Correction: I cited one of my reposted maps to MilitaryLand when it was obviously War_mapper's. Maybe I was originally planning to use the former's.
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Correction: I cited one of my reposted maps to MilitaryLand when it was obviously War_mapper's. Maybe I was originally planning to use the former's.
Some more analysis of the situation:
These comments were made in Discord, so obviously there's no link available, but I remembered to add one for the most recent update (yay!):Quote:
Originally Posted by Previous week
Quote:
Originally Posted by Right now
Severodonetsk is kind of a red herring - the twin city of Lysychansk is the key in Ukraine's strategy of using the Donets River as a barrier to Russian concentrations. It's within a mile of Severodonetsk, just across the river, so fording under fire is basically impossible for the Russians so long as Lysychansk remains in Ukrainian hands. Whereas if Ukraine loses Lysychansk by storm or by withdrawal, the river becomes almost useless as Ukraine will hold too little of the Southern bank to anchor their lines, with the eventual result being full withdrawal back to Slovyansk/Kramatorsk.
Indeed, the latest news is that over the past two days Severodonetsk has been abandoned without much of a fight by Ukraine, in much the same way that Lyman itself was.
The question for June is whether Russia can expand its Popasna salient to force a Ukrainian retreat from Lysychansk. Of course the troops garrisoning Severodonetsk will be redeployed to strengthen defenses around that salient, but at some point Ukraine does need to reclaim some of that Popasna salient just to relieve the constant pressure on the defenders.
In the medium-term the loss of bridgeheads across the river is a hindrance to Ukraine's objectives of retaking all this territory east/north of the river, but I've never understood all the discussion of the Battle of Donbass as though Severodonetsk were of supreme and immediate tactical significance.
The Izyum salient has AFAICT literally not budged a square kilometer since late April; both sides are in a holding pattern there.
I'll need to catch up on what's going on in Kherson Oblast; so far it seems like Ukraine wants to force out the Russians north of Nova Kakhovka and threaten the city itself (holding Nova Kakhovka is necessary for the security of the Kherson City rear area).
Looks like I was wrong about Severodonetsk. Over the past couple of days the defenders have reportedly launched a sweeping counterattack through the city. Is the idea to invite Stalingrad attrition?
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Pro-Russian milblogger Yuri claims the origin of the counterattack in the political leadership of Ukraine countermanding the military's strategy, a reversal which will certainly lead the Luhansk defenders to their doom. This debacle is being orchestrated on behalf of the interests of the US and UK, who have nevertheless already cut Ukraine loose, and naturally the only remaining matter for discussion is how the former Ukraine will be divided between Russia, Poland, Romania, and Hungary following its imminent collapse (maybe once some patriotic generals assassinate Zelensky).
Elsewhere he expressed cultivated disgust toward the Ukrainian military promoting an upcoming Ukrainian LGBTQ Pride event in Poland this month. To repost:
https://i.imgur.com/K0PUp4p.jpg
Here's a contrarian essay about what lessons to take from the Ukraine war. It basically argues, since we have to acknowledge the indispensability of high throughput of men and materiel in high-intensity conventional warfare, both Russian and American (and NATO) doctrines of warfare are wrong and we wouldn't execute any better than Russia against Ukraine despite our alleged advantages in technology and quality.
I agree with the premise and have addressed it before, but I do think the author underestimates the effect of technology, training, sustainment, leadership, discipline, and the like in conventional warfare. If only raw manpower, materiel, and other resources counted then the Soviet Union should have conquered continental Europe by 1944 without ever iterating on their organizational practices from 1941 (something the author explicitly notes as opposite the case). Endless T-26s and Enemy at the Gates infantry swarms would have done the trick. But my point about the US acceding to mass-casualty wars is supported; whether it's naval war or land war, the US does stand at risk of stumbling into the kind of situation the BEF, the Regular army, did in 1914.
Quote:
What is comforting about blaming the Russian failures on their practice, rather than their doctrine, is that it relieves Western militaries of any requirement to thoroughly examine their own doctrine. This is important because, as the various articles note, the doctrine for a river crossing operation is similar across militaries.
[...]
The river-crossing story highlights the real ailment afflicting both the Russians and their Western observers: chronic inexperience in offensive combat against a competent adversary that is able, in today?s description, to contest all domains in a protracted war that generates high numbers of casualties. Neither Russia nor the West has had operational or combat experiences relevant to the war in Ukraine in over a generation, if not actually since World War II.
[...]
Consequently, in Ukraine, we are seeing the return of the imperative for force preservation, rather than force protection. This is currently beyond the consciousness of Western militaries and current combat casualty care capacity.
Quote:
Importantly, these levels of casualties in the Ukraine war also call into question the ability of Western armies to maintain adequate fighting strength in other than short wars with modest casualties. Much is being made of the Russians relying on hastily mobilized reserves to replace losses. Ironically, as has been demonstrated since the Napoleonic Wars, the lev?e en masse is a requirement for protracted state warfare at this level.
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This new reality essentially means that there is nowhere for a relatively large formation to hide. Surprise, particularly at a limited number of potential crossing points on a river, may not be possible. Thus, these types of physical deception operations may also be pointless. Finally, given the sophistication of many sensors, smoke screens may be less useful than in the past.
Quote:
Consequently, the analysis of the Ukraine war needs to address another unasked question: What if this view that quality people and leaders are the most important ingredient in modern warfare is wrong? What if Stalin was correct that quantity has a quality all of its own? If that is the case, then the Ukrainians may need much greater assistance if they are to survive a Russian-style grinding war of attrition.
Additionally, as the United States plans for how it will compete and potentially fight China and Russia in the future, the approach should be characterized by humility and an intense desire to challenge existing assumptions, concepts, and capabilities, rather than to validate current approaches.
Yes, and without superior leadership, training, and tactics Germany would never have had the chance to even start a second world war. Because they would have lost horrendously in a couple of years the first time. The author's dichotomous analysis strays into over-reductiveness.Quote:
But we should well remember that the same type of Red Army destroyed the vaunted Nazi Wehrmacht during World War II in a long, grinding war of attrition supposedly suffered from the similar centralized leadership and hastily trained soldier maladies as today.
[...]
What should have been considered then and now is why the German forces were crushed by such an inferior adversary? Perhaps enough people, materiel, and an indomitable will to fight despite privations and setbacks are exactly what are really necessary to endure and win in peer warfare.
Obligatory Fat Leonard - but Fat Leonard was veritably just Milo Minderbinder.
Another article purporting that the contemporary US Navy is fatally flawed.
I posted earlier about a US strike in Syria that may have been improperly undertaken, with the resultant death of dozens of civilians. DoD claims to have investigated and found that almost everyone affected by the strike was a combatant. No procedural improprieties were admitted either.
Quote:
"No Rules of Engagement or Law of War violations occurred," the investigation said.
In addition, the commander "did not deliberately or with wanton disregard cause civilian casualties," it said.
The report said that "administrative deficiencies" delayed US military reporting on the strike, giving the impression that it was being covered up.
The Times cited an initial assessment of the incident saying that about 70 civilians could have been killed.
Pentagon Spokesman John Kirby said that 52 combatants were killed, 51 of them adult males and one child, while four civilians died, one woman and three children.
Another 15 civilians, 11 women and four children, were wounded, he said.
Asked if anyone was being punished for the civilian deaths, Kirby said the investigation did not find the need to hold any individuals accountable.
The probe "did not find that anybody acted outside the law of war, that there was no malicious intent," Kirby said.
Over the past month we've had a lot of reporting about munitions depletion on both sides of the Ukraine war, reaching out into European inventories as well. All of Russia's reported advances since April have come about according to a reversion to conservative artillery-heavy doctrine, with potentially a majority of active RuAF infantry having been eliminated since the start of the war. Recently Ukrainian government and military voices disclosed an even more extreme depiction, that even with the accelerating incorporation of NATO-standard 155mm platforms to frontline units, the Russian artillery maintains a 10-15-time proportional advantage over Ukrainian artillery, of which the gun artillery has become limited to "5000-6000" shells fired daily.
In other words, Ukraine can only field a few hundred tubes at any given time - across the entire frontline - due to the reliance on legacy Soviet platforms and resource constraints. No wonder they are willing to field NATO-donated 155mm caliber Caesar, Krab, and M777 given only a few weeks' training. And of course the Switchblade 300 loitering drones are of almost no use against opposing artillery, being very short range (there are apparently still no Switchblade 600 in Ukraine yet, and the specs of the Phoenix Ghost are obscure).
I don't know how many shells Russian armament industry has been producing monthly this year, or what their projected capacity is, but it seems certain that even Russia's Cold War stocks will have to be exhausted by the end of the year, no matter how massive - many millions of shells and rockets expended. On the other hand, to my knowledge there is no other country in Europe that can still produce Soviet-grade munitions, whereas 155mm caliber and other such items are manufactured worldwide. Even the US to my knowledge only has about a million 155mm shells stockpiled, though NATO-wide production is surely well in excess of the practical throttle of the ceiling of donatable artillery pieces.
We relearn the lesson that there is no stockpiling for peer-peer war. Shell hunger is inevitable.
Since the Ukrainian military has a relative surplus of infantry compared to Russia, the ongoing struggle over Severodonetsk makes some sense. The Ukrainian president's office has estimated that Ukraine has lately suffered 200 personnel killed daily, which extrapolates to the total loss of a brigade weekly (American generals shit their pants at the prospect). If the vast majority of these losses are inflicted by opposing artillery, it's to Ukraine's advantage to shift the proportions while enduring the same losses. But Ukraine is not a totalitarian country, so it can't really funnel militia light infantry into meat grinders while protecting professional units to the extent Russia can.
Russian Ministry of Affairs summarizing a recent talk Putin gave:
President Vladimir Putin: There is no in-between, no intermediate state: either a country is #sovereign, or it is a #colony, no matter what the colonies are called. And a colony has no historical prospects.
If a country is not able to make sovereign decisions - it's a colony.
In that talk he also compared himself to Peter the Great, who "returned" land from Swedish occupation to Russia.
:creep:
How much does one have to hate America in order to uphold Russian fascism?
Quote:
This is why many in the commentariat are failing to appreciate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is probably happy with how his invasion of Ukraine is turning out, he says.
The Western foreign policy community has assumed for a long time that Russia under Putin had similar notions of what it means to be a world power, had more or less accepted the rules of the post?World War II international order, and was moving?albeit with setbacks?on a similar neo-liberal economic trajectory.
But, argues Wilson, something completely different has been going on in Putin?s mind. He has only been marginally interested in building stability and prosperity as the West would understand it. Rather, his entire project has been about building Russia?s ability to be a coercive, expansionist and undeniably great power, with control concentrated in the hands of one person.
The Russian translation of ?great power? is velikaya derzhava, the second part of which is a cognate of a verb that means to seize or to hold, and Putin?s worldview represents a continuum of Russia?s imperial mythos.
Wilson points to the work of historian Stephen Kotkin, who has calculated that, over a period of about 450 years, Russia expanded outwards at a rate of 100 to 150 square kilometres a day, in the process engulfing 184 different nationalities or ethnic groups.
And that expansion continues, Wilson says: Russia now claims roughly half of the Arctic.
This imperial worldview has always been in evidence, he says.
For example, in 2005, Putin established a commission to rewrite Russian history textbooks. ?It produced a textbook for history teachers. In that book was the remarkable paragraph that said most of the Russian politically conscious class rejects the present boundaries of the Russian Federation. They are inadequate to protect Russia?s security.?
Quote:
?Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who was then the secretary-general of NATO, goes to Moscow, and says to Mr Putin, ?I?ve come with a package of proposals to reform Russian NATO relations.? And Putin says to him on camera, ?I don?t want to reform Russian NATO relations. I want NATO abolished.??
Also in that year, Wilson notes, a senior Russian official came to Chatham House in London. The official said, ?Putin is not so silly as to think that he can recreate the Soviet Union, but there is a core of the former Soviet Union that is properly ours?Belarus, Ukraine and northern Kazakhstan. And it would be nice to have it back.?
In 2018, Putin unveiled what Wilson describes as a ?rather frightening array of new doomsday weapons, including a nuclear-armed torpedo that says, ?You didn?t listen to us. Look at these weapons and listen to us now.??
All of this was accompanied by ?lurid and strident propaganda 24/7 on Russian television, pushing anti-Western messages,? explains Wilson. An important part of this propaganda campaign was the idea that Ukraine is not a country or a people. ?Putin said that very early on to George Bush. Again, we didn?t listen,? he says.
Quote:
It?s therefore likely that Russia believes it is now demonstrating strength on its own terms by being able to wage what Wilson refers to as the ?Russian way of war?.
?There?s an expression in Russian that translates as ?To be tender-hearted does not become a sword?,? says Wilson. What this means in practice is the exercise of extreme brutality towards civilians, combined with an indifference to Russia?s own casualties.
We really wound up falling into the same trap as the Interwar world did with Germany, though until 2014 it was quite excusable for overwhelming contextual reasons.Quote:
right now, Putin may not be feeling dissatisfied with the way things are going, despite all the assertions that the invasion is a disaster for him.
According to Wilson, Russia?s Black Sea blockade and destruction of Ukrainian infrastructure means that what Putin has achieved is the probable end of Ukraine as a viable nation-state.
?Yes, the losses have been far higher than expected, in terms of both manpower and material. Yes, the attempt to take Kyiv was a notable failure. But if you look at how Putin defines winning, it would be, if Ukraine can?t be reintegrated back into the Russian empire, then no one will have it.?
The key is western rearmament, and we need evidence that it's happening (not "going to happen"). If we do actually rearm, we have a common standard across NATO, and we collectively have a far bigger industrial base than Russia. If Ukraine gets a chance to retrain, we can pipeline these materiel to Ukraine even as we're equipping ourselves, until there is no material difference between Ukrainian and NATO military. However, if we talk about rearming, but do nothing of the sort, then we're not using our industrial base.
Excellent piece consolidating flaws in economic sanctions strategy, which has always been "under-theorized."
https://scholars-stage.org/of-sancti...tegic-bombers/
Sanctions are like strategic bombing, in that they often seem to be conceived and applied as a way to pressure "the masses" to turn on their elites and thus bring change to governmental policy undesirable to the sanctioning agent.
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There are many plausible reasons one might inflict economic harm on an opposing country: pain might be used to try and compel a foreign power to change its behavior. Restrictions might be intended as a bargaining chip for the eventual war settlement negotiations. Or they might be kept in place to degrade the Russian economy over the long term, thus frustrating Russian attempts to modernize their military in the decades to come. The use of sanctions may be principally about credible deterrence—the threat of sanctions will only deter hostile powers from taking actions if they believe we are willing to accept the costs of employing economic weapons. We must act now to make those threats credible in the future.
It is not clear to me which, if any, of these rationales motivate our current sanctions regime. The popular press shows an extraordinary disregard for this question. New York Magazine asks “Are the Sanctions Against Russia Working?” without ever stating what work the sanctions should be doing (see also Michael McFaul’s argument that “sanctions are working, but need to work better” ). The Washington Post describes “why sanctions can be so effective” without telling us what they are effective at achieving. The New York Times reports a list of every sanction the United States has levied to “pressure” Russia without writing a line on what this pressure aims to accomplish.10
But regardless of how thoroughly or fatuously our governmental actors theorize it, sanctions aren't merely a tool against Russia's invasion - they must comprehensively degrade Russia's state capacity, which 'surgical' sanctions against the military-security complex can not accomplish even if they could be invented. We should hesitate to dismantle the adversarial sanctions regime before the Russian state renounces imperialism. And that's just not a promise a Putinist government could deliver credibly even if brought to those terms. If Cuba and Iran are the classic cases for sanctions relief, there's really no country that Russia in its present form could benefit ahead of, not even North Korea.Quote:
The aims matter. There is a difference between a sanction campaign that attempts to destroy an enemy industrial complex vs. a campaign aimed at compelling an enemy to change their aggressive behavior. In security parlance, that second sort of campaign is labeled coercive diplomacy. “Escalation is the currency of coercive diplomacy,” writes Richard Nephew in The Art of Sanctions. ]If your aim is “to inflict some measure of pain in order to change [the] policy” of an enemy state, then [B“opponents must believe that you are not only prepared to go further, but that doing so is inevitable without resolution of the underlying problem.” The goal of the sanctioning state is to offer a choice: “you can stop this now or suffer worse.”[/B]12
But in order to offer this choice, the sanction setters must also “define [the] minimum necessary remedial steps that the target state must take for pain to be removed.”13 Have we done this? Do we have any clear idea of what specific steps the Russians should take for the West to let up on the pain it now inflicts? On the other hand, can we credibly commit to escalate the pain we impose if Moscow does not change course? Or have we repeated the error of sanction’s regime against Iraq, where the sanctions were so onerous to begin with that the U.N. could neither negotiate easily nor threaten further?
[...]
In the realms of diplomacy and hard power we have reduced the linkage of ends, ways, and means down to formula. This is not true when it comes to economic coercion. Earlier I quoted from Lawrence Friedman and Jeffrey Michael’s The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. The book is a compendium of the debates theorists and practitioners have had about the nature of nuclear forces and nuclear posturing from 1945 to the present day. It is 804 pages long. It references hundreds of sources. A similar compendium of sanctions strategy—perhaps it would be titled The Evolution of Economic Coercion—could not be written. There simply is not a comparable wellspring of theory and practical experience to draw on.
[...]
But for the moment we grope in the dark, as the strategic bombers once did. We, like them, are condemned to inflict mass suffering because we lack the theory to do otherwise.
We should aim to take things back to the Cold War, diplomatically and economically. It'll hurt us, but it'll hurt Russia a hell of a lot more. Make it the new norm until Russia can persuade us otherwise.Quote:
Originally Posted by Montmorency
Compared to the Cold War, the importance of Russia has radically shrunk - only their nukes matter. They've lost Eastern Europe, Central Asia and are a shadow of what they were. China used to be the junior partner now is an order of magnitude bigger in their economy and view Russia as a somewhat useful proxy for deflection to Europe and cut price resources.
Cut them off. With any luck Belarus and the other colonies will break away, diminishing them further.
It will hurt since Europe's "leaders" has pinned most of their fuel to a single autocrat as opposed to a range of autocrats.
~:smoking:
I was disappointed by the Switchblade 300 - dedicated 40mm grenade suicide drone - when I checked the spec sheet, but this article includes a comment that some Ukrainians even prefer relying on the tactical drones and quadcopters with jury-rigged underslung grenades that we've seen from both sides so far.
Ouch!
I actually can't figure out if Ukraine's defense industry has not had native 152mm production for many years (other than a few Kvitnyk guided rounds), or if there's actually been production in the thousands yearly by Ukroboronprom, the primary national defense-industrial concern. This month the same also announced "contracts for the purchase of tens of thousands of ammunition for ground artillery," which may refer to imports. But if so, imports from where? There may also be Czech or Slovak companies producing low quantities for their domestic Dana system, but I haven't heard of any other ongoing production or capacity in Europe.
On the drones. Too vulnerable for their cost.
Drones should ideally be cheaper than the missiles used to destroy them. So the high tech ones from the USA probably rarely make sense - perhaps as a slightly cheaper stand off launch platform for missiles to help get a bit more range.
Otherwise more simpler ones would make sense if they could erode the enemy's air defences since they do have a finite number of missiles to use.
Is there a place for having decoy drones to release chaff / flares to muddy the waters?
~:smoking:
It's a matter of tradition/philosophy as well. American military equipment is supposed to be of extreme quality, but also costly and time-consuming to fix. Russian/Soviet, on the other hand, is inferior, but also less costly and much easier to fix. I understand why the US, an affluent nation with an unsurpassed logistical organisation prefers the first approach, but, in my uneducated opinion, the Soviet perspective is much more efficient for the vast majority of countries. Maintenance of American equipment has led to some rather tragicomic situations in the less professional armies of the NATO members. Comical because of all these harmless malfunctions under peaceful conditions, but also tragic, considering all that tax money wasted.
US stuff is definitely way too expensive to maintain for most countries, same actually for most NATO/Western produced equipment in general. Usually you'd need maintenance contracts, contracted technicians etc... This is why for Afghanistan the US was buying the ANA Mi-17 Helos instead of Blackhawks and Chinooks until Congress had a hissy fit.
US drone tech is also from 20 years of uncontested airspace, think the US Navy probably has the most advanced drones for contested environments but not cheap throw away ones for ground-based controllers near the front line.
We do have some cheaper small ones like the Raven hand launched UAS but the gap between that and the next level up Shadow UAS is where the Ukrainians need something cheaper but more capable than the small cheaper stuff we have.
Drones with strike capability are good but the US ones also are able to operate within the whole network of US aircraft so there'd be EA-18 Growlers or something else jamming radars and other supporting things that the Ukraine can't replicate and are far too sensitive for the US to lend-lease.
Russian/Soviet stuff I wouldn't necessary always put as inferior, for present day yes, but that's mostly because there was a 20 year gap of investment in the Russian arms industry. Before the fall of the USSR they produced good stuff, the major difference though is that they always kept reserves of all the previous generation equipment available for use too. The lack of reserve equipment and ammo throughout NATO (apart from the US) is what's hindering support to the Ukraine right now. The Germans can't even provide Leopard 2s to the countries that want them in exchange for giving Ukraine T-72s. The major NATO countries used to have 1000s of tanks in service and in reserve, not low hundreds in service with maybe dozens of reserves.
Looks like the MiG-29 gifting drama may come up again but now that heavy weapons have been going to the Ukraine for months without any real Russia blowback or escalation this is now just something to be expected.
https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/3...rs-help-report
Slovakia offers Poland, Czechia a scheme to provide MiG-29s to Ukraine: report
NATO will certainly be working with a much more common inventory of items following the emptying of soviet era stocks as donations.Quote:
Slovakia will transfer its MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine in exchange for temporary airspace protection from Poland and Czechia, reports suggest.
Talks to implement the scheme have been happening in the context of a similar exchange which could see Slovakia receive German-made Leopard 2 tanks in exchange for delivering Soviet-era T-72s to Ukraine, according to a report by Business Insider.
Slovakia has been named as one of the likely candidates for providing Ukraine with new fighter jets since March 2022, shortly after the start of Russia?s full-scale invasion of the country.
Numerous weapons systems have been transferred from Slovakia to Ukraine, including S-300 air defense systems.
In case it hasn't been mentioned yet, Ukraine has been granted EU candidate status. AFAIK it means there are no arguments against their accession in principle, and it's a matter of them reaching the required levels.
Great news. I hope they get in.Quote:
Originally Posted by Pannonian
I also hope they aren't strung along, as the disillusionment that causes actually reduces the coherence/happiness of the candidate and the external security of the EU.
Turkey being a great example here.
So... Ukraine wants loads of weapons and ammo, including tanks and heavy artillery and rockets to fight an invader right now. Ideally a couple of months ago.Quote:
Originally Posted by Pannonian
The EU gives them a to-do list of things that once they've finished they will be considered for entry. Assuming the vote passes. Unanimously. Is the EU going to send the tens of billions to rebuild everything? Time will tell.
Turkey should never have been promised that they might enter since their currency is not stable (hopefully lessons were learned from Italy and Greece) and less democracy than Hungary.
~:smoking:
Perhaps, perhaps not. But they were and are being 'promised' membership.Quote:
Originally Posted by rory_20_uk
They did deserve a lot more than a customs union for defending europes southern flank for twenty plus years in the cold war.
Perhaps full membership should never have been offered, and that something akin to Ukraine's DCFTA would have been more appropriate.
But no, they have and continue to be strung along and it has had the following consequences:
1. It has created public disillusionment in Turkey with the EU that has been exploted by populists.
2. The EU has turned what is a strategic nexus from a strong bastion in a dangerous part of the world into a weakness being exploited as that same nexus acts as a balancing power (including balancing against the EU).
In short, the EU pushed Turkey outside the tent, turned them around, and invited them to take a piss into their tent. Stupid.
Yes, the EU screwed up again. They seem to enjoy allowing political flights of fancy rather than anything approaching a strategic approach as to what they want to do. Adding increasingly powerless countries which have equal voting rights as Germany and France is madness.
Turkey is a strong addition to NATO, but not so much the EU.
Ukraine needs the support of ongoing sanctions of Russia, reduction in purchases of Russia's exports, and weaponry now. Once the Eastern border has been sorted, reconstruction has been at least started at this point it would be worth considering starting to talk about accession to the EU.
~:smoking:
Hmmm, recognition that the Defence Command Paper, its Future Soldier 'fix' and army procurement generally are a disaster.
Will it have any readacross into the IR foriegn policy paper? i.e. how much UK Defence resource is poured into the Ukraine 'problem'.
Just in time for this 1937 moment, the government are cutting the Armed Forces by 10,000. We will be spending 2.5% of our GDP on defence, but not until 2030.Quote:
Originally Posted by Shaka_Khan
In other news, Mr. Chamberlain, in response to statements that Europe is on the brink of war, announces that the BEF will be cut by 10,000. Defence spending will be increased, but those increases won't take place until 1945.
Unlike the 1930's headcount isn't as important as equipment. You might have noticed that drone warfare is increasingly common and requires few soldiers to oversee.Quote:
Originally Posted by Pannonian
Did you miss the part where the UK is going to give another ?1 billion in military aid? What is the EU doing? How many billion? To be fair, the EU has given the Ukraine a piece of paper as opposed to weaponry, tanks, planes etc so I guess that is almost as useful.
If the UK should be spending on the Armed Forces, it should be on the Navy, since we are an Island and money is extremely limited.
The elephant in the room is the dozen countries in between who it might be nice if they could do... something useful. Even if it was giving the USA a load of cash to send over their equipment. Germany is very slowly doing something, but their Defence companies export c. 75% of what they make due to all the red tape.
~:smoking:
I dream of a government that didn't waste 33bn in dodgy covid contracts (as per the NY Times), including 8bn written off in PPE that wasn't fit for purpose (as per Rishi Sunak earlier this year). We know of one of these contracts, 150m or so to a Tory peer after a meeting with Johnson overrode the protests of the civil service. None of the PPE bought in that contract was ever used, of course, as they didn't fit the required criteria (as the protesting and overruled civil servants knew). Imagine if that 33bn was put towards something other than giving away taxpayers' money to Tory donors and friends and family.Quote:
Originally Posted by rory_20_uk
And this is why Johnson does what he does. He knows that running on perpetual Brexit wins him elections. All I did was talk about how the government was doing sweet FA about defence, and someone immediately points to Europe and says, they're bad. The Tory strategy is to keep picking fights with Europe and other culture wars, and reap the votes. They don't even have to implement Brexit in any concrete way. All they have to do is keep saying "Protect Brexit", and the Leavers will flock to them.
Talk about a particular view...Quote:
Originally Posted by Pannonian
The UK for all its faults is paying more as a share of GDP for several years and has given a lot more to Ukraine than many others. So, "sweet FA" is a highly biased way to view it as I pointed out.
Blair gave banks vast sums of money via PFI - hospitals took loans at a high rate and the banks flipped them since they were effectively government backed. Its almost as if the party in power always finds ways to enrich themselves. No one is defending it and I'm boring myself in repeating variants of independant oversight that I think should be in place.
~:smoking:
One would think that the most important oversight would be voting out the government so that someone else who isn't quite as corrupt (maybe David Lloyd George or something) can have a go at rolling back all the cronyist and illiberal measures this government has been putting in. Except that the Tories know that Europe is still a winning argument, as we see again and again. They're in trouble again? Look, EU. And they don't even have to push that argument themselves any more, as others will happily forward that argument for them.Quote:
Originally Posted by rory_20_uk
And if that is what they are doing, it is working splendidly!
Since you bring up brexit all the time even when talking about quite separate topics, all the while insisting that the gov't only does it to troll you.
Boris gets to live rent free in your head.
It's been so long that I've forgotten what I wanted to post about here. Might have been the role of LDPR fighters.
Wrong lesson. The Ukraine War proves the opposite, that headcount is still essential. One of the worst drags on Russian performance is that they have too few infantry, which is why most of their (successful) assaults have been spearheaded by elite infantry behind masses of untrained separatist conscripts, and most of Ukraine's (successful) defenses have been secured by similar masses of untrained volunteer militias. Until the mythical battlefield of autonomous swarms of drones and rovers emerges, relying on tech solutions (tech-fetishism) is self-destructive unless you're the USA. NATO countries could do worse than establishing robust reserve systems capable of rapidly mass-mobilizing civilians to "mere" moderate competency across all specialties from infantry to intelligence, since "moderate" is always better than "untrained."Quote:
Originally Posted by rory_20_uk
Poland alone has delivered more in valuation than the UK. You are deeply underestimating cumulative EU contributions so far, or overestimating British ones, even if everyone's contributions have fallen short of adequate (excepting the Baltic states).Quote:
Did you miss the part where the UK is going to give another ?1 billion in military aid? What is the EU doing? How many billion? To be fair, the EU has given the Ukraine a piece of paper as opposed to weaponry, tanks, planes etc so I guess that is almost as useful.
NATO should be developing its doctrine and force structure on the assumption of tight future joint operations, which would be best fitted according to comparative advantage. In that case the UK could invest more in its navy. In the more likely scenario that everyone continues to avoid the hard choices and sovereignty-limiting collaboration that the world's challenges require, the UK would be better off just scrapping their navy and investing most of the returns in anti-shipping platforms and standoff fighters.Quote:
If the UK should be spending on the Armed Forces, it should be on the Navy, since we are an Island and money is extremely limited.
The sad - though double-edged - reality is that in the 21st-century, high-tech and capitalist-efficient military manufacturing has a lead time of years. Spare capacity does not meaningfully exist, machine tools are irreplaceable, and there is no more suddenly retooling a nail factory and its workforce to produce airplane parts, or whatever. I'm not sure, if the EU and US leaderships had committed in March to stand up a new complex for the Soviet-grade artillery calibers that Ukraine cannot replenish, that they could have under any circumstances reached the production stage before 2023 - and at thousands per month at that. Where basic artillery ammunition is some of the simplest war materiel that exists, behind bullets. If you want spare or scalable capacity, you have to pay for it well beforehand.Quote:
The elephant in the room is the dozen countries in between who it might be nice if they could do... something useful. Even if it was giving the USA a load of cash to send over their equipment. Germany is very slowly doing something, but their Defence companies export c. 75% of what they make due to all the red tape.
https://twitter.com/radeksikorski/st...70366816391168Quote:
Originally Posted by Montmorency
I'm 100% civilian so I'll not embarrass myself in arguing the make up of a military army. I was thinking that for a defensive force, a levee en masse armed with anti armour can quickly make attacks extremely costly whereas investing on high tech stuff is all very well and good until the Russian cruise missiles cripple the bases before the next "definitely not a war" happens - you can't disperse tanks / planes / helicopters that much.Quote:
Originally Posted by Montmorency
So the UK is number 2 in value of aid. Of course another way of looking it is percentage of GDP and then the Baltics and Poland shoot higher as do all the countries who were behind the Iron Curtain. funnily enough. Who isn't high on the list are Germany, France and Italy - the Tin Man, the Lion and the Scarecrow respectively - although all three countries vie for each role. Craven, cowardly apologists and deniers seems so far to be a good summary.
Yes, creating some F-35s out of thin air isn't going to happen overnight. BUT Germany has many (a few hundred I think) tanks that they pretended didn't exist (Rheinmetall had to call bullshit on that one) and I am sure they are not alone in having heavier weapons mothballed that relatively quickly can be brought up to scratch. Certainly in Europe there is no greater threat than Russia - and they'll never do more good than now. The USA National Guard and even the police departments have a vast amount of older equipment which they frankly don't need (in the case of the police, positively shouldn't have) and logistically a lot might be easier to make new than collect some is probably worth the effort. Finally, there is The Rest of the World who have a lot of weaponry, most of it is either Russian or NATO compatible and again could be purchased.
This really shouldn't be something the USA should have to do the heavy lifting on - they are paying for Ukraine's weaponry whilst the EU pays for Russia's. Congress has demanded more troops to be station over in Europe and of course I'm delighted since NATO has increased the number of troops on high alert... without saying and specifics. And high alert is anything from 2-3 days to 6 months this does rather matter.
~:smoking:
I think NATO is adjusting correctly to the Russian threat. The UK is investing much more in its Navy and I hope continues to do so, having a capable UK ground force and RAF though are equally important as they provide significant contributions to the Baltic security rotations, which as a nuclear power and as a 1st rate military in quality is significant.Quote:
NATO should be developing its doctrine and force structure on the assumption of tight future joint operations, which would be best fitted according to comparative advantage. In that case the UK could invest more in its navy. In the more likely scenario that everyone continues to avoid the hard choices and sovereignty-limiting collaboration that the world's challenges require, the UK would be better off just scrapping their navy and investing most of the returns in anti-shipping platforms and standoff fighters.
The sad - though double-edged - reality is that in the 21st-century, high-tech and capitalist-efficient military manufacturing has a lead time of years. Spare capacity does not meaningfully exist, machine tools are irreplaceable, and there is no more suddenly retooling a nail factory and its workforce to produce airplane parts, or whatever. I'm not sure, if the EU and US leaderships had committed in March to stand up a new complex for the Soviet-grade artillery calibers that Ukraine cannot replenish, that they could have under any circumstances reached the production stage before 2023 - and at thousands per month at that. Where basic artillery ammunition is some of the simplest war materiel that exists, behind bullets. If you want spare or scalable capacity, you have to pay for it well beforehand.
The slow lead time in manufacture is sad and expected, NATO countries would have had to continue maintaining their large stock piles in the post war era and continue to keep manufacturing lines open despite the last 20 years of war being a counter-insurgency focus. No excuse really but people like me that are advocates for a strong defense are usually seen as war mongers and ignored in favor a 'peace dividend.' The stupid but correct logic in a well-armed military for deterrence is that it is doing its job well if it never has to be used for war if the deterrent is credible enough. A hard sell for almost every government which would rather spend money on education and health care which have much more visible returns on investment short of war breaking out.
I think we're seeing the start of a proper Western rearmament though; the corporate cultures being forced to decouple with Russia and probably recalculate their investments in China will see a more polarized and economically independent factions over the next decade, especially as we try and restrain China's demands for its place under the sun.
I think there's some sort of unofficial EU/NATO policy against supplying German tanks, even the older Leopard 1s. I recall about two weeks ago Spain was mulling sending its Leopard 2A4s that have been in long term storage and then backed out with a line of 'they're in too poor shape to send' which is a piss-poor excuse because that really to me means disposable so send them to be refurbished and then onto Ukraine. Same with the older Leo1s, like you wrote, Rheinmetall has quite a few but no okay to send despite having made clear since a few days after Feb 24th that they can be refurbished and sent. The Germans seem to have quite a hang-up about German "Panzers" fighting the Russians in the Ukraine again, simply ludicrous.Quote:
Yes, creating some F-35s out of thin air isn't going to happen overnight. BUT Germany has many (a few hundred I think) tanks that they pretended didn't exist (Rheinmetall had to call bullshit on that one) and I am sure they are not alone in having heavier weapons mothballed that relatively quickly can be brought up to scratch. Certainly in Europe there is no greater threat than Russia - and they'll never do more good than now.
At least the older warsaw era inventories of eastern and central europe are being cleared out for donation including finally some Slovak MiG-29s while the neighboring countries make up for capability gaps like the Czechs covering air policing for the Slovaks and the Germans providing their own German manned patriots for air defense.
As a member of the National Guard, I'd rather not give away the functioning equipment we have, the US Army doesn't use us as a last resource branch but rather an 'operational' militia/reserve force so every four years each Brigade deploys in some capacity (training or peacekeeping missions due to the lack of wars now) so we actually need that equipment. Also, as the US is the major deterrent force for the 1st World in Europe and East Asia it's best we don't erode our capability too much.Quote:
The USA National Guard and even the police departments have a vast amount of older equipment which they frankly don't need (in the case of the police, positively shouldn't have) and logistically a lot might be easier to make new than collect some is probably worth the effort. Finally, there is The Rest of the World who have a lot of weaponry, most of it is either Russian or NATO compatible and again could be purchased.
As for police forces, well for one the equipment they have that is 'military' are really just wheeled APCs, tall ones at that to be good against mines/IEDs, honestly not very good for a straight up fight like in Ukraine. There's no police armor or artillery forces (let's hope we stay sane and keep it that way). There's also the thing that even if they had good equipment for Ukraine that it'd be owned at the County or State level and not within the capability of the Federal government to gift to a foreign power.
If it were up to me there'd be Ukrainian pilots training on export versions of the F-16s, JAS-39 Gripens, Leopard 2A4s- 2A6s, CV-90s and Marders, as well all older cold war stock Leopard 1s and M60s MBTs while continuing the supply of rocket and cannon artillery in all forms. Former warsaw bloc members of NATO probably don't have the manufacturing capability for boosting production of ammo and spare parts in the quantity needed by Ukraine so I think we need to try and switch them to NATO equipment during the war so that the effort can be sustained longer.
I think it is key though that the US continues to do the heavy lifting as it is the least vulnerable to Russia's hydro-carbon diplomacy and has the benefit of everything we do for Ukraine is watched by Beijing in regard to gauging US support for Taiwan. Europe's weening of Russian energy should have started eight years ago but better late than never and hopefully the promised investments in defense (especially Germany) lead to a revamping of much atrophied industries.Quote:
This really shouldn't be something the USA should have to do the heavy lifting on - they are paying for Ukraine's weaponry whilst the EU pays for Russia's.
EDIT:
Excellent look at the problems of German rearmament.
https://youtu.be/8jDUVtUA7rg
Notably, Russia has fired up to 3000 (?) ballistic, cruise, anti-ship, and anti-radar missiles at Ukrainian ground targets over 4 months. Just Ukraine. We have relearned the lesson that strategic bombardment must be truly massive in scale - much more than a few thousand missiles - or concentrated with other means in a short timespan to effect more than a nuisance to the target (*cough*Tomahawks*cough*).Quote:
Originally Posted by rory_20_uk
So believe me, even a thousand Russian (conventional) missiles spread across all of NATO, to the exhaustion of their stocks, would hardly be worth noticing beyond the original media outrage.
Cumulative armament did of course make this war feasible, as it did the world wars... Russia can never escalate from saber rattling in the absence of its enormous Soviet-era stockpiles of countless thousands of missiles and millions of shells. Europe by and large does not need to expand its armed forces, but it does need effective scalable industrial base and reserve capacities, as well as further doctrinal and command integration. I remain convinced that even the US military can expand its capabilities by reviewing its procurement and doctrine even if it freezes its budget for a decade.Quote:
Originally Posted by spmetla
This article makes some good points. Why does Army doctrine remain that
when the material advantage has shifted back to the defense in war and the US military itself expects all potential peer conflicts to have a defensive nature?Quote:
The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy?s armed forces by battle?Decisive results are obtained only by the offensive.?
Russia: Defensive battle to exhaust Russian material advantage and initiative until NATO is sufficiently mobilized, then air-based reduction of Russian forces concluding with a ground offensive to push them back into Russian borders (tens to low hundreds of miles of movement).
Taiwan: Minimal contribution of American ground forces.
North Korea: South Korean defensive battle at DMZ fortifications until Northern artillery and airpower are neutralized. I should actually look up what the doctrinal purpose of the current American contingent in South Korea is in the event of a Northern invasion, but I'm pretty sure the South Koreans are supposed to do the bulk of the ground combat, including offensive ops.
No one's stupid enough to license an invasion of Iran, and we're not deploying brigades to Israel or the Indian subcontinent. Does the army expect to bound across the African savannah in the future?
See above. Our deterrence factor is not affected by running a deficit in some Army or Marines heavy platforms this decade. Off the top of my head, France has given away ~20% of its Caesar SPGs to Ukraine (12 units), and the US has donated well over a hundred of its 1000 M777 howitzers. Even if I don't hear correctly that the Marines are supposed to transition away from M777s anyway, if we've given this much, we can afford to give more. We're surely not going to miss another hundred artillery pieces anytime.Quote:
Also, as the US is the major deterrent force for the 1st World in Europe and East Asia it's best we don't erode our capability too much.
AFAIK there's a policy against supplying Leclercs and Challengers and M60s as well.Quote:
I think there's some sort of unofficial EU/NATO policy against supplying German tanks, even the older Leopard 1s. I recall about two weeks ago Spain was mulling sending its Leopard 2A4s that have been in long term storage and then backed out with a line of 'they're in too poor shape to send' which is a piss-poor excuse because that really to me means disposable so send them to be refurbished and then onto Ukraine. Same with the older Leo1s, like you wrote, Rheinmetall has quite a few but no okay to send despite having made clear since a few days after Feb 24th that they can be refurbished and sent. The Germans seem to have quite a hang-up about German "Panzers" fighting the Russians in the Ukraine again, simply ludicrous.
We've sent Humvees and Bushmasters, it would do.Quote:
As for police forces, well for one the equipment they have that is 'military' are really just wheeled APCs, tall ones at that to be good against mines/IEDs, honestly not very good for a straight up fight like in Ukraine.
Whether in Europe or the US, some NATO government really should have tried to launch new manufacturing capacity for Soviet-grade ordnance by now, even if it wouldn't come online until next year. There's no sense in leaving Ukraine to shelve hundreds and hundreds of perfectly good pieces for lack of ammo; it just commits to overreliance on NATO platforms, increasing their attrition and war-and-tear.Quote:
Former warsaw bloc members of NATO probably don't have the manufacturing capability for boosting production of ammo and spare parts in the quantity needed by Ukraine so I think we need to try and switch them to NATO equipment during the war so that the effort can be sustained longer.
It would be fine if the US prioritized the military, logistical, and training components, and the EU offered its checkbook for economic sustainment and reconstruction. Financial losses in Europe from this war are very real and could escalate by the end of the year, but Germany should be paying for refugees in Poland and Moldova and the UK should be covering Ukraine's loans (grants). Or just the EU itself (see below). Regardless, I would prefer to see the EU countries collectively or bilaterally taking up the great preponderance of non-military support for Ukraine from now on.Quote:
I think it is key though that the US continues to do the heavy lifting as it is the least vulnerable to Russia's hydro-carbon diplomacy and has the benefit of everything we do for Ukraine is watched by Beijing in regard to gauging US support for Taiwan. Europe's weening of Russian energy should have started eight years ago but better late than never and hopefully the promised investments in defense (especially Germany) lead to a revamping of much atrophied industries.
I had seen this one.Quote:
Originally Posted by Furunculus
Attachment 25905
But notice:
Attachment 25906
Attachment 25907
And let's not forget that the most valuable component of a multi-million pound tank is not the weapon, the armour, or the engine; it is its crew. Equipment production can be scaled up. Efficiencies can be found to produce things more quickly. But personnel cannot be trained more quickly than they are, and practical experience is priceless. Hence arguments of drawing down manpower because of new warfare doctrine misses the point.
I point anyone who's interested to a youtuber called Nicholas Moran, aka the Chieftain. Employed as a tank historian by World of Tanks, he is also highly prized by the US military, being one of the last active members to have seen action in both an Abrams and Bradley. IIRC he was fast-tracked for promotion to his current rank (Colonel) for precisely this reason: experience of old school warfare.
Shower thought: Technically the history of "drones" is much longer and more winding than this analogy allows... but the timespan between the public emergence of powered flight as a hobbyist technology (~1906) and its mass-industrial application in combat (1915/16) mirrors the trajectory of light/medium drones a century later.
Whoa
https://i.imgur.com/A9uswto.png
Mind the balance!Quote:
Originally Posted by Pannonian
Strictly speaking,what we've seen in this war is that crews and infantry rapidly mustered and trained over a few weeks are good enough to take to field, sometimes to greater effect than ought be expected (e.g. Ukrainian NATO artillery). Yet lead time on new runs or new capacity to produce the weapons systems can drag on into years. (For example, the Russians reportedly have only a handful of machines for boring artillery cannons, and might not be able to produce new ones in the war's timeframe.) A crew or infantryman trained at high expense to exquisite standards in all individual, unit, technical, and combined arms dimensions are a great thing to possess, but they have to be supplemented by mass-mobilized recruits and reservists; remember the fate of the British Regular Army in 1914. These need to have access to equipment and vehicles in order to join the fight in anything but the most trivial application, whether the equipment is sourced from storage or a fresh production line (technically import is another source but not a reliable or deep one these days).
Thus the throughput of equipment to the point of use is the bottleneck in war planning and execution - it remains so after all these years. War evidently hasn't changed enough for quality to decide all.
Which isn't to imply an inevitable return to WW2 levels of output - it's just no longer feasible even in the context of another world war, despite the increase in gross population since then. But maybe it calls for a return to late Cold War military-industrial capacity and storage (such as when global arms manufacturing and surplus permitted Iran and Iraq to source hundreds of new tanks and planes off the market in short order.
The readiest rebuttal is to avoid going too far in the other direction from quality of men and materiel, or you end up in the same place as the Russian Armed Forces - loads of equipment, crappy manpower, and not enough of it. That's why I recommend a European emphasis on mid-grade surge capacity in both.
Of course, one might also point out that the crash course lead time for the stuff that really matters to specifically American expeditionary power - ships and planes - is so hopelessly protracted that all of the above doesn't even matter that much as long as we don't plan on becoming enmeshed in a years-long ground war in Asia...
Germany produced loads of AA guns in the last year or so of WWII, despite it being known that the best anti-aircraft defence was fighter planes. Why? Because Germany was so short of fuel that it couldn't afford to properly train new pilots. Leading to new pilots being practically cannon fodder for the decently trained allied fighter pilots. Rather than produce more fighter planes that were to be manned by inadequate pilots, they turned instead to AA guns which required lower levels of training to be effective (albeit nowhere near as effective as fighter planes).Quote:
Originally Posted by Montmorency
lol I substituted the name of the British politician in the other thread
Dailykos has a particular bias in its Ukraine analysis, but there are some useful nuggets, such as that the HIMARS GMLRS rocket costs about as much per unit as the Excalibur 155mm projectile (>$100K), and the US arsenal is probably significantly less than 50 thousand of the latter (which is still several times more GMLRS than Excalibur). Explains why allegedly the Allies don't intend to contribute more than 15 cumulative HIMARS to Ukraine (with up to 12 currently in or on the way to Ukraine).
Meanwhile, news since early May suggested that Excalibur contributions to Ukraine were minimal, but this week's US aid package to Ukraine lists "1000 high-precision 155mm shells", almost certainly Excalibur, so in the context of the dozens of Krab, PzHaubitze 2000, CAESAR, M109 Paladin, and other platforms Ukraine has already received, it seems plausible that the Allies have developed a considerable respect for Ukraine's needs in artillery parity. I don't know if ATACMS rockets for HIMARS (the 300km range ones) have the power to break up the Kerch Strait bridge, but if they do, it would be a fantastic allocation.
You'll probably never get the post on LDPR fighters I once planned to write, but I see ISW noted that "140 thousand" conscripts have been mobilized since the beginning of the war, which presumably does not include the standing separatist armies from the outset. On one hand, Russia has probably exhausted the readily accessible pool of conscripts in occupied Donbass below the level of total war. The population under Russian control must be around 3 million, so they're at half of WW2 Soviet mobilization levels. On the other hand, it means the Ukrainians face over a hundred thousand more separatists than they did at the beginning of the war. Once more, either side would be at a standstill without its respective horde of minimally-trained paramilitaries. Also why I don't think Russia attempts to annex the Donbass unless it can secure an armistice while the full oblasts are under their control; designating them as first-class Russian citizens would come with more legal rights from military coercion.
Certainly, expensive munitions but looking at the ammo depots and C2 nodes hit since these have arrived, I'd say worth the cost. Even with Western support Ukraine won't get a quantitative edge over Russia in artillery but if range and precision are better for Ukraine, they can cause a lot of hurt.Quote:
Dailykos has a particular bias in its Ukraine analysis, but there are some useful nuggets, such as that the HIMARS GMLRS rocket costs about as much per unit as the Excalibur 155mm projectile (>$100K), and the US arsenal is probably significantly less than 50 thousand of the latter (which is still several times more GMLRS than Excalibur). Explains why allegedly the Allies don't intend to contribute more than 15 cumulative HIMARS to Ukraine (with up to 12 currently in or on the way to Ukraine).
I agree, however if I were the commander on the Southern front, I'd do night strikes against docked naval ships, subs, and harbor facilities in Sevastapol first alongside their airbases too. This together with a destruction of Kerch Strait bridge would really hurt Russia logistically. I imagine over the next few weeks we'll see a lot of railyards going up in smoke as Russia still seems bound to these for supply. I also think that if the Black Sea fleet ends up forced to hole up along the Caucasus coastline that'd limit the ability to do effective cruise missile or shore bombardment roles if the Ukrainians end up successfully pushing south and east of Kherson.Quote:
I don't know if ATACMS rockets for HIMARS (the 300km range ones) have the power to break up the Kerch Strait bridge, but if they do, it would be a fantastic allocation.
Curious if we'll see a larger and more successful offensive by Ukraine in the south given that Zelensky has ordered it to be liberated. So far Ukraine hasn't been able to muster the numbers and effects to do more than nibble away at village after village.
Also, curious as to Russia's next offensive, I think they'll preserve what strength they have right now to try and blunt any Ukrainian counter-offensive and then push to take the whole of Donetsk and if possible, push on Mikolayiv.
Fall and winter aren't too far away and I'm worried what further gas supply shenanigans Russia will do to Ukraine and Europe as a whole.
I screwed that up, "less than 50 thousand" was supposed to refer to GMLRS; Excalibur inventory is in the 4 digits as far as I know (e.g. IIRC one of the last few years the procurement was just over 900 units).Quote:
HIMARS GMLRS rocket costs about as much per unit as the Excalibur 155mm projectile (>$100K), and the US arsenal is probably significantly less than 50 thousand of the latter (which is still several times more GMLRS than Excalibur).
What's the most effective way of isolating Crimea, and is it feasible for Ukraine to do it?Quote:
Originally Posted by spmetla
Reminder of how utterly and irrevocably Putin and the Russian ultranationalists wrecked Slavic unity and, ironically, all positive vestiges of the Soviet legacy.Quote:
A series of polls by Rating Group show that Ukraine and Russia are now very different societies. Ukraine does not share Vladimir Putin’s complexes about the last 30 years. Over the last decade, positive answers to the question ‘Do you regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991?’ have been on a rising trend in Russia, up from 55% in 2010 to 63% in 2022. In Ukraine, the number was not too far behind in 2010, at 46%; but it is now only 11%. Moreover, under Zelensky and his predecessor, President Petro Poroshenko (2014–19), Ukraine has successfully shifted to a ‘more European’ way of commemorating the Second World War. In contrast to Putin’s pobedobesie (‘victory frenzy’, the obsession with 1945), 80% of Ukrainian respondents defined 9 May as a day for ‘remembrance of war victims’ in 2022, while only 15% saw it as ‘Victory Day’. In 2012, the figures were the other way around in Ukraine: only 18% referred to remembrance, while 74% still thought of victory. Victory in ‘World War Two’, rather than the Great Patriotic War – the Soviet framing – is also placed in a broader and more national context. All historical ‘fighters for independence’ are now placed in the same pantheon, including not only nation-building stalwarts like the Cossack hero Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky, but also previously more controversial figures like Ivan Mazepa, who lost the Battle of Poltava in 1709 (up from 44% in 2012 to 76% in 2022); Symon Petliura, the controversial leader of the short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1918–19, who allied with Poland and whose supporters committed pogroms (up from 26% in 2012 to 49% in 2022); and even the interwar nationalist leader Stepan Bandera (up from 22% in 2012 to 74% in 2022).
If one looks at it objectively, Putin is one of the worst Russian leaders of all time. Little needs to be said of the plundering and feudalization of Russia's long-term socioeconomic prospects, but just refer to Russia's foreign relations with its former co-republics.
Belarus: Puppet state, so long as the extremely-unpopular local strongman can be kept in power
Ukraine: Mortal enemy
Baltics: Mortal enemy
Moldova: Worsening relations
Georgia: Adversarial
Armenia: Trapped between Turkey and Azerbaijan, desperate for any Russian assistance, offers little in return
Azerbaijan: Increasingly distant, increasingly self-assertive in the region
Central 'Stans: All openly balancing Russia with China AFAICT
Russia is in a worse position with essentially every former SSR compared to the beginning of Putin's rise to power. To be fair to him, he wasn't alone in devising Russia's course; the entire elite power structure of Russia has long deserved the 1918 treatment.
His fixation on "hard power" and trying to oppose 'the West' instead of use its better aspects for advancement have been really hinderances for Russia's sphere. I don't think he gets that a bit more soft power and using the cultural and historical ties could lead to a much more voluntary set of nations looking to Moscow. He's just gathering allies that are in opposition to the US lead world order, not allies working toward any other goal at all.Quote:
Russia is in a worse position with essentially every former SSR compared to the beginning of Putin's rise to power. To be fair to him, he wasn't alone in devising Russia's course; the entire elite power structure of Russia has long deserved the 1918 treatment.
Looking at Kazakhstan's recent statements in opposition to recognizing Russia's breakaway 'republics' in Ukraine are a good indicator of how awry the invasion has gone. Even if Putin took all the Ukraine at this point it'd still be a strategic loss as Russia will remain in a poorer position in the world than it was a year ago. It's only a stronger position if he looks at the map of Europe like a 'Hearts of Iron' player which is not realistic for today's world, something that caused most of Europe to completely mistake posturing for negotiations which were actual preparations for invasion. Russia is not North Korea.
The PRC has definately played the game better.
I hear Romania is restarting 152mm production. @edyzmedieval
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CH8o9DIIXqI
oooooo
Tangential rant: Let's be frank re: the "simplicity" (cf. quantity) argument that the essayist dismissively touches on. Aircraft, given their cost, numbers, and absolute complexity, are currently just platforms where technology is going to produce more of an edge than in almost any other military application. While for the sake of example there's probably no real procurement, technical, or logistical cost advantage at scale for, say, buying 5 T-64BV over a single T-90M, as ground vehicles the former can probably perform at 80% relative to the latter in a cumulative sense for intended MBT roles. They will both have similar speed, maneuverability, and vulnerability on the full-spectrum modern battlefield, and they both even arm the same 2A46M 125mm cannon. So in abstract there's a case for maintaining a cheap old workhorse for mass mobilization in a domain like armor to supplement the crack gear and personnel.
But if you could substitute a wing, or even two, of F-104 for a squadron of F-35, would you make that choice? The technological leap between second-generation and fifth-generation jet computer and missile technology (and especially stealth where available) is simply incalculably greater than that between second-gen tanks and topline 3rd-gen tank armament, armor, and countermeasures, which combat would undoubtedly reveal. What would be the point of, for example, swarming F-104s against a squadron of F-35s if it's not implausible that the F35s can standoff engage and destroy all of the F-104s with zero loss? Because that's what technological disparity can bring in the air.
(These might be videogamish matchup examples - one more than the other - but they serve to illustrate the cross-differences between Quality vs. Quantity branches)
Arguments about the need to recall the lessons of industrial warfare are essential without taking them to literally require a return to thousands of turboprop plane and welded-steel tank units! It just indicates a need to rebalance between desired capabilities and expected aggregate survivability and availability (or lack thereof) in large-scale conflict. Contemporary doctrines will have moved on properly with extant conditions in most respects.
Correct, we still use the 152mm howitzer so restarting production for those shells is something that's also in our benefit at least temporarily.Quote:
Originally Posted by Montmorency
ROMARM (Romanian arms manufacturer - owned by the state) is producing a good number of ammo supplies, shells & other equipment, both for old standards (7.62) and also for NATO standards. (5.56)
Surprised Mark Sumner at DailyKos was the one to put out this notice, but it's welcome.
This was pretty obvious when I first peeped FIRMS mapping back in March: all of Ukraine, and Europe, was smattered with anomalies. I actually first realized the nature of the interpretive challenge when trying to sort out whether anomalies in the area of occupied Chernobyl were supposed to be reported forest fires or military activity.Quote:
Early in the invasion of Ukraine, those interested in following the war discovered that they had some friends in high places—places anywhere from 200 to 800 miles above the ground. Not only has intelligence been available in terms of satellite imagery (some of it from free sources), but NASA’s FIRMS Fire Map has become a staple in tracking what’s happening on the front lines and behind the front lines. However, at this point, the value of FIRMS has plummeted and the possibility of misreading this data has reached an all-time high.
The FIRMS Fire Map, which is created from two types of instruments spread across multiple satellites, is intended for tracking exactly what the name implies: fires. Technically, it spots “thermal anomalies” or “hot spots.” The hot spots located by FIRMS infrared tools are points that stand out, temperature-wise, from the background, and have been literal life savers when it comes to tracking wildfires in both the U.S. and around the world. That the FIRMS data also turned out to be aces at picking up flashes from artillery and the explosions of missiles was a happy accident—“happy” only in the sense that it provided much-needed support for people engaged in Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), not for anything actually happening on the ground.
But at this moment, using FIRMS data as an indicator of anything happening in Ukraine takes a good deal more scrutiny and expertise than it did a month ago. Here’s why.
First, take a look at this map of the area in eastern Ukraine.
At first glance this aligns pretty well with what we know is happening when it comes to conflict. Russian forces are trying to get to Bakhmut, near the center of this image, so it makes sense they would be bombarding Ukrainian forces in the area. Ukrainian forces are surely trying to take out Russian artillery. So they’re probably shooting up the backfield. Except … that cluster of shots over near Alchevesk is a good 40km into Russian-held territory. The spots south of Krasnyi Luch are even farther in the red zone. So … High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) seeking out artillery stockpiles?
Before you answer, take a look at this war-torn battlefield.
This looks pretty bad. However, a quick glance at some of the names on this map will show that this is actually on the Romania/Bulgaria border. It’s an area where, so far as anyone knows, Russian artillery is not engaged in shelling towns and not a single HIMARS is firing missiles. Why is the map so spotted with hot spots? Because … hot spots.
First of all, it’s summer. FIRMS is not immune to being thrown off by a reflective surface or toasty bit of asphalt (though the system keeps a list of known/fixed hot spots and filters them out, so sure false spots are transient). Second, it’s dry. So there are actual fires. Some of those hot spots are FIRMS doing its duty and reporting places where trees are ablaze. Third, it’s summer, and it’s hot, and it’s dry. So farmers all over Europe are burning off the stubble left after the harvest of spring crops.
Most of that winter wheat that was greening up Ukraine back in April was harvested in May or June. Farmers like to burn off those fields in the summer to kill off weeds, prevent the spread of diseases, and drive out pests. Burning also helps put some of the nutrients from last year’s crop back into the soil for the next year. In any case, fields in many areas are burned in the summer in preparation for planting in the fall. Take a close-up look at these hot spots, whether in Romania or Ukraine, and the great majority are out in a patchwork of farm fields. And yes, Ukrainian farmers are still farming right through all this mess. Those guys who were towing tanks with their tractors are not going to get intimidated now.
This doesn’t mean that FIRMS is useless. However, it does mean that a casual glance at the FIRMS Fire map is a dangerous way to spot military activity at this time.
But the abuse of FIRMS only seemed to reach epidemic levels over the past month, when a number of commentators, even good ones, were trying to apply facial assessments to FIRMS maps to determine volume of artillery fire in this or that Ukrainian or Russian-held piece of territory. I'm not going to say that's totally illegitimate, but... like with reconstructing fragmented ancient scrolls, one has to be cautious not to exceed what one already knows for sure coming in, yet also refrain from commiting source incest in a circular fashion. FIRMS can more properly be used to corroborate video evidence and ground reporting, or at most suggest the geographical extent of confirmed combat at a tactical level.
Which classic authors or contemporary media properties does this put you in mind of?
https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/st...92984946974720
Wonder what role this month's Russia-Iran summit (among other MENA pressure) played in Russia's formal submission to Ukrainian agro exports. Or maybe it's also that Russia wants to restore its own exports and accompanying revenue, on the assumption that expected Ukrainian revenue flow is low enough that it would have been made up by NATO grants/credit anyway in the short term.
Nothing too critical in this, just revisiting the use of anti-tank guns that we had discussed a few months ago.
Seems they're being used as indirect fire AT guns, quasi artillery I guess, I guess with the right spotters it can be done. Interesting to see them digging so they breach can recoil enough as AT guns are much lower in profile. At this high angle of fire for an AT gun they should get good penetration of most vehicles assuming its a good hit, even with dated 100mm AT guns.
Guess in a war, guns are guns, best use em.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4HOqLDIDOT4
Makes me think of the remark that Operation Barbarossa was the biggest moving tank museum in history.Quote:
Originally Posted by spmetla
Notice the reference later in the video to the earlier-discussed practice of commuting to the frontline: "We spend most of the day at work and come back in the evening, take a shower, have dinner, and go to bed... If we're not called up, it's a day off."Quote:
Originally Posted by spmetla
I have no idea how AT cannons could be useful as indirect artillery, but then again, we've seen footage of both Russian and Ukrainian tanks in makeshift batteries providing indirect fire (effectiveness unclear to me). Maybe it just lends more support to the argument that the armor arm must evolve back in the direction of the assault gun or SPG archetype.
This war has exposed a lot of categorical myths about the nature of 21st century warfare. Fixed fortifications and semi-trained infantry, tankers, and gunners have all re-emerged to play a fundamental role, with lesser but surprising contributions from anti-tank mines and centralized partisan and stay-behind operations.
Lol. "European Decolonization," Serbian Brotherhood edition. (Yugoslavia is just flatly named Serbia here. Not just Serbia even, but "Serbian Tzarate.")
https://i.imgur.com/WmzPG9q.jpg
...
Just a note. Stugs in WWII were under the command of artillery, with crews consisting of trained artillerymen, whereas tanks were crewed by tankers. Stug sights included ranges for indirect fire. AFAIK their guns were the same. So my guess is the use of AT guns for indirect fire consists mainly of training.Quote:
Originally Posted by Montmorency
Another 'D'oh' moment: Why wouldn't AT mines be worth their weight if IEDs are?
There's a US version too, which is hilarious.Quote:
Originally Posted by Montmorency
Attachment 25955
Unironically Id love to see a Republic of Lakotah. Also its clear that the author knows less than nothing, because a) if it truly was decolonization then it would all be Native land (which at this point I support tbh), and b) the Republic of Mormons would be called Deseret before anything else.
Also France randomly being in there made me laugh. Like what is France going to do with Missouri lol. At least them taking back Louisiana makes sense.
Decolonization means the restoration of old colonies. Although it's unclear how this could happen in the United States if the European states are themselves decolonized.Quote:
Originally Posted by Hooahguy
The most egregious history fail is a Confederate States without South Carolina or Georgia.
It's telling that some of the only full countries this account would prefer to exist are a Serbian empire and the Confederate States of America.
Something I don't understand. While I've spend distinctly less time closely following the Ukraine war over the past month, and some analysts such as Henry Schlottman have been disengaged, there has been a lot of commentary about possible redeployments of Russian troops from southern Kharkiv oblast (i.e. Izyum bridgehead/Lyman area) to the general southern theater, with the assessed purpose of providing an operation reserve
As of August 2 JominiW had 12 BTG in the Kherson bridgehead, which is in the realm of reported strength over most of the past 4 months.
Already some Ukrainian government sources (whom I don't deem reliable for such details) claimed 30 BTGs in the Kherson bridgehead since a few days after the first Ukrainian bombardment of the bridges in the area (~July 19).
A less well-known OSINT account, commonly cross-cited, finds up to 50 BTGs in Kherson oblast alone, with a slight majority cis-Dnistrian.
https://i.imgur.com/IqSZEGs.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/QSqrf2n.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/NeDgNq4.jpg
But this seems unbelievable to me on several counts. First, that RuFor would have transferred so many units deep behind their lines in the south, when the obvious means of reinforcing against an expected offensive, such as in Zaporizhzhia, is to build defenses in depth close to the frontline. Second, that RuFor could have up-to-doubled their fully-formed complement of forces in the Kherson bridgehead either within just a couple of days once the bridges came under fire, or over time after the bridge's ability to support extensive movement, let alone of heavy equipment, had been badly compromised. And does rail capacity to move multiple brigades along a single, single-track line through the south uo to the river even exist? Or if it was by motor transit, such vast convoys would have easily been detected by satellite, presumably to be disseminated throughout the Internet.
Third, though tangentially I believe this analyst is severely lowballing the quantity of separatist combat elements, if there were only a brigade or two left to contest the Bakhmut front against the Ukrainians, RuFor would absolutely not suddenly have retained the combat power to restart the process of gradual territorial gains in the past week.
The reports of Russian retrenchment from the Izyum bridgehead are too much to ignore, but there's something off here. Like, if the embedded analysis were true in describing the allocation of forces between Melitopol and Izyum, then the Ukrainian counteroffensive, whenever that is, would be better off trying to contain RuFor to Kherson province while swinging east to join an eastern advance from Kharkiv to perform a pincer around the entire separatist zone - rather than playing to the expectation of some sort of southern offensive.
Seems the Ukrainians blew up some facilities and at least 8 planes in a Crimean airbase. American and Ukrainian authorities have put forward a number of vague and/or contradictory explanations for how this might have occurred, suggesting Ukraine wants to obscure their capabilities to a degree.
I knew from the beginning of the war that estimating crew or passenger casualties from vehicle losses was going to be tricky. Even when vehicles aren't destroyed or captured when parked with no or minimal crew, even a record of a catastrophically-destroyed vehicle allows the possibility that the explosion occurred at a length from impact, allowing passengers to escape, or maybe even as a followup well after combat subsided. Crews and passengers abandon vehicles for all sorts of reasons, often related to panic - put even a tank under enough machinegun fire or small arms fire, or within some proximity to artillery detonations, and the human element might decide to take their chances elsewhere. (In case you ever feel like cursing a wargame's morale model.)
We've seen some crazy footage of the survivability of tanks. If you're not badly injured or disoriented, even a couple of seconds before detonation or deflagration can be enough to leap out of a hatch, depending on countless unique factors.
This clip might take the cake. A full-mounted BMP takes a pretty serious hit, perhaps from a missile. The front part - engine compartment? - immediately goes up in flames. Yet even so, I count at least 6 soldiers escaping the burning vehicle in decent shape, which amounts to up to an entire mechanized infantry squad associated with a BMP (vehicle crews are drawn from passenger squads) escaping a permanent vehicle writeoff more or less intact.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1557075448198303744
Have you heard of Nicholas Moran, aka the Chieftain? He's probably contributed more to laypeople's understanding of the practicalities of tanking, with his best known contribution being the "Oh bugger, the tank is on fire" test. Which explains the surprisingly high survivability of the much-criticised M4 Sherman, and the low survivability of the much-praised T-34.Quote:
Originally Posted by Montmorency
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q6xvg5iJ4Zk
Ukraine might be flexing an ability to carry out attacks deep within Crimea.
If, as the hope goes, these attacks anticipate a large-scale offensive to sever Russian holdings through Zaporizhzhia, then regardless of just how many units RuFor has transferred to the west, one would really hope that the recent actions foreshadow a capability and plan to disable the Kerch Strait bridge with the kickoff. Russia loses perhaps the majority of its supply capacity into Crimea and southern Ukraine in that case. No matter how significant the obstacles to maneuver warfare, "trapping" a large force with a limited logistical chain in Crimea/Kherson genuinely could lead it to 'die on the vine' beneath a campaign of attrition in a way that couldn't be accomplished under extant circumstances.
But as before, if it doesn't develop soon then I don't see how Ukraine can take advantage of the disruption before it's remediated (as many of the logistical issues in Donetsk have been by now).
Good demonstration of the probabilistic nature of fragmentary explosions. Those artillery hazard radii you see are more like 'this can theoretically happen if you're very unlucky.' What I don't understand is why... the subjects act like NPCs.
https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/...19856999268352 [VIDEO]
What do you mean?Quote:
Originally Posted by Montmorency
*sigh*Quote:
Originally Posted by Pannonian
A grenade or mortar round fell within a couple meters of every man in a section, leaving one badly wounded. The rest scramble, but almost immediately de-aggro and keep walking as though nothing happened, while the third at least stops to look back at the injured comrade.
Seems like anomalous behavior for humans.
NPC behavior is exactly what it is. Its a kinder explanation than they just dont give a rats behind about their comrades. Im not sure which is more disturbing tbh.
It's very difficult to know how you are going to react, even if you are trained. However, footage like this leads me to believe that they either have not had sufficient training, are exhausted, and/or don't really care. It mostly looks like a total lack of leadership or direction.
It's also possible that a dictator likes to screw around with world leaders just to feel important (cf. tthe 5-hour Macron-Putin meeting or whatever it was). Would be hilarious if any of these events had some connection to Trump's Macron dossier.
https://i.imgur.com/CUGmfCS.jpg
I was referring to the preceding posts, but it is indeed alarming that world leaders seem to have difficulty reading human beings. If someone spoke to me that way, I would interpret it as a subtle "f*ck you". I am not sure this is a cultural thing, although Putin's words seem to have been tailored in such a way that a typical western male would receptive.Quote:
Originally Posted by Montmorency
"I'm at the gym. I'm going to watch the game. I'm just a bro like you. We're buds. Catch you later."
An excellent article about how the Russians were defeated around Kyiv. (if its paywalled let me know).
Seems like Ukraine has launched its expected general offensive in the South. The strategy may be to squeeze the Kherson bridgehead until it runs out of supplies. Other aspects may include bisecting the bridgehead to cut the Kakhovka dam off from Kherson, or to push from Zaporizhzhia toward Tokmak, the only rail junction linking Kherson with occupied Donbass. Almost nothing solid has yet emerged about events on the ground.
Quote:
The Ukrainian sergeant slid the captured Russian rocket launcher into the center of a small room. He was pleased. The weapon was practically brand-new. It had been built in 2020, and its thermobaric warhead was deadly against troops and armored vehicles.
But the sergeant, nicknamed Zmei, had no plans to fire it at advancing Russian soldiers or at a tank trying to burst through his unit’s front line in eastern Ukraine.
Instead, he was going to use it as a bargaining chip.
Within the 93rd Mechanized Brigade, Zmei was not just a lowly sergeant. He was the brigade’s point man for a wartime bartering system among Ukrainian forces. Prevalent along the front line, the exchange operates like a kind of shadow economy, soldiers say, in which units acquire weapons or equipment and trade them for supplies they need urgently.
Most of the bartering involves items captured from Russian troops. Ukrainian soldiers refer to them as “trophies.”
“Usually, the trades are done really fast,” Zmei said last week during an interview in Ukraine’s mineral-rich Donbas region, where the 93rd is now stationed. “Let’s just call it a simplification of bureaucracy.”
Quote:
“We have hopes for Kyiv,” said Fedir, one of the brigade’s supply sergeants and an understudy of Zmei, referring to military commanders in the capital. “But we rely on ourselves. We aren’t trying to just sit and wait like idiots until Kyiv sends us something.”
Quote:
Such was the case in early May, when the 93rd — a renowned unit that had fought in almost every major battle of the war — was operating around the Russian-occupied city of Izium. Zmei, who before the war owned a small publishing house that specialized in dark fantasy novels, received an innocuous text message from a nearby Ukrainian commander.
“Hi,” the message read. “Listen, here’s the thing, we have a needless tank, a T-72 a bit damaged.”
“And we’d exchange it for something nice,” the commander added.
[...]
The commander’s requests were modest: a transport truck and a couple of sniper rifles in return for the Russian trophy tank. But Zmei told his customer, “This is too few things for a tank, write down what else you need.” The commander responded that he had plenty of tanks and wanted only the items requested.
When the commander mentioned all the tanks in his unit’s possession, Zmei sensed an opportunity to expand the trade. He wanted more tanks, and noted that the 93rd had foreign-supplied anti-tank missiles and U.S. portable surface-to-air missile systems available for a swap.
“Can get the launchers for a Stinger, NLAWs, various large stuff for a trade — and a lot of that,” Zmei said, referring to some of the Western weapons, which cost tens of thousands of dollars apiece.
Of the more than half-dozen soldiers interviewed for this article, most said that this underground economy was driven by the need to survive. Sometimes, they said, that meant circumventing a clumsy bureaucracy.
Although soldiers said that they were supposed to send captured equipment up the supply chain back to Kyiv, they noted that there was little effort to investigate the underground exchanges, let alone punish anyone for doing it.
The same kind of informal trade, or otherwise 'borrowing' of personnel and crewed vehicles, was observed during WW2. But not to this degree, I feel like.Quote:
In Michael’s squalid kitchen are printouts tacked to the wall listing the Western equipment his battalion desperately needs: encrypted radios, semiautomatic grenade launchers and Polish 155-millimeter howitzers, known as Krabs.
A Krab unit commander named Andriy said that his howitzers were not available for trade, though he might consider a swap if offered a French self-propelled artillery piece in exchange.
The 93rd currently only possesses old Soviet-era artillery pieces that have worn out barrels and are low on ammunition.
“I have to go and buy everything and trade things, and bring it all here,” Michael said.
Throughout the war it's been reported of both sides, from Ukrainian militia to Russian Spetsnaz, how heavily they have relied on crowdfunding and individual procurement of basic infantry equipment, drones, and even vehicles.
It's not quite a pre-modern way of war, but it's hard to find a truly applicable modern term, including "capitalist" or "neoliberal." Gamified?
Been watching it closely too. Wishing them the best of luck, however, if they cannot retake Kherson it bodes ill for their ability to retake any dug in part the Russians hold. Assuming they do take it though it would change the calculus on Russia's part significantly as their 'land-bridge' to Crimea would once again be under threat and the Kherson/Crimea canal could be blocked again further putting the Russians in Crimea in a sorta of siege, especially as artillery gets in range of Crimea itself.Quote:
Seems like Ukraine has launched its expected general offensive in the South. The strategy may be to squeeze the Kherson bridgehead until it runs out of supplies. Other aspects may include bisecting the bridgehead to cut the Kakhovka dam off from Kherson, or to push from Zaporizhzhia toward Tokmak, the only rail junction linking Kherson with occupied Donbass. Almost nothing solid has yet emerged about events on the ground.
Looking at the videos of the Ukrainian army operating there I'm still of the mind that those older Leo1A5s and Marder1s should be sent over. If the Ukraine has to assault dug in Russian positions supported by Dutch YPR-765s (just modified M113s APCs really) then they'd be much better served by the more capable Marders and the support of light MBTs like the Leo1A5.
Processing captured goods and putting into formal logistics channels has always been a difficulty in war. Trading actual platforms like artillery systems though is something quite crazy, really shows what a logistical bind Ukraine is in. Switching from Soviet standard to NATO standard mid-war isn't easy, not to mention the sheer variety of systems of each standard they have in inventory.Quote:
The same kind of informal trade, or otherwise 'borrowing' of personnel and crewed vehicles, was observed during WW2. But not to this degree, I feel like.
Throughout the war it's been reported of both sides, from Ukrainian militia to Russian Spetsnaz, how heavily they have relied on crowdfunding and individual procurement of basic infantry equipment, drones, and even vehicles.
It's not quite a pre-modern way of war, but it's hard to find a truly applicable modern term, including "capitalist" or "neoliberal." Gamified?
Omegalul: Popular Russian milblogger celebrates an alleged Russian artillery strike against a Ukrainian military hospital (a war crime), hopes that it was deliberate, complains that it wasn't routine for the past 6 months.
Quote:
We repeat once again: as a result of the strike, the wounded servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were liquidated. [Ed. Formatting from source]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cY2xBNWrBZ4Quote:
We do not understand why in Syria the field hospitals of Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State were massacred, while in Ukraine only (inshallah) they begin to reach this after six months of SVO. [Ed. Formatting mine]
But it's no secret what I believe should be done with fascists.
Agreed on all points. From the latest maps we have, it looks like the Ukrainians are trying to split up Russian forces into a pocket northeast of Kherson while maintaining pressure on the road to Kherson itself. If they can achieve that, it would be a huge blow for Russian forces in the area. Theres a great podcast recently posted about this by people much smarter than me. Only about 30 mins long but very informative and even-keeled. From their analysis the strategy seems to be slow but steady progress forward, with Ukrainians routinely rotating forces to keep them fresh rather than an all-out offensive that would be high-risk, high reward. I also agree with their analysis that this could very well be the decisive offensive of the war. As we head into winter and a European energy crisis sets in (or even a recession), we could be looking at reduced Western support. A Ukrainian victory in Kherson could ensure continued support while a defeat could drive Ukraine to the negotiation table sooner than it might have wanted to.Quote:
Originally Posted by spmetla
Yeah, the slow steady progress seems a good tactic for Ukraine in this area. Russia is restricted in how it can supply its troops, Ukraine has been excellent in targeting logistical and C2 nodes while Russia hasn't had much to answer to HIMARS. The recent appearance of HARM missiles that work with Ukrainian MiG 29s is a game changer as it allows Ukraine to conduct suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions as well as target Russian counterbattery radars too. That together with the increasing capabilities of Ukrainian air defense and artillery make the idea of Russian victory in the time period of the next few months a none-factor.
Ukraine's lack of armored vehicles though sadly restricts them to only doing this very slow and deliberate creeping offensive. It may get them Kherson and perhaps even cut off Crimea but I can't see how such an approach will work in the east of the country. Ukraine needs more tanks and IFVs to increase their offensive capabilities too though at this point such donations would really only be in time for winter and spring.
Gotta say though, I'm happily surprised at how more or less together the EU has remained during this energy crisis.
I have some old and new thoughts to share on the offensive, but I'll sit on it for another day or two. It seems Ukraine husbanded the resources to at least probe Russian defenses throughout Kharkiv Oblast while advancing in Kherson. Russian bloggers have speculated on a Ukrainian buildup in Kharkiv for a while now, but all simultaneously shat themselves on the 6th so hopefully it's a real dog's dinner for them. Meanwhile, Ukrainian SOF keep raiding across the Siversky Donets in northern Donetsk and vlogging through villages (3 or 4) on the Russian-occupied side.
https://i.imgur.com/mQDXtkq.jpg
According to the latest news, Russia plans to procure millions of rockets and shells from North Korea, which will buy Russia's artillery arm months of stable performance (range for Russian cannon ammunition consumption in 200 days, not counting mortars or wastage, should be 3-7 million according to my mental meta-analysis of estimates). At least it would leave NK as even less of a security concern. We've seen Russia documented dipping into Belarus's depots before; how much did they leave for Lukashenko?
Gets the point across without fiddling with additions to or subtractions from real Chinese defense spending.
https://i.imgur.com/v0LXUYl.jpg
It appears that Ukraine have something of an advantage until they reach the river where assaulting will then become much more difficult. Of course I hope that Russia's army shatters and we see mass surrenders etc etc.
I imagine that North Korea can create the low tech munitions that really hasn't massively changed in c. 50 years - and they'd be delighted to be paid in oil / food / vaccines for it. They could send the older stuff from storage which helps them keep their stock nice and shiny. How quickly they can send material is a question - but they can probably prioritise arms trains and even ships would be slow but would work. Again, whether China will use this as a back-door way of supplying Russia (in the well worn "the enemy of my enemy is a problem for later") or whether bleeding Russia's army white is just a good thing and any issues they have with the USA is predominantly a Naval issue.
The best defence of Taiwan is that China would be the proud owner of a large island with almost all infrastructure has been destroyed and millions of shell shocked civilians who are extremely hostile to the new regime, having suffered hideous losses getting there and having widespread unrest in mainland China as so many only children have been killed. Probably all high tech equipment was either destroyed in the invasion or destroyed to prevent China getting it - and of course all company money has long gone abroad. In short, sabre-rattling continues to be more useful than the destabilisation that an invasion would cause - ignoring whether there'd be a wider war and the associated trade embargoes.
~:smoking:
Yeah, it's time. We underestimated Ukraine again.
I wrote the following on the Kherson Offensive almost a week ago for my personal notes.
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Revising the first bullet entirely, I don't believe it's premature to say that things are proceeding in form for Ukraine. Their forces appear to be steadily advancing along much of the front in Kherson, as well as (at least) probing in Zaporizhzhia and near Izyum, and have just opened a Russian-anticipated yet still surprising axis in Kharkiv that has produced dramatic advances in a day. Ukraine has in the past days already displayed more operational acumen than Russia at anything, and achieved a more effective advance than anything Russia has enjoyed since the beginning. It seems the plan was to feint substantial Russian reserves toward Kherson, effect inevitable logistical degradation (being achieved by the offensive), and then opportunistically attack along key axes against dilute Russian resistance.
That's a pretty good reason for Ukraine's apparent decision not to commit a decisive balance of forces to Kherson at the outset. Indeed, a decisive attack into Zaporizhzhia with fresh formations is not out of the question.
I'd like to add that if Ukraine did reach Beryslav or Bilozerka in Kherson, it could begin to cover much of the downstream river itself with direct fire and barrel artillery, making the bridgehead immediately unsustainable with respect to the operation of vehicles or artillery. I would consider this an urgent priority given the rate at which GMLRS rockets for HIMARS are being expended to keep the bridges and river crossings under constant interdiction (HIMARS fire missions against river crossings during the offensive have reached a level of daily intensity equivalent to a week's worth pre-offensive).
In other news, according to my current estimate against Oryx (using a 1.25-1.5x multiplier range, assuming a proportional distribution of unspecified recorded losses), Russia has lost at least a quarter of its post-Cold War T-72 models (T-72B3), and at least a third of similar T-80 variants (T-80BVM). T-72B3s alone represented about half of all active Russian tanks before the war. Tough to replace when Russian hardware makes systematic use of Western advanced and off-the-shelf electronics. No wonder they basically pulled all T-90s from combat duty after April. The material situation continues to justify the prioritization of reactivated and refurbished Cold War models. (I'll believe 3rd Korps has any significant number of T-90s assigned when I see them show up in the loss sheets.) Hopefully with the Kherson offensive Ukraine can return to repleneshing its armor inventory with captures.
Military history tends to repeat itself a bit because of the dominant impact of terrain. This has long been a known element of warfare.
Ukrainian vanguard said to be on the outskirts of Kupyansk.
Parody of Russia's Baghdad Bob-esque kill claims throughout the war:
https://i.imgur.com/PXmusWj.jpg
I wouldn't be surprised if Ukraine is back to 200 KIA daily with these offensives, but you gotta love recent Oryx updates:
RuFOR, added today: 5 tank; 23 AFV; 6 arty
UFOR, added today: 1 tank; 1 BMP
In principle the Russians should eventually lose something on the order of 200 tanks and 1000 AFVs just defending the Kherson bridgehead (based on my understanding of initial strength) since the loss of all that equipment is inevitable and reinforcements continue to trickle in even now.
If this war protracts like Iran-Iraq, both Ukraine and Russia will be fielding suchlike by the end of 2023:
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
The German OOB in that map was 18 ID and 3 AD, whereas as of the beginning of the week the Ukrainians had, I don't know, 15 brigades in the same AO? Many of them militia or irregular. The active elements of the offensive this week were just 3 brigades according to Zelensky. Somehow very few seriously anticipated an attack in an area where Russia had maybe 2 or 3 soldiers per square kilometer. :creep:Quote:
Originally Posted by Seamus Fermanagh
I love the way classical authors did ontologic philosophy.
There are 6 types of person:
1. Friendly
2. Mesomorphic
3. Allergic to wool
4. Former enemy
5. Not yet born
6. Emperors
7. Bonus kind who are seventh
EDIT: Reportedly a French documentary that puts Macron in a better light for his Russia policy. Non-French speakers would need to paste the French captioning into a translator. There's also a clip from it floating around presenting part of a phone call between Macron and Zelensky on D-0 in which the latter pleads for [Macron] and the NATO leadership to ask Russia to back off.
The Ukrainian success at Kharkiv is certainly great to watch right now. Izium cut off and if they retake Kupyansk then the major rail and roadways supplying most of that front for Russia are cut off.
I'm so pleased that Ukraine can time and time again pull off some great military feats that prove my naysaying and pessimism as wrong. The war isn't won but these successes after so many months of war will have huge effects on Russian morale and combat effectiveness. When propaganda can no longer explain away the movement of the frontline in the losing direction the pressure on Russia and Putin's regime as a whole will increase substantially.
Soldiers can and will fight but if the cause looks lost and the motivation was already questionable then risking your life for the benefit of your corrupt chain of command breaks down. The current Ukrainian successes will likely have unit morale and cohesion effects (on the Russian soldiers) as negative as after the pullout of the Kiev front (or feint lol...).
I just hope Ukraine can maintain this momentum before fall and winter, best of luck to them.
I'm curious if Sarmation is still lurking in here and would like his perspective some. His viewpoint on Russia's failures this many months in would be interesting as they'll have huge effects on the Balkan region as a whole if this continues. His view as anti-NATO and pro-Russian would be an interesting perspective to see how this conflict plays out in the Balkan region. Serbia may remain pro-Russian but it'll be an increasingly difficult position if Russia looks like the new 'old man of europe.' Future Russian revisionism and revanchism will remain threats but this will likely be the cement that maintains the dissolution of the Soviet and Russian empires and perhaps finally discredit strong man rule in Russia enough to allow some sort of democratic institutions to finally creep in to hold the power structure accountable.