Re: News from the Far East
I know very little about Indochina geopolitics, but AFAICT it's another case of a dictator (Hun Sen) flexing his consolidated grip over his country to advance a revision of the regional order. But I have no idea what his aims are or what his actual negotiating position for this round is, with Cambodia escalating the Preah Vihear and related issues more than ever. It can't just for the sake of squeezing out slightly expanded access to the temple complex. Regardless, by all appearances neither side appears to want a war, and Thailand itself has responded with a lot of the typical posturing. But I could be missing key factions in either country who do want war, so we'll have to watch the development of the border clashes carefully (on the grounds that it's difficult for both countries to somehow make a mistake that instigates unwanted war). As always, it is important to keep in mind the facts on the ground: neither country has the equipment available for significant combined arms operations, and Cambodia has no air force to speak of, inherently limiting the scope of any bilateral conflict.
Re: News from the Far East
A-a-a-nd it's over. I wonder if either side had any clear notion of what was going on, or if it really is just a process of managing internal politics (as Communists have always affirmed), where the sacrifice of a handful of soldiers is cheap fodder. Been reading in the meanwhile about the potent character of Thai and Cambodian nationalist construction of historical memory, the more important territorial contestation of the Gulf of Thailand and its resources, and moreover, the close and strange interpersonal relationships between the ruling classes of the two countries (which of course go beyond the Huns and the Shinawatras). It's not so much a question of any factions wanting war, but whether certain such factions will have enough significance to push both countries into a bilateral deadlock on co-interests, and therefore promote a more belligerent posture within this frustrated relationship.
Sample analysis of the factors peripheral to the territorial claims, which does align with my original impressions of the situation:
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Complicating the puzzle further is the fact that while appealing to international law and calling for the intercession of the ICJ and the U.N. Security Council, Phnom Penh has arguably played a disproportionate role in escalating the conflict.
...
A number of plausible theories for Hun Sen’s behavior, including the leak, have been floated. One is that Hun Sen wished to bring down the Pheu Thai government in order either to scuttle its casino legalization bill, which threatened to reduce the profits of Cambodia’s own gaming sector, and/or to forestall its crackdown on Cambodia-based cybercrime operations upon which his government’s patronage networks allegedly rely. (Thailand’s decision to go after Kok An, an important ally of Hun Sen, may well have been a red line.) Another theory holds that Hun Sen fomented the crisis in order to burnish his son’s nationalist credentials, although this has been undermined somewhat by the fact that it is Hun Sen, rather than Hun Manet, who has been depicted as leading the country through the crisis.
The one clear thing is the unanimity of public sentiment that the conflict has created within Cambodia. The government’s position – that Cambodia is a victim of premeditated Thai aggression – has reflexively been adopted by most of Cambodian public opinion, from social media users to journalists, civil society leaders, and exiled opposition figures living in exile. At the very least, anyone opposing the current course of events is loath to say so publicly.
This may point to the real reason why Cambodia’s leaders have encouraged the conflict. Since a contested election in 2013 in which opposition forces came close to victory, the CPP government, backed increasingly by China, has eliminated most sources of opposition and reverted to ruling more openly by force. In this context, stoking nationalism may be a good way of rallying the nation around the flag and compensating for the government’s dearth of democratic legitimacy. It may also serve to distract attention from more pressing concerns, including the stagnating economy, which is threatened by U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariff war, and the crime and reputational impacts stemming from Chinese-run scam operations. Robust Chinese support has also arguably made the Cambodian government more confident in asserting its interests vis-à-vis its two larger neighbors. This is even the case with Vietnam, as the recent frictions over Cambodia’s planned Funan Techo Canal have shown. However, as in 2003 and 2008, Thailand remains a safer and more manipulable target of nationalist brinkmanship.
How far things will go remains unclear – but if elements in both Thailand and Cambodia have had a political interest in pushing the dispute to the point of conflict, neither government has much interest in a full-scale war.
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All this suggests that the two nations will sooner or later find a face-saving way to pull back from the precipice... But a comprehensive solution, which would require both nations to make concessions on issues that touch on keen nationalist sensitivities, would require more political capital than either government currently possesses.
If the history of the past century is any indication, the border issue will then return to a state of dormancy. Like a landmine in the underbrush, it will remain concealed, awaiting the next incautious political footfall.
Re: News from the Far East
An article titled "When AUKUS Meets the Rule of Law", jumping off from a recent report on the legal and constitutional status of AUKUS in its member countries, to the question of how the changing role of courts in Anglosphere foreign policy, as well as that of political currents as such, will complicate any long-term military or diplomatic projects. In the era of the US embracing multipolarity, so to speak, while dismantling its own centuried institutions by fiat, we can really extend the parameters of the analysis to anything in international or internal politics that requires long-term planning and stability.
Although I disagree with the premise that executive privileges in foreign policy used to be unchallenged but now are challenged. As far as I know, even as the courts are more actively encountering such questions, a co-driver of that process is itself the continuing limitless arrogation of sole discretion and scope of action in the foreign policy of the American executive, and to some extent other national executives within the traditional American sphere. The relevance of the analysis to decision-making in crises is also overblown, as there is no reason to believe that participating in legal/judicial niceties will be part of most executives' concerns during world-historical international crises, which more involve the fruition of long-term planning and cooperation rather than its formation, and are also naturally statist-authoritarian moments, for better or worse.
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A new report published earlier this year, “AUKUS and Justiciability,” draws together judicial, academic, and strategic voices to revisit a legal doctrine long assumed to shield war powers from legal scrutiny. That doctrine—nonjusticiability—has traditionally insulated decisions about military deployment from judicial review. But across all three AUKUS countries, that insulation is increasingly open to challenge.
The report therefore charts a subtle but important shift. Courts are still reluctant to rule on foreign policy or defense operations, but they are no longer ruling them out entirely. AUKUS is often framed as a strategic and technological milestone, but this piece argues it is equally a constitutional experiment. As courts in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States become more willing to entertain challenges to military deployments and executive power, the long-assumed doctrine of nonjusticiability is eroding. Even unsuccessful litigation—on issues like Indigenous land rights, nuclear safety, or statutory authority—can introduce delays, caution, or political friction that undermine allied coherence. In a future crisis, this legal vulnerability could translate into strategic paralysis.
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That is why the question of justiciability matters. Not because courts are likely to overrule deployment decisions—but because they may increasingly be asked to. Once a court entertains the question, even to dismiss it, the political landscape changes. Executive power no longer enjoys the special preeminence in foreign affairs that was once presupposed by civil society. Nor are understandings of constitutional history and practice as strong as they once were, particularly in the political sphere. That perception alone is enough to embolden those seeking to delay decisions or complicate coordination among allies.
[...]
"As such, these are not just matters of legal theory. What is at stake here is the very operability of AUKUS in moments of crisis. Strategic alliances require not just political will and shared threat perceptions, but timely decisions and unified action. If a future crisis in the Indo-Pacific requires a coordinated AUKUS deployment, but one partner is faced with litigation or domestic legal hurdles, that coherence collapses. Legal uncertainty becomes strategic liability.
