Fatimids and mercinaries

I have heard that the Fatimids had a standing army which included a significant number of mercinaries. This was also true of the Byzantines. I understand that the Varangian and Bulgarian Brigand units represent the mercs in the Byzantine standing army, and the Byzantine faction can raise them like regular troops instead of hiring them inns because they were, for practical purposes, part of the standing army, not specially hired short term.

So I was wondering, are there similar Egyptian units? In other words, does the Egyptian roster include units which in real life were mercinaries but part of the standing army, not just short term hire? Can anyone help me?

In MTW? Hmm, been so long since I used that infirior piece of software. The only one I can think off right off is the black spear unit. I want to call them Sudanese spearmen, but I know that's the M2TW version of them. But one way to get an idea of what is a full time merc is to read the unit cards. If you see the unit described as being not of Egypt or made up of nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes they be mercinaries.

Sudanese spearmen? That would be Nubian spearmen in MTW. However, I do not think that non-Egyptian origin is proof that the unit is mercinary. The Islamic custom of using slaves of non-Muslim origin as soldiers clouds the issue. The Mamluks, for example, would be non-Egyptian, I believe, but not mercinary. I don't know if the Fatimids had any other slave-soldier units.

Leaving slave warriors aside, non-Egyptians subjects of the Sultan might volunteer or be recruited for the regular army. As inhabitants of the Egyptian empire, they might not necessarily be considered mercinaries.

Historically, just because a soldier was of foreign origin, it would not necessarily mean he was a mercinary. Take the Roman army. As the Empire grew in stature, more solders would be non-Roman in origin. The legionaries would have the status of Roman citizens, but many solders would not. I don't think most people would count these troops as "mercinaries."

Thanks for trying, anyway. I should take another look at those cards. I could have missed something.

Modern law makes a difference between a professional full-time soldier and a mercenary, but historically they were long pretty much one and the same thing; "regular" soldiery were just usually engaged for a longer term. Eg. the post-Marian Roman army was very much a mercenary force; the men, whether citizens in the Legions proper or noncitizens in the auxilia, served for pay and other benefits. Conversely their earlier reservist system worked on basis of legal obligations of the citizenry (and client peoples and states) to serve under arms.

Similarly many of the more "regular" Medieval troops (pretty much all that didn't own land themselves really) were essentially salaried mercenaries, drawing regular pay and upkeep in return of putting their military skills at the use of their paymaster be that now a free city, feudal landlord, monarch or whatever. "Permanent" mercenaries essentially. The faris knight-equivalents of the Middle East were just such salaried standing troops.

That aside, many of the desert tribesmen serving the rulers of the region would also have been essentially mercenaries - even when they were nominally allies, that was often based on rank bribery of the chieftains making their followers mercs-by-proxy. Ditto for the Turkish nomad tribesmen, although I don't know how common they were in Egyptian armies.

Watchman has it. The modern distinction between a full time professional soldier and a mercenary doesn't go back much farther than Napoleon. It's a very modern idea. But in medieval era the Romans drew a distinction between full time soldiers drawn from within and without the empire. That's why I say that full time soldiers drawn from outside the Egyptian borders are mercenaries.

Strictly speaking, post-Marian Romans actually had three types of soldiers - citizen Legionaries and noncitizen auxilia were the "regulars", the former for obvious reasons recruited entirely domestically, and then assorted allies and "irregular" mercenaries (foederati) gathered from wherever the Hell the commander now could find them. 'Course, the distinction between the auxilia and the allies/mercenaries could get a bit blurry.

From what I've read, on the internets mostly. The difference between Auxilia and Feoderati is that that the former were recruited locally and trained up to Roman standards formed into units and sent of their way where needed. While the latter where gathered by a Legate riding into a village and sliding a chest of gold under the nose of the headman for all his men of fighting age to come with him. No Roman training just the local customs.

:laugh4:
I find it difficult to argue against that description.

If I understand the consensus correctly, then my question is almost without meaning. Any soldier who received pay could be considered a mercinary. Well, by that reasoning, even a feudal levy could be considered mercinary, because the noble who raised the force for his king was paid with a land grant. Admittedly, that would be stretching the meaning of the term mercinary almost to the breaking point.

Okay, I guess that means its pretty much up to me how I want to answer my own question. I'll read the unit cards when I have time, like Lars suggested, and make my own judgement call.

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Originally Posted by lars573

Watchman has it. The modern distinction between a full time professional soldier and a mercenary doesn't go back much farther than Napoleon. It's a very modern idea.

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Question: What was Machiavelli on about, then? Or was he something like the "pioneer" literature-wise when it comes to the issue?

Ah, I'm finally back!

Haven't read ole Niccolo myself, so can you elaborate ? I know that around the time he lived in Italy had a bit of a problem with the condottieri military enterpreneurs who had a virtual monopoly of effective military power on the peninsula, and duly cheerfully used their strong bargaining position with their employers to their own profit. Nevermind now having a habit of getting involved in assorted domestic power struggles, and being a major menace to the peasants even in nominally friendly territory.

It was from The Prince that Machiavelli gave his grievance. His issue was clearly with the various condottieri that dominated Italian battlefields; he spent a whole chapter on it condemning them. He had good reason too considering how many of the most powerful Italians of his time were just plain mercenary captains at some points in their lives.

He also condemned the use of "auxiliaries" (in this case to put simply is just using soldiers from another state to fight one's own wars) but that's not in the topic.

It's the alternative that he proposed that led to my question, however. He did not make clear what he think is "one's own forces" until the end where he said that it's either "subjects, citizens, or dependents." Citizens are clear enough; Machiavelli was probably referring to things from a polis' militia to the Roman Republic's armies. On subjects and dependents these are not so clear. He could mean a full-time professional fighting force or he could mean a feudal levy. If it is the former then one can conclude he recognized the distinction between them long before the French Revolution and the era of national armies that began with, whatwasit, the levée en masse.

Of course, prior to him and much later I agree things were never clear. After all the Varangians, mercenaries by their very definition, proved to be the most loyal of all Byzantine fighting forces when all hell breaks loose.

That's actually quite logical when you think about it. Such "palace guard" foreign mercenaries were invariably very well paid for obvious reasons and tended to enjoy all kinds of special privileges, often including a virtual immunity to legal repercussions for pretty much anything short of murder (and sometimes even that). The operative logic is simple enough: foreigners in a strange land far from home, and more or less resented by the natives for any excesses they may have indulged in under the protection afforded by the patronage of the biggest shot around, their continued prosperity and survival is pretty much directly linked to their employer remaining on the throne. They themselves are unlikely to try a palace coup, as there would be no way for them to keep the power if they were succesful - indeed, if the protection of the ruler was removed for any reason, they would more likely than not be summarily massacred by the angry natives. Even if their relations with their hosts weren't that bad, their claim to legitimacy would be a round zero making keeping the seized throne a very losing proposition.

And more importantly, being foreigners, they had no prior local looyalties based on family, political party, clan membership, client-patron relationships etc. etc. as any natives otherwise eligible for the job nigh invariably did. You brought the outsiders to do the job just because they were outsiders unconnected to the festering pit of intrigue that was the court, whereas if you employed natives for the job there would be an extremely real risk of one of them one day shoving a sword in your back so Uncle Mikaelos can become the next boss and reward them handsomely for the lift...

The Praetorians are a brilliant example of that sort of trouble, having at least once flatly auctioned the Roman Empire to the highest bidder. Not really surprising they were eventually disbanded and replaced by personal hired guard corps usually of the model described in the first paragraph (eg. the German guardsmen of many of the later Emperors). Similarly pretty much every single new Byzantine Emperor formed his own new guard unit, although they apparently usually just relegated the earlier ones to less exalted (and risky) duties.

The Varangians' practice of an oath of loyalty to their chief (well meted out in such Germanic epics as Beowulf) -- which, in this case, of course, is the emperor -- also seems to have played a role in the Byzantine emperor choosing them as his personal and most trusted guard. The practice was widespread amongst warriors that made out part of a chieftain or other potentate's personal retinue of warriors, known amongst Germanic peoples and Romans as a comitatus. The practice seems to have survived into the 16th century as the Russian druzhina.

I don't know, however, if a Varangian could simply leave the Guard he'd joined as simply and freely as a member of a Great Migrations chief's comitatus or a Russian prince's druzhina could, though. It was probably possible, as with Harald Hardrada, but I don't know if it was widespread.

Hmm...now that I think about it that makes sense. There are even an ubiquitous amounts of examples to back your post up; from the Black Guard in Morocco to arguably the early Janissaries, though the latter became entrenched and "Praetorian" anyway.

And one of the ways European leaders liked to use the Swiss for. Was it the Pope who had a Swiss Guard or some such?

I agree they should be looked at from a different perspective than "normal" mercenaries. These units tend to have a certain absolute loyalty to their patron lacking in the usual mercenary business.

Though I'm still wondering what Machiavelli meant by that passage. Was he really distinguishing "national" armies -- including full-time salaried professionals -- and the condottieri, or was I reading too much into the passage? Machiavelli was a very innovative political thinker and I wouldn't put it pass him; then again The Prince is actually a work based very much on Renaissance thoughts of the time, especially on the Italy that Machiavelli knew, when and where "national" armies have yet to exist in concrete form...

The Pope is the last one to maintain a Swiss Guard, but in the past, many more potentates had one. The only one I remember off the top of my head was the ancien regime's Swiss Guard, but I'm sure there were more.

EDIT: "Professional" armies right up to Carnot's levee en masse were largely national (meaning: recruited from the king's own country) in their upmake, as far as I know. I think the proportion of "nationals," for lack of a better term (i.e. people from the state or kingdom or empire that the army in question served) steadily increased from the time of the rise of the mercenary in the time of the Swiss and the Landsknechts, up until Carnot's reforms to bolster France's chances at war with all of Europe. At least, for France -- most French regiments spoke French and the like, and the truly foreign, mercenary regiments were small -- that is... for tiny states like the United Provinces, or true, multinational empires in the purest sense of the word, like the Habsburg Monarchy, the percentage of foreign-born soldiers in the military must've been substantially higher.

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Originally Posted by Baba Ga'on

The Pope is the last one to maintain a Swiss Guard, but in the past, many more potentates had one. The only one I remember off the top of my head was the ancien regime's Swiss Guard, but I'm sure there were more.

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Ah yes, I forgot about the French. I even remembered distinctly about them defending the King or some such during the Revolution and got slaughtered for their loyalty...

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Originally Posted by Baba Ga'on

EDIT: "Professional" armies right up to Carnot's levee en masse were largely national (meaning: recruited from the king's own country) in their upmake, as far as I know. I think the proportion of "nationals," for lack of a better term (i.e. people from the state or kingdom or empire that the army in question served) steadily increased from the time of the rise of the mercenary in the time of the Swiss and the Landsknechts, up until Carnot's reforms to bolster France's chances at war with all of Europe. At least, for France -- most French regiments spoke French and the like, and the truly foreign, mercenary regiments were small -- that is... for tiny states like the United Provinces, or true, multinational empires in the purest sense of the word, like the Habsburg Monarchy, the percentage of foreign-born soldiers in the military must've been substantially higher.

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I agree that France has had a relatively more "uniform" army than many of her contemporaries can afford to have, if only for sheer manpower restrictions. However I doubt that a national army in modern terms existed concretely -- to a level they existed since Richelieu's time at least -- until the levée en masse when it was clearly a fight of survival for "France against Europe."

However, in Machiavelli's time and from Machiavelli's perspective that was not the case, so I do not know if he refers to something of a structure similar to the French or not with his proposal to the Medici's.

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Originally Posted by Brandy Blue

If I understand the consensus correctly, then my question is almost without meaning. Any soldier who received pay could be considered a mercinary. Well, by that reasoning, even a feudal levy could be considered mercinary, because the noble who raised the force for his king was paid with a land grant. Admittedly, that would be stretching the meaning of the term mercinary almost to the breaking point.

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Not quite. Feudal levies were almost never full time. Being given land in lieu of coin is what Feudalism is all about. They'd be called up for a campagin or a battle then go home. What we most of us are saying is, before the later 18th century professional full time soldier and mercenary can be used interchangably. However if one were to draw a distinction. A key difference between a professional soldier and a mercenary would be whether they were foregin to their rulers state or not.

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Originally Posted by AntiochusIII

Question: What was Machiavelli on about, then? Or was he something like the "pioneer" literature-wise when it comes to the issue?

Ah, I'm finally back!

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Never read Machiavelli. But he seems to have been big on covering all the angles, and avoiding wildcards. Condottieri, being loyal to money and little else would have really rankled a guy who was all about rulers relying on what they had, not what they could buy.

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Originally Posted by AntiochusIII

Though I'm still wondering what Machiavelli meant by that passage. Was he really distinguishing "national" armies -- including full-time salaried professionals -- and the condottieri, or was I reading too much into the passage? Machiavelli was a very innovative political thinker and I wouldn't put it pass him; then again The Prince is actually a work based very much on Renaissance thoughts of the time, especially on the Italy that Machiavelli knew, when and where "national" armies have yet to exist in concrete form...

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From what I've understood it the problem with the condottieri is that if you got them on both sides they won't have any interest of winning for you, but to prolong the conflict (less risk of dieing and more payments). The merc loyalty is slightly improved in the way that you can only betray once, after that none will hire you, so I doubt that issue was common (that said, if you look like losing they won't stick around as much as you could hope for).

So his "national" armies were rather armies that had some benefit of winning.

[QUOTE=Ironside]From what I've understood it the problem with the condottieri is that if you got them on both sides they won't have any interest of winning for you, but to prolong the conflict (less risk of dieing and more payments). QUOTE]

Yes, but don't forget that the captain of a company of condottieri had an interest in keeping his company alive. The amount of pay he received depended on the size of his company. When a general knows that a bloodly battle means his pay scale will go down, and the same is true for the enemy general, its not hard to develop a custom of keeping the casualties low.

Another major plank of Machiavelli's argument against hiring mercenaries went along these lines: either the captain is an effective leader, or he is not. If he is not, then what use is he to you? But if he is, you can be sure he'll try to wrest your power from you. Either way you are better off without hired soldiers.

And as Brandy Blue stated:

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its not hard to develop a custom of keeping the casualties low

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that's another charge that Machiavelli levelled at them - that they liked to make a great show of fighting a battle, but didn't really do much. Which meant of course that faced with any army from outside the "Italian way of doing things" they were pretty :daisy: useless ~D

The accusation isn't AFAIK entirely baseless, but I understand the condottieri usually waged war seriously enough (not that they particularly had anything against sitting on their assess drawing salary if they could get away with it of course, but employers tended to get them to enemy territory posthaste for assorted good reasons) and their clashes could be rather bloody. On the other hand, much as was the case between the Muslim and Christian freebooter corsairs of the Western Mediterranean, these people tended to be more or less familiar with each other, and might well have developed a sort of occupational camaraderie. The actual fighting itself could be fierce and intense enough, but afterwards the participants would treat each other with surprising degrees of businesslike courtesy and leniency.

An odd kind of chivalry, you could say.

When Italy began the stomping grounds of foreign armies in the 1500s it's not like the condottieri were inefficient or anything, being after all well-practiced professionals; there just was rather too few of them to be able to do much against the huge armies the powerful French and Habsburg states wielded. Part of that was of course that the condottieri had developed over-pricing their services into an art form, with the due result any faction only had a comparatively small number of them; but in part it was also simply the sheer disunity of the Italian peninsula - there were a whole lot of all kinds of troops around, but the squabbling little princedoms and city-states could rarely work together to any degree and thus the forces potentially available were never pooled into large armies. Most were doubtless only too happy to stand by and watch as the Landsknechts, Reisläufer and Spaniards ruined their neighbour and competitor.