Countries greatest military mess-ups

Jutland.

Now in terms of total losses suffered by both sides and the strategic implications Jutland wouldn't initially appear to be a muckup. However considering the numerical advantage enjoyed by the Royal Navy coupled with the tactical situation available to Jellico when the High Seas fleet withdrew from combat the battle, in my opnion in a major military muck up. It wouldn't have been so bad had the Germans been opposing another of the Allies (both France and Russia prided themselves more on their land forces) but for the maritime based British Empire the failure to crush the German High Seas fleet in a single engagement was disasterous for moral and the reputation of the Royal Navy in general. I would further like to add that for the British the battle was a muck up as the British continued to adhere to the principles which it credited it's victories against Napoleon for, namely maintaining pristine ships and firing more shots per minute than the enemy. Neither of these principles were of much use at Jutland where accuracy of shots and communication between ships were of more use. The fact that the Royal Navy continued to rely on signallers rather (like my great grandfather on HMS Royal Oak) than morse code was detrimental to their performance.

Jutland-Not the biggest muck up, but certainly alot of room for improvement.

Do civil wars count? if so

1. Communists deciding to fight Republicans and Socialists during the Spanish Civil War (Does it count as surrender to Franco to kill each other when his men are right there?:help:0

2. Russian Civil War, Denikin failing to realize the enemy of my enemy is my friend untill it was too late for Petliura to be of much assistance to him

3. American Civil War, well I don't know where to start.......

People make very bad decisions in civil wars.

The Battle of New Orleans was quite small and not important to anyone except us Americans.

However ... if the plan is to use infantry to attack earthworks protected by a canal and artillery, and you know you will need fascines to cross the canal and scaling ladders to mount the earthworks, wouldn't you call it a blunder to forget to bring the fascines and scaling ladders along?

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Originally Posted by CBR

Battle of the Crater can be considered messed up because Meade changed the forces meant to lead the attack. Instead of the black division that had been instructed to go around the crater, an untrained division was to lead instead. On top of that the attack got delayed because of lack of footbridges and general confusion.

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It was a racial decision from what I understand (not sure how much of an exaggeration this is) but my understanding is that the black division had trained for some time to attack around the crater. Some white general (forget his name) didn't want the blacks to get the "glory" and the rest is as they say history. Also, even though the Confederates by this time were alerted to the attack (how could they not be), would it have been prudent to send the black soldiers around crater as prescribed? (I also thought they were just thrown into the crater along with the division that replaced them.

Meade did use two reasons: 1) that the black division had no experience and 2) in case of a defeat it would look bad, as it would seem like the Union just sent in black soldiers to spare white lives. The second reason seems to have been the important one as he apparently did not think the operation had much chance of success.

He told Burnside (the guy who had planned it all) about the change only 15 hours before so it left Burnside with little time to plan. One could fault Burnside for not having a backup plan but the problem was that his other three divisions were considered to be burned out. With no other proper options and his black troops having spent nearly three weeks training for it, and being very enthusiastic, maybe one can't blame him too much.

Some of the black regiments did manage to bypass the crater, but all surprise had been lost by then. The three white divisions had been sent in first and the black division was sent in about 2 1/2 hours after the first wave.

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Originally Posted by CBR

Meade did use two reasons: 1) that the black division had no experience and 2) in case of a defeat it would look bad, as it would seem like the Union just sent in black soldiers to spare white lives. The second reason seems to have been the important one as he apparently did not think the operation had much chance of success.

He told Burnside (the guy who had planned it all) about the change only 15 hours before so it left Burnside with little time to plan. One could fault Burnside for not having a backup plan but the problem was that his other three divisions were considered to be burned out. With no other proper options and his black troops having spent nearly three weeks training for it, and being very enthusiastic, maybe one can't blame him too much.

Some of the black regiments did manage to bypass the crater, but all surprise had been lost by then. The three white divisions had been sent in first and the black division was sent in about 2 1/2 hours after the first wave.

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Thanks for the clarification on that.

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Originally Posted by Decker;2053265912[I

The Battle of the Little Big Horn[/I] - Not really much to be said about here.

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Not too long ago, I read an interesting article in Armchair General about this. I wish I could remember more about it, but the main thrust was that Custer in his initial execution of the attack. Military doctrine and practice showed that a determined attack against even large numbers of enemy warriors would cause them to break and run. Also, in such situations, dividing your force was common practice to encircle the enemy and capture prisoners. Attacking an overwhelming force while dividing your own may sound foolish to us now with hindsight- but then it was known as a reliable tactic. :shrug:

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Originally Posted by Xiahou

Not too long ago, I read an interesting article in Armchair General about this. I wish I could remember more about it, but the main thrust was that Custer in his initial execution of the attack. Military doctrine and practice showed that a determined attack against even large numbers of enemy warriors would cause them to break and run. Also, in such situations, dividing your force was common practice to encircle the enemy and capture prisoners. Attacking an overwhelming force while dividing your own may sound foolish to us now with hindsight- but then it was known as a reliable tactic. :shrug:

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Oh I understand that being a valid target. However I read and heard that his scouts told him a really big group was headed his way yet he preceeded on instead of being more cautious which led to most of the 7th Cavalry to being decimated (Reno's small force came out relatively intact iirc as well). [Feel free to correct me if I'm wrong.]

Custer’s Indian Fighting reputation was made at the Battle of the Washita where instead of attacking the hostile fortified camp of the Comanche’s, he instead attacked the village of Black Kettle, a Peaceful Cheyenne.

Dividing his troops to attack women and children rather than face the warriors at Little Big Horne was what was also planed but the Cheyenne and a few Arapaho were waiting for him at the ford this time.

Going into a defensive position had worked on a few occasions when forces were nearer to equal, but not this time.

All of Custer’s decisions that day were the wrong ones based on attacking isolated encampments. Not what he faced this day.

He should have listened to his Crow Scouts and run like the devil until the other forces came up.

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Originally Posted by Brenus

They couldn't excepted the fall so quick of the Belgium fortress of Eben Emael...

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Yeah that always made me chuckle. One of the reasons, this fort fell as fast as it did was because the German gliders could land on the roof. The trees and bushes on the roof of the fort, which would have prevented the gliders to land there, were cut down so that the soldiers stationed at the fort would have a place to play football.

It's not a big blunder but an amusing detail non the less.

Cannae was great mistake from Roman side. Before battle Hannibal destroyed 2 consular armies (Trebba and T. Lake). Romans knew that he is dangerous and like untypical fights. They had only one way of fighting - brutal attack directly in the middle of enemy formation. No matter that elite of enemy forces was on flanks.

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Originally Posted by KrooK

Romans knew that he is dangerous and like untypical fights.

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Yes, they could see what had happened at Trebbia and corrected it: not being tricked into attacking, and they picked a battlefield where no ambushes were possible.

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They had only one way of fighting - brutal attack directly in the middle of enemy formation.

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Yes that was the primary way of fighting for the Romans, and even when things were falling apart at Trebbia the center had cut through Hannibal's infantry. For Cannae they more than doubled the size of the army.

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No matter that elite of enemy forces was on flanks.

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Yes so the Romans had an even larger army, including more cavalry than at Trebbia, and picked a spot with a narrow frontage with a river on their right wing and hills on the left. They also seemed to have been defensive with the cavalry to ensure that it would not be easily defeated and the two consuls each picked a wing to ensure the best control and encouragement.

So unless we should fault the Romans for not being psychic I still can't see their big mistake. Unless it is merely in hindsight knowing they lost and therefore should not have fought the battle at all.

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Originally Posted by CBR

Yes, they could see what had happened at Trebbia and corrected it: not being tricked into attacking, and they picked a battlefield where no ambushes were possible.

Yes that was the primary way of fighting for the Romans, and even when things were falling apart at Trebbia the center had cut through Hannibal's infantry. For Cannae they more than doubled the size of the army.

Yes so the Romans had an even larger army, including more cavalry than at Trebbia, and picked a spot with a narrow frontage with a river on their right wing and hills on the left. They also seemed to have been defensive with the cavalry to ensure that it would not be easily defeated and the two consuls each picked a wing to ensure the best control and encouragement.

So unless we should fault the Romans for not being psychic I still can't see their big mistake. Unless it is merely in hindsight knowing they lost and therefore should not have fought the battle at all.

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Didn't the Romans make their units much bulkier and closer together than ever before instead of making a longer line?

I interpreted the battle as the middle of Hannibal's line giving away making a sort of "V" in the Roman formation giving the impression that they had made their army bulkier as you say.

Yes the Romans increased the depth of their maniples. We are unfortunately not told specifically by how much. Polybius says it was several times deeper than its front. He also say the legions had been boosted in size to 5000 infantry, so the maniples of Hastati and Principes could have been perhaps 160 men each and in standard formation 8 ranks and 20 men wide. If they went to 16 ranks and just 10 wide, and with the depth per man described as 6-7 feet, then it would been something like 30 feet wide and 100+ feet deep. I think that would fit the "several times deeper than its front" bit.

Why would the Romans do such a thing? Well, a standard Consular army consisted of two Legions and two allied Alae of more or less similar size. If it was needed then two consuls could combine their army. At Cannae each of the consuls had a double consular army and Polybius writes the Romans never had recruited 8 legions before.

So the Romans did not have the experience in handling a army that was four times the width of what they normally operated with, and still twice the width of what only occurred rarely (happened at Trebbia though). Such an army would have had a width of perhaps 3.5 Km just for the infantry, it would have taken twice as long to deploy and it might even have been difficult to find a spot big enough to deploy and fight.

Doubling the ranks of each maniple is a simply thing do and would IMO have made the army manageable within the level of experience the Romans had for that time. But I don't think it was a cause to the Roman defeat though.

So you're essentially saying they were out fought at Cannae?

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Originally Posted by Decker

So you're essentially saying they were out fought at Cannae?

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Hannibal took a big but calculated risk with his cavalry. He put all his heavy cavalry on his left wing and let the Numidians handle the right wing. The Numidians would never have defeated a similar size of Roman allied cavalry if the allied cavalry had attacked but (and this is me guessing) he must have assumed that the Romans would try to be defensive. He had seen the Roman army deployed just one or two days before so maybe he spotted something in how they deployed.

We should also not forget the fog of war, there were no binoculars and lots of dust so there was a good chance that the Romans would never notice the weak right wing.

The concave infantry formation is more up for debate as historians don't agree on what happened. I don't think there was any planned retreat and the losses among the Celts suggest a tough fight and rout with many being cut down. But the formation meant the Roman infantry would not just move forward when in pursuit but also inwards. That would increase the disruption and give a better chance for his Africans in their counter attack.

The Battle of Teutoberger Forest. Marching two whole Legions, totaling 1/15 of the entire Roman military, straight to their deaths because of an incompetent commander is sure to be a large military blunder.

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Originally Posted by CBR

Hannibal took a big but calculated risk with his cavalry. He put all his heavy cavalry on his left wing and let the Numidians handle the right wing. The Numidians would never have defeated a similar size of Roman allied cavalry if the allied cavalry had attacked but (and this is me guessing) he must have assumed that the Romans would try to be defensive. He had seen the Roman army deployed just one or two days before so maybe he spotted something in how they deployed.

We should also not forget the fog of war, there were no binoculars and lots of dust so there was a good chance that the Romans would never notice the weak right wing.

The concave infantry formation is more up for debate as historians don't agree on what happened. I don't think there was any planned retreat and the losses among the Celts suggest a tough fight and rout with many being cut down. But the formation meant the Roman infantry would not just move forward when in pursuit but also inwards. That would increase the disruption and give a better chance for his Africans in their counter attack.

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But there lies the problem I brought up before, Varro made his formation deeper instead of longer, Hannibal's cavalry could not have charged the infantry, we have hindsight but didn't the Romans come up with the standard depth and length of their maniples as a result of centuries of experience?

I agree with you that Hannibal had the advantage of being just a soldier with other soldiers; he never had to factor in or care about if any of them survived and could sacrifice formations for victories to his hearts content, the Romans however were elected politicians leading many of their constituents into battle, and had to worry not only about victory but about being scene to do everything they possibly could to bring a maximum amount of soldiers home alive. Ironically against an enemy like Hannibal trying to plan for a scenario of returning as many people home as possible actually meant doing everything exactly by the book/the standard rules and Hannibal was an expert at defeating Romans who played by the rules.

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Originally Posted by OvidiusNasso

But there lies the problem I brought up before, Varro made his formation deeper instead of longer, Hannibal's cavalry could not have charged the infantry, we have hindsight but didn't the Romans come up with the standard depth and length of their maniples as a result of centuries of experience?

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Armies in general went for a rather symmetrical deployment with cavalry on both wings. We could wonder why the Romans went for that at Cannae when they had such a numerical superiority in infantry. Maybe there are factors that we don't understand?

A lot of the heavy cavalry did use throwing spears and even the threat of a charge might have made infantry slow down. If one wanted to attack then maybe it was wise to have some cavalry to threaten and counter the enemy cavalry? Otherwise it would simply cause too big a disruption and leave gaps between legions. We should also not forget about the light infantry. A combo of light infantry and cavalry could perhaps be even worse for a force purely of infantry trying to advance.

I'm sure the Romans felt the basic 6 to 8 ranks (and sometimes up to 10 ranks) worked fine, but Cannae was special because of the sheer size of the army. The Greeks used 8 ranks as standard yet they sometimes went to 16 for some of the larger battles, even when outnumbering the enemy.

Either they doubled the ranks in the maniples or they could have put half the legions behind the first line. The latter might not be good because it would have taken even longer to fight the battle, and I don't think I have read about Romans ever doing that apart from perhaps using a legion or two as a special reserve. Or as you say, fill the whole front, but again it does not seem to have been a viable tactic either.

Varro does not seem to have hurt his political career after losing at Cannae. Most likely because he did what Romans expected of him: engage the enemy, and that he did not give up after the battle but gathered and reformed the survivors.

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Originally Posted by Brenus

The French Generals were out manoeuvred so it can’t be counted as their blunder (except for ignoring the Aerial Recon Pictures showing the concentration of German Tanks in the other side of the Ardennes).

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:inquisitive:

:laugh4: @ PJ

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Originally Posted by Brenus

“[B]Well,
And of course Dien Bien Phu: by which aberration the French Generals (against the recommendation of the French Government) believed that the Vietminh (on foot) will not be able to move but the French Air Supply will succeed during the rain season is still a question for me.

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To understand , one must look at the whole picture of the French political and military situation inIndochina in 1954 . With Mao's victory and the arrival of Chin com on Sino Vietnamese borders in 1949 , the strategic situation in Tonkin ( north Vietnam) have become desperate in 1954 after many years of fighting . So General Navarre , Frenh commander-in -chief at France's behest and with US coordination concocted a plan which has 2 aspects :
1°) militarily to shorten French lines of supply
2°)politically try to salvage French positions in Indochina to preserve its interests in Laos , Cambodia and mostly in central (Annam) and southern Vietnam ( Cochinchina )
Cochinchina was relatively safe in French hands . The Vietminh had solid positions in Annam .
The Dien bien phu ploy meant to attract Giap main divisions in Annam and to lure them to move to DBP . French main thrust was the Atlante operation in Annam where they would wipe out Vietminh infrastructure and military forces and consolidate French rule in Annam
The DBP garrison was meant as a bait ; hopefully with some luck it would inflict sever casualties on Vietminh forces to impair their fighting capabilities ; if it were to fail as expected, the garrisoned troops would be mauled and that would fulfill one hidden purpose : France was expecting defeat and intended to transfer the burden to the USA ;French expeditionary force would have to retreat , the French government and general staff were afraid that the French forces which consist mainly of foreign legionaires ( ie merrcenaries ) and gung ho paratroopers would mutiny when confronted with a shameful retreat .
The Navarre plan was much coherent in its many aspects , it stood on paper a good chance of success.And it did succeed despite the DBP defeat and Atlante failure . The Geneva agreements validated the plan: thanks to Russian and Chinese help in pressuring the Vietminh , the agreements allowed French and US a political victory despite the military defeats . Vietnam was divided in two , the Vietminh were forced to evacuate their forces from Annam . French forces regrouped in what would become South Vietnam , theirs not to continue the fighting according to plan Navarre ; that would be devolved to US forces that would do the containment strategy on new and sounder political and military basis . Under the bait of elections to unify Vietnam , France and USA got from the Geneva accord a cease fire which gave them 2 year respite from Vietminh .Despite their victory , the Vietnamese were the big losers in Geneva .

This one definetely belongs here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kar%C3%A1nsebes

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Originally Posted by Kagemusha

This one definetely belongs here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kar%C3%A1nsebes

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Holy cow.

The Greatest Military Messups would be

Napoleon's campaigns of Egypt and Russia. Very bad campaigns, great battles nonetheless, but it proved nothing. Egypt was a major blow, and Russia was only a reminder, Thats in my opinion of course

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Originally Posted by Kagemusha

This one definetely belongs here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Karánsebes

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Ouch...

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Originally Posted by Kagemusha

This one definetely belongs here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Karánsebes

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Wow. I never knew that one. Ottomans counted 10.000 dead, eh ? Wow.

It reads very plausible, but only one account? A pity we will never know for certain.

Aside from that, my own contribution to the thread: Battle of Acheloos.
Unfortunately, the Wiki entry reads as if it was heavily edited by Bulgarian "patriots", I'm sure you know the kind. I read a lot more scholarly accounts here, but I don't have the books on hand at the moment. Still, losses were disastrous and the battle was a genuine turning point.


EDIT: Oh and, welcome to the .Org mister Do doan, enjoy your stay!

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Originally Posted by Nowake

It reads very plausible, but only one account? A pity we will never know for certain.

Aside from that, my own contribution to the thread: Battle of Acheloos.
Unfortunately, the Wiki entry reads as if it was heavily edited by Bulgarian "patriots", I'm sure you know the kind. I read a lot more scholarly accounts here, but I don't have the books on hand at the moment. Still, losses were disastrous and the battle was a genuine turning point.


EDIT: Oh and, welcome to the .Org mister Do doan, enjoy your stay!

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Something against the Bulgarian patriots? :wink: By the way, thank you for including that battle. While the numbers were more or less equal, I think the Byzantines have more elite (of course, they also used lots of unprofessional force at that time) regiments than the Bulgarian army. And yet, critical analysis does not show that this was the greatest military mess-up of the Byzantine Empire. Leo Phocas was not a bad general, he was successful againt the Arabs. Victory was to great extend due to the talent and knowledge of the Bulgarian ruler at that time Simeon who spent several years of Constantinople and was educated by Byzantine scholars aside with the children of the Byzantine Emperor. This heavily influenced his external policy but also made him quite familiar with the Byzantine tactics and way of thinking.

Actually, it was not the entry, which is disturbing, Bulgaria really controlled most of the Balkan peninsula at that time without what is now Bosnia, Croatia (we suffered a defeat there) and Thessaloniki + Constantinople and Peloponessus. It also controlled Transylvania at that time (I won't go into discussions here; I know the Romanian historians have a different version). It was the estimation of the aftermath. I definately did not like the sound of 40 years of peace that brought the prosperity and etc. and etc. That was not true because of Hungarian raids for example. Some scholars even claim that it was mistake of Bulgaria ot concentrate that much on the conquest of Constantinople as it distracted the attention from other frontiers such as Transylvania (and wasted resources) and eventually lead to loss of the territory to Hungary only few decades later.

Anyway, I would like to add the Battle of Manzikert here. A batte in 1071 between the Byzantines and the Turks ended with decisive Turkish victory. The battle was actually lost because of the intrigues of the various commanders who were disloyal to the Emperor Romanus IV. As a result, battle that could have been won for Romanus ended with defeat and his capture. Battle was not that crytical from military point of view: the causalties were not that high, the Emperor was released and even the Turkish Sultan conditions were not that heavy as he still considered the Byzantines a formidable enemy and potential ally against the Fatimids of Egypt. However, to make the mess bigger, a civil war erupted in the Byzantine Empire, a war that allowed the Turks to take control over Minor Asia, which used to be the core of the Empire. This severely weakened the Byzantine Empire in the following centuries and directly contributed to the fall of the Empire several centuries later.