Re: Iran & Nuclear Armaments: The Sequel
Quote:
Originally Posted by Seamus Fermanagh
Egads! I'd forgotten the stray members of the Sauds -- but the scenario you outline is all too plausible. This is precisely the kind of fear I have and why I feel action to limit nuclear proliferation may be necessary (regardless of its legitimacy). Ugly choices for ugly possibilities.
The issue of the non-state or 'rogue' element has worried strategists from the very beginning of the nuclear age. Not because such rogue elements are by definition irrational. On the contrary, they demonstrate a major weakness of classic nuclear thinking.
Classic nuclear thinking has it that 'rational' leaders and regimes use nuclear arms only to deter, not to attack or avenge. I put 'rational' in inverted commas because in the context of nuclear strategy, some axioms are not really self-evident.
For instance it can be argued that any calculations based on imponderables like 'freedom', 'credible deterrence' and 'annihilation of mankind' are inherently irrational. And what deters one person or government might not deter another. In the eyes of a devoted Communist the future of mankind is all-important; to a Zen Buddhist it doesn't mean a thing. Ruling elites miscalculate. Cultural barriers block adequate communication of threats and commitments.
Hence paradoxes abound in the realm of deterrence. In the 1950's and 1960's the eternally convulsive and seemingly erratic leadership of the Peoples' Republic of China was considered an example of 'diminished deterrence'; they apparently didn't mind losing a few million or even a hundred million lives to obtain essentially ideological foreign policy goals. The Chinese proudly lived up to this reputation, for instance through the 'human wave' tactics in Korea. On closer inspection (as Kissinger and Nixon well understood) the Chinese policy goals were actually classic geostrategic goals disguised in ideology, and their apparently irrational mass tactics were a 'rational' way to deter opponents. Their mass waves were the poor man's nuke.
To overcome this inherent weakness in nuclear thinking, the French theorist Raymond Aron emphasised the need for empirical studies. He argued against game theory and other general or abstract theories of deterrence: 'It is always a case of knowing who can deter whom, from what, in what circumstances, and by what means.'
Even with the firmly established nuclear doctrines and protocols of the Cold War, there was always a chance that some rogue General would not be deterred and start a nuclear war of his own, based on a 'rational' assumption that the 'surviving' nation or political community would ensure a better future for mankind. Nowadays, some rogue Mullah may take the same road or even opt for a one-way ticket to Paradise.
Yet I think Aron would oppose your axiom that the risk of proliferation outweighs the risk of military prevention. He would speak in terms of calculated, calculable and incalculable risks. I am not Aron and I have a more philosophical approach. Because of the peculiar nature of this larger risk, I use the parable of the 'Fifth Horseman'.
The Fifth Horseman is Hades or Hell. Most importantly, he operates in the shadow of the Fourth Horseman whose name is Death. There has been a common belief since the Reformation that you can not defend against things that you are unable to observe with your senses. The Fifth Horseman operates on this unseen plane. He rides on your back, as it were. You think you can fight him by bombing Tehran, only to discover that he is hiding in Ryad. Or in Islamabad. Or in Washington itself. The more you sow death in the Muslim world in a quest to eradicate nuclear proliferation, the more he will reap his rewards in the form of humiliated and frustrated Muslims with access to lethal knowledge and resources.
You can never fight the Fifth Horseman in hand-to-hand combat. He is the hand. He rides on the back of your tanks, he descends victorously in the wake of every smart bomb you can drop. For every dead Muslim, he enlists a Mohammed Bouyeri (Van Gogh's killer) or a John Walker Lindh in your own country. The only way you can fight him is by lifting the shadow of Death from the Muslim world.
*cackles, throws shaman bones in the air*
Re: Iran & Nuclear Armaments: The Sequel/War in Iran!
Threads merged as the discussion is overlapping
Re: Iran & Nuclear Armaments: The Sequel
Adrian,
Pakistan and Turkey weren't calling for Israel's outright destruction. There is a breadth of opinion on Israel among other Middle Eastern nations ranging from mild distaste to blood boiling hatred. I don't really see the two situations as analogous.
Aside from which, I don't know that MAD type stalls are a guaranteed, or even a necessarily likely outcome. Look at the Cuban missile crisis. Do you really think it ended the only way it possibly could have?
I know there's two threads that are sorta on the same topic, but I see them as sufficiently different. This one discusses Iran's sovereignty and inherent right to develop the technology (which I agree with) or purchase it (which I don't). The other one assumes some coalition of nations is going to go to war with Iran and talks about how likely that scenario is.
Edit: Looks like I'm wrong. In any case, rather than focusing on whether or not Iran is developing nuclear weapons, which we cannot control, we should be spending our time developing methods to ensure they do not disseminate them to their extra-national allies, which if we can't, we're all doomed. The London subway, Madrid and 9/11 will pale in comparison.
Re: Iran & Nuclear Armaments: The Sequel/War in Iran!
i'll take america, we got lots of nukes and an easilly decieved populus (to easily:no: )
so i think i can raise a slave army of some kind from this.
Re: Iran & Nuclear Armaments: The Sequel/War in Iran!
Hmm...Ok, but be forewarned, I was thinking of making it a giant forest because trees need a place to live. Don't get mad if I attack you in the future...(don't worry ShambleS, we have a 10 year truce)
Anyway, If there is a war, no point in debating who is wrong or right, because these terms are arbitrary. The strongest power will dominate the lesser ones, to get its way, and right now it's America...no one you can blame but yourself if you are the little guy...drink some protien shakes and lift some weights for a lack of a better analogy.
Still though, it will be interesting to see how America fares, as things aren't going too well in Iraq...
Re: Iran & Nuclear Armaments: The Sequel
Quote:
Originally Posted by Don Corleone
If Canada put 18 divisions in Hamilton, Mexico put 23 in Mexicali and Montrety, our Navy reported that a combined Russian, French and Chinese fleet was approximately 10 miles from the mouth of the Chesapeake (the tidal basin that leads to Washington D.C.) and we had airspace violations from some unknown foe all across Florida, would we really be the agressors if we didn't wait for them to get their timing right?
Saying Israel was the agressor in the 6 Days War is like saying Poland started the fight with Germany in WWII. Come on.
Very well demonstrated, and very true.
Re: Iran & Nuclear Armaments: The Sequel
Quote:
Originally Posted by Don Corleone
(..) we should be spending our time developing methods to ensure they do not disseminate them to their extra-national allies (..)
Sure. The main insurance policy is nuclear. It says if a country gives nuclear hand-outs to terrorists, it will be looking at a Teller-Ulam designer sun for a couple seconds before eternal darkness sets in. That is why the regimes of North Korea, Pakistan or Libya never indulged in the practice.
However, if you want fool-proof insurance against rogue elements, I think there is none. As I stated above you can tentatively calculate risks, based on empirical knowledge. Experience shows that military retaliation against states on account of what their non-state allies have done has hardly ever been effective. Israel tried to oust the Palestine Liberation Organisation from Lebanon by virtually occupying that country. It didn't work out. The United States frequently penalised Middle Eastern states for collaborating with terrorists -- Lebanon in 1983, Libya in 1985, Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 -- and it didn't work out. The U.S. tried to deliver a lethal blow to Al Qaida in Afghanistan in 2001. It didn't work out. It tried to do so in Iraq in 2003. It didn't work out.
Since the end of the Cold War I think Aron's view is back on centre stage, with a vengeance. In today's world there is no more over-arching conflict between 'rational' superpowers, only a host of complex threats and sudden confrontations that require tailor-made deterrence strategies. Former CIA Director James Woolsey stated before Congress: 'We have slain a large dragon, but we now live in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways the dragon was easier to keep track of.'
Continued international cooperation and pressure on rogue states may be the only real solution. Again it is not fool-proof, but it has worked before. Libya would be a case in point. After decades of harbouring terrorists, trying to acquire WMD's and generally pissing off the entire neighbourhood, Tripoli recently agreed to a complex deal with the United States and gave up its nuclear ambitions and terrorist connections in order to become a moderate, generally recognised and accepted nation. In the end it's sanctions and total isolation what did Ghadafi in. Same thing with Milosevic. I believe Saddam should have been smoked out in similar fashion.
As for your remarks about the 1962 Cuba Missile Crisis (or for that matter the 1973 Yom Kippur Crisis) there is nothing that proves or refutes beyond reasonable doubt that it was MAD that prevented escalation. In a sense, nuclear deterrence is a non-event. But what we do know is that MAD was uppermost in the minds of decision-makers on both sides.
