After three weeks of negotiations, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and leading opposition figure Benny Gantz agreed to form a national unity government last week. While the idea of a unity government between Netanyau’s right-wing Likud party and Gantz’s centrist Blue and White bloc had been discussed on both sides over the past year, what finally broke the logjam after three inconclusive elections since April 2019 was the public health crisis and economic recession caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Gantz, facing the difficult choice of breaking his core campaign promise to not serve alongside Netanyahu or taking Israel to a costly fourth election amid a national emergency, chose the former.
Gantz’s explosively controversial move has rippled through the Knesset, Israel’s 120-seat legislature, drastically altering the political landscape. First, the announcement of the unity government precipitated the breakup of Blue and White and its four-member leadership team, known in Israel as the “cockpit.” Gantz and co-chief Gabi Ashkenazi, both former heads of the Israel Defense Forces, pursued talks with Netanyahu, while the two other Blue and White leaders, former Finance Minister Yair Lapid and former Defense Minister and IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Ya’alon, established themselves as the largest opposition party by merging their previous parties, Yesh Atid and Telem.
Even within smaller factions, Gantz’s decision caused churn. The left-wing Labor-Meretz alliance has broken up, with Labor electing to join Gantz in the government and Meretz remaining in the opposition. But Labor’s remaining lawmakers in the Knesset—now only three—were split over the decision of whether or not to enter the government. Meanwhile, Ya’alon’s two Telem acolytes are leaving him to establish their own two-man party in order to break away from Gantz.
The unity government agreement may have ended Israel’s seemingly never-ending election cycle, but it puts Israel’s normal governing structures on hold. While Israeli governments have a default term of 48 months, the coalition agreement establishes a 36-month term, with Netanyahu staying on as prime minister for the first 18 months and Gantz taking over for the other half. It also creates a new position of alternate prime minister, which will be filled first by Gantz, then by Netanyahu. The purpose of this is ostensibly to avoid having to swear in a new government after the first 18 months, but the true purpose is to allow Netanyahu to maintain all of the trappings and privileges of the office after he steps down.
More importantly, Netanyahu is set to stand trial soon on multiple charges of corruption in three separate cases. Staying in power means he won’t be subject to the Israeli law that mandates the immediate resignation of any minister other than the prime minister upon being indicted. And even if convicted, he wouldn’t be required to step down until all pathways to appeal have been exhausted.
The Netanyahu-Gantz deal also establishes an emergency government for the first six months in order to deal with the coronavirus pandemic, which has killed more than 200 Israelis and sickened over 15,000. No significant legislation other than that pertaining to COVID-19 can be introduced during that timeframe. There is, however, one glaring exception to this rule: Israeli annexation of territory in the West Bank, a key campaign promise of Netanyahu. The coalition agreement sets a date of July 1 for the government to begin annexing the West Bank and applying Israeli sovereignty to settlements, subject to coordination with President Donald Trump’s administration and according to the parameters laid out in the American peace plan that Trump unveiled in January.
Gantz had previously demanded veto power over plans for annexation of the West Bank, and that it be conditioned on the assent of the Jordanian government and the international community. But the deal he signed with Netanyahu cedes both of those points, putting the decision solely in Netanyahu’s hands and prohibiting any delay tactics from ministers or legislators. Given the singular prominence granted to the issue in the agreement and the fact that the Trump administration has repeatedly claimed that the political deadlock in Israel is hampering implementation of its “deal of the century,” the most significant and lasting aspect of the unity agreement may be that it enables annexation to be carried out.
For Netanyahu, the deal is an unquestionable win. He remains prime minister despite facing the stiffest electoral challenge to his leadership so far over the past year, and will reap the benefits of remaining in office while facing legal proceedings. His victory was made possible by the political opposition, which dropped its primary campaign issue of not serving under an indicted prime minister in order to join him, destroying its own internal cohesion and structure in the process. In addition, Netanyahu secured a high-profile policy victory on annexation, and also secured a veto over the appointment of officials who will have a say in his legal fate, including the next attorney general and state attorney.
Gantz also secured some clear accomplishments. He becomes defense minister with a clear path and timeframe to becoming prime minister, and secured parity for his party with Netanyahu’s camp in the number of Cabinet ministers and committee chairpersons. He also avoids a fourth election, which, after the schism that resulted from his decision to seek a government with Netanyahu, would have decimated his party and reduced his political relevance.
But Gantz has suffered in the Israeli public’s eyes by conceding every principle and red line that he had previously voiced—from refusing to serve under Netanyahu to safeguarding legal and judicial institutions to preventing annexation of the West Bank. There are also some trapdoors for Gantz built into the agreement. Under the terms of the deal, the government will collapse if he and his party vote against one of Netanyahu’s budgets or do not maintain coalition discipline on annexation.
