[Pro Patria] Does the attacking helicopter give enough bang for the buck?

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China would be the worst threat but I doubt helicopters can do much against human wave attacks.

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That's what artillery and machineguns and suchlike are for.

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Originally Posted by Watchman

That's what artillery and machineguns and suchlike are for.

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Perfect segue to the Artillery thread :2thumbsup:

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Besides I don't think we've seen the end of 3gw. State to state war will always be the primary cause.

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And be a far deadlier conflict for the West.

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The Russians are heading towards domestic and economic trouble to they could mature into a theat. How many times have they been beaten down only to emerge stronger? They may have the armor but they also are still developing good SAMs which the older helos won't be able to defend against.

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In a conventional conflict the Russian won't see light. A far smaller population base than NATO - 140 vs 800 - a heavily declining one too and their economy relies entirely on oil and gas.

Tactically the Soviets combined massed tank formation with armored infantry, supported by massive numbers of artillery. They always had the good sense to not just rely on their good fighters with their excellent missiles but to invest heavily in integral AAA and SAM, supported by two additional layers of SAM batteries for air defense. To counter the anti-tank missiles of NATO both APS with hard and soft kill ability were devised and reactive armor was used on a wide array of vehicles.

It is hard to estimate now how well the attack helicopter would have performed. BTW did you know that a MBT with a modern FCS is able to shoot a helicopter down? It depends who knows and sees first - a well camo. modern tank is for sure a danger for any heli. as there is little to do against a Mach 5 120mm round. But it is of course only a backup ability.

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Perfect segue to the Artillery thread

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Indeed

OA

The attack helicopter retains its position in modern warfare due to doctrines of maneuver warfare. In the traditional view as the anti-tank attack option its been left wanting as its vulnerability outweighs its firepower in anything but a supporting role. The present and future attack helicopters will continue to rely completely upon CAX.

I don't think China would have much of a chance against the US (and/or EU/NATO since those groups would probably fight together against China if China did try to attack one or the other). Not only would China not have all that much of a population advantage, if it even had one. But I'm also not that impressed with their military materiel, for example their tanks, jets, and most importantly their navy. That and I have never heard of the Chinese military referred to a highly professional, well-trained fighting force, and if it isn't it wouldn't stand much of a chance because human-wave attacks and a generally discoordinated military don't work well at all against modern technology and fire support systems and modern military doctrines.

I would think it a safe bet the present Chinese army is no longer the Stalinist rhinoceros of the Korean War, personally. Leaving that aside neither was it to my knowledge built up for half a century for an apocalyptic Third World War (only to find the other side rudely deflated without warning) the same way "Western" militaries were, nor does it have much in the way of the practical experience those have picked up in assorted little squabbles around the globe. And while they've been intensely enough trying to bring their hardware up to modern standards, AFAIK they still have to import the high-tech parts which ought to tell you something.

That said, the sheer size - a round 1/5 of the entire world population - and overall resource base of the PRC alone would make it a somewhat daunting opponent. NATO would probably run out of money to pay for new smart bombs long before the Chinese ran out of reserves to send into the fray, but then again, if brought under considerable economic, political and military pressure and with its armed forces sort of preoccupied from maintaining internal security the whole state would probably implode. They've got enough tensions as is without hostile powers actively hammering wedges into the cracks. That'd of course result in a godawful mess and probably destabilize half Eurasia for a fair while, but...

This seems to be rather straying from the topic of attack helos though.

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I don't think China would have much of a chance against the US (and/or EU/NATO since those groups would probably fight together against China if China did try to attack one or the other). Not only would China not have all that much of a population advantage, if it even had one. But I'm also not that impressed with their military materiel, for example their tanks, jets, and most importantly their navy. That and I have never heard of the Chinese military referred to a highly professional, well-trained fighting force, and if it isn't it wouldn't stand much of a chance because human-wave attacks and a generally discoordinated military don't work well at all against modern technology and fire support systems and modern military doctrines.

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I too think that they are lagging behind in terms of technology even if they are great copy-cats - what actually means intellectual property in Chinese :). But I think that they might find it hardest to get tactically to the same level as some Nato members - this type of knowledge is far harder to copy.

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That said, the sheer size - a round 1/5 of the entire world population - and overall resource base of the PRC alone would make it a somewhat daunting opponent. NATO would probably run out of money to pay for new smart bombs long before the Chinese ran out of reserves to send into the fray, but then again, if brought under considerable economic, political and military pressure and with its armed forces sort of preoccupied from maintaining internal security the whole state would probably implode. They've got enough tensions as is without hostile powers actively hammering wedges into the cracks. That'd of course result in a godawful mess and probably destabilize half Eurasia for a fair while, but...

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1.3 billion vs. 800 million - an advantage, but not such a huge one. Far less $ pro capita, a far faster aging population, far worse infrastructure, huge social and environmental problems.... I don't China poses a conventional world wide military thread. Still in a regional conflict I wouldn't bet that the US Navy survives given the huge built-up of anti-ship rockets...

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This seems to be rather straying from the topic of attack helos though.

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Right

BTW, talking about gunships, what about the one like the AC-130 II Spooky ? I don't know exactly how much it costs but the concept is neat. Especially if modernized. Given the sheer size of the aircraft it might even be possible to install a active protection system as on a MBT and combine it with an array of other defensive measurements. A good gunner with a large AA gun and good sensor might wreck it though... So SH would you pick such a gunship over attack helicopters costing the same?



OA

The AC130 Spectre is ok so long as they aren't facing anybody with modern AA systems or an air force.

Does anyone have any information about the us of AH-1 Cobras in the Iran-Iraq war? The Iraqis did have a lot of armor and the Iranians did manage to stop them and push them back into Iraq, I have little doubt that helo supplied CAS had no small role in that.

According to:

MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL PUBLICATION

FMFRP 3-203 - Lessons Learned: Iran-Iraq War,
10 December 1990

The counterattack of Iran:

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One of the worst debacles of the war occurred during the
1982 counteroffensive in Khuzestan. There is some
explanation for the initial reverses in this battle-the: Iraqis were
overextended and short, proportionately, of infantry and,
further, they did not expect the violence or scale of the Iranian
reaction. But at a point the Iraqi command structure seems to
have become paralyzed, and this undermined the soldiers’
confidence in their leaders. When the order came to withdraw,
it was apparent to the men that it was too late and that certainly
contributed to the rout. In general this looks like a debacle, but
when we evaluate the actions of armies, we must be careful
not to use the yardstick of experienced Western armies. We
need to look carefully at the total context and appreciate that
we are looking into someone else’s private world, as it were.

The Iraqi commanders were up against what to them must
have been a strange and terrifying phenomenon: the
human-wave attack. Going into Iran, they never anticipated
facing waves of martyrdom-seeking Iranians. As one Iraqi
commander put it, “It’s horrifying; they swarm at you like
roaches.” As with our own initial experiences with the Chinese
in the Korean War, much of the Iraqis’ collapse in battle must
be attributed to the unexpected nature and violence of this new
tactic.

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So Iranian blood seems to have stopped the Iraqi offensive.

Important:

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Close Air Support. The Iraqis were roundly criticized early
in the war for not integrating close air support. For reasons
perhaps best articulated by Major Ronald Bergquist in The
Ro/e of Airpower h the /rar?-/raq War, the Iraqis did not have
or make the commitment to a close air support system.

Shortly after the war began, however, the Iranians began
employing helicopters in the close air role. Not long after the
Iraqis followed suit; the American-style Iranian helicopter
interventions had obviously made an impression. Helicopters
became the Iraqi Army’s close air arm.

The integration of this element into the combined arms
team took time, however, and for a while the Iraqis used
helicopters in a way Westerners would not expect, employing
them as indirect fire assets. In this maneuver, rocket-loaded
helicopters would fly to positions behind the front lines, orient
on the target, pitch the nose of the helicopter up and launch.”

This is a variation of some ideas that have existed in the
American artillery and helicopter communities for some time.
The practice is unusual, however, and probably not too
efficient, except for providing area fire. In this sense it was
reasonably effective against troops in assembly areas or in
large attack formations such as those presented by the
infamous human wave attacks. In addition, the technique
undoubtedly has some value as a form of harassing and
interdiction fire.

While we cannot be certain, it appears that by about 1985
the Iraqis began employing their helicopter assets in a more
conventional role. During 1988, the “brave knights” of the
helicopter force were cited in the daily war communiques as
making a certain number of sorties along with the “hawks” of
the Iraqi Air Force.

Estimates are that each side lost 250 helicopters in the war.
The bulk of the losses were to the Soviet ZSU 23-4 23mm
system. There has been only limited discussion of the
effectiveness of attack helicopters in their various roles.
Evidence exists that the Iraqis used helicopters as chemical
rocket delivery platforms. What type munitions were employed
is uncertain, but it would most likely have been mustard gas.

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Note also that the Iranians lacked trained pilots and spare parts for their airforce - this should also apply to the helicopters. Still they were able to operate a decent part of their fleet.


From: Fire in the Hills: Iranian and Iraqi battles of Autumn 1982 --> http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_214.shtml

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During this offensive, the IRGC for the first time deployed some of its armour – mainly T-55 MBTs and Type 63/531 APCs of the recently-established 30th Armoured Divsion IRGC, all of which had been captured from the Iraqis during the previous engagements and for the first time were being grouped as independent units. Iranian armoured units were supported by the 21st and 77th Infantry Divisions, 58th Commando and 23rd Special Forces Brigades, 22nd and 33rd Artillery Groups, as well as the 1st, 3rd, 5th and 7th Infantry Divisions IRGC. The Islamic Republic of Iran Army Aviation (IRIAA) also deployed a sizeable helicopter division, including 34 Bell AH-1J/T Cobras, and a number of Bell 204s, Bell 206s, Bell 214s, and Boeing CH-47 Chinooks in support role.

But the Iraqis – instructed also by a team of East German advisors – now started operating their Mil Mi-25 Hind and Aérospatiale SA.342L Gazelle attack helicopters in “hunter/killer” teams, which proved especially effective. The tactics used by the IrAAC hunter/killer teams was simple but highly effective, as it put the best capabilities of both helicopter types to advantage: the Mi-25s would go in first and roll over the Iranian positions firing 57mm unguided rockets, trying to suppress the anti-aircraft positions. The Gazelles would follow, using the confusion to fire their HOT anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) against singled out Iranian tanks.

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Iran's CAS was quite limitated

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The Iranian commanders always hopped that by making surprise attacks against Iraqi lines on the central or northern front there was a small possibility of catching the Iraqi Army off balance, or overstretched, and breaking a whole part of the front. For this purpose, the Iranian troops were first to isolate the Iraqi pocket in Naft Shahr, and then reach the Mandali-Baqubah road at a point some 41nm (75km) from the Iraqi capital, where the Iraqi Army held a large depot with huge vehicle parks and workshops.

The air support for the operation was to be given by a battalion of the IRIAA from the Kermanshah Army Aviation Group, including two dozen Bell AH-1J Cobras and Bell 214A Isfahans, and commanded by Capt. H. Namazian. They were forward-based near Sumar and were to play a crucial role in supplying ammunitions to the advancing Iranian ground forces. In addition, the IRIAF prepared some 14 or 15 McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom IIs from the 31st and 33rd Tactical Fighter Squadrons (TFS) at the TFB.3 near Hamedan, led by Capt. R. Salmaan and Capt. S. Khalili, respectively. Meanwhile, the 51st and 53rd TFS from the TFB.5 at Omidiyeh, led by Maj. A. Sadeghi and Capt. R. Jamalan, respectively, prepared between seven and nine Northrop F-5E Tiger IIs.

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A great article to be sure, much more is still there...

OA