Afrika Korps

Just a quick look:

I have to study the battle of Hamel a bit more. While it certainly was a great victory once again the casualities of the german side are a wartime estimate (Bean). The number of the captured are almost always correct, but experience has told me that sometimes warpropaganda on both sides exagerated the inflicted losses up by a factor of four (British at the Somme). The difference is that the "allied" numbers are on Wiki, the axis numbers are not.

Sadly I can not find the total strenghts on both sides and the once in the decisive sectors. However once again I'm a bit surprised that the Wiki shows things in a rather deceptive way and compares quite fresh allied divisions - with a huge difference in structure and manpower - with seemingly often depleted German divisions. The sources are all anglo-american, no French and German sources have been used. I really wonder why the english wiki seems to be so biased in many regards.

Ok now I finally found a better description of the Battle in The Great War. It seems that in the way of the main trust of Rawlinson were 6 skeleton divisions with 3000 men each (18000 men). The assinged army of the Allies had 15 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions. A conservative estimate with 6000-8000 men each gives between 108000 and 144000 men. They were supported by 2000 guns and 17 air squadrons with 414 vehicles (aka Tanks), and over 100 tracked support vehicles (tanks) and troop carriers.

I will continue later.

I apologize to all for not getting in on this thread sooner; my work and social schedule have been rather heavy lately. I have read all of the posts and found the discussion intriguing. The posts about the development of tactics during the first world war are fascinating indeed. In an effort to steer the discussion back towards its original beginning I should like to add that I agree with some that the Afirka Korps was a indeed a regular collection of regular Wheremacht units, given a modified organization to accommodate a special mission. That it was considered a crack outfit is probably part truth and part myth based on its overall performance and the reputation of Erwin Rommel.

As for its superiority during some battles, this was due to the better use of a combined arms approach on the tactical level, and a general superiority of equipment at various times during the many battles it fought. If one considers how much more flexible an organization the average Panzer division was at the time, compared to how the average British or Commonwealth Armored unit was arranged, than it is easy to see how it could respond more rapidly to contingencies. British armored formations lacked infantry support until much later in the war, and indeed many of their AFVs armed with the 2 Pndr had no HE ammunition to deal with enemy infantry. This often lead to the attaching of infantry brigades to the armored brigades to provide this capability, but as they might not have trained with each other prior to this, it was an ad-hoc solution at best.

The dreaded 88mm gun aside, most of the German main battle tanks were Panzer III H or G models, armed with the 50mm KwK 38 L/42. At the time of the battle of Gazala, there were only 19 Panzer III J models available. They had the much improved 50mm KwK 39 L/60. These later became the mainstay of the Afrika Korps during the Tunisian campaign. The British had the Crusader MK II as its main AFV, which despite its good speed, had weaker frontal armor than the German Pz III. There were separate brigades for of Matilda and Valentine tanks that had superior armor than the German tanks, but they were slow and sometimes unreliable. All of these were equipped with QF 2-pounder gun. There were also brigades made up of lend lease equipment. The M3 Stuart or Honey as the British called it, and 167 M3 Grant Tanks. It was these that surprised Rommel along with 112 of the new 6 Pndr anti-tank guns available to the infantry.

Although the new 6 Pndrs and M2 75mm guns of the Grants gave the Afrika Korps serious trouble during parts of the battle, the way in which the German formations dealt with them by the use of better tactics and maneuver neutralized their impact. Whenever possible, they would attempt to lure the heavier armored Matildas, Valentines, and Grants into kill boxes of anti-tank guns, dominated by the 88mm Flak 36 guns aided by the lighter 28/20 and 50 mm PAK. If these were unavailable, the way that Panzer Divisions were able to mass all of its armor rapidly against the often piecemeal deployment of the British Armored Brigades allowed them to defeat them in detail. This was a result of a better doctrine and a more flexible command climate.

Here is an interesting sight about the Afrika Korps that has a wealth of information:

http://www.afrikakorps.org/

I hope it will foster more discussion from this group of Org Members. :beam:

That is a good analysis, rotorgun. It pretty much falls in line with everything I've read.

It is funny to log on and see this thread up again as I've been watching a lot of the "Military Channel" lately. They're obviously lacking in original content as quite a bit of the late night and off-hours programming is composed of British imports. As such, I've seen the Afrika Korps referred two at least twice as an "elite" or "crack" force. Further, you would think that the Germans outnumbered the British in the desert! And you don't hear much about superior tactics and certainly nothing about British losses to the Italians.

I understand issues of pride and such, but the inaccuracies in those BBC "documentaries" were quite astounding. I mean, they did win after all. There is nothing wrong with acknowledging reality.

Panzer...

As you seem to be interested often in tanks, here is a great link for comparisons between Tanks and Anti-tank weapons from WWII:

http://gva.freeweb.hu/index.html

Just click on the weapons data link and it will take you to a section where you can select each country in other links. There is a wealth of data on the various AFVs and Anti-tank guns available. You'll see that with the Cruiser tanks, for instance that their armor could be penetrated at a further distance by the Panzer III 50mm weapons, but the 2 Pounder was had to be closer to do the same to the German vehicles. That is really critical in the open desert where an inferior armed opponent cannot use ruses and concealment to allow his enemy into his kill range. In my opinion, the British would have been wiser to dig in some of their tanks to provide a smaller target and give the lower hulls protection. This sacrifices mobility, but would have allowed them to lay in ambush while mobile elements lured the Germans with feigned withdrawals. A tactic that Monty learned from Rommel himself.

Thanks for the link. Haven't seen that one. :bow:

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Originally Posted by PanzerJaeger

Thanks for the link. Haven't seen that one. :bow:

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You're welcome indeed.

Your thread has got me digging out my old war games and books about the subject, and I came across an old jewel. Rommel's War in Africa(Wolf Heckmann)-Doubleday & Co. 1981, Garden City, New York. It has an excellent foreword by General Sir John Hackett who was a Major in charge of the 8th Hussars' Honeys (M-3 Stuarts) of the famed 7th Armored Division (The Desert Rats) at the Battle of Gazala. Herr Heckmann writes a book which brings us the point of view of many combatants on both sides as a way of telling the history of the fighting. It's a compelling read.

One of the things he mentions is that a strongpoint called Blenheim that was located just south east of the Bir Hachiem defenses. (The southernmost part of the British defense line.) Blenheim was a series of fortifications and natural defenses where the British high command had originally planned to meet the expected (yes they were expected) thrust by the Afrika Korps. Rommel's plans were known to the British high command through Ultra intercepts as well as reconnaissance on the day that the Germans opened their offensive. The plan was to move into these prepared defenses prior to the attack and thereby await the oncoming panzer divisions as they turned northwards. For some reason, despite such foreknowledge, the British didn't begin moving until the 21st and 15th Panzer Divisions had already passed Blenheim by.

Many of the commanding officers of the 7th Armored tank and infantry regiments were quite angered by the failure of 8th Army to order them to move until it was too late. Some felt that even though they might have still take a beating by those "tough panzer boys", they might have at least doled out a considerable amount of punishment in return. It was a either a colossal blunder, a deliberate omission for the sake of Ultra, or just plain bad luck. What a price was paid though. Many of the Honey tanks and new Grants were overwhelmed by the more numerous and generally superior German machines. Employed instead in a series of piecemeal brigade sized meeting engagements, they suffered severe losses all out of proportion to the losses of the Germans.

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Originally Posted by rotorgun

You're welcome indeed.

Your thread has got me digging out my old war games and books about the subject, and I came across an old jewel. Rommel's War in Africa(Wolf Heckmann)-Doubleday & Co. 1981, Garden City, New York. It has an excellent foreword by General Sir John Hackett who was a Major in charge of the 8th Hussars' Honeys (M-3 Stuarts) of the famed 7th Armored Division (The Desert Rats) at the Battle of Gazala. Herr Heckmann writes a book which brings us the point of view of many combatants on both sides as a way of telling the history of the fighting. It's a compelling read.

One of the things he mentions is that a strongpoint called Blenheim that was located just south east of the Bir Hachiem defenses. (The southernmost part of the British defense line.) Blenheim was a series of fortifications and natural defenses where the British high command had originally planned to meet the expected (yes they were expected) thrust by the Afrika Korps. Rommel's plans were known to the British high command through Ultra intercepts as well as reconnaissance on the day that the Germans opened their offensive. The plan was to move into these prepared defenses prior to the attack and thereby await the oncoming panzer divisions as they turned northwards. For some reason, despite such foreknowledge, the British didn't begin moving until the 21st and 15th Panzer Divisions had already passed Blenheim by.

Many of the commanding officers of the 7th Armored tank and infantry regiments were quite angered by the failure of 8th Army to order them to move until it was too late. Some felt that even though they might have still take a beating by those "tough panzer boys", they might have at least doled out a considerable amount of punishment in return. It was a either a colossal blunder, a deliberate omission for the sake of Ultra, or just plain bad luck. What a price was paid though. Many of the Honey tanks and new Grants were overwhelmed by the more numerous and generally superior German machines. Employed instead in a series of piecemeal brigade sized meeting engagements, they suffered severe losses all out of proportion to the losses of the Germans.

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Yes that was one of many poor moves made by the British at Gazala. It was very much their low point in the war.

It seems as though someone would be able to say definitively what the cause of the particular failure to move you mentioned was, although I've never seen anyone involved cited as giving one. If it were an attempt to keep Ultra secret, then I would think someone would have said something to that effect. This leads me to believe it was most likely just a slow response to the intelligence, which would not be surprising.

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Originally Posted by PanzerJaeger

Yes that was one of many poor moves made by the British at Gazala. It was very much their low point in the war.

It seems as though someone would be able to say definitively what the cause of the particular failure to move you mentioned was, although I've never seen anyone involved cited as giving one. If it were an attempt to keep Ultra secret, then I would think someone would have said something to that effect. This leads me to believe it was most likely just a slow response to the intelligence, which would not be surprising.

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Not only that, but the British suffered throughout the North African campaign form poor radio discipline, something we refer to today as OPSEC. Many times British officers would transmit their plans and orders in the clear, which the excellent German intelligence staff took advantage of. This was a factor in increasing the reputation of Rommel's ability to out guess his opponents, which no doubt added to the idea of the elite stature of the Afrikakorps. Not until general Montgomery instituted better discipline in his officer corps, did the 8th army finally overcome this deficiency. Check out the wiki article on Operation Battle Axe.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Battleaxe

Wolf Heckmann also mentions incidences of lapses of communication discipline in his book as well. He even claims there was a German officer on Rommel's staff that could mimic the accent of the British so well, that he was able to issue false situation reports and even issue actual orders to several British units during the Gazala affair. Not quite cricket, what?

:oops:

Really interesting discussions guys! It's great to see you guys still go at it.

This may be off-topic but... who do you think is a better general? General George S. Patton? Or British General Montgomery?

I'm curious, because my friend wrote an eight-page essay for our IB History class, and he wrote it on Patton. His paper talked about Patton in Sicily, and how he was faster than Montgomery. It's interesting, because discussion about Montgomery here seems like he would have been a formidable opponent for Rommel, if he wasn't captured so early on. Any thoughts?

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Originally Posted by The Spartan (Returns)

This may be off-topic but... who do you think is a better general? General George S. Patton? Or British General Montgomery?

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Well, imo, Monty is often over criticized and Patton is often exalted beyond his true abilities. There is so much politics, nationalism, and ego surrounding both of them it is really hard to find honest assessments of their battlefield capabilities. Quite frankly, neither of them ever faced a full strength German army group - or anything even resembling it - and imo, neither would have been made it on the Russian front. They both screwed up in Sicily, and while Monty floundered around Caen and completely mucked things up during Market Garden, Patton didn't really have the opportunity to show he could do better much better. His drive through France was largely uncontested and his offensive to close the Bulge was competent at best. (The US lost more troops trying to close the Bulge than in the initial German offensive.) It was pretty much just attrition, not much in the way of tactics.

All that being said, I think Patton was the better leader. From everything I've read, he had a better grasp of combined arms and armored warfare. Beyond that, he had a better sense of the battlefield in general.

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I'm curious, because my friend wrote an eight-page essay for our IB History class, and he wrote it on Patton. His paper talked about Patton in Sicily, and how he was faster than Montgomery. It's interesting, because discussion about Montgomery here seems like he would have been a formidable opponent for Rommel, if he wasn't captured so early on. Any thoughts?

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Do you mean O'Conner? Monty was never captured. I think he was probably a better commander than Monty, though we'll never know.

As for Monty, its kind of a mixed bag. Monty was in general a more competent battlefield commander than his predecessors and did institute some very important changes, including the radio discipline that Rotorgun mentioned. However, he was also able to take advantage of the massive numerical superiority of supplies, arms, and manpower that his direct predecessor had built up, not to mention the Torch landings. It would have been fairly difficult to fail in his position.

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Originally Posted by KarlXII

As already mentioned, German tanks in North Africa were often obsolete models sent to the least cared for front (North Africa never recieved much attention until Operation Torch), such as Panzer II's and III's. The real punch Rommel had with his force was his 88mm AntiAir guns that he placed in an AntiTank role. In fact, he did not invent this idea, as it was used during the Invasion of France. I am not sure how he came to the use of 88's as AntiTank weapons, but it devastated most Commonwealth armor.

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Actually, if I remember my French campaign history, it was Rommel who unleashed the AA weapons on British armor in France. The AA weapons had high muzzle velocity (to reach altitude) and were therefore ideal anti-armor weapons as well.

In fact, AA guns were even mounted on tanks later in the war: 75 mm of the Panthers & 88 mm of the Tigers (both versions), the 3" replacement for the original 75 mm gun on the Shermans, the 90 mm gun on the Pershings, and 85 mm guns on the T34/85s were all originally AA guns that were redesigned to fit a tank turret. IIRC, the 3" gun the British put on the Shermans to make the Firefly conversion was also an AA gun. Prior to WW2, tanks were viewed as infantry support platforms, and used low muzzle velocity guns with HE shells. Only during WW2 did everyone realize that the best tank killer is another tank...

Also, the DAK didn't solely rely on German equipment - they used captured weapons, even tanks, often, due to the afore-mentioned logistics problems. For that matter the British did the same thing...

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Originally Posted by PanzerJaeger

Do you mean O'Conner? Monty was never captured. I think he was probably a better commander than Monty, though we'll never know.

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Correct I meant O'Conner ~:doh:

Wavell was pretty much a disaster on every front he served. After O'Conner was captured, (and the Siege of Tobruk situation) Churchill transferred Wavell to India Command, and Auchinleck was put in Charge of Eastern Command (where he appointed Monty). But even in Burma, Wavell was pretty awful, and only thanks to Slim did they manage to trounce the Japanese so thoroughly.

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As for Monty, its kind of a mixed bag. Monty was in general a more competent battlefield commander than his predecessors and did institute some very important changes, including the radio discipline that Rotorgun mentioned. However, he was also able to take advantage of the massive numerical superiority of supplies, arms, and manpower that his direct predecessor had built up, not to mention the Torch landings. It would have been fairly difficult to fail in his position.

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Very true Panzer...also, as I have discovered in my readings, it was Rommel's success after his capture of Tobruk, and subsequent pursuit of Auchinleck's ragged 8th army, that led to his demise in some ways. OKH, OKW, and General Kesselring personally all advised him to not advance beyond the Egyptian border. This he ignored after a stormy meeting during the pursuit. The plan to take Malta required the use of the Luftwaffe, the German paratroops, and the supplies built up for the operation. Hitler, was so enraptured by Rommel's success, that he immediately got behind it, even imploring Mussolini to not miss his chance of ultimate victory; the Italian senior commanders had advised him against any move into Egypt as well. Subsequent to Hitler's interference, the troops and supplies for Malta went to Rommel instead. Many of his supplies never reached him due to the increase British naval presence after Malta's successful defense.

Seeing that Auchinleck was able to conduct a successful delaying strategy, albeit a desperate one, it allowed him to fall back on his supply bases. As a result, he was able to scrape together enough reinforcements to prevent the German/Italian force from breaking through at the Battle of Alam Halfa. This, as we know, led to his ultimate defeat at El Alamein.

Here's a fairly good documentary on tank warfare in the desert. Its titled Tigers in the Desert, but only the first part deals with the Tiger. The rest examines the other Axis and Allied tanks in the theatre and how they fought.

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Part 6

Its a pretty good channel if you haven't stumbled upon it. Lots of old documentaries in their entirety. :2thumbsup:

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Originally Posted by anweRU

Actually, if I remember my French campaign history, it was Rommel who unleashed the AA weapons on British armor in France. The AA weapons had high muzzle velocity (to reach altitude) and were therefore ideal anti-armor weapons as well.

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Kondor Legion used them in the Spanish Civil War against armor. Rommel used it at Arras to break a counter attack though.