Printable View
Heh, I'm not sure that Overlord is much of a credit to Monty's record.Quote:
Originally Posted by ReluctantSamurai
I do agree, though, that Monty gets an inordinate amount of criticism, especially compared to the much overhyped Patton. The reality is that all the Allied commanders were dealing with overwhelming numerical superiority, among other significant advantages, and they all screwed up at one point or another despite them.
Actually, it goes far beyond that. Monty's operational planning for 'Overlord' gave the whole invasion plan a much better chance for succeeding than the original plan he inherited from COSSAC. And Monty was in control of all Allied ground forces from the pre-landing time until Sept 1, when General Eisenhower assumed command.Quote:
I know General Dwight Eisenhower was in command, but some of the beach landings I can see Monety's hands on
I would agree with the first part of that statement, but would ask on what do you base the second part?Quote:
However, his heroic role is, in my eyes, MUCH propaganda. A mediocre strategist, at best.
No worries mate. God knows how many times I've put my foot in my mouth while trying to make a point:laugh4:Quote:
I will freely admit that my already displayed error would be enough to question me
I'm not sure what you mean by that? Care to elaborate? While his plan, which was the one implemented, wouldn't win any brilliancy prizes, was certainly better than the one put forth by COSSAC, and showed, IMHO, a pretty good grasp of what the Allies were capable of doing, and what they were not. Of course, all plans go out the door once the fighting starts...........Quote:
Heh, I'm not sure that Overlord is much of a credit to Monty's record.
I think that statement could apply to just about any commander who has been in charge of leading troops...and in ww2, the Germans had their share of screw-ups, as well.Quote:
The reality is that all the Allied commanders were dealing with overwhelming numerical superiority, among other significant advantages, and they all screwed up at one point or another despite them.
On the topic of military blunders...as long as Rommel has been mentioned, let's go with his biggest snafu: chasing the British into Egypt after the culmination of the Gazala battles. Gen. Rommel showed that once again he who ignores the maxims of logistics, generally loses.
I'm sorry for the long response time. I'm on a boat with only an IPad anda shaky internet connection.
If one begins from the premise that the invasion and eventual capture of France was a 'sure thing', (which Hitler ensured, starting with his middling non-decision on the competing defense plans proposed by Rommel and Von Rundstedt all the way through the campaign to the Mortain offensive), mere eventual success is not all that impressive. A more accurate assessment of Monty's performance takes into account his planning and execution of the campaign, not it's rather forgone conclusion.Quote:
Originally Posted by ReluctantSamurai
And by that measure, Monty doesn't come off looking so hot. His plan may have been better than what he inherited, but transforming a poor plan into one that is less-poor really doesn't deserve high praise. Portending future failures, the airborne component's goals were overly ambitious while it's performance was ineffectual at best, only achieving its primary objective three days after DDay and with regular infantry support. Further, the beaches were weakly defended and too far apart. 21st Panzer's limited counterattacks on the 6th clearly demonstrate that the operation was vulnerable to Rommel's strategy. Had he been given free reign over the battlefield, he very well may have isolated the beaches and driven the Allies back into the sea as he originally envisioned.
His execution fared no better as the campaign progressed inland. He had an incredible advantage in numbers, mobility, and air power and what did he do? Unlike his Soviet counterparts who grew to be very adept in maneuver warfare late in the war, Monty's solution had not changed from his days in the desert - base attrition. The German positions North and South of Caen were extremely vulnerable, and yet he insisted on throwing his forces against the strongest German units, situated on the strongest defensive line Rommel had crafted, built around dense urban center. While Cobra presented a convenient excuse, Goodwood bordered on sheer negligence. And speaking of Cobra, it was Bradley, not Monty, who envisioned the mobile breakout that finally brought the campaign to a close. Who knows how long he would have kept ramming his proverbial head into a brick wall when there was a door directly to his right.
With all that being said, Monty obviosly should get credit for the eventual success of the campaign. Just as with el Alamein, he faced a scenario where victory was all but ensured and made it a reality, a trait that many Allied commanders struggled with. A description of his performance in the Normandy campaign as anything more than 'competent' is, IMO, overly generous.
When it comes to Military Blunders did the battle of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Carrhae” Battle of Carrhae[/URL] not cross anyone’s mind?
It was not just a blundering disaster for the Romans though. The winning general for the Parthians got himself executed as a potential threat to the king.
While I am skeptical of Roman Histories in general this story is surely an example of a series of blunders.
Here was another embarassment for the Romans.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_..._Caudine_Forks
Let's add the battle of Nagashino to the list. One clarification though: The doomed en-masse charge of the Takeda cavalry and their subsequent annihilation by gunfire did not happen. The simple fact is that Takeda Katsuyori sent his army of 15,000 men to assault a heavily foritifed position defended by an allied Oda-Tokugawa army of 30,000 men, only 1,000 of whom were gunners. Katsuyori pretty much went in blind, as all his scouts were killed by the enemy and a thick fog obscured his view of the enemy position. That is where the blunder lies; guns played little part in it.
"What was the most important lesson of Nagashino? Nothing more revolutionary than that an outnumbered force cannot break into a well fortified and strongly defended position."
-Dr. Mitsuo Kure, Samurai: An Illustrated History
Trust me, I'm not defending Monty by any means, but...I've moved from the "Monty-hating" camp into a more moderate view on him. I'd compare him to an NFL quarterback who you look to to not lose the game, not necessarily to win it. It just seems a bit lame that those who criticize Monty for being ponderous and slow-moving...and one who doesn't move unless he had overwhelming material superiority, overlook how the Soviets started virtually every offensive from Uranus onwards.......by lining up tube after tube of artillery for kilometers on end for the bombardment prep; having thousands of Il-2's to pound the hard-points; and then sending in huge armored formations.Quote:
And by that measure, Monty doesn't come off looking so hot.
Ike should also share some of the blame for Market-Garden (it was his signature on the operational orders, after all) by caving in to the Airborne generals who couldn't wait to flex their muscles on their new-found glory, and for ignoring the ULTRA intel.
Goodwood was actually Dempsey's brainchild, IIRC........
Seelow Heights, anyone?Quote:
His execution fared no better as the campaign progressed inland. He had an incredible advantage in numbers, mobility, and air power and what did he do? Unlike his Soviet counterparts who grew to be very adept in maneuver warfare late in the war, Monty's solution had not changed from his days in the desert - base attrition. The German positions North and South of Caen were extremely vulnerable, and yet he insisted on throwing his forces against the strongest German units, situated on the strongest defensive line Rommel had crafted, built around dense urban center.
Probably Monty's biggest failure, IMO, was allowing the Germans to keep Antwerp inoperable for as long as they did. That did more than just about anything else to prolong the war another six months.
That is so not how the Soviets conducted operations. There's nothing remotely similar between Uranus and Mars and later operations.Quote:
Originally Posted by ReluctantSamurai
Seelow Heigths was a special case due to political reasons, terrain configuration favoured the defender as there was basically only one possible axis of attack and in the end it was only a few days delay.Quote:
Seelow Heights, anyone?
Really?Quote:
That is so not how the Soviets conducted operations. There's nothing remotely similar between Uranus and Mars and later operations.
Uranus: Troops involved...1,000,500 men, 13,541 guns (exclusive of AA guns and 50mm mortars), 894 tanks, and 1,115 aircraft.
"At 07.20 hours, in the murk of Thursday morning 19 November, South-Western and Don Fronts issued the call-sign 'Siren', at which all guns, settled during the night in their firing pits or drawn up to their stations, were loaded; ten minutes later, the order to fire was given and eighty minutes of bombardment was signalled by the first salvoes from the RS-6 rocket launchers. More than 3,500 guns and mortars, deployed along the three narrow breakthrough sectors which stretched altogether for some fourteen miles, joined in the bombardment after the first rocket salvoes."
[Figures and narrative from The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War with Germany, by John Erickson]
Mars: Troops involved...The initial strength of the seven Soviet armies committed in Operation Mars amounted to about 667,000 men and over 1,900 tanks out of the 1,890,000 men and 3,375 tanks that comprised the Kalinin and Western Fronts and the Moscow Defense Zone in November 1942. Additionally, at least 150,000 men and several hundred tanks reinforced the attacking armies during the operation.
[A brief description of the opening assault in 20A sector, from David Glantz's Zhukov's Greatest Defeat]
"Hundreds of meters to the rear all along the front, commanders and staff officers, huddled in their greatcoats to ward off the bone-chilling cold and with precious map cases under their arms, crawled into command bunkers where they would oversee the assault. Farther to the rear, one could hear the muffled sounds of artillery casing rattling together like the unlikely sound of crickets in winter as the thousands of artillery and mortar tubes of 20th Army's twenty-odd artillery regiments readied to fire into the snowy skies"
And this is just for the 20th Army sector.....
In January 1944, the offensive to break the siege of Leningrad employed 375,000 men, 1,200 tanks and SP guns, 718 aircraft for close tactical support, 192 aircraft from the Baltic Fleet, and 330 bombers of Long Range Aviation in Leningrad & Volkhov Fronts, while Baltic Front numbered no less than 45 rifle divisions, 4 tank brigades, and 335 aircraft.
[Narrative from John Erickson's The Road to Berlin]
"[Baltic sector]At 0935 hours a salvo of rockets opened the artillery preparation for the attack, 2nd Shock Army guns being joined by the long-range guns from Kronstadt forts and the warships of the Baltic Fleet, 100,000 rounds loosed off in a 65 minute bombardment."
"[Leningrad sector]At 0920 hours on 15 January, 3000 guns and heavy mortars opened a massive bombardment of the German positions, firing off over 200,000 rounds in one hundred minutes."
In the attack on Vyborg, Finland in 1944 the Soviet command massed thousands of guns and almost 1,000 Katyusha rocket-launchers, 536 bombers and almost 500 tanks to knock the Finn's out of the war.
Bagration: Four Soviet Fronts assigned. 118 Rifle Divisions, 2 cavalry corps, 1 tank army, eight tank/mech corps, four air armies (5,327 aircraft in addition to 700 bombers from the Long Range Bomber Force). A total of 1,254,000 men (plus 416,000 men from the left flank of 1st Belorussian Front), 2,715 tanks and 1,335 SP guns. Lined up, practically hub-to-hub were 24,000 guns and mobile heavy mortars, supplemented by 2,306 Katyusha rocket-launchers.
Beginning to see a pattern here?
For the final advance to the Oder River, Marshal Zhukov's 1st Belorussian and Marshal Koniev's 1st Ukrainian Front disposed of no less than 163 rifle divisions, 32,143 guns and heavy mortars, almost 6,500 tanks and SP guns, 4,772 aircraft, involving in all just under 2 1/4 million men. The average density in infantry formations was one rifle division per 3.7 km, with 64 guns and 12 tanks per km along a front that stretched for some 300 miles. [figures from The Road to Berlin]
And folks say Monty liked his artillery and bombers:laugh4:
Seelow Heights happened because of Zhukov's immense ego. Instead of letting Konev complete the turning of Heinrici's right flank, he decides to make a direct frontal assault. A few days delay, indeed.....tell that to the 30,000 or so who died there so that Zhukov could reach Berlin first...........Quote:
Seelow Heigths was a special case due to political reasons, terrain configuration favoured the defender as there was basically only one possible axis of attack and in the end it was only a few days delay.
Really.Quote:
Originally Posted by ReluctantSamurai
There's a vast difference between using artillery and planes to create a gap within enemy lines which can later be exploited by mobile forces and senseless pounding of enemy with artillery.
The fact that Soviets did use a lot of artillery doesn't mean that they didn't do much else. Comprende?
No, it's because Stalin purposefully draw the demarcation line right over Berlin, slightly weakened Zhukov's forces and made May the 1st the deadline for taking Berlin, kind of creating a race between them. My guess is that he would have preferred Konev to take Berlin, fearing Zhukov's popularity. Only after he saw what kind of disaster could potentially happen, he changed the orders, allowing Zhukov to assault the city and Konev to provide support.Quote:
Seelow Heights happened because of Zhukov's immense ego. Instead of letting Konev complete the turning of Heinrici's right flank, he decides to make a direct frontal assault. A few days delay, indeed.....tell that to the 30,000 or so who died there so that Zhukov could reach Berlin first...........
"There's a vast difference between using artillery and planes to create a gap within enemy lines which can later be exploited by mobile forces and senseless pounding of enemy with artillery."
I think I made my point that the Soviets loved their artillery preps...and they employed it en-masse even more than their Western allies:shrug:
"Comprende?"
I comprehend just fine, thank you:laugh4: I'm not criticizing the heavy use of firepower...by either the Soviets or the Western Allies, just illustrating how it was done.....As for Seelow Hts., I guess we'll have to agree to disagree....Zhukov wanted to be the first in....period. Agreed that Stalin played upon his ego to get him to push harder, but as with most Zhukov orchestrated battles, the Soviet Army paid in blood for his glory. Koniev's drive up from the SW would have made Heinrici's position untenable. 30,000 brave soldiers died for a bit of time.....
Then you misunderstood what PJ wanted to say. There's nothing wrong with having a local superiority in men and equipment, it's where you choose to use it, how you choose use it and what will you do afterwards, and that's where German and later Soviets differed from western allies for the most part.Quote:
Originally Posted by ReluctantSamurai
Now, I'm not bashing western allies. Considering their situation, it was probably the best way all in all. Western allies had much larger industrial base, much more raw materials and few manpower issues. That basically meant that they could always outgun their opponent and that they're gonna have few logistical problems. Basically, fighting the war of attrition was the best way to fight a war for them.
Generals tend to have big egos but I don't think Zhukov was worse than average. They didn't anticipate such heavy resistance and Stalin, never completely trusting western allies, insisted that the attack commence on April 16th, which allowed for only two weeks of preparation, and later that the city must be taken by May 1st.Quote:
I comprehend just fine, thank you:laugh4: I'm not criticizing the heavy use of firepower...by either the Soviets or the Western Allies, just illustrating how it was done.....As for Seelow Hts., I guess we'll have to agree to disagree....Zhukov wanted to be the first in....period. Agreed that Stalin played upon his ego to get him to push harder, but as with most Zhukov orchestrated battles, the Soviet Army paid in blood for his glory. Koniev's drive up from the SW would have made Heinrici's position untenable. 30,000 brave soldiers died for a bit of time.....
Also, Zhukov most of the time made correct decisions, there were few blunders of course, but he also was the general who saw "most action" and was involved in every major Soviet operation from 1941 to 1945. Overall, he was a very competent commander.
Are we not missing a major differentiation between the goals of each side. The Western allies were attempting to defeat the Germans; to push them back and force their surrender. The Russians were, lets be frank, on a bit of a charge because they were eye-ing up a land-grab.
"Then you misunderstood what PJ wanted to say."
I understood the point he was trying to make.
"There's nothing wrong with having a local superiority in men and equipment, it's where you choose to use it, how you choose use it and what will you do afterwards, and that's where German and later Soviets differed from western allies for the most part"
Not sure what you mean by this.....
"Overall, he was a very competent commander."
In an overall strategical sense, and perhaps on the operational level. But at the tactical level, he was brutal (read as careless with human life) and he didn't get along well with subordinates (not unlike Monty, in that respect). Zhukov is one of my top three over-rated generals of WW2...
Crasus sending untrained mercenary legions against the horse archer and cataphract armies of Parthia, without scouting, without securing a water source or a defensible position and against their best general.
Baldwain of Flanders leading a host of Latin knights against the Bulgarian Kingdom and being massacred in entangling terrain after much harassment.
Burnside's Bridge.
Marye's Heights.
Pickett's Charge.
All in all, the ACW was simply full of amateurish blood-lettings.
Here is one for you:
The Battle of Annual, 22, July, 1921. Spain vs. the Rif. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Annual
A Spanish Army force of 5,000 is attacked by 3,000 Rif irregulars. Spain send 18,000 more Regulars to the relief. (23,000 Regular Troops)
The casualties tell the rest. The Rif lost 800 men. The Spanish, depending on sources lost either 13,363 or 20,000. One historian says that only 1,200 Spanish escaped alive.
Ugly!
I believe the Bradley Fighting Vehicle deserves a honourary mention here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aXQ2lO3ieBA
Simply because for that kind of resources down the drain you can fight a fair few battles with proper equipment, and the even now the thing does not yet work properly.
Actually, I think it only carries 4 men now. The M-113A4 still carries 13. With new armor technology the shape charges of the TOW Anti-Tank Missiles are ineffective. Now an infantry platoon is only about half of the size it was and in a vehicle no better armored than the one it replaced. Its speed is actually one MPH slower than the M-113 and it is not amphibious. The Bradley is 30 tons while the 113A4 is 13.6 tons. The A4 actually exceeds it in mobility.
It has a lot of fire power but does not put many troops on the ground. Just about enough to provide ground security for the vehicle when it is stopped.
What happens when a taxi looks like a tank? https://i.imgur.com/HNJtr.jpg
I never knew that it was a real model that the movie talked about.
It does have good armour (for an IFV) nowadays according to specs. Insufficient against IED though.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fisherking
Now, building an IFV from an APC chassis are still the least crazy about it.
Agreed. Even the crimea thing didn't have the same level of inanity. The ACW was a collision of the napoleonic with the industrial ages and neither was truly ready for the other. By 1914, we had our collective industrialized murder principles much more refined.Quote:
Originally Posted by Gelatinous Cube
Well yeah, but the lines had far more space between men than Napoleonic formations, precisely because of the increased firepower. Add to that the fact that the number of men involved was vastly greater, and Napoleonic battles must have seemed like micro-management in comparison.
What was the documentary?Quote:
Originally Posted by Gelatinous Cube
Speaking of this ?Quote:
Originally Posted by Kralizec
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Sarikamish
has gallipoli been mentioned yet or is that one too easy?
A couple years ago, I watched a documentary aptly named The First World War. I thought it was a great watch. :yes:Quote:
Originally Posted by Gelatinous Cube
First world war is great. The best second world war documentary is also BBC's - The World at War. Whoopin' 36 hours all together and is truly epic. The best part is that it was done when some important figures were still alive so you get to hear people like Speer and Doenitz personally.
A huge recommendation to anyone who hasn't seen it.
First World War is definitely the best on WW1. It's worth buying.
The World at War is a little bit old. It made a good effort at that times, but new archives show that what was truth then is not. We know more now about the dark side of all the protagonists. I do enjoy Soviet Storm, series made by Russian TV. the Battlefields Series are one of the best for the moment.
I think that's the one, yes.Quote:
Originally Posted by LeftEyeNine
Somewhat true, but I still like it the best, and the new research mostly deal with the eastern front, which is already under-represented in the series, only 4 of 36 episodes deal with eastern front.Quote:
Originally Posted by Brenus
It doesn't go into details and numbers so it aged quite well (compared to most documentaries about ww2 anyway). Very much worth watching imho.
Sorry for derailing the thread everyone.