here it is again, with the qualifier bolded:Quote:
The foray into Lebanon where they sent in troops but withdrew much of the accompanying armour after early losses highlighted its vulnerability in an urban setting (which "officially" was clear of any civilians so they cannot have been a factor in the descision) .
Hezbollah is not a third rate army - it is a highly trained, well equipped guerilla force, for all intents and purposes a light infantry division.Quote:
I agree, Iraq War II has shown that modern heavy armour is very useful in cities, at least against a 3rd rate army (like Somali militia).
Going a little off-topic, but I wonder what, if anything, took out Israeli tanks?
IIRC, the US lost only two Abrams in the Iraq 2 War. It was speculated that one - on the Baghdad ring road? - might have been taken out by an anti-aircraft missile. The normal RPGs available to the Iraqi army and insurgents etc did not seem to make much impact. A British Challenger 2 apparently reported about 70 RPGs bouncing off it near Basra (that tank crew must have had brass balls :sweatdrop: ).
But I can imagine Hezbollah getting access to some higher tech stuff - the rockets that they keep lobbing into Israeli towns, for example, are not your typical third world militia kit. And eventually a determined, experienced adversary will figure out counters to even powerful tanks. (e.g. like the Wehrmacht learnt how to cope with KV-1s and T-34s early in Barbarossa).
Going a little off-topic, but I wonder what, if anything, took out Israeli tanks?
If I recall correctly the first loss was quite a while back in occupied territories using a new type of homemade explosive . That led to the all the tanks being taken out of service for upgrades .
In the Leb the first two were attributed to conventional anti tank mines , then followed a mixture of losses to mines anti tank guns/missiles and improvised bombs .
I recall seeing mentions of the Iranians (and most likely also the Syrians) having made a point of supplying their Libanese friends with generous stockpiles of honest-to-god ATGMs. So generous in fact the Hezbollah guys could afford to use them even against soft targets - they'd have run out of ammo rather soon if things had dragged out of course, but it wasn't exactly a material attrition match.
Plus given it was their "home ground" they had held for the past decade or half and knew quite intimately, they naturally had ample opportunity to place all the booby-traps they needed. Even MBTs break with big enough blasts. Didn't some Palestine militants manage to nail one of those IDF "heavy APCs" (converted from old MBT hulls) that way a couple of years back as well ?
All of those Governments had one thing in common. Less despotic Governments have not been able to get away with that sort of thing for a very, very long time.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tribesman
I certainly agree that Africa is a mess and that it is generally allowed to just keep getting worse.
The mess in Chad is only the latest example and there are several others. It is obviously more a matter political and economic interest rather than any real humanitarian effort.
Most of the governments are corrupt without question but that is not an excuse for letting innocents die or suffer with only a word or two on the evening news now and then. But in truth it is much more than just Africa. The last time I heard there was still a genocide going on in western New Guinea. Indonesia though seems to be immune to serious criticism of its treatment of subject peoples. The Javanese are and have been in charge of the government and are pretty much hated by everyone else but they have good resources in their conquered territories and no one is saying a word, or is it because they are the largest Muslim country in the world?
God moves individuals to great insights of sprit, whereas religion seems to be a tool of the powerful to move people into giving them what the powerful want in the name of God.
Almost all of these recent conflicts have religion as a component…Regardless of what religions may say I don't think that God cares too much for war.
Just a side comment but, entertaining tho' it may be, I wouldn't like to have to rely on the historical accuracy of anything produced by the History Channel.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Tribesman
I watched a Show about Abrams Tanks on the Mitliarty Channel last month, and they was saying how those Abrams can take a hell of a beating and still keep going on.
I highly doubt a RPG from a 3rd rate Milita in Somilia would take out a Tank,like a Abrams, in one hit.
I doubt RPGs have enough "bite" to puncture the shell of a first-rate MBT. Except maybe with a roof hit (buildings, anyone?), or square hit to the rear. Ought to still be able to disable a tread or two though - although at least some Israeli tanks have the option of extra armour to shield those too...
Anyway, one little issue with urban settings is that there's no shortage of stuff the enemy can hide AT mines, big bombs and similar booby-trap nastiness in, which if not quite capable of knocking out a tank may well immobilize it.