We've all been pointing this out for years.
The exemption from ever-closer-union failed in finding a tactical compromise that had no bearing on the strategic problem. An exemption from ever closer union doesn’t achieve anything useful in this context.
Britain’s ability to maintain its ‘special status’ has changed. Originally it depended on the power of veto. With the arrival of QMV it has depended on its ability to gather a blocking minority of euro outs. With the Lisbon vote-weight changes that came into effect in 2014 the eurozone nations alone have a qualified majority, and that matters because the ECB will caucus a ‘consensus’ opinion of its members. So the last great gambit was the renegotiation, at the end of which Belgium et-al insisted that the exemption from ever-closer-union must apply only to Britain.
http://archive.openeurope.org.uk/Con...safeguards.pdf
To give an example of what this problem looks like in practice:
In short, we face a serious (future) problem whereby a integrated economic union of eurozone states begin to caucus decisions against the policy consensus of the EBU, the consequence of which would be that Britain ceased to be a sovereign nation. Once we cease to be a sovereign nation we instead become a sanjak, such as Greece was under the ottomans and is again today under the troika.