Originally Posted by [b
Quote[/b] ]The tactician: the "rush fool" Blucher was twice as fast as the lethargic Wellington.
Wellington had a keen appreciation for terrain and deployed his infantrymen on the reverse slopes to conceal them and to avoid casualties from artillery fire. Wellington defeated the French marshals throughout the war, although he suffered several setbacks (Badajoz, Burgos and the hasty retreat after Salamanca. At Quatre Bras Wellington had heavier casualties (4.800) than Ney (4.140) and who fought without d'Erlon's corps. As one participant of Napoleonic discussion forum said: Wellington fought in a new way: he sat on his ass.
Wellington had his serious limitations; for example he was only efficient when he had deployed his infantry into a strong defensive position. Then he simply would wait and see what the enemy will do. That's all, nothing else. At Waterloo his whole strategy was to stand to the last man like the Russians at Borodino.
According to Andrew Uffindell "The Eagles Last Triumph" (publ. in London, 1994) "Wellington excelled at defensive tactics but was less sure at campaign strategy."
Had the Prussians not been at Waterloo, this battle would not have been fought in the first place. Wellington's army was incapable of defeating Napoleon's troops on its own. The whole purpose was to hold on until the Prussians tipped the balance. It was, in the end, a coalition effort, that still does not alter the fact that and would almost certainly have lost. One could almost venture to say that Wellington was 'running scared' of Napoleon, and thats why he may of not wanted to face him alone.
Wellington didn't use his artillery in a modern way, that means of big batteries handled aggressively as did the French, and later on some Allies. For example in 1815 Wellington rejected Sir Frazer's proposal for grouping of 6 batteries of horse artillery into a Grand Battery. The batteries were assigned to cavalry brigades but they spent very short time together. Furthermore, the conservative Wellington was suspicious of artillery officers and stated that they were 'the type of officers who had "revolutionised other armies."
The most fundamental error made in 1815 was Wellington's initial judgement that the French offensive on 15th June was a bluff, and "that he need not react to this." This mistake led to Blucher's Prussian army fighting alone at Ligny on 16th June. Furthermore, if his orders were followed by Prince of Orange it would lead to a very dangerous separation between Allied armies. Fortunately Prince of Orange didn't implement them.
Wellington was slow, slower than Blucher's Prussians and slower than another British commander Marlborough. "Marlborough and Blucher would be on the French frontier well before Wellington." With such turtle-speed if Wellington had met Napoleon in Spain, that affair would have been over very quickly, quicker than what happened in 1808 with his compatriot, talented general Moore.
Wellington was no Napoleon. Nor was it in Wellington's nature to risk his troops for his Allies. When in 1815 Prussian officer Müffling asked "poor Arthur" on the lack of speed of his army, Wellington answered:
"Do not press me on this, for I tell you, it cannot be done. If you knew the composition of the British Army and its habits better, then you would not talk to me about that. I cannot leave my tents and supplies behind. I have to keep my men together in their camp and supply them well to keep order and discipline." [Hofscshroer p. 191]. The Prussians were faster than the British, despite the fact that they had more cannons that slowed down the speed of their march. For example Blücher got 3/4 of his men "to the right place at the right time", while Wellington only miserable 1/3 of his total forces. Thus the "rush fool" Blucher was almost twice as fast as the cunctator Wellington.
With such slow movements and maneuvering Wellington was good only for a secondary theater of war, Spain, and not for the fast paced central European campaign. One of Wellington's groupies, Jac Weller, wrote: "The lack of drive also reveals itself in his (Wellington) failure to exploit his successes. His "pursuits" of defeated armies were lethargic affairs rather than aggressive drives in the Napoleonic style." Weller also describe Wellington as overly cautious, defensive minded and not an aggressive general. Thanks to such lethargic commander French armies recovered quickly after defeat.
In 1814 Blucher's Prussians within 72 hours fought in 3 engagements, made 3 night marches () and for the whole week there had been no issue of rations.
The Bad.
(Wellington's ferrous nickname had nothing to do with his behavior in battle)
The deserter.
One of the differences between Wellington and Napoleon was that Wellington "deserted" under fire and Napoleon didn't. "Poor Arthur" took to flight, abandoning his troops in combat. The opinion was that "Wellesley should have been court-martialled but his brother was Governor General of India and that saved his skin." - source: "Diary of Colonel Bayly, 1796-1830"
"Wellesley galloped back to the Madras camp where he found General Harris and told him that the attack on the Tope had failed. [Wellesley] was described as being much agitated. Having delivered his report, [his troops forgotten] he flung himself full length on a mess table and went to sleep. ... Arthur Wellesley ... he had lost control of the action and of himself and he had panicked and deserted his men, behaviour which would not have been tolerated in a subaltern much less a colonel." - Gordon Corrigan "Wellington: A Military Lif"e
What would have Wellington done to a colonel in Spain who abandoned his troops in the middle of a bloody battle and ran "much agitated" to the rear, to the coziness of the headquarters ?
"To lie like Napoleon's bulletin or to lie like Wellington's dispatch."
In his dispatch, Wellington had said he was told of the outbreak of hostilities on the evening of the 15th. Privately he said the news came at 3pm. In fact, it was 9am, but he waited for confirmation from Paris that never arrived, thereby losing a vital 24 hours. As a result he let down the Prussians at Ligny on June 16, having promised his support. Wellington naturally wanted to conceal this lie.
According to author Peter Höfschroer, Wellington deceived his allies: "in 1815 Wellington promised to provide rapid and substantial aid to Blücher at a crucial point in the battle at Ligny, although he knew he could not do so. The Duke risked sacrificing Blücher in order to gain time for his own troops to fall into formation. Instead, it was Blücher, who came to his rescue in the final hour of the 1815 campaign."
His dispatches are also full of comments on how the British army would have been beaten if he had not been there. According to Weller such attitude led him to neglect an elementary aspect of good leadership, the competent subordinates. Wellington attempted to control everything and constantly complained of being "poorly served" by his generals.
Wellington also claimed to have watched the Prussian defeat at Ligny through his telescope from the crossroads at Quatre Bras. It must have been an "extraordinary telescope", wrote Siborne in his History of the War in France and Belgium in 1815 (1844), "to be able to see through a hill - in the dark".
Positions of British troops according to Wellington.
He presented this view of his troops well-concentrated and
thus influenced the Prussians to take a stand against Napoleon.
The Prussians received the freshiest blow before Wellington decided
to meet Napoleon and only after assurances of support from Blucher.
The real situation with Wellington's troops; far from being concentrated
and completely unprepared to cooperate with the Prussians.
Blucher and Napoleon had their armies in hand, Wellington didn't.
But it was Napoleon and Blücher who bled on that day, not Wellington.
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Wellington bad-mouthed Prince of Orange and belittled Blücher.
Then he grabbed all the glory for himself.
There is so much whitewashing and sugar-coating of Wellington - being done by the "Waterloo Industry" in London. In my opinion he was a ruthless control freak, and not a good man at all. In 1815 Wellington deceived the Prussians promising quick support that was impossible because of the crap concentration of the British army. Prussians were crushed at Ligny, although Blücher rallied his men during retreat. Without Blücher, Wellington would pay dearly for his horrendous mistakes and only a hasty retreat and embarking a la Dunkirk would save his butt.
In 1815 Wellington as a commander was miserable. "Poor Arthur" invented the story of the rushing fool Blücher hurrying to fight Napoleon. According to Hofschroer "This was to cover his own glarring errors." The Duke devastated his Portuguese ally's territory to cover his retreat into the Lines of Torres Vedras and such man just might have been capable of sacrificing the Prussians at any difficult for him situation. Furthermore, "Wellington belittled Blücher efforts afterwards. Then he grabbed all the glory for himself." Meanwhile British authors present Blücher as a poor tactician.
Blücher at first considered Wellington an honorable man. He later learned how mistaken he had been.
Prince of Orange "clearly had a better grasp of the strategic significance of Quatre Bras" crossroad than Wellington. The Battle of Quatre Bras was initially fought between the French and Dutch, Belgians and Germans who held off all French attacks before the English finally came. After the battle was won, Wellington took credit for it and ... bad-mouthed Prince of Orange. At Waterloo almost all the Dutch, Belgian and German troops who distinguished themselves at Quatre Bras, and their commanders, were left on forward slope, a suicidal position, while all British troops were kept in the safety of reverse slope with masses of cavalry in their support.
Wellington's Prussian ally, Blücher, suggested they call it the Battle of La Belle Alliance, but Wellington had other plans. He raced back to his headquarters in the village of Waterloo and wrote his famous dispatch, explaining just how he had won the battle of Waterloo and "Waterloo-mania" swept Britain with noisy re-enactments of this great British victory.
No serious student now doubts the contribution made by Prussian army to the Allied victory at Waterloo. The arrival of those 40,000 troops in the late afternoon of that long, hot, bloody day ensured success.
Without the Prussians, Wellington's finest hour may have ended in stalemate or worse.
A combination of politics and personal pride refused to allow that Napoleon's destruction was due to anything other than British pluck and dash and the genius of Wellington. It is a tale of arrogance and conceit. This stubborn misappropriation of glory denigrated Prussian ambitions in Europe and elevated the reputation of the Iron Duke. .
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