Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Quote:
Originally Posted by Agent Miles
And that article by a PC gamer discusses an invasion after the conquest of all the jungles that the Japanese wasted their effort on. That probably is true, except, that I ‘m talking about a DoW on the U.S. only, followed by a blitzkrieg aimed at the West Coast. Every bit of logistics that was used to move troops thousands of miles to take places like Rabaul, etc., instead is aimed at Midway and then Hawaii. The entire IJN focused on one immediate goal, Invasion U.S.A. We can be very jaded today about how incredibly lucky we were, but that doesn’t change the situation as it really was. The Japanese had the best fighter in the world, pilots with thousands of combat hours, more carriers and battlewagons, better optics, heavy cruisers with killer torpedoes, a light infantry army that didn’t need miles of trucks to supply it, and years of experience at the business at hand. Somehow it takes more logistics to take L.A. than to do all the other conquests that the Japanese managed instead? That’s everyone’s point, right?
There is no way the Japanese step foot on the US mainland. I wish they had tried the war would've been over by '42.
Besides what does the US offer anyway? A longer front ? Broken supply lines? Do you really think FDR would've negotiated with the sub-human japs? It would've been a disaster complete and utter.
02-04-2009, 22:45
Uesugi Kenshin
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Quote:
Originally Posted by Agent Miles
Right, so the Japanese live off the land while they destroy a quarter of the U.S. aircraft industry and slaughter millions of Americans. How many ships fed the Japanese soldiers that surrendered in the Philipines in the 1960’s? You want FDR to let Europe starve while you scorch the west coast? I don't think that Churchill or Stalin would agree to a Japan first strategy.
As you point out, Japan took those objectives in SE Asia.
Ummm the guys who surrendered after the '40's were tiny groups weren't they? It's much harder for a few thousand men, not to mention the number of men required to do anything on the US West Coast, to survive off the land than it is for four or five guys.
I think you're completely off-base with your idea that Japan could attack the US mainland. There is some chance that the Japanese could have done something to Hawaii, but the west coast was completely out of their reach. Even if they landed troops there they would have basically been left there with no supplies and US forces would have been quickly organized to stamp them out. Millions would not have been slaughtered.
02-04-2009, 22:58
Husar
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
The japanese could have quickly taken the whole west coast, held parts of the population hostage, then secured the corn fields in the midwest and starved the rest of the US, the US could have never reacted to such a blitz strategy in time and would have been on the defensive before they had really gathered any men while millions of japanese would come from the west coast.
Pretty easy victory, they would've had the supplies they needed before the US president had been informed, I mean it's not like the whole west coast was empty with no food to be found anywhere.
02-04-2009, 23:36
Meneldil
Re : WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
I'm not going to go in the what-if game, because there are simply too many factors to take into account. I'll just say that :
- A large part of the Japanese army was stuck in China, fighting a more and more organized opponent.
- The Japanese barely had the logistics to conquer a few islands in the pacific. Successfully invading and holding the American West coast would have been much more demanding.
- The US wouldn't have starved to death by losing the Midwest, just like USSR wasn't starved to death by loosing Ukrainia and most of its western part, just like China wasn't starved to death when it lost most of its coastal areas.
- By 1941, it was pretty obvious that what was going on was *big*, and that losing would probably mean you're screwed for good. Churchill understood it, Stalin understood it later. I doubt FDR would have been oblivious of that fact.
- Japan has been traditionally cautious of Gaijins (and still is, I'd say). Hence why most of the -somewhat- rational japanese leaders were against a full-scale war against the US.
As for the japanese army's capabilities proper, I'm not sure I agree with the idea that the early IJA was a perfect warmachine. They fought mostly badly outnumbered (colonial forces in Asia) or underequiped (Chinese) opponents.
I mean, they fought against colonial garrisons (mostly unexperienced and outnumbered), or armies that were badly equiped and organized. Add to that the fact Japanese did a great job at hiring locals to fight with them (warlords in China, nationalists in Burma, Indonesia and Indochina).
As for the whole suicide thing, I'm not sure it was considered as a viable strategy (except for the Kamikaze), but more as a way to die honorably when a battle was apparently lost. Funny thing is that Kamikaze didn't have much choice as well, since they didn't have the oil to go back to Japan after their raids.
That probably explain also why the IJA asked civilians to kill themselves (or murdered them) when everything was going wrong.
02-04-2009, 23:57
CBR
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Quote:
Originally Posted by Agent Miles
Right, so the Japanese live off the land while they destroy a quarter of the U.S. aircraft industry and slaughter millions of Americans.
We are talking modern day armies. They cannot live off the land like an army could do 200 years ago. Shells and bullets don't grow on trees. One might get lucky to take fuel but otherwise that has to be transported too.
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How many ships fed the Japanese soldiers that surrendered in the Philipines in the 1960’s?
I fail to see how a few fanatic survivors compares with a fully functioning army.
You want Japan to attack and occupy Midway and Hawaii and then move on to US west coast right?
Even if we assume Japan had the capacity to transport all the 11 divisions how long would it have taken to neutralize Hawaii? A few days, a few weeks? How long to embark all troops minus losses and forces needed to occupy the islands. Then maybe another 10 days for freighters to reach the coast of California. I doubt in invasion could have been possible before early January 1942 and that is assuming everything runs by the clock, and Clausewitz had something to say about war and friction but hey never mind that.
So assuming no troubles from US carriers or submarines the Japanese armada finally spots the coast of California. That should be a piece of cake right?
Maybe we should look at the historical US response to Pearl Harbor. By early February 1942 the Western Defense Command had about 250,000 soldiers incl 6 infantry divisions, a cavalry regiment and 14 AA regiments. Even by late December 1941 3 infantry divisions were located there.
A couple of weeks after Pearl Harbor they actually relaxed a bit as it became obvious that there was no immediate threat. So we can safely assume troops would have been sent there faster if they actually thought there was going to be an invasion.
So even if assuming that the few hundred aircrafts that had been gathered there was not enough to upset Japanese air superiority, and assuming that the US troops were green, would a Japanese army of maybe 9 divisions and 4,500 miles from home just have a walkover when they invaded California?
Well you can guess what I think of their chances...
And then there are pesky things like the Philippines having even more time to mobilize but of course that does not matter much as long as the Japanese are losing on the other side of the Pacific.
CBR
02-05-2009, 00:31
PanzerJaeger
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Quote:
Originally Posted by CBR
Looking at losses provided by Wikipedia which comes from the book " Bodenplatte: The Luftwaffe's Last Hope" then the Allied lost 336 planes and had 190 damaged versus Luftwaffe losses of 271 lost and 65 damaged. Destroying 24% more than you lose could be considered a tactical success I guess but when looking at permanent pilot losses (213 KIA or POW) for the Luftwaffe, while the allied lost nowhere near that as many planes were destroyed on the ground, then it was an utter failure.
As mentioned, a not insignificant portion of the Luftwaffe losses can be attributed to their own Flak guns due to clerical oversight. I'm not sure that should be involved in a comparison of their performance against their targets. In any event, any German loss at this point could be considered irreplaceable as they were so numerically inferior - whether it be a pilot or a simple rifleman. Had the US forces had any equity of scale with their German counterparts, I think Baseplate would have been a significant achievement. In fact, their ability to launch the operation at all and the success they did manage was a significant achievement, albeit insignificant to the overall effort. :dizzy2:
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To compare with Japan: Late '44 the average Navy fighter pilot had 40 hours of flying time and the Army apparently were down to 60 or 70 hours. But have found one claim that said 100 hours for the Navy so not sure which number is correct.
Luftwaffe training had been cut down to around 100-110 hours by '44. In the summer that year a survey of their pilots found that a majority of the pilots had seen between 8 to 30 days active service. Only a small percentage had an average of 3 months of service.
So depending on what number we pick the two airforces either had similar training or it was worse for the Japanese. If it was worse that would partially explain why their late war performance was worse than the Luftwaffe.
Very interesting. This is the type of info I was looking for. :bow:
The Japanese forces don't seem to be as well documented as the other combatants. There is definitely info out there - especially on the technical specs of their ships and planes, but not the wealth and detail that there is on the others.
Any info on the tactics and training of the ground forces?
Quote:
Originally Posted by Meneldil
Things got out of hands in China because the Kuomintang (and later, the CCP) were too stuborn to give up, and because the local japanese generals went crazy (against the IJA headquarters' opinion), not because Japan wanted to conquer whole China and exterminate the Chinese population. They did it because they couldn't force the nationalists to accept peace, and thus, had to fight to death.
Could you expand on that some?
02-05-2009, 01:39
CBR
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Quote:
Originally Posted by PanzerJaeger
As mentioned, a not insignificant portion of the Luftwaffe losses can be attributed to their own Flak guns due to clerical oversight. I'm not sure that should be involved in a comparison of their performance against their targets. In any event, any German loss at this point could be considered irreplaceable as they were so numerically inferior - whether it be a pilot or a simple rifleman. Had the US forces had any equity of scale with their German counterparts, I think Baseplate would have been a significant achievement. In fact, their ability to launch the operation at all and the success they did manage was a significant achievement, albeit insignificant to the overall effort. :dizzy2:
First I'll have to make a small correction as I forgot to add the few Ju88's that was lost/damaged too so total German loss was 280/69. It says 84 were shot down by their own AAA (another 88 from Allied AAA)
I'm not judging their performance based on losses. And of course there are several ways to judge it. One way of looking at it would be losses from air to air combat only. In that case it appears to be 62/25 in favor of the Allies but maybe having bomb loads would have had an effect. But there is no doubt there was a difference in skill.
I'm merely looking at the consequences of the operation. It hurt the Luftwaffe more than it hurt the Allies. And yes there is no denying that they did manage to launch an operation like that and even achieve surprise but that is just half the battle and they failed in the other half as it was just too ambitious. Adolf Galland was also against the operation according to Wiki.
In the end it would not have mattered much because as you say any loss was irreplaceable and the war was to end in defeat in a few months anyway. But if one looks at the way they could have done the most damage to the Allies then Bodenplatte was the wrong way. Not sure about the survival rates but it might have been somewhere between 50-70% (unless at low altitude) so as long as the pilot is shot down over friendly area he can jump into another fighter after a quick smoke and coffee :beam:
Quote:
The Japanese forces don't seem to be as well documented as the other combatants. There is definitely info out there - especially on the technical specs of their ships and planes, but not the wealth and detail that there is on the others.
Any info on the tactics and training of the ground forces?
Well I gotta admit I'm more attracted to their sexy looking warships and airplanes than their army. Although they managed to show some strategic skill that surprised the allies in the beginning of the war, my impression of their army is that it was somewhat lacking.
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
The Japanese were in a total war with us. We did nuke two of their cities. I am pretty sure that the IJA would do whatever their Emperor ordered.
The Japanese would get to the West Coast with enough supplies to take their objectives, just as they did in SE Asia. Then they could live off the land like I said, unless FDR burned California to the ground. The “divisions” that the U.S. called up in two months were no more trained soldiers of a professional army than those colonial forces that the Japanese defeated in SE Asia. The Wehrmacht was poorly supplied in Russia that first winter. It didn’t stop them from destroying half that country. Sure we would still defeat the Japanese. The choice is, stubbornly continue to fight Japan or sign a truce. Millions of Americans would have died and the country would have been ruined. In the meantime, Hitler could conquer a starving Russia in the summer of ’42 and Churchill would have to do the best he could with a starving Britain alone against Fascist Europe.
The U.S. was prostrate in early 1942. Our army was totally untrained. The main power of our navy was in ruins except for a few aircraft carriers and a new theory of naval power that 90% of the naval commanders didn’t even believe in (we still built battleships after PH). Our aircraft were obsolete or outclassed by the Japanese. We had totally underestimated our foe the way all of you still do today.
02-05-2009, 16:07
Sarmatian
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Even if I do agree that US troops lacked training and experience, I certainly wouldn't equate them with colonial troops IJA defeated in SE Asia. Those colonial troops were little more than a police force, they weren't reinforced or properly supplied and they lacked armour. Japan's infantrymen were fierce fighters, due to their rigorous training and discipline but they couldn't compete against a modern mechanized army which uses combined arms, as was evident at Khalkin Gol, where they were trounced by the Soviets. Read the article provided by CBR (thanks for the article CBR btw, great read)
It is impossible for a modern army to live of the land. Even if they do manage to find enough food (which is questionable), they would still need medical supplies, ammunition, spare parts etc... Where did you see a WW2 army living of the land? Those isolated groups of 5-10 soldiers that got lost in various jungles in SE Asia can't be considered an army.
Even if it were remotely possible for them to actually land on west coast, the end result would be the loss of all those troops and defeat of Japan much before 1945. Surprisingly, that's the reason they didn't try it...
02-05-2009, 16:44
Agent Miles
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
The U.S. didn't have a modern mechanized army in 1942. We didn't have anything resembling that in Jan. '42. Why does everyone seem to think that Patton's Third Army would have defended the West Coast?
Here's a link by a USN Commander about sealift in WW2. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87...campaigns.html
Specifically the Japanese:
"The rate of successful delivery of military supplies to front line units averaged 96% in 1942, declining to 83% in 1943, 67% in 1944 and 51% in 1945.(90) These statistics fail to capture the extraordinary indirect effects of both U.S. submarine and air attacks on Japanese merchants as the Japanese had to resort to carrying much of their supplies within the combat zones by slow, inefficient means such as barges, fishing boats and the like. These direct and indirect effects of U.S. attacks clearly impacted Japanese army units. Throughout the war, munitions deliveries were 15% below front line needs, and 33 to 50% of all food sent to the front was lost due to attack or spoilage.(91) Accounts from front line units depict significant efforts to make up for lack of food deliveries by gardening, fishing, or bartering with natives with sporadic accounts of cannibalism in especially poorly supplied areas like New Guinea.(92)"
This hardly describes a situation in which the Japanese would be starving. They had 6 million tons of merchant shipping. We only had 16 M tons in the Pacific at the end of the war. The torpedoes on U.S. subs didn't even work at the beginning of the war.
1.4 million draftees were taken into the U.S. army in the summer of ’41. Although seven months training may give you a half-way trained private, it certainly isn’t enough time to train sergeants or officers to lead them. Even by Kasserine, we still weren’t ready. Only skilled pilots knew how to survive combat with Zeros and you have to survive that combat to become a skilled pilot. Our tanks were ridiculous. As with the navy commanders, 90% of our Army officers were ready to fight WW1 again. Now all this formidable war machine must do is protect a thousand miles of coastline from a real army.
02-05-2009, 17:12
CBR
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Quote:
Originally Posted by Agent Miles
The Japanese were in a total war with us.
That is the problem isn't? Japan did not plan nor prepare for a total war as they thought they could win with a bit of shock and awe that would make the decadent and weak Americans cave in. That was the problem for the Axis powers in general really: the Allies thought in longterm for both production and training and won the war on attrition.
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We did nuke two of their cities.
The US ability and willingness to use nuclear weapons in 1945 says nothing about Japanese ability and realistic objectives in 1941.
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I am pretty sure that the IJA would do whatever their Emperor ordered.
Most of the Japanese army was busy in China so it does not matter what the Emperor wanted. Even if they magically produced 200 divisions out of thin air they would also have to magically produce a large freighter fleet to transport such an army.
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The Japanese would get to the West Coast with enough supplies to take their objectives, just as they did in SE Asia. Then they could live off the land like I said, unless FDR burned California to the ground. The “divisions” that the U.S. called up in two months were no more trained soldiers of a professional army than those colonial forces that the Japanese defeated in SE Asia. The Wehrmacht was poorly supplied in Russia that first winter. It didn’t stop them from destroying half that country.
I don't see how you can even compare the ability or ~10 Japanese divisions to 150+ Axis divisions in Russia. And yes they had trouble with supplies in the winter '41 and had been advancing for several months with more or less proper supplies. A modern army does not work unless it has supplies. The ammunition takes up more weight than its food.
If you noticed in my Pearl Harbor link it is even stated that the Japanese High Command admitted before the Midway operation that they could not even supply a garrison there. So that invasion would ultimately have been temporary.
Here is an interesting Time Magazine article from March 1942 talking about the problems with lack of shipping. It also mentions how 3.5 tons of shipping was needed so supply one soldier in France in WW1 and that number now was higher. Such a number would also increase the further away one has to transport stuff and the Pacific is a bigger ocean than the Atlantic: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ar...3059-1,00.html
Luckily someone did all the calculations for a Japanese invasion of Hawaii. It is a very long post that involves lots of numbers and logistics.
Here is one quote regarding shipping needs for one division:
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Calculating IJA shipping requirements.
The TO&E of a typical IJA triangular division (reinforced) is here
ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japa.../hb-17.jpg
24,600 men
7,930 Horses
3,500 Horse carts (assumed)
411 LMG's
453 50mm knee mortars
78 A/T rifles
114 x HMG's
18 x 37mm A.A.
72 x 70 or 75 mm gun
12 x 105 mm gun
7 Tanks
284 trucks.
15 cars.
Food supplies: 2 months.
Units of fire: 2
Supplies: gasoline, lubricants: 2 months
Summary: Cubic Feet / % of total lift
Using the USMC tables and the assumptions described above, the shipping costs for the reinforced IJA division at the link above are:
Men and Baggage: 2,263,200 cubic feet. = 40% Horses, baggage and equipment: 1,732,560 cubic feet = 30.7% Tanks: 7,091 cubic feet = Negligible Divisional weapons: 42,332 cubic feet = 1% Vehicles: 328,099 cubic feet = 4.9% Support and construction: 21,066 cubic feet = negligible Ammunition: 354,295 cubic feet = 6.3% Food (Horses and men): 863,244 cubic feet = 15.3% Gasoline and lubricants: 39,973 cubic feet = 1%
Total cubic volume: 5,651,861 cubic feet.
Shipping required @ 30 cubic feet per ship ton = 188,395 tons.
So 188,395 tons for one division. When looking at the total amount of shipping it becomes obvious that Japan did not have the capacity for more than a few divisions.
But the conclusion is that it was possible but not a sure thing. And also we would now be looking at late Jan/early Feb before that operation is even over. Even if it was possible to go further and invade California it would most likely be March if they were unrealistically quick. And still not involve a lot of troops.
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
The hypothetical Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor is explored in-depth by author/historian Harry Turtledove in his novels Days of Infamy and End of the Beginning. The author captures the flavor of the period extremely well, both novels are solidly written, and get good reviews. Given his historian background, no glaring historical anomalies are found here. Good stuff - recommended. :2thumbsup:
02-05-2009, 19:07
Agent Miles
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
To clarify, I was not talking about the Japanese doing everything they did in WW2 and then invading the U.S. As CBR's earlier link argued, that would not work. I was always arguing that the Japanese manpower, sealift and supplies that they did have and did use in SE Asia and the Pacific taking their objectives should have been used in a blitzkrieg directed against Midway (when it was defenseless), then Hawaii before it was reinforced (B-17s can fly to Hawaii, but not fighters and you cannot reinforce or hold anything without control of the air) and then the West Coast (when a paper army was our only defense). Everything that could be spared would focus on this goal the way Clausewitz would want it. The Japanese would still lose a protracted war, but to fight this protracted war instead of signing a truce, FDR would have to abandon Russia to Hitler (T-34 crews don’t fight well if they don’t eat our lend-lease food and we literally fed Russia) and perhaps force Churchill to a truce with a Nazi dominated Europe. Millions of Americans would perish and we would have to fight the battle for Okinawa a thousand times to retake California.
I have shown that the IJN had enough sealift to do this and that their forces would generate enough combat power to meet this goal. If need be, the IJA in China could suck it up for a few months so that a maximum effort could be made against the U.S. The Japanese sealift would be taking supplies to the West Coast and bringing back whatever can be plundered, to include slave labor. U.S. subs operating from, Panama I suppose would be using the torpedoes that didn’t work against these merchant ships. As soon as FDR sees the light, you give back the continental possessions in return for a truce with open trade, and then gear up to overrun Asia.
No one has demonstrated how the Japanese supplies and sealift that did exist at that time and were used effectively would somehow only work everywhere except against the U.S. mainland. No one has explained how the real U.S. military that existed in early 1942 would manage to stop this despite inferior equipment, training and skill.
02-05-2009, 21:00
Uesugi Kenshin
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Quote:
Originally Posted by Agent Miles
1.4 million draftees were taken into the U.S. army in the summer of ’41. Although seven months training may give you a half-way trained private, it certainly isn’t enough time to train sergeants or officers to lead them. Even by Kasserine, we still weren’t ready. Only skilled pilots knew how to survive combat with Zeros and you have to survive that combat to become a skilled pilot. Our tanks were ridiculous. As with the navy commanders, 90% of our Army officers were ready to fight WW1 again. Now all this formidable war machine must do is protect a thousand miles of coastline from a real army.
If our tanks were ridiculous the Japanese tanks were more like paper-covered rickshaws. The M-3 Lee would probably have been a sufficient tank to combat the Japanese tank forces at the time and it was just an interim solution for us.
Not only have you completely failed to show that the Japanese would have been able to put any number of divisions on the shores of California, but you have also assumed that the American populace wouldn't fight back, the US army would be powerless to stop the relatively ineffective force that was the IJA, and that the US would be willing to surrender to the Japanese even though Roosevelt was looking for a reason to get into the war, but couldn't for a while because of the lack of domestic support.
02-05-2009, 21:37
Agent Miles
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
The Japanese airpower would rule the battlefield, even against a large militia. Again, I’m not talking about the Japanese defeating America. I have always said truce. They will punish us so badly that FDR must sue for peace or lose the war in Europe. Attacking the U.S. mainland would do what the Japanese did not accomplish. Millions of Chinese citizens resisted too. They were slaughtered and much of their country was occupied. Are you saying that the Japanese could not scrape together enough tonnage to invade the U.S. with several divisions of trained professionals and make any headway because citizens would stop them?
02-05-2009, 21:53
Seamus Fermanagh
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Quote:
Originally Posted by Agent Miles
To clarify, I was not talking about the Japanese doing everything they did in WW2 and then invading the U.S. As CBR's earlier link argued, that would not work. I was always arguing that the Japanese manpower, sealift and supplies that they did have and did use in SE Asia and the Pacific taking their objectives should have been used in a blitzkrieg directed against Midway (when it was defenseless), then Hawaii before it was reinforced (B-17s can fly to Hawaii, but not fighters and you cannot reinforce or hold anything without control of the air) and then the West Coast (when a paper army was our only defense). Everything that could be spared would focus on this goal the way Clausewitz would want it. The Japanese would still lose a protracted war, but to fight this protracted war instead of signing a truce, FDR would have to abandon Russia to Hitler (T-34 crews don’t fight well if they don’t eat our lend-lease food and we literally fed Russia) and perhaps force Churchill to a truce with a Nazi dominated Europe. Millions of Americans would perish and we would have to fight the battle for Okinawa a thousand times to retake California.
I have shown that the IJN had enough sealift to do this and that their forces would generate enough combat power to meet this goal. If need be, the IJA in China could suck it up for a few months so that a maximum effort could be made against the U.S. The Japanese sealift would be taking supplies to the West Coast and bringing back whatever can be plundered, to include slave labor. U.S. subs operating from, Panama I suppose would be using the torpedoes that didn’t work against these merchant ships. As soon as FDR sees the light, you give back the continental possessions in return for a truce with open trade, and then gear up to overrun Asia.
No one has demonstrated how the Japanese supplies and sealift that did exist at that time and were used effectively would somehow only work everywhere except against the U.S. mainland. No one has explained how the real U.S. military that existed in early 1942 would manage to stop this despite inferior equipment, training and skill.
While your concept for creating victory was better than that used by the Japanese Empire, Japan simply didn't have the tools to follow it through.
The IJA had a little over 51 divisions in 1941, the IJN could have fielded 5 or so more. Even if we assume that China/Korea could be sopped off with only 10 divisions or so, and even assuming that the Phillipines and Commonwealth forces would do nothing, we still have a force of no more than 45 divisions that could be deployed.
Deploying that force for a two-month operation, as noted above, would take approximately 10.6M tons of shipping. At the outset of the war, Japan had roughly 6.4M tonnes of available shipping. Since Destroyers doubled as fast transports for the IJN, we can add a bit more to that, but using virtually everything in Japan produces a total maximum force of 39 Divisions.
Let us assume that 1 Division is employed for taking out the small bases such as Midway and Johnston Island, and 3 Divisions are deployed to Hawaii to take out the defenders there. That leaves 35 divisions. This sounds like a huge force, but....
Vancouver through Tiajuana is a HUGE swath of territory. Yes, forces present in the area could have done no more than delay Japanese advances, but the USA would have had 30 plus divisions on the line within 90 days, and many more thereafter. Yes, their traing would have been horrible and casualties high, but they would have started better equipped than all but the Japanese Guard formations. Given the comparative supply lines involved, the turnaround would have been rapid.
Moreover, subjugating the populace would have been impossible. Even more so than the East, Western Americans of the era were well supplied with weapons, and once some of the initial shock wore off, would willingly have used them on anyone with an epicanthic fold. With an attack on the Mainland, the ensuing bloodbath would have been hideous. Nor would any forgiveness have been offered. Japan would have been eradicated root and branch.
Any effort to invade and occupy the US mainland would have been a disaster, however costly for the USA.
Now, occupying Hawaii with a massive surprise invasion and launching large scale raids against the USA at the same time might have worked. Instead of sending 35 divisions on a hopeless quest, you send 5 to Panama, 3 to Hawaii, and 3 each to SFO, LA, Diego, and the Puget sound with the intent of wrecking everything they can't steal but also of being back on their boats in 2 weeks or less (except in Hawaii and possibly Panama) This would have ripped holes in the aircraft industry, the naval building program, and destroyed the Galliard cut in Panama. Full recovery would have taken years and the USA would have been on the defensive for closer to two years instead of 6 months. Opsec for so much activity would have been difficult to say the least, but....
02-05-2009, 23:00
CBR
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Quote:
Originally Posted by Seamus Fermanagh
At the outset of the war, Japan had roughly 6.4M tonnes of available shipping. Since Destroyers doubled as fast transports for the IJN, we can add a bit more to that, but using virtually everything in Japan produces a total maximum force of 39 Divisions.
And if the Japanese Navy needed 1.4 million tons then I guess they had a good reason for it. Unless shutting down the Japanese industry(a bit odd when you go off to war) and civilian economy there would also be a need for the 2.7 million tons that had been allocated to that.
That leaves around 2.1-2.5 million tons for the army with a third of that needed for supplying China.
The operation described in the axis history forum link I gave use about half of the remaining army shipping. So unless we accept the "If need be, the IJA in China could suck it up for a few months" which is again rather odd since the army was fighting and even losing a large battle in the days and weeks after PH, then we can expect an army effort twice as strong as in the Axis History link.
Going through the use of tankers in that link Japan uses about half of their overall capacity and it would have to be increased by 50% for the extra range needed to reach California(3 instead of 2 tanker groups cycling back to Japan)
And if we then double the army shipping capacity or even triple it and forget about China then I'm starting to doubt if the remaining 25-30% tanker capacity was enough.
CBR
02-06-2009, 05:05
Seamus Fermanagh
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Quote:
Originally Posted by CBR
And if the Japanese Navy needed 1.4 million tons then I guess they had a good reason for it. Unless shutting down the Japanese industry(a bit odd when you go off to war) and civilian economy there would also be a need for the 2.7 million tons that had been allocated to that.
That leaves around 2.1-2.5 million tons for the army with a third of that needed for supplying China.
The operation described in the axis history forum link I gave use about half of the remaining army shipping. So unless we accept the "If need be, the IJA in China could suck it up for a few months" which is again rather odd since the army was fighting and even losing a large battle in the days and weeks after PH, then we can expect an army effort twice as strong as in the Axis History link.
Going through the use of tankers in that link Japan uses about half of their overall capacity and it would have to be increased by 50% for the extra range needed to reach California(3 instead of 2 tanker groups cycling back to Japan)
And if we then double the army shipping capacity or even triple it and forget about China then I'm starting to doubt if the remaining 25-30% tanker capacity was enough.
CBR
Good points. I was just suggesting that no read of their sealift says an invasion of anything past Hawaii was doable (and that would have been tough). My thoughts on a large raid would be a "best case" for Japan -- if the ships weren't back moving supplies inside 6 weeks, Japan would have ground to a halt.
02-06-2009, 06:13
CBR
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Quote:
Originally Posted by Seamus Fermanagh
Good points. I was just suggesting that no read of their sealift says an invasion of anything past Hawaii was doable (and that would have been tough). My thoughts on a large raid would be a "best case" for Japan -- if the ships weren't back moving supplies inside 6 weeks, Japan would have ground to a halt.
Yeah sure, I merely wanted to add some numbers for the "regular case"
CBR
02-06-2009, 15:51
Agent Miles
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
How many Americans can you slaughter with 50,000 bayonets?
When you say that the Japanese chose not to fight a total war and couldn’t spare shipping for an invasion because it would have been really tough, you’re saying what I originally posted. Their failure is a failure of strategy. They did not make the strategic sacrifice necessary (no matter how tough) to use the military that they had with the merchant fleet they had and the supplies they had to rapidly and immediately do god awful damage to the U.S. when our attention needed to be on stopping Hitler. Yes, they would still lose…if FDR really wanted Rommel to overrun North Africa (because the Brits wouldn’t be getting any of our M-3 juggernauts) and the Russians to literally starve to death by the millions.
Untrained soldiers and an NRA militia are no more an army than a pile of bricks is a house. We had no answer to the Zero. Our aircraft would have been slaughtered and our ground troops pounded relentlessly. They would do to us what we did to the Germans in Normandy.
Either the Japanese destroy California and slaughter millions of Americans or FDR scorches California and throws human waves at their army, both of which have the same end result. Sure we can defeat the Japanese. In this case, however, we just lose the war in Europe, and don’t forget, Einstein told FDR that Hitler is the real enemy. Japan did exactly the wrong thing by building a Co-Prosperity Sphere and then just sitting there while the world took care of Hitler.
The link you gave CBR to the Kaigun homepage, is by two guys who turned their hobby into a book and a homepage. They don’t have one day of military service between them. Their conclusions are like two Catholic Priests saying that a three-way is just not possible.
02-06-2009, 16:20
CBR
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Quote:
Originally Posted by Agent Miles
The link you gave CBR, is by two guys who turned their hobby into a book and a homepage. They don’t have one day of military service between them. Their conclusions are like two Catholic Priests saying that a three-way is just not possible.
Sounds like an ad hominem argument to me. Finding holes in their logistical arguments would do you more credit or are we just to trust your military experience?
CBR
02-06-2009, 16:46
Kagemusha
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Quote:
Originally Posted by Agent Miles
Right, so the Japanese live off the land while they destroy a quarter of the U.S. aircraft industry and slaughter millions of Americans. How many ships fed the Japanese soldiers that surrendered in the Philipines in the 1960’s? You want FDR to let Europe starve while you scorch the west coast? I don't think that Churchill or Stalin would agree to a Japan first strategy.
As you point out, Japan took those objectives in SE Asia.
You think that US would have capitulated if invaded? I think the opposite. Surely invasion might have positive effect on European war for Germany, since US would have made it sure to focus on completely defeating Japan as their top priority.
With the huge depth of US, they could have even evacuated West coast to midwest, while gearing up their own forces. I see no chance not so ever for any hypothetical Japanese invasion to succeed.
02-06-2009, 19:49
Agent Miles
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Well after 21 years in the army, I know what doesn’t make an army and that you cannot operate anywhere without control of the air. Bean counters will tell you that Hannibal can’t get elephants over the Alps or that Rommel doesn’t have a mountain of supplies, so don't worry about him.
I never, ever, said that the Japanese would win.
TRUCE TRUCE TRUCE TRUCE TRUCE
FDR could ignore everyone else and become Abraham Lincoln in an American tragedy, or he could appease the Japanese and prevent Hitler from nuking the bajesus out of England (I know this was not possible, but FDR most certainly did not.).
That’s all I ever said. The Japanese should have gone right for the jugular if they wanted to get a truce. The international situation demanded U.S. involvement elsewhere. If the invasion failed they would lose no matter what. This was a better strategy than hiding in bunkers on worthless islands until the U.S. could afford to destroy them.
02-07-2009, 00:03
PanzerJaeger
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Quote:
Originally Posted by Agent Miles
Well after 21 years in the army, I know what doesn’t make an army and that you cannot operate anywhere without control of the air.
Disagree. Maybe with today's planes and technology, but not during WW2.
Look at the war in Europe. Russia completely lost air superiority, and even the ability to contest it, within the first days of Barbarossa. They were still able to operate for several years, mounting successful defensive and offensive operations without it. And when the tables turned, the Germans, too, were able to operate effectively.
Air power arguably played the most decisive role in Normandy. It was an unusually small front where the Allied air assets could be concentrated, and the German armor present was irreplaceable, making each loss especially detrimental. However, the Germans were still able to operate successfully against the Allies. The eventual collapse of that front was due indirectly to massive numerical inequalities between the two sides and more directly due to Hitler's insistence on a suicidal offensive - not Allied air power.
Air superiority was definitely an asset that commanders wanted on their side, but it was not necessary to operate effectively. I believe any "American" front opened by the Japanese on the West Coast would resemble the Eastern Front far more than Normandy. Japanese air superiority would be largely negated by the size of the front they would have to manage.
02-09-2009, 03:31
CBR
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Quote:
Originally Posted by Agent Miles
Bean counters will tell you that Hannibal can’t get elephants over the Alps or that Rommel doesn’t have a mountain of supplies, so don't worry about him.
Sounds like a straw man to me. No one here has said anything like that and even if they had and whether they are right or wrong has nothing to do with Japan in December 1941.
There are lots of "bean counter" examples in WW2. To mention a few: Patton ran out of fuel by late August 1944 as distance increased although the depots in Normandy were loaded with fuel.
Rommel ended up with a similar problem as he became overextended when he reached El Alamein. There were many thousand tons of supplies at Tobruk, Benghazi and further back at Tripoli. But not enough trucks to bring them forward.
Your comments seem to just dismiss logistics which I find rather odd.
Quote:
The Japanese should have gone right for the jugular if they wanted to get a truce.
Yes that is true. To even have a chance at either making peace with USA right away or later, by making it too difficult and bloody for USA to win, Japan had to do more or perhaps a lot less, than they did.
But you seem to be saying that what Japan had to do was also what they could do.
You claim that FDR would want a truce but why would he want to do that? If Japan is only attacking USA then you cannot even be sure Hitler would declare war on USA in the first place. So FDR might not even have to worry about two fronts. Even if he did, the situation in December 1941 (or rather February/March 1942) hardly looked bleak for the Allies. Sending supplies to Russia or Britain would only be slowed down if the situation was truly desperate for USA. A front still had to be opened in the European theater which took time so no need to hurry there.
I'm sure most troops could still be considered rather green by early 1942 and yes they had trouble when facing the Germans for the first time in North Africa. But there is certainly also a big difference between facing crack German panzer truppen and then a Japanese army that still used horses for transport and had less artillery than US infantry divisions.
In August/September the Louisiana maneuvers were held that involved 19 divisions with more than 400,000 men. Sure one exercise does not make a veteran army but they along with other divisions really should not be a walkover for a Japanese army that would find itself outnumbered and outgunned.
And the Japanese would have been outnumbered as the absolute maximum available number of divisions (used in the SE Asia offense plus reserves in Japan) would have been around 14 and that included several lower quality divisions. The rest were needed in China and if Japan wanted to give up on China (which was not an option politically) then they might as well just do that and have USA drop the oil embargo.
That still leaves the problem with finding shipping for all 14 divisions which would have had to be taken from the shipping that barely was enough to supply Japan. That really is not a great option either, especially when we are talking about an operation(s) that would take several months.
Japanese naval and air superiority would also be somewhat questioned. Of course we can only guess what type of naval actions that could take place during the Hawaii operation but at the time of Pearl Harbor 3 US carriers were in the Pacific with a fourth (Yorktown) leaving Norfolk Dec 16 and reaching San Diego Dec 30. If USA had felt seriously threatened it would be odd if not one or two more would have been sent from the Atlantic.
The Wildcat fighter might not have been the best but US carriers still managed to do some damage in the battles in the first half of 1942. So it would be rather dubious to outright dismiss the threat from just the historical US navy deployment even before the Japanese finally had taken Hawaii.
Even if USA gave up on Hawaii the Japanese invasion navy, with 6 fleet carriers, would have faced 4-6 US carriers that were supported by land based aircraft(perhaps not many but still) They would have been a serious threat to transports and hindered the Japanese ability to support their ground troops.
Now I'm not familiar with the locations of aircraft factories in California (if we assume that is an objective to protect for the army) but I doubt they were far away from major cities so it should not have been that difficult to protect. And with a slow moving fleet of transports and no clear air superiority it would have been difficult to achieve surprise. Even if the landing itself was unopposed the US army should have units and time enough to contain and eliminate the invasion force.
The combination of numerical superiority, surprise and supply line length that enabled Japan to take most of its objectives in SE Asia simply aren't there for a drive across the Pacific against USA. I cannot see how an American President would ever feel he would have to make peace/truce even with Japanese troops landing in California.
Just because we know that the historical strategy let to defeat does not mean any other strategy would have been better. Invading Hawaii would have been a better option than the California invasion, although still very risky. An even better option, also risky, would have been not to attack USA at all.
CBR
02-09-2009, 22:31
Seamus Fermanagh
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Quote:
Originally Posted by CBR
Now I'm not familiar with the locations of aircraft factories in California (if we assume that is an objective to protect for the army) but I doubt they were far away from major cities so it should not have been that difficult to protect. And with a slow moving fleet of transports and no clear air superiority it would have been difficult to achieve surprise. Even if the landing itself was unopposed the US army should have units and time enough to contain and eliminate the invasion force.
Boeing was HQ'd in Seattle. Martin, Lockheed, and Hughes all had facilities in the LA/Long Beach/Santa Ana area. Numerous others sprung up.
02-11-2009, 19:13
Agent Miles
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Taiheiyo sensou (太平洋戦争) – or the Pacific War (version 2.0)
The twelve divisions that the IJN supplied and moved for the invasion of the Philippines and Malaysia/Burma (which were: the Guard, 2nd, 5th, 16th, 18th, 33rd, 38th, 48th, 51st, 55th, 56th and 104th), as well as many separate brigades, are instead supplied and moved to Midway and then Hawaii. These were trained soldiers led by experienced officers who knew how to ‘shoot, move and communicate’. http://www.combinedfleet.com/pearlops.htm
CBR’s link kindly reports that the Japanese had earmarked 4 million tons of shipping to the war effort in their plan, which would more than suffice to move and supply twelve divisions in my scenario. Midway would have been a speed bump and the two divisions on Hawaii would not stand a chance against twelve divisions. All the carriers in the IJN would have easily attained air superiority against untrained, ill-equipped U.S. pilots. http://www.world-war-2-planes.com/mi...-aircraft.html
A6M Zero was the best plane in the world.
Only two USN carriers would be available to stop this attack in January ’42.
Admiral Halsey knew that his pilots could barely hit training targets, let alone combat ships.
Now, with twelve divisions on Hawaii and the most powerful carrier fleet in the world with 600+ ground based Zeros for use, the Japanese would be poised for an attack on the west coast by Feb./Mach ‘42
.
Of course, the U.S. would simply sink those four million tons of cargo ships. http://www.historynet.com/us-torpedo...rld-war-ii.htm
The Torpedo problem http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japa...-Losses-4.html
Actual Japanese Merchant Shipping losses
Failing this, 1.4 million draftees that could barely march together and had never fired a shot in anger, would defend 1200 miles of coastline that led to 25% of the U.S. aircraft production. During an invasion, they would have to learn to shoot, move and communicate while being bombed and strafed. Their HQ, supply dumps, transportation pools, artillery parks, and communication centers that they depended on would be bombed and strafed. Mechanized convoys, troop concentrations, airfields and any counterattacking units would be bombed and strafed. Anything that moved would be…well, you guessed it. All they have to do is keep a quarter of a million Japanese soldiers from plundering a major city and slaughtering the inhabitants.
Let’s look at Midway. The Japanese thought that they had crippled the USN carrier forces in the Battle of the Coral Sea. They weren’t expecting three carriers (which they most certainly would be for an invasion). Even with the element of surprise at Midway, the U.S. victory owed much to simple good luck. The attack was launched from a distance where the Wildcats could not escort the strike. Without fighters, the torpedo bombers found the target and were annihilated. The commander of a squadron of dive bombers was sent to the wrong location, figured out in his head where the Japanese should be and followed a hunch before his fuel ran out. When he arrived, all of the fighters and flak were focused on the torpedo bombers and overlooked his squadron, who saved the day. So all FDR has to plan on for the defense of the continental U.S. is a total freaking miracle.
No less than Churchill, Stalin, Einstein and most likely Gen. Marshall would explain to him what a great idea this would be.
That is why he would sign a truce.
02-12-2009, 00:33
Spino
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Excellent thread so far, I'm throughly enjoying everyone's input!
The Japanese empire's overall strategy during WW2 was a curious mix of clever and daring strategy combined with close minded conservatism and ego fueled foolishness. For a nation that sported a GDP and industrial base slightly larger than France's and a population less than half that of the United States the choice to go to war with US begged the question "What in blazes were they thinking?"
Nice chart on Axis & Allied GDP during the war. It really highlights the futility of fighting a war of attrition, let alone any other kind of war, against the US. Take note of how the US' GPD nearly doubled between 1938 and 1945.... http://www.onwar.com/articles/0302.htm
Imperial Japan's war effort was, like those of its fellow Axis members, plagued with mistakes. However unlike Germany which had a much larger GDP and industrial base which helped offset some of its losses Japan's limited means meant it could ill afford to make one major mistake, let alone a series of short sighted decisions and outright blunders. Were it not for the vast expanse of the Pacific ocean and America's 'Germany First' strategy it is entirely possible that Japan could have been knocked out of the war by 1943.
Industry:
Japan's military industrial complex built a dizzying array of planes, vehicles, submarines and warships when it should have concentrated its efforts building a few effective and proven designs. It compounded this error by continuing to build obsolete equipment well into the later years of the war (especially equipment that reinforced failed or obsolete strategies). Oddly enough both Japan and Italy followed this diverse building strategy to the detriment of their forces.
Case in point, the vaunted Japanese Zero. The A6M Zero was a great, early war carrier aircraft that became effectively outdated by late 1942/early 1943. When unnecessary losses began to mount in light of the Zero's fundamental weaknesses (poor high speed performance, no armor, no self-sealing fuel tanks & fragile airframe) all early marks should have been phased out immediately in favor of upgraded ones which redressed these faults. And yet both Japan's high command and it's pilots continued to resist the idea of adopting such upgrades or plane designs that traded maneuverability & range for speed, power & survivability! The Japanese Army was equally arrogant and close minded as illustrated with its reliance upon the Ki-43, a plane inferior to the A6M Zero in every category save maneuverability. And yet Japan continued to build and field the Ki-43 until the end of the war! And yet unlike the Navy the Army had better alternatives on hand early on. The Allies had more respect for less numerous marks like the Ki-44 ('Tojo') and Ki-61 Hien ('Tony') which were faster & more rugged than the Ki-43 and Zero. Even excellent later war designs such as the Ki-84 Hayate ('Frank') and N1K1 Shiden ('George') were initially resisted by Japanese pilots. This close minded mentality had horrendous consequences considering Japan could ill afford to lose skilled pilots, let alone equipment.
This excellent website sports a page which highlights the incredible disparity in wartime production between the US and Japan.
Strategy:
Fleet operations - Japan built a sizeable, state of the art carrier force but given its industrial capacity it could barely afford to lose a single carrier without seriously hindering its ability to project power. And yet Japan risked more fleet carriers in piecemeal operations (i.e. Coral Sea) during the early years of the war than did the United States which took greater pains to consolidate what few carriers it had on hand in the Pacific.
Submarine strategy - Despite the fact that the Japanese military routinely brutalized conquered populations and mistreated enemy POWs it adopted this inexplicable strategy of refusing to allow its submarines to engage in the 'dishonorable' pursuit of attacking enemy merchant shipping at the onset of hostilities! A foolish decision considering Japan had the best torpedoes of the war; they were the fastest, most reliable, longest running and packed the most punch of any torpedo fielded by any nation. And yet rather than unleash its sizeable submarine fleet against vulnerable Allied merchant ships and convoys in the early stages of the war it squandered them needlessly in recon missions and in hunts to destroy Allied warships. Had Japan unleashed those submarines on those lone merchant ships and poorly protected (if protected at all) supply convoys bound for Australia, New Guinea and the Solomons in early 1942 the US' efforts to strengthen Noumea and seize Guadacanal might have been pushed back several months. In spite of its flawed doctrine Japan's submarine fleet went on to sink approximately one million tons of Allied shipping. Eventually Allied ASW and code breaking caught up with the Japanese submarine fleet which was eventually relegated to delivering supplies & troops to isolated island bases.
Convoys - Speaking of submarines, even in light of terrible merchant losses suffered to Allied submarines the Japanese high command resisted the idea of implementing convoys until 1944!
The interesting thing is had the Japanese simply forced themselves to work out a grand strategy that did not directly involve the US they could have had free run of SE Asia and the rest of the Pacific. FDR had a devil of a time convincing Congress & the US population that another world was was in their best interest. Without the attack on Pearl Harbor the US population would have simply maintained its apathy about all things relating to Asia and the Pacific.
US Invasion
The problem with a scenario where the Japanese Empire invades the US is that it doesn't factor in an extremely well armed and patriotic population. And whatever the condition of the American military at the onset of the war you can bet it wouldn't take long for every single soldier stationed in the contiguous 48 states to be put on every commandeered train, plane, ship and automobile and sent straight to the point(s) of invasion. After that toss in every rabid Japanese hating hunter & patriot with a rifle taking pot shots at the invaders. After an initial, brilliant surprise attack and beach landing(s) the Japanese invasion force would eventually be crippled by attrition and the host of problems that accompany incredibly lengthy and vulnerable supply lines.
We also have to take into account the probability that the US government would engage in scorched earth policies so as to deny the Japanese all possible means of feeding & maintaining its invasion forces which would no doubt be relying heavily upon foraging and pillaging for its needs. Furthermore in order for Japan to adequately secure and protect its invasion sites it would also have to block and/or disrupt naval reinforcements arriving via the Panama canal and/or from around the southern tip of South America. This would further dilute its carrier presence & air support for the west coast invasion beaches. When it comes down to it Japan simply didn't have the means or the numbers to conquer and subdue a massive chunk of such a large, industrialized and fiercely patriotic nation.
Speaking as to fun specifics had the Japanese actually invaded the mainland they would have eventually learned the futility of fighting early war American tanks. The Japanese were mauled by Russian armored formations at the Battle of Khalkhin Gol; they could barely handle Russian BT-5s, BT-7s and T-26's (all light tanks) so how they would have handled the M5 Stuart, M3 Lee and M4 Sherman with their weak AT guns and virtually non-existent infantry AT weapons is anyone's guess. Furthermore whatever the shortcomings of the F4F Wildcat it would have been the P-40 Warhawk and P-39 Airacobra that would have been relied upon to deal with Japan's carrier planes during an invasion. The P-40 Warhawk was superior to the F4F Wildcat in every way save perhaps durability (the P-40 was no dog, it was effective against the Bf-109E in N. Africa and Russia). By late 1941 the Flying Tigers also proved that, when used properly, the P-40 was more than a match for Japan's Oscars and Zeros.
Last but not least simply compare the massive naval & air assets the US military required as being essential for the invasion of Okinawa in 1945 (as well as what it intended on using for the planned invasion of the Japanese mainland) to what the Japanese Empire had at its disposal in 1942. It's like comparing a mountain to a mole hill.
The total strength of the Allied fleet at Okinawa was 1,600 ships, including 40 aircraft carriers, 18 battleships, 32 cruisers and 200 destroyers. The U.S. Navy sustained greater casualties in this operation than in any other battle of the war.
The United States Navy assembled an unprecedented armada in April of 1945, with 1,300 ships laying in wait off the coast of Okinawa.[18] In fact, the effort in the spring offensive of 1945 was far greater than the previous spring offensive in Europe. During the Normandy invasion, the Allies had employed 150,000 troops, 284 ships, and 570,000 tons of supplies, all of which required a very short supply line. On Okinawa, in Japan's back yard, maintaining the supply line seemed an incomprehensible feat. In the invasion of Okinawa, there were 183,000 troops, 327 ships, and 750,000 tons of supplies.[19]
Here's what the Imperial Japanese Navy had in 1941... and unlike the Okinawa invasion force this was everything the Japanese had that could float and fight... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Japanese_Navy
Quote:
In 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy possessed 10 battleships, 10 aircraft carriers, 38 cruisers (heavy and light), 112 destroyers, 65 submarines, and various auxiliary ships.[35]
Of those 10 aircraft carriers only six were fleet carriers (Zuikaku, Shokaku, Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu & Soryu), the remainder were smaller escort carriers. Nonetheless six fleet carriers is impressive, but the IJN would need to keep that fleet fully fueled, supplied and loaded with replacements for whatever losses it experienced during the invasion. The modest damage and pilot losses sustained at the Battle of the Coral Sea forced the IJN to plan the Midway invasion without their best carriers, the Shokaku and Zuikaku. That's 1/3 of Japan's total fleet carrier force knocked out from one battle with only two American carriers. If you're going to invade the USA, even a poorly prepared USA, you're going to need to bring more than what Japan could bring, alot more. And if Japan brings her entire navy along to take the west coast what would remain behind to stave off the remaining British fleet and keep the newly secured Asian empire under control?
In 1942 the Imperial Japanese Navy was a fraction of the size of the US fleet that undertook the invasion of the small island of Okinawa. The Japanese navy could barely keep its forward bases at Guadacanal, Rabaul, Tobruk and Saipan fully supplied during the war. A Japanese invasion of the US mainland? Not a chance in hell of succeeding.
02-12-2009, 17:17
Agent Miles
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Once again, either the Japanese destroy the west coast and butcher millions of Americans, or FDR scorches the west coast and uses human waves of patriots to stop the invasion. I already considered this possibility. This would have the same end effect. These patriots weren’t even a trained militia like we had in the Revolution. Who is going to feed them? They would end up diseased and useless. If they just drove to California or hopped on a train, then they would clog the very transport lines that the Army must use to get supplies to the 1.4 million soldiers. If you can’t explain how the actual Army would credibly stop the Japanese, then how should someone believe that a patriotic rabble would do it?
The Japanese have 4 million tons of shipping to keep their invasion force supplied. As CBR inadvertently pointed out in considerable detail, that is more than enough to sealift the invasion force along with two months supply and then continue to supply it. The USN subs are armed with dud torpedoes, so what is going to attack these ships, the USN carriers? The USN did not have surface raiders and the carriers would not have been risked. Remember, a damaged carrier must go to the east coast for repair or set in San Diego as a target. So how are the Japanese supply lines vulnerable?
The IJN does not have to send its forces to Panama or the southern tip of South America, the USN must do this. A concentrated IJN can wait and pounce on a split USN. The Atlantic fleet must steam up the coast or the USN Pacific flee must flee down the coast to meet this force and thus leave the west coast undefended.
The early war U.S. tanks would have been little more than burning wrecks without control of the air. The Japanese would have done to the U.S. what we did to the German tanks in Normandy. Don’t forget that the Japanese lost to no less than Gen. Zhukov in that battle with the Soviets. We did not have a Guderian. We built a mechanized army long before we knew how to use it.
The Zero was the best fighter in the world not just the best carrier plane. The P-40 and P-39 were no match, read some history. Only experienced pilots like those in China had learned how to survive against Zeros. The tactic they used was that if you had altitude and if you surprised the Zero, then you could dive on them from behind and get in one attack. Then you must immediately use the speed boost from the dive to break away before you got shot down. Of course, you can’t exactly do this if you are escorting bombers to a target, or if you don’t have surprise, or more altitude, or if you have to stay around and say, actually defend ground troops or something like that. The information that they had sent to the U.S. was largely ignored by racist officers who refused to believe the Japanese could even build such a superior aircraft. Actually, most American officers from MacArthur on down totally underestimated the Japanese. Imagine that!
The U.S. invaded a strongly defended fortress where the fortifications had been constructed for years on Okinawa. The Japanese would not face anything like what was on Okinawa. The size of the Okinawa task force proves nothing. The Japanese took Luzon when they were out-numbered 3:2. The U.S. force on the west coast would be spread out over 1200 miles and the Japanese would be concentrated at the point of attack. The Japanese wouldn’t be waiting on the beaches like we did at Anzio. They would be driving all over as they did throughout the Pacific.
People keep arguing with a U.S. military that would not exist for months or even years. How would the military in March 1942 stop an invasion? The Japanese had a window of opportunity where they could savage the U.S. to the detriment of the war effort against Hitler. Even you suggest that the U.S. would just scorch one quarter of our aircraft industry along with the west coast and sacrifice millions of citizens as though this is a solution. Yes, we win against the Japanese, if we want a Nazi Europe. Nothing you have said would convince FDR to destroy half the country rather than sign a truce.
02-12-2009, 20:24
Spino
Re: WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military
Quote:
Originally Posted by Agent Miles
Once again, either the Japanese destroy the west coast and butcher millions of Americans, or FDR scorches the west coast and uses human waves of patriots to stop the invasion. I already considered this possibility. This would have the same end effect. These patriots weren’t even a trained militia like we had in the Revolution. Who is going to feed them? They would end up diseased and useless. If they just drove to California or hopped on a train, then they would clog the very transport lines that the Army must use to get supplies to the 1.4 million soldiers. If you can’t explain how the actual Army would credibly stop the Japanese, then how should someone believe that a patriotic rabble would do it?
I never said 'patriotic rabble' would stop the Japanese, I said they would play a part. Well armed patriots compelled by extreme nationalism and/or racial hatred can work wonders. For stellar examples of the effectiveness of well armed guerilla insurgencies during WW2 simply look up the accomplishments of Polish & Soviet partisans on the eastern front.
Quote:
The Japanese have 4 million tons of shipping to keep their invasion force supplied. As CBR inadvertently pointed out in considerable detail, that is more than enough to sealift the invasion force along with two months supply and then continue to supply it. The USN subs are armed with dud torpedoes, so what is going to attack these ships, the USN carriers? The USN did not have surface raiders and the carriers would not have been risked. Remember, a damaged carrier must go to the east coast for repair or set in San Diego as a target. So how are the Japanese supply lines vulnerable?
Four million tons of shipping... dedicated entirely to the taking of the US west coast?!? So this is an all or nothing venture? So what about the rest of Japan's empire in SE Asia and the SW Pacific? How do they get all that iron, tin, rubber, oil, etc. from the newly conquered Asian/Pacific territories to Japan, by truck? So we are operating under the assumption that prior to an invasion of the US mainland the Japanese have effectively neutralized the Hawaiian islands and Pearl Harbor? Has the battle of the Coral Sea taken place? Where are all the US carriers that survived Pearl Harbor? What about the remaining US carriers? Are we assuming all eight US carriers (seven fleet, one escort) that were not present at Pearl Harbor were destroyed as well (Lexington, Saratoga, Yorktown, Enterprise, Hornet, Wasp, Ranger & Long Island)?
And as I posted before, with all Japanese naval assets diverted towards a US invasion what are they going to use to stave off the British naval presence based out of India? Once Nazi Germany abandoned its plans of invading Britain the UK was able to deal with pressing issues not related to staving off an invasion or sinking U-Boats. How do the Japanese deal with the possiblity of a few British carriers wreaking havoc with their recent conquests in the west? From the Japanese perspective the entire point to the war was to bring into the fold the raw materials of the Pacific Rim that Japan did not possess, not throw everything they had in a foolish bid to conquer the western US.
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The IJN does not have to send its forces to Panama or the southern tip of South America, the USN must do this. A concentrated IJN can wait and pounce on a split USN. The Atlantic fleet must steam up the coast or the USN Pacific flee must flee down the coast to meet this force and thus leave the west coast undefended.
So you would give the American fleet a chance to consolidate before hitting it?!? Hitting the canal itself and rendering it useless before American ships have a chance to use it would be ideal. Hitting the US Atlantic fleet as it travelled throught the canal and emerged on the Pacific side would be the next best thing. Either way you need to create a dedicated strike force to do the job which will take away from the invasion force's overall effectiveness and element of surprise. Keep in mind the US navy actually played out wargame exercises prior to the war where the adversary carrier fleet did just that, take out the canal. If you're going to attack the US mainland you have to deal with the canal and anything that tries to use it. Failure to do so means the Panama canal region gets transformed into a massive naval base and staging area.
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The early war U.S. tanks would have been little more than burning wrecks without control of the air. The Japanese would have done to the U.S. what we did to the German tanks in Normandy. Don’t forget that the Japanese lost to no less than Gen. Zhukov in that battle with the Soviets. We did not have a Guderian. We built a mechanized army long before we knew how to use it.
The Japanese navy had no dedicated close air support aircraft other than the D3A Aichi 'Val' dive bomber. Dive bombing is only so effective against enemy tanks and if you only have a few hundred dive bombers on hand (taken from all 10 aircraft carriers) there's only so many tanks you're going to take out while taking into account other targets of opportunity. Even the Stuka had some difficulty delivering bombs with pinpoint accuracy on moving targets (especially tanks) on the eastern front. Furthermore as with the Zero the D3A and B5N 'Kate' torpedo/bomber sported zero armor and no self-sealing fuel tanks. The Japanese lost 29 aircraft out of the 353 that participated in two successive waves at Pearl Harbor, that's a 8-9% attrition rate for one day's work, not bad. Now imagine the attrition rate after several months of intense fighting on the west coast. How quickly do you think Kido Butai could replace its lost planes and more importantly, its dead pilots?!? And how quickly would it take the Japanese navy to ship naval and army squadrons from Asia and get them set up in the US? Cargo and supply ships take alot longer to reach their destination than warships and regardless of whether you're traveling from Japan to Hawaii or straight from Japan to the US mainland, either way that's a loooong haul.
As to your Zhukov reference... you are forgetting that in 1941 the Americans had someone by the name of Patton. Even before the war he was widely acknowledged as being our best armored formation commander and a driving force behind the creation of our armored forces. You can bet he would have been given command of one of the Corps assigned to kick the Japanese off the US mainland.
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The Zero was the best fighter in the world not just the best carrier plane. The P-40 and P-39 were no match, read some history. Only experienced pilots like those in China had learned how to survive against Zeros. The tactic they used was that if you had altitude and if you surprised the Zero, then you could dive on them from behind and get in one attack. Then you must immediately use the speed boost from the dive to break away before you got shot down. Of course, you can’t exactly do this if you are escorting bombers to a target, or if you don’t have surprise, or more altitude, or if you have to stay around and say, actually defend ground troops or something like that. The information that they had sent to the U.S. was largely ignored by racist officers who refused to believe the Japanese could even build such a superior aircraft. Actually, most American officers from MacArthur on down totally underestimated the Japanese. Imagine that!
The Zero was not the best fighter in the world in late 41/early-mid 42 but it was flown by some of the best pilots. The Flying Tigers proved the Zero was hardly invincible, let alone superior to the P-40. You could certainly make a strong argument that the Zero was the best carrier borne fighter aircraft during 1941 and 1942. Truth be told in 1941/42 the best fighter in the world was a toss up between the Spitfire V, the Focke Wulf 190A and the Bf-109F.
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The U.S. invaded a strongly defended fortress where the fortifications had been constructed for years on Okinawa. The Japanese would not face anything like what was on Okinawa. The size of the Okinawa task force proves nothing. The Japanese took Luzon when they were out-numbered 3:2. The U.S. force on the west coast would be spread out over 1200 miles and the Japanese would be concentrated at the point of attack. The Japanese wouldn’t be waiting on the beaches like we did at Anzio. They would be driving all over as they did throughout the Pacific.
Yes but Luzon was practically next door to the Japanese empire (within reasonable range of its friendly territories and island bases) compared to the US west coast which was on the far side of the Pacific. Japanese would also be confronted with a much larger, and wide open front on the US west coast. That means more options for a US counterattack and alot more ground for the Japanese to defend. Furthermore US infrastructure was pretty damn good in 1941/42; we had numerous ways of getting reinforcements and supplies to the west coast in a timely fashion.
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People keep arguing with a U.S. military that would not exist for months or even years. How would the military in March 1942 stop an invasion? The Japanese had a window of opportunity where they could savage the U.S. to the detriment of the war effort against Hitler. Even you suggest that the U.S. would just scorch one quarter of our aircraft industry along with the west coast and sacrifice millions of citizens as though this is a solution. Yes, we win against the Japanese, if we want a Nazi Europe. Nothing you have said would convince FDR to destroy half the country rather than sign a truce.
Considering the bulk of US industry and agriculture lie to the far east of the Rocky Mountains it is entirely reasonable to think a scorched earth campaign would be considered if it could exert an enormously negative influence on the invaders. The American people screamed for blood after Pearl Harbor, how do you think they would have reacted if the Japanese invaded the mainland and committed atrocities against civilians?!? The day after Pearl Harbor it was not uncommon to see lines stretch around the block at recruiting offices throughout the country. There would be little need for the government to motivate the nation with propaganda encouraging them to make sacrifices and pitch in to kill the Japanese invaders.
Last but certainly not least you are also forgetting that the US was not quite as ill prepared for war as you think. US industry was already churning out tons of weapons and equipment and rearming its military in 1941, all thanks to the Lend/Lease program and the US government's concerns over Japan's designs on her Asian neighbors. With a Japanese invasion you can bet the overwhelming majority of supplies, weapons, planes, tanks, etc. heading to the UK and Soviet Union would suddenly be diverted towards the arming of a west coast liberation army.
