Re: Great Power contentions
Any thoughts on this 'peace process' sought out by Trump?
I can't in my right mind thing that there's anything Trump could do to achieve peace aside from getting Ukraine to capitulate.
The Russians certainly don't want peace under any terms short of victory, there's not much pressure the US can put directly on Russia via sanctions etc at this point as so much has already been done. The only leverage against Russia that the US really has in in how much it supports Ukraine.
This is of course played out by Trump's weakening of NATO. China has been able to step into European politics as the mature and stable partner now that the 'leader of the west' has decided to go rogue against its own partners and allies.
Deterrence against an invasion of Taiwan is certainly weakened.
I just hope that the supposed planning for an 'invasion of Panama' to seize the canal never happens. There're no guard rails around Trump anymore and I don't think the military brass would ever refuse even without explicit support for war from Congress.
If the US were to do that it would be the final nail in the coffin of the 'rule-based world order' as though the US has done wars in the past (post-WW2 i mean) it's never done so for conquest. Additionally, a guerilla war against the US would likely happen in Panama for years which would destroy any economic 'benefits' of outright US ownership.
A US war against Panama would also outline the vulnerability of Canada and Mexico. Canada at least has the rest of NATO as a deterrence. Mexico however is without formal allies. This could lead to it joining NATO (a positive development) or to partnering with the PRC (less likely but still possible due to money available).
Re: Great Power contentions
Unless Trump durably shuts down the USAI contracted pipeline (unfortunately Biden left billions on the table here and was generally extremely slow, Euro-slow, on actually settling contracts, notwithstanding even their relevance/soundness, which is more technical to comment on), there's not really any difference in the long-term prospect we observed for Ukraine a year ago compared to now or a year from now. Russia's industrial, economic, demographic, and materiel limits remain what they are (another 1-1.5 years of hard press in LSCO), Ukraine will never develop the skills and heavy formations necessary to have any hope of retaking territory (though they seem to have gotten wiser about dynamic defense this winter), and their morale remains comparable to Russian morale, or maybe worse.
Same situation as a year ago regardless of who's in office. This is actually analogous to the Israel-Palestine situation, where both a Biden/Harris or a Trump admin also seemed poised to entail the long-term destruction of the Palestinian state project in the long-term. It wasn't even clear which government would result in less human suffering before the 'final solution', though I'd suggest Trump is worse for Palestinian lives and livelihoods in aggregate.
The one wildcard a year ago was just how low Ukrainian morale could go. Too low and there was a serious risk of an operational collapse occurring somewhere, and spreading into a strategic collapse that took down UFOR east of the Dnieper, or even the government itself. But by late last year it was pretty clear that Ukrainian morale had stabilized, as had the government's legitimacy - despite sinking fast after the failed 2023 campaign, by the end of last year Zelensky still maintained majority approval, which is quite a feat in a democratic system nowadays. So in other words, it's far from obvious that the Russians have such a surfeit of will as to outlast Ukraine. Maybe the Kursk Offensive even supported this resolve, I don't know. Also this winter the RuFOR operational tempo has declined dramatically, in part due to more effective UFOR spoiling attacks against their salients. To be fair, part of the picture is probably just waiting for clear decisions by the new Trump admin, as well as the exhaustion of reserves following a ridiculously protracted and intense year-plus-long campaign. And combat activity remains elevated far above 2022-3 averages overall. On the other hand, the UFOR equipment pipeline and stockpile from EU/US donations, arms contracts, and domestic production remains very ample for defensive purposes, as long as Ukraine can manage its manpower situation properly.
But TLDR: Stalemate. Same as always. It's hard to see Ukraine collapsing, but Russia won't stop until it's convinced there's no further point for the time being. It can aspire to taking the rest of Donetsk, most optimistically continuing to roll up the old southern front to the Dnieper, but not really any more.
I'd be more worried about Chinese influence in Africa and Latin America now that the US has gone fully rogue.
Re: Great Power contentions
Re: Great Power contentions
Re: Great Power contentions
So it's finally happened. Israel has wiped out Iran's air defense network and has been begging the US to stabilize the situation and/or finish the job (the long-term process remaining murky as always). Trump is mulling over how much of a geopolitical 'free pass' this situation constitutes, for the sake of the immediate news cycle at least.
In reference to former general Petraeus' comments on demanding unconditional surrender from Iran with the threat of "the complete destruction of your country and your regime and your people", after which we "reluctantly we blow them to smithereens", someone posted the following:
Quote:
Old-time conservatives are people who are desperate to convince themselves that it is absolutely necessary to behave barbarously in this unfortunate circumstance, reluctantly of course.
Trumper conservatives are people who openly want to hurt others in as many ways as possible.
Re: Great Power contentions
Re: Great Power contentions
12 (14?) bombs and an automatic insistence on severe damage in the immediate aftermath suggests to me Trump and JCS conceive of this strike primarily as a negotiating tactic, as opposed to a genuine attempt to neutralize Iranian nuclear facilities and materials. 12 GBU-57 is an expensive demonstration though, and if Iran holds firm, Trump may have locked himself into expending the majority of our inventory in successive gestures. The problem of Israeli and American disalignment on the issue - the Israelis have for decades sought generational outcomes, that would allow them to dominate future relations with any party in the region into the long-term, while before the Israeli escalation even Trump has signaled he would be satisfied with an enhanced JCPOA - complicates projections. But at least, they don't really have the capabilities for additional provocations at scale.
Re: Great Power contentions
BDA is going to be difficult. The initial assessment that the bombs hit where they were targeted and penetrated appropriately means that, if it worked, the underground demolition effect would collapse tons of earth on the target and obscure any resulting damage. I suspect we are going to have to rely on satelite recon photos of Iranian efforts at the sites, trace measurements of radioactivity v normal background radiation (I will presume they have a baseline from before or my tax dollars have been horribly mis-spent), and probably humint passed along by Mossad to get a real sense of the results.
Re: Great Power contentions
The question may be moot, as the evidence is that most things of importance were evacuated prior to the American raid, so hitting those sites again, as well as the newer, deeper ones being built, is a waste of money and goes against Trump's rhetoric*. Iran is defenseless as it is, and Netanyahu - maybe too early to say - seems satisfied in proving his point. Israel has escalation dominance throughout the region, the US can potentially be invoked as a trump card at any time, and the Iranian nuclear program will struggle to establish itself beyond its preexisting level of progress until it can address its extensive infiltration (the overhead surveillance was already a fact of life).
*I know, I know, but Trump actually has a long and consistent record of limited, symbolic bombings and attacks in the Middle East in the pursuit of ostentatious "peace." He would have done it to North Korea too, had they not already had a longstanding nuclear arsenal, and/or had Kim not won him over.
