Part opinion piece part omen for the future I would say from Brendan Keenan
Originally Posted by :
Brendan Keenan: Economics and politics diverge, but in Europe politicians usually win
Many governments do not share academic perspective
THE Baltic Dry Index is falling -- and I am keeping a careful eye on it. This measure of the costs of shipping goods across the globe was one of the earliest signs that something nasty was happening to the world economy. So early that I did not pick up on its significance. Nor did anybody else very much.
Okay, I admit it -- I didn't actually ever look at the Baltic Dry Index. But when other, more familiar, data became available, it was clear what the Baltic had been telling us: the fall in trade and output was at a pace even greater than that of the crash of 1930.
Fortunately, it levelled out sooner than happened in the 1930s. This critical difference is generally ascribed to the huge stimulus applied almost immediately after the crash, through large government deficits and record low interests
But, while economic output has not contracted by as much as it did 80 years ago, it has not yet shown any sustained recovery.
Now, the Baltic Dry is falling again. Those who know about such things say it is being distorted by a surfeit of ships, but it has now been followed by other data pointing to renewed weakness in the world economy.
Paradoxically, the Irish services sector had its strongest showing in June since the crisis began, while the euro area and the UK weakened -- but Ireland has been out of step for some time.
This makes us look particularly vulnerable to what has become known as a "double dip". The domestic crash was so profound that it has taken until now for the surveys to show manufacturing and services returning to growth. Presumably, it would not take much to go wrong abroad to see them shrink again.
Response
If something is going wrong -- and the evidence is growing -- the response of governments may be very different from 2008. Interest rates are very low, and little more direct stimulus can come from them. Governments have piled up far more debt in the past few years and their ability to offset another downturn with further borrowing is limited. Or is it?
The fiercest argument is not over whether governments can borrow more to offset a second downturn. If they cannot, they can always print money. It is whether they ought to do so.
This seems quite extraordinary. After 80 years of sophisticated economic science, and 65 years of unprecedented international co-operation, one would have thought there would be agreement on such a basic matter as the role of government in a financial and economic crisis. Far from it.
There is, it has to be said, a fair degree of consensus among the economics profession. For them, what matters is the sum of saving and borrowing, rather than who does it. Private firms and households are reducing their debts in response to the crash, so governments should compensate -- at least partly -- for this by borrowing more.
Yet many governments, led by that of Germany, seem not to accept the majority academic view. Germany has been followed by Conservative-led Britain and, somewhat more surprisingly, by France and Italy. Do they disagree with the economists? Do they -- as has sometimes been suggested -- not actually understand them?
A more probable answer is that, in Europe anyway, the politics and the economics diverge. When that happens, politics usually win. In the USA, both tend towards encouraging further stimulus measures.
One reason the economics are more favourable in the US is that, even with current heavy borrowing, public debt would not reach 100pc of GDP until 2025. Some EU countries already exceed that figure.
Others, including Ireland, could well reach it in the next three or four years.
Even so, it is the politics of Europe that differ most from those of the USA, and which seem to pose the greatest dangers to the economy. Those four decades of international co-operation meant the recent G-20 summit could not be seen publicly to fail. Under the resulting compromise, those countries that wish to are cleared to try to halve their budget deficits in just three years.
Germany is going to try, which means others, especially in the eurozone, will have to follow. The words "have to" must surely apply to Ireland, although not everyone seems to agree.
Irish mixture
That peculiar Irish mixture of pessimism and arrogance has been to the fore recently.
The pessimism holds that our problems are insoluble: the arrogance maintains we should do a solo debt default, even a devaluation -- an event which, if it happened, would probably break up the euro. In the real corridors of power, no such options are open to Irish governments.
The position of a country like Ireland in these circumstances is the one complained of by Cassius in "Julius Caesar" -- creeping under the huge legs of the great powers to find somewhere safe. If we had been more aware of that, we might be in less trouble. And now, the huge legs are on the move.
In a recent essay for the Bruegel thinktank, Wolfgang Proissl, a former Brussels correspondent for 'Financial Times Deutschland', argues persuasively that, despite the existence of the euro, under the pressures of the crisis, the old European monetary system is reasserting itself. Germany is the benchmark and, to survive in the system, other member states must follow the benchmark.
It is not that the Germans want it that way. But it has become clear that they cannot pay the political price of a true monetary union. Not only would there be transfers between states, but the union would have a softer currency, larger deficits and higher inflation than Germany alone can have -- and wants.
The French on the other hand, says Proissl, wanted the euro precisely as a way of not letting Berlin and Frankfurt set the parameters for everyone else.
The resulting messy euro compromise has not worked well in its first great test and may yet fail altogether. Or at least come close.
If these forces do look like pushing the eurozone into a second recession, or threatening the whole euro project, once unthinkable changes could yet come to pass.
Until the fog of this battle clears a bit, a country like Ireland is best advised to play by the rules -- whether Merkel's or the market's -- whatever we may think of them. What we think of them is irrelevant, and arguing about them at best pointless, and at worst dangerous.
Irish Independent