Roman phalanx?

Military leaders usually had only a very foggy idea of what was going on in a battle thanks to all the dust being kicked up and the simple limitations of human senses in dealing with vast distances and immense numbers of people. Battlefield communications were something pretty deplorable for most of history, anyway.

After the battle plans were made and troops fromed up there was generally very little that could be done to change anything anymore; adapting to changing situations was normlly up to individual division commanders and similar front-rank officers.

In Greek hoplite warfare it was perfectly common for entire flanks to collapse without the center or other flanks noticing anything - and for the victorius side to try to chase the routers for quite a while before realizing they could also turn around and go see how their mates fared. A hoplite line hit in the flank was pretty much as good as routed, although in the rare cases where both flanks were turned and the center enveloped there would normally be a desperate battle to the death with high casualty figures uncharacteristic of hoplite warfare.

oaty I never said the phalanx didn't have to keep up the attack to be safe, what I did stress was the lack of support they got.
A phalanx alone can't win great victories unless there are some extreme circumstances such as Marathon. They can't chase very well and they run the risk of getting flanked all the time.
They need the support of light troops and cavalry to get a serious victory, and in this case they needed that support just to win. But Perseus somehow managed to bungle up his advantages. He left the battle as it was getting started with his main cavalry, now what was that all about? The decisive arm of your army leaves the battle without getting involved!
So yes, he let the phalangites march to their doom.

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Originally Posted by Kraxis

But Perseus somehow managed to bungle up his advantages. He left the battle as it was getting started with his main cavalry, now what was that all about? The decisive arm of your army leaves the battle without getting involved!
So yes, he let the phalangites march to their doom.

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What was the reason?
Probabaly he figured the battle was lost anyway at some point? But who is he after that? :)

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A phalanx alone can't win great victories unless there are some extreme circumstances such as Marathon.

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And although Marathon was a decisive victory, it didn't really result in a lot of dead Persians. The Phalanx charged, the Persians broke and scrambled back to their ships, but not many died.

6400 out of estimated 20-25,0000

25% + of the enemy force dead is not many killed?

Given that the Persians were essentially occupying a cul-de-sac with the only way out being their ships ? Not very. Had the Greeks possessed some cavalry, or even light infantry, to mount an effective close pursuit with the Persian losseswould've likely climbed well past eighty or even ninety per cent.

That was actually an issue that almost always, except perhaps for the short period when almost no armour at all was worn, plagued hoplite warfare. While you could well win the day and drive the enemy off the field, his total casualties tended to be very light and thus his military power remained mostly intact - in the squabbles between the Greek city-states under 5% casualties was the norm even for the losers.

Even the lighter scale-cuirass hoplite panoply was, after figuring in the greaves, helmet, shield and weapons, simply heavy enough that the soldiers couldn't pursue effectively - especially as the routing foes would naturally ditch their heavier equipement to flee faster. Bronze now just happens to be a pretty suboptimal metal, at least as far as weight/performance ratio goes, to make fighting gear out of. But that was what they were stuck with.

The Romans had a whole different approach. While especially early on their cavalry wasn't too great for actual fighting, it did a great job obliterating broken enemy armies - the Romans had a very "total war" approach to casualties.

“Given that the Persians were essentially occupying a cul-de-sac with the only way out being their ships ? Not very. Had the Greeks possessed some cavalry, or even light infantry, to mount an effective close pursuit with the Persian losseswould've likely climbed well past eighty or even ninety per cent.

That was actually an issue that almost always, except perhaps for the short period when almost no amour at all was worn, plagued hoplite warfare. While you could well win the day and drive the enemy off the field, his total casualties tended to be very light and thus his military power remained mostly intact - in the squabbles between the Greek city-states under 5% casualties was the norm even for the losers..”

The Greeks pursued right to water, it was the ships that allowed the Persians to escape, not the hoplite’s armor.

The period usually offered up for the supposed abandonment of armor is the last quarter of the 5th century to the mid part of the 4th. But over this period just about every major Greek power in fact, consistently deployed cavalry and light infantry with their hoplites. The laggard being Sparta, but even she has cavalry and light infantry at most battles (either her own or via her allies). The Greeks certainly did not need to alter their hoplite gear to gain pursuit ability.

Why are you convinced of only a 5% casualty number for the losers as normal, at Delium the Athenian rate was more like 14%?

I don’t get your last bit, the Romans are better at pursuit because of their cavalry or their gear?

At Marathon the Persians had the sea and a swamp at their rear. They didn't have much options in terms of retreating. Of course there is always some that can run into the swamp and yet more that can board the ships, but that will create bottlenecks and crowding. Areas where the lighter Persians would stand still, something that would be very ripe for the somewhat slower hoplites. This of course meant that the Persians subject to the hoplite's attacks would try to fight back, and they did as this was where a large part of the hoplites loses were suffered, at the ships. I believe the brother of Socrates that died down there.
The hoplites didn't need to be as fast as the Persians to catch them in this case. That 'only' about 6-7000 Persians got killed is an indication that they got enough of a headstart to let the greater part of the army get away. If not we might have seen percentages around the order of Lake Trasimene or Cannae (similar enclosed situations).

Kraxis

By head start I take it you’re agreeing the Hoplites were too slow

At Cannae, perhaps 30,000 Romans escaped the slaughter on the battle field. Unfortunately for half of those men (some 15,000) they had no ships to run to only the roman camps or the ruins of Cannae. Thus even Hannibal’s army was not fast enough to catch all the Romans, significant numbers of Romans escaped. Half were later surrounded and surrendered.

Canneae is just about perfect as battles go (at least for the winners), at Marathon the Persians did break the Athenian center and pursue the routed men quite far (according to Herodotus). The Athenians it seems to me will have been distracted from their own pursuit on the Persians, with the necessity of saving the men of their own defeated center. They did not have the luxury of Hannibal, who very probably considered his Celts holding the center at Cannae (or the somewhat similar battle at Trebia) as disposable.

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The Greeks pursued right to water, it was the ships that allowed the Persians to escape, not the hoplite’s armor.

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What allowed so many Persians to reach the ships alive was the comparative inefficiancy of hoplites in pursuit. If the Greeks could not easily strike them in the back when they were running towards the ships, and only really came to grips with the fleeing Persians when the latter were packed into a big crowd trying to board the vessels, parts of which no doubt turned to fight in desperation, then obviously the casualties were lighter than they would have been had the Greek hoplites somehow been able to keep pace with the routing Persian light troops.

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The period usually offered up for the supposed abandonment of armor is the last quarter of the 5th century to the mid part of the 4th. But over this period just about every major Greek power in fact, consistently deployed cavalry and light infantry with their hoplites. -- The Greeks certainly did not need to alter their hoplite gear to gain pursuit ability.

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I don't think anyone ever said the armour was lightened to help pursuit. After all, if the other side was also in the "light" version he'd still be less encumbered in a rout because he'd be throwing away his shield and weapons...

Heavy infantry on the whole aren't good pursuers.

I don't quite see how the increasing use of cavalry and skirmishers would be incompatible with abandoning armour either. Greek cavalry of the time, to be blunt, sucked beans, and the hoplites could no doubt see it off quite well with just spears and shields. The javelins of the skirmishers were wont to punch straight through shields and most armour in any case, so there'd be certain sense in leaving armour out to begin with so the heavy infantry could at least in theory run down the pesky javelineers.

More to the point, however, the lightened load allowed for far more unit mobility, marching speed and tactical maneuvers not doable with the comparatively slow-moving heavy panoply. There may also have been some sociopolitical reasons to leave out the single most expensive part of the hoplite panoply, but those I know nothing of.

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Why are you convinced of only a 5% casualty number for the losers as normal, at Delium the Athenian rate was more like 14%?

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Because every military history book on the subject I've read thus far says about 2.5% for the victors and 5% for the losers was the standard going rate in hoplite clashes. In unusual circumstances - usually involving turning the flanks and envelopement, thus making it impossible for parts of the losing side to flee - could of course result in a lot higher ratio, as would likely the later military developements (more cavalry and skirmishers etc.) that moved the military method towards more professnional, result-oriented direction.

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I don’t get your last bit, the Romans are better at pursuit because of their cavalry or their gear?

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Cavalry, obviously. Its primary battlefield job was to hunt down routers. Roman infantry panoply was much lighter, or at least more weight-effective, than the Greek hoplites' had been (iron mail vs. bronze scale or plate), but on the other hand many of their enemies, particularly the assorted barbarians, wore essentially no armour at all...
Roman armies normally had a sizeable contignent of fast-moving skirmishers, though. Presumably these could mount a semi-decent pursuit if needed.

Yes, I say that the hoplites were slower. We also have to consider the fact that the hoplites at Marathon had just dashed a few hundred meters to get under the Persian arrows. That will tire out any man if he wears the full panoply the hoplites of the day did. Then the same man has to fight Persians that fight back and push at him. He will tire more. Finally the lighter Persians run away... By then the hoplite will for want of a better word be exhausted. The chase will be slow, perhaps even a quick march.
Light infantry wouldn't have been equally tired.

The Roman panoply wasn't that much lighter actually.
If we take a Priceps as the general soldier he was equipped with a heavier shield (yes it was actually heavier than a greek aspis), equal weight on the body (heavier if the hoplite wears a linnen cuirass), negliable less weight in the helmet (equal if the hoplite wears a Pilos, Phrygian or Attic helmet) but the lack of greaves would be a positive thing on the run. All in all he wouldn't be much lighter or faster than a classical hoplite, and he would be heavier than a hoplite from around 400-350BC.
The weightdestribution would also be much the same as the Princeps didn't wear a tightening belt on the waist to put some of the weigth of the armour on the hips rather than the shoulders.
A Hastatus would of course be lighter and faster (he would most likely also be younger and naturally faster) given his very light armour.

Heavy infantry too laden for speed?

Well not Jesse Owens speed but still fast enough. Remember that the ancients wore armour continuously: while building, training, or on the march. It seems as though we are not taking into consideration their, apparently to we comparatively dorment, indolent softies, considerable conditioning, toughness, and endurance. They were bread for war and especially hand-to-hand combat, a type of engagement that requires and presupposes decisive speed.

Pharsalus, 48BCE, provides a good example of tactical level Roman versatility and quickness. Octavian's insightful solution to Pompey's superior cavalry provides us with a rare though effective example of delightfully shrewd use of screened infantry mobility: a case where experience, training and effectively mobile discipline overcame greater, though similarly trained, numbers.

Hoplites usually ran at each other from a hundred paces or so - except for Spartans who marched to the sound of flutes and so kept better order.

There's no reason why hoplites should be slower than legionaries wearing chain, helments, greaves, carrying a large scuta and a heavy pilum!!

Legionaries using long spears - apparently there are some obsucre references to some Emperor about 220AD trying to train a couple of legions as "Spartans" and "Mascedonians", and possibly even taking them on campaign in Syria - but it's all terribly academic and unsure.

But of course Romans DID use thrusting spears - As for why legions evolved the way they did......

IMO it's a complicated story - Italy was "Graeca Magna", and msot Italian cities had a layer of Greek culture, including hoplite equipment for the richer classes.

However unlike Greece, Italian culture was someonwhat more egalitarian, so the lesser classes were still allowed to fight.

So in the Earliest Known Roman army we have 6 classes of citizen - 1st class equiped as hoplites, 2nd similarly but without body armour and with a scuta, 3rd a bit lighter again (no helmet IIRC), 4th possibly as light javelinmen of slingers, 5th similar but with even more basic info, and hte 6th too poor to serve except as labourers (from memory).

Compare this with the Classical Greek model where only those rich enough to be hoplites served.

Rome got trounced by a Gallic army at Allia circa 390BC, and Rome was sacked. The first identifiable "legions" started appearing after this.

The consisted of the Hastati - lightly armoured men with pila & Scuta, Principes & Triarii - heavier armoured men with the thrusting spear, Leves - lightly armoured skirmishers with lighter javelins, and a couple of little known troop types Asenci and Roarii about which again we know little.

I think it likely that the original 1st & 2nd classes were amalgamated into the Princepes and Triarii based upon age, the 3rd class became the Hastati, the 4th -6th classes were split up among the rest.

Contrary to populat belief, Roman tactics WERE LINEAR - jsut like everyone else's - there's no evidence at all that they formed their chequerboard in combat, and it is likely that it would have been suicide to do so - exposing so many flanks to attack would have been very dangerous!!

But their organisation into legions of up to 6 lines (more commonly 4) required better control than a single linear formation of hoplites - so they adoted the Maniple from their Italian neighbours.

The Century already existed as the voting unit of hte population of course - that 1st organisation had 40 centuries of 1st class, 20 of 2nd, etc. - so it was a natural progression (IMO) to make a maniple 2 centuries, since this was a useful sized unit for manouvre and command.

The use of the Pila increased - the Principes seem to have adopted it about the time of Phyrus's invasion - whether before or after isn't really known.

Jsut my 2 cents worth :)

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Contrary to populat belief, Roman tactics WERE LINEAR - jsut like everyone else's - there's no evidence at all that they formed their chequerboard in combat, and it is likely that it would have been suicide to do so - exposing so many flanks to attack would have been very dangerous!!

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This is up to debate.

Some historians belieft the gaps in the checkerboard were used only during the advance of the line, and that they were closed before battle was joined to prevent said outflanking.

Others disagree and state the gaps were also there during battle. Adrian Goldsworthy for one argues that even a phalanx would have had to have gaps in it, because it is almost impossible for a line of thousands of men to advance in close order without bumping into eachother, and that's before you add in the hundreds of obstacles that litter the field. Even if the field was prepared before the battle, things like thrown javelins sticking in the earth and dead bodies lying about are enough to cause disruptions in a tight battle line.

Goldsworthy claims the Romans simply had more and bigger gaps, and that the outflanking thing was not a problem because only very few warriors are eager and reckless enough to advance between enemy lines, especially if another maniple is drawn up behind that gap ready to countercharge anyone attempting to outflank the first line.

Anyway, this is just to illustrate the issue is not clear cut. (Is anything in ancient history?) Gaps may well have been used in battle. Or not.

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Originally Posted by KRALLODHRIB

Heavy infantry too laden for speed?

Well not Jesse Owens speed but still fast enough. Remember that the ancients wore armour continuously: while building, training, or on the march. It seems as though we are not taking into consideration their, apparently to we comparatively dorment, indolent softies, considerable conditioning, toughness, and endurance. They were bread for war and especially hand-to-hand combat, a type of engagement that requires and presupposes decisive speed.

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*sigh*
Good job missing the point. The point is that unless the heavy infantry trying to run down their routing opposite numbers, who are going to promptly throw away all their easily disposable heavy equipement, has a *major* edge over them in terms of running speed and endurance, the latter are very likely to outrun them.

God forbid if the guys running away are light infantry, who aren't exactly weighed down to begin with and whose job is to a large part run around the battlefield. Might as well try a swimming contest with an otter.

Exactly, we have to assume that everybody were equally in better shape than us. It makes little point that they were in fact in better shape if the disparity remains the same.

If the light troops had our shape and the heavies the ancient people's shape, then perhaps there might have been a point.

And even the strongest soldiers today have a hard time running with their gear on, gear that weight aboutthe same as the ancient warriors gear. And I can't possibly imagine our soldiers being in worse shape in general, and in this case we have even got the advantage of our soldiers being much bigger and physically stronger.

The point is moot.