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The Soviet High Command projected that operations in Manchuria would last about one month and prepared accordingly. Preparations for a short, victorious campaign involved massive redeployments of forces in lim ited time under conditions of secrecy. Carefully selected commanders manned a unified command structure to control the massive forces operating on such a wide front. Commanders at all levels selected strategic, operational, and tactical objectives and tailored their forces to secure them in the shortest possible time. A vast array of support units of all types prepared to support the combat forces. As planned, operations exploited terrain and dynamically used all elements of combat power, especially armor. Flexibility and audacity characterized the operation. Commanders at all levels displayed initiative to achieve success.
Challenging the Soviets in Manchuria were stringent time requirements, terrain obstacles, and Japanese resistance. The Soviet Army met the first two challenges itself, while Japanese dispositions and plans helped it meet the third. Essentially, the Soviets completed the operation in seven days (by 16 August). Subsequent engagements and movements were pro forma. The Soviets exceeded their timetable by three weeks, suffered light casualties, and overwhelmed the Kwantung Army.1
Why the Soviet victory? In essence, ultimate Soviet victory was inevitable. The preponderance of Soviet forces, the crumbling Japanese strategic posture in the western Pacific, the devastating bombing offensive against Japan (including the atomic bomb), and the weakened condition of the Kwantung Army all spelled inevitable defeat for Japan. So the real question then becomes why did the Soviet victory come so quickly? Although it is convenient to use the oversimplifications cited above, they mask other reasons for quick Japanese defeat.
The Soviets expected a difficult campaign when they entered Manchuria, so they prepared accordingly. The result was a bold plan of operations. The Soviets respected the prowess, at least in name, of the Kwantung Army; they had, after all, battled the Japanese forces before and knew the individual strength and bravery of the Japanese soldier. Even the knowledge that the Kwantung Army of 1945 was not the same as the one of 1941 did not measurably lessen that respect. The Soviets apparently had a fairly good knowledge of Japanese defensive plans and adjusted forces accordingly. Nevertheless, they probably overassessed the strength of Japanese covering units on the border, hence the massiveness of initial Soviet attacks. The Soviets also expected greater Japanese resistance in the redoubt area of southern Manchuria. Soviet planning reflected this overestimation in several decisions: to gain the central Manchurian plain, to inflict piecemeal defeat on Japanese forces, and to divide them before they could consolidate. Thus, the attack occurred on many axes, including the thrusts into Korea. But even Soviet commanders were surprised at the scope and speed of their own successes.
In terms of leadership, equipment, and manpower, the Kwantung Army of 1945 certainly was not the same army as it was in 1941, but it was also not so ineffective as some analysts have claimed. In many instances, the marginal replacements of 1945 performed well on the battlefield, whenever they were permitted to fight. Even in reduced state, Japanese divisions outmanned their Soviet equivalents and fought well. Thus, the Japanese 80th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 119th Infantry Division did a remarkable job at Hailar and on the road through the Grand Khingan Mountains to Pokotu. The 135th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 123d Infantry Division acquitted themselves well at Aihun and Sunwu. Many border garrisons, holed up in fortified regions against overwhelming numbers, performed heroic defenses and earned the respect of their adversaries, who perhaps thought of similar Soviet sacrifices at Brest and Sevastopol. The Soviets viewed with awe the Japanese "death units," which threw their explosive-laden bodies at Soviet tanks.2 In fact, where Japanese forces stood and fought under competent leadership, they did a credible job and gave the Soviets the opposition they had expected. In reality, it was the higher echelon leadership of the Kwantung Army who engineered the army's overall mediocre performance.
Unquestionably, the cease-fire rumors and the ultimate surrender decision disrupted Japanese operations and forestalled possibly greater Japanese resistance in southern Manchuria. Yet much of the damage had already been done and could not be undone. Setting aside Soviet actions, the Japanese High Command reacted sloppily and indecisively, whether because of overconfidence, complacency, confusion, or pessimism. Japanese overconfidence and complacency regarding the Soviets had persisted for years, if not decades, before the Manchurian campaign. The Khalkhin-Gol defeat at the hands of the Soviets was surprising to Japanese commanders in 1939, but even more surprising was how little they had learned from it. Perhaps the Soviet defeats of 1939 and 1940 in Finland and in 1941 at the hands of the Germans gave rebirth to that Japanese complacency and overconfidence. Yet, five years later, by 1945, little had been done to modernize the Japanese infantry division to make it capable of engaging a modern Soviet rifle division, much less a tank or mechanized unit. Antitank weapons were lacking, and although the division was heavy in manpower, it was lighter in firepower than the Soviet equivalent. In mechanized and tank forces, the Japanese also compared badly: they had no tank comparable to the Soviet medium T-34. The Kwantung Army was scarcely better equipped to conduct mobile war in 1945 than it had been in 1939. At least in part, this deficiency was a measure of complacency and overconfidence. Japanese plans forgot or ignored another lesson from 1939: the Soviets had a penchant for doing the seemingly impossible, such as using the arid wastes of eastern Mongolia as a launching pad for a major invasion of Manchuria. Whether through complacency or overconfidence, the Japanese demonstrated a traditional tendency to underestimate the Soviets. That underestimation spelled doom for the Kwantung Army. For whatever reasons, Japanese commanders failed their army. Confusion reigned at the top, and area army and army orders conflicted. Thus, many units withdrew from combat, while others were swallowed up by it.
Compounding the Japanese difficulties was the nature of the Soviet offensive. Japanese plans might have succeeded to a greater degree against a lesser foe. Unfortunately, the Japanese High Command faced a highly professional force led by the cream of the Soviet officer corps, blooded and educated in four years of war. Far East Command units were among the best in the Soviet Army, and their equipment had been tested against the best weaponry European arsenals could produce. For the Soviet Army, this was the last campaign in a long war, quite literally one last opportunity to excel. And excel it did. The Manchurian operation qualified as a postgraduate exercise for Soviet forces, the culmination of a rigorous quality education in combat begun in western Russia in June 1941.
Historians must exercise care when projecting lessons from the study of any military campaign, for the value of such a study derives from viewing that campaign against the concrete conditions that affected its conduct. The Manchurian campaign may hold tactical lessons to be learned and applied in similar contemporary situations, basic techniques that transcend the technological changes that have occurred since 1945. If in fact such constants, or tactical techniques derived from battle that apply to any period, do exist, then Manchuria is worthy of study.
The concrete conditions Soviet forces faced in Manchuria presented Soviet planners a unique set of problems associated with how to attack and win quickly in the beginning period of war. The Soviets adopted tech niques formulated to solve those precise problems. For example, speedy advance would preempt initial or subsequent Japanese establishment of a solid defense and would secure strategically critical territory before the Japanese could decide to abandon the war effort. Speedy advance, of course, required the Soviets to crush any opposition that might threaten their ability to adhere to that timetable.
Thus, the Soviets structured their forces to squelch the opposition and to generate the requisite speed. They also adopted tactical methods to maintain that momentum. Using cover and deception, they assembled and de ployed their forces in secret. These precautions bolstered the effectiveness of other combat techniques. Soviet forces attacked on multiple axes-in fact along every possible axis-with a majority of forces well forward in the first echelon as a means of bringing maximum pressure to bear on an already overextended foe. On each axis, the Soviets massed at the critical point and artfully maneuvered those massed forces over terrain considered impassable, much less suitable for maneuver.
In order to generate initial success and to maintain offensive momentum, the Soviets carefully timed application of their offensive power by attacking with assault units, advanced units, and then main force elements. Consequently, from the very beginning, Japanese forces were off balance, and they remained off balance throughout the short campaign. These creative Soviet methods sowed confusion in the Japanese command structure, and that, in turn, ruled out effective Japanese response.
In order to exploit these initial efforts and to preempt Japanese plans, the Soviets used armor-heavy forward detachments of every size to drive deep into Japanese positions. With limited combat power forward, Soviet main force units could advance almost unhindered. Each detachment worked in a manner similar to an awl, boring a hole into hard wood and preparing the wood for subsequent penetration by a screw. Punctured in numerous sectors, the Japanese defense lost all coherence and never regained it. Soviet main force units and the forward detachments were tailored combined arms entities suited to the terrain over which they operated. They tore into the disrupted defense, fragmented it, left it paralyzed, and raced on to their next objective. Soviet success in the campaign underscored the effectiveness of their strategic, operational, and tactical techniques.
Recent Soviet studies on the beginning period of war and the concrete nature of combat have emphasized certain of these techniques. Deception has never lost its attractiveness and currency, nor has the necessity for creating self-sustaining balanced combined arms entities at all levels. Three other techniques the Soviets used in Manchuria are still relevant on today's battlefield:
Echelon forces imaginatively, especially against a defense that may take time to gel.
In Manchuria, single echelon formation at theater, front, and army level operating on multiple axes across a broad front col lapsed and fragmented the Japanese defense before that defense could effectively establish itself. Today, applying pressure all along a broad front could rupture a partially formed defense.
Commit forces to battle in timed phases.
In Manchuria, steady, relentless hammering destroyed Japanese equilibrium and accelerated Japanese collapse. In a contemporary context, multiple penetrations and the resultant intermingling of forces would also make it difficult for defenders to use tactical nuclear weapons discriminately.
Lead with forward detachments at every command level.
In 1945, probing forward detachments perpetuated confusion in the defense and carried the battle to tactical and operational depths, thus preempting effec tive defense. Besides producing similar offensive successes, forward detachments today could also attack a defense's tactical nuclear weapons delivery systems.
A concrete legacy of the Manchurian campaign, these three techniques offer prospects for success against even a relatively prepared enemy defense. Against an unprepared or partially prepared opponent, the use of these tech niques could be devastating. The techniques worked in 1945, when mobility was in its infancy (or adolescence). So they certainly apply today, when mobility extends to virtually every aspect of a force. And they may even prohibit any rational use of tactical nuclear weapons. What is certain is that these techniques are of more than simple historical interest to Soviet tactical writers. They should be of more than historical interest to U.S. tacticians as well.
BTW the Japanese force put up heavy resistances, very often fighting to the death. But most strongpoints were made futile by punctures in other areas and the lightning fast advances on most axis of attack. Surrounded they would be reduced with heavy firepower.
