Ancient and Medieval Armies (Roman auxilary forces/tactics and Medieval tactics)

I know what a Roman legion is made up of, but how would the auxila be used? how would auxilary archers and cavalry be used? what tactics in battle would a legion normally use? (Imperial and Post-Marian)

what would a medieval army consist of? what tactics would they use?

thanks!

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Originally Posted by God's Grace

what would a medieval army consist of? what tactics would they use?

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...you don't ask easy questions, do you ? We're talking about a round five-century period on an entire subcontinent (if not wider afield) which was effectively divided to a slew of smaller theaters that usually didn't interact all that much, but tended to have wildly different emphasizes and preferences according to local circumstances. On top of which there were several major shifts in equipement and military method over the period... :sweatdrop:

Well the only way to answer such general questions succintly is to tell you that basically armies in classical civilisation and the medieval period tried to kill people. And the purpose of the auxiliaries was to aid the main legionary force in achieving the goal of killing people. In both cases, the armies generally consisted of soldiers, that is, men employed for the purpose of killing people.

...and when it comes down to that, a lot of ink (or in this case bytes) could be spilled over the actual definitions of "soldiers" mentioned above, seeing as how for a good part of the periods both Roman and Medieval European armies in fact consisted of part-time levies... and that includes the Medieval chivalry, who after all spent far more time managing their estates than on active war footing.

I suppose they could all potentially fight and die in battles, but the further up the social hierarchy one went the less it was one's job to kill and the more it was one's job to organise other people to kill for you. For instance, the most dangerous job in the Hundred Years War and also the lowliest was probably to be a pillar (a sort of light cavalry or mounted infantry whose job was essentially to pillage and extort people for a garrison) because it exposed one constantly to the danger of being ambushed and murdered by other garrisons or indeed by the not so helpless peasants (zillions of such cases were catalogued by French courts). For that reason pillars were often actually other local peasants forced to serve to discharge a ransom obligation, or who wanted arms to press a private quarrel. On the other hand, generally the professional soldiers in the garrison and almost always the captain didn't have to risk themselves like that (if they did it was usually because the pillar had had his lopped off and the locals had to be taught a lesson).

"Auxilia" were generally recruited from particular regions for their specialist skills to compliment the largely infantry arm of the legion. Archers, cavalry, skirmishers, and light infantry where some of the types of auxilia formations created to round out a Roman legion. I have seen a diagram of the Roman "Quincux" formation used by the legion during the imperial period, which showed that the auxilia infantry were placed in the third or "reserve" line ready to protect the flanks or move forward in support of the main line.
Auxilia archers were deployed interspersed in the second ranks. While the auxilia cavalry generally worked together on one flank or the other.

Medieval armies generally had nothing of this sophisticated kind of organization, although there were some notable exceptions, such as Edward II's forces at Poitiers and Henry V's at Agincourt, relying heavily on a combined arms approach. Most medieval armies tended to be organized into "battles" of roughly battalion sized groups of men-generally under the command of a noble. There could often be alot of jockeying for position by the Knights and Men at Arms as each treid to position themselves to engage their opposite of "equal rank". So much of the success in warfare of this period involved the gaining of ransom for negotiating the release of captured noblemen that this often was at odds with sound military tactics. There was also a good deal of raiding, pillaging, and ambushing (chevauchee) done during this period by mounted company sized parties. The highlight of the middle ages was the siege, and considerable resources went into this activity more than any other.

I hope this answers some of your questions. It is a rather broad topic to discuss, so perhaps you could define your queries a bit more.

I think that assessment of medieval armies is a bit unfair. To say that they were not as sophisticated as a Roman army is perfectly true, but to say they were almost never sophisticated enough to have simple things like interspersed missile troops, an infantry reserve, and wings of cavalry, is not. The main thing is not that medieval tacticians were retarded but that due to the system of military obligations there was often an over reliance on upper class soldiers which often made opposing armies homogenous. But you can and will find combined arms tactics going right back to the start of the Middle Ages, and they get much more common when things like indentured retinues and mercenary companies made it much easier for belligerents for exactly the sorts of soldiers they wanted.

"Chevauchee" actually refers to a whole expeditionary army (of thousands of men) engaging in a march of destruction across a front about 50km wide. Pillaging by individual garrisons and whatnot, which did account for most of the activity in a alot of wars, wasn't a "chevauchee" per se. The word simply means "ride" but it acquired a technical meaning from a treatise done by some French official around 1300. Incidentally it was the Prince of Wales at Poitiers, in the reign of Edward III.

Thank you Furious Mental for further enlightening us on the tactical prowess of medieval armies. I was a bit hasty in my initial assesment of their capabilities, and didn't mean to imply that it was the norm of all such forces. Indeed there were many cases of medieval leaders exhibiting tactical skill in the selection and deployment of combined arms- Richard Plantagenant at the battle of Arsouf being just one example.

As for the "Chevauchee" you are right. I was remebering a particular such "ride" made by Guesclin de Gascony during the 100 years war that was on a smaller scale. In this operation only a small raiding force of 30 or so was used to raid the English forces in Normandy.

I am sure that there are many numerous examples of more sophisticated armies to name. I was merely generalizing that it was by no means standard practice. Many a campaign was mounted in very haphazard manner, usually leading to failure; the campaign of Edward II in Scotland failed largely because of the way it was organized and executed.

Excellent points made, however.

I am flattered:embarassed: . Anyway, that is an enlightening example of Edward II in Scotland as it certainly shows the importance of the nobility in raising armies and the authority of the king in leading them - being such a useless and unpopular king he simply couldn't get much of the English nobility behind him and so he suffered a shortfall in numbers. It also meant that he wasn't really respected by many who did follow him and he had trouble controlling some of their impetuous tendencies. It's a point well made that the military classes could be ill disciplined, and it showed when there was no strong leader to control them. Bannockburn was one example, Crecy is even better, in particular because of the contrast between the non-existent leadership of Philip VI, and the firm hand of Edward III (who, so accounts say, had such authority over his army that his men-at-arms actually resisted the temptation to break ranks and capture Frenchmen even while his conscripted Welsh light infantry were allowed to run out in front of the army and slaughtered them mercilessly). Although it isn't so obvious, these problems had alot to do with the limited tactics one may find; in order to execute complex plans with different tactical units, a general had to be able to do more than simply tell his army to charge. Phillip VI at Crecy seems to have had no real understanding of how to use his Genoese crossbowmen and levied infantry but even if he had it probably wouldn't have done him any good because his men-at-arms were only interested in a hell for leather charge. Go back right to the early middle ages and consider Anglo-Norman knights; their well documented tendency to fight on foot to resist a cavalry charge probably had something to do with contact with the English, for whom it had always been habitual, but it probably also took strong kings (which the Anglo-Norman kings were at least until Stephen of Blois) to make them do it (partly because it associated them with the less than socially elite English fyrdmen, probably partly also because it meant that they had to stand in the front rank rather than relying on said fyrdmen to absorb an enemy charge).

thanks, cause usually when I read about how a Roman legion fights, it usually never mentions how the auxilia are used other than support.

They sometimes ended up doing all the fighting, as the Romans occasionally used them as a "first wave" much like the Hastati of the Republican triplex acies. So they sometimes up and won the whole battle without the actual legionaries waiting in reserve engaging - which suited the Romans right well, since as far as they were concerned a victory was even sweeter if it was achieved without shedding Roman blood (as only citizens could enlist into the Legions; others went to the Auxilia to earn their citizenships).

Before citizenship became general all over Italy Italian and Latin auxiliaries formed their own legions which fought on either side of the Roman legion and in much the same fashion as I understand it.

Sure, the socii - but that really concerns more the pre-Marian reservist-army period.