Thanks for the response, Pindar. I´m not at all familiar with the logic of perfection. Perhaps you have a link for me? Googling myself didn´t help. :oops:
Right now I ask myself (and you ~:) ): Why should I accept that there is one being that is perfect in every way? In fact I think all beings in the world have specialised in some aspects and perform poorly in other areas. Perfection can nowhere be found in nature.
Reason is inevitable. Any conclusion assumes its own rightness and the correctness of the means used to get there. It is contrary to any point we would wish to make to say that we cannot make a point. Organizing our understanding is an attempt to perfect what we must use.
Exactly, but you have just admitted that we cannot escape circularity. And with circularity, we can prove anything.
You are essentially giving the "reason works" answer, am I right?
Quote:
Originally Posted by Kanamori
In the experience of humans so far, the scientific method of testing conclusions against our environment has been more successful than simply tossing the dice and coming to contradictory beliefs.
Thanks for the response, Pindar. I´m not at all familiar with the logic of perfection. Perhaps you have a link for me? Googling myself didn´t help. :oops:
I don't know about what Google has to offer. The Logic of Perfection is the rational rubric that attended Greek Thought on the question of the Absolute. This is seen from Parmenides through to Plotinus. It is also the rational standard adopted by a Hellenized Christianity and Islam. The former assuming a Neo-Platonic model the latter an Aristotelian one.
Quote:
Right now I ask myself (and you ~:) ): Why should I accept that there is one being that is perfect in every way?
Should suggests some kind of ought: questions of prudence are not my concern here. I have been focused on the rational and irrational elements behind theistic and atheistic stances.
Also if the proof relies on a prime mover it is like so 19th century and just can't handle the heat. :sweatdrop:
I think the first reference is on page four, post 120. The proof is a model of an argument that is much much older than the 19th Century. It is millennia old in its scope.
God has all the qualities entailed in the idea of perfection. This is because to be God under any rational rubric means to be perfect.
What this means isn't clear to me. This, along the notions of "being" and that the universe couldn't have caused itself, seems a little vague. If you're interested in spending the time, I'd like to see a fairly detailed description of this portion of the proof.
Could the being shown in the proof not have perfection pulled from the ideas that make it up? Why can there only be one god? Why must we not be a part of this being? My organs are probably not aware of me, and it could be argued that we are processes, so we may be simply be lacking conciousness of some entity that we belong to.
Along with that, I've been thinking about conciousness and whether or not we can really be beings that continue to exist through time. Most of our body's cells do not stay with us for all of our lives, and the cells that do stay with us -- nerves I think do -- change and are never the same for all our lives, not to mention that the fact that I never actually remember existing, I just have memories.
Also, there are empirically based theories that say that the universe could have just always existed; relativity can go along these lines, I think. As in, time does not exist without spatiality, and without spatiality there is no matter.
Quote:
You got back to me.
I only had time to make it a daydreaming project.
Quote:
Exactly, but you have just admitted that we cannot escape circularity. And with circularity, we can prove anything.
You are essentially giving the "reason works" answer, am I right?
No, I'm not so audacious as to say that I know reason works, only that I am forced to assume that it does. Any statement, inlcuding "reason doesn't work," rely on us thinking that our thinking can be right; rightness and wrongness are judgments coming from evaluation. Denying reason is trying to deny pointedness that thinking is. Trying to deny the thinkning is just a trick of the words that are used as representations. (I know I'll have to expound on this later...)
Quote:
I'll put it bluntly and allow Prof. Salmon to expound the point:
There is no reason why we should prefer the scientific method over crystal gazing, astrology, or dice throwing.
After hearing about a person gitting run over by a car, I think that it is in my best interestto avoid putting myself in the way of cars. The same methodology has resulted in more expansive and testable theories about our environments.
No, I'm not so audacious as to say that I know reason works, only that I am forced to assume that it does. Any statement, inlcuding "reason doesn't work," rely on us thinking that our thinking can be right; rightness and wrongness are judgments coming from evaluation. Denying reason is trying to deny pointedness that thinking is. Trying to deny the thinkning is just a trick of the words that are used as representations. (I know I'll have to expound on this later...)
Very astute point. I thought of it myself in a bit different way. I guessed that one possible objection would be "But Reenk, are you not yourself presupposing the validity of reason simply by using it to show that it is an unwarranted assumption?".
I would have to concede the point, but also reply with two of my own:
1) I am using reason simply because it is the only method that would be convincing to my audience (you). It would be more effective to use a crystal ball prediction to convince someone who holds crystal ball predictions as the epistemic foundation of knowledge, and the same is true in our case.
I could very well argue:
fripalu :hippy: iu-yoi
...but somehow, I don't think you would be as convinced...
2) It still runs in to the problem of circularity.
I have heard people criticize the argument of:
"I believe in God because the Bible says so, and I believe in the Bible because it is from God".
...and yet would not any justification of reason would run into the same problem?
Should suggests some kind of ought: questions of prudence are not my concern here. I have been focused on the rational and irrational elements behind theistic and atheistic stances.
Well, I consider myself open for rational arguments. Therefore I feel like I should believe something if it seems rational to me. ~:)
But I´m still struggling with this idea of perfection. I assume perfection means "the best that can possibly be". When you say that one aspect of perfection is non-contingency, I would argue that I simply don´t know whether non-contingency is possible at all, and I doubt that anyone (except god, if he exists) can know for sure. If I remember correctly you said earlier that a non-contingent being was necessary because otherwise there would be an infinite regress. Well, IMHO the infinite regress has the same problem: I don´t know if it´s possible, and probably nobody can know for sure. So in my view one has theses choices here:
1) Assume that non-contingent beings are possible. In this case the proof would probably convince me that there is a god.
2) Assume that an infinite regress is possible. In this case the proof would be faulty.
3) Concede that there is not enough information available to give a definite answer.
I think the first reference is on page four, post 120. The proof is a model of an argument that is much much older than the 19th Century. It is millennia old in its scope.
Age of arguments does not auto-validate them. It does mean we should carefully consider them rather then casually cast them off for a quick pop culture buzz...
Quote:
Originally Posted by Pindar
In any case, as a simple example I'll give you a form of an argument that finds reference in Plato, Aristotle and Leibniz.
1- Contingent beings exist
2- Contingent beings have a cause
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
5- A causality resting solely on contingent beings leads to a reductio ad absurdum (an infinate regress: a logical fallacy).
6- Therefore the ultimate cause must be a non-contingent being (a necessary being).
7- Therefore a necessary being must exist.
The above is a simple valid argument.
7 is true if the previous ones are correct.
5 not the main thrust but why must an infinite regression be any more logically absurd then a single step? If there is a cut off point at which point is it 2 steps logical, 3 steps not? If such a definitive line exists a definitive reason for such must also, not a whimsy that infinity is too large a concept for man hence too large a concept for the universe, the reason should not circumcised by our infallibilities.
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause.
I think the first reference is on page four, post 120. The proof is a model of an argument that is much much older than the 19th Century. It is millennia old in its scope.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
Age of arguments does not auto-validate them. It does mean we should carefully consider them rather then casually cast them off for a quick pop culture buzz...
I don't think he ever tried to imply that. I think he was just answering your question of:
"My apologies but which page is the proof on?"
...and then replying to your comment of:
"Also if the proof relies on a prime mover it is like so 19th century and just can't handle the heat. :sweatdrop:"
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
7 is true if the previous ones are correct.
5 not the main thrust but why must an infinite regression be any more logically absurd then a single step? If there is a cut off point at which point is it 2 steps logical, 3 steps not? If such a definitive line exists a definitive reason for such must also, not a whimsy that infinity is too large a concept for man hence too large a concept for the universe, the reason should not circumcised by our infallibilities.
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause.
Why not?
PSR
(finally, somebody going on the right tangent :2thumbsup:)
1- Contingent beings exist
2- Contingent beings have a cause
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause
4- The cause must be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
5- A causality resting solely on contingent beings leads to a reductio ad absurdum (an infinate regress: a logical fallacy).
6- Therefore the ultimate cause must be a non-contingent being (a necessary being).
7- Therefore a necessary being must exist.
ooo goody i love logic was one of my favorite courses in Computing
1 - This is logically correct - it is a universal truth and thus a good starting point for a logical argument - we exist, we are Contingent Beings therefore Contingent Beings Exist
2 - Again Logically correct - All effects must have a cause - we are an effect therefore we must have a cause
3 - Logically Correct - An Effect cannot be its own cause - an effect comes into existence because of a cause - if the effect is the cause it will never come into existence. We are an effect - we exist - therefore we cant be the cause.
4 - oh dear and it was all going so well - this is logically a fallacy - a cause does not have to be a being it can in fact be anything - without some more logic to justify why it a contingent or non-contingent being are required for us to exist this statement fails
5 - Logically Correct - if the cause of a contingent being is another contingent being then the cause of that contingent being is another contingent being. A is the Effect of B is the effect of C is the effect of D etc - an eternal loop therefore the Cause of Contingent Beings cannot be Contingent beings.
6 - this would be true if 4 had passed but it didnt so this falls down
7 - same as above
4 needs some work to prove this but i dont think it can be done
God has all the qualities entailed in the idea of perfection. This is because to be God under any rational rubric means to be perfect.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Kanamori
What this means isn't clear to me. This, along the notions of "being" and that the universe couldn't have caused itself, seems a little vague. If you're interested in spending the time, I'd like to see a fairly detailed description of this portion of the proof.
The above means that under a rational paradigm the base meaning of God is wrapped up with the notion of being perfect. In short: something imperfect cannot be God.
Regarding your questions on being: being is the reference to what exists, has ontic independence: often noted by individual extension. It is the base stuffness that makes a thing, a thing.
On self causality: Let me see if this explains the problem: a self caused X is an absurdity. Why? Because it is impossible for an effect to be its own cause. Why? because there is no point at which the necessary precursor (the cause) can then be established without always already positing the consequent (the effect) and also avoid a circularity. This means it begs the question (X comes from X) and simply becomes an assertion.
Quote:
Could the being shown in the proof not have perfection pulled from the ideas that make it up? Why can there only be one god? Why must we not be a part of this being? My organs are probably not aware of me, and it could be argued that we are processes, so we may be simply be lacking conciousness of some entity that we belong to.
The argument turns on a logical distinction: necessary and contingent being. These two are distinct by definition. If something is contingent, say a hedgehog (it has a beginning and end etc.) then it cannot be a necessary being.
Quote:
Along with that, I've been thinking about conciousness and whether or not we can really be beings that continue to exist through time. Most of our body's cells do not stay with us for all of our lives, and the cells that do stay with us -- nerves I think do -- change and are never the same for all our lives, not to mention that the fact that I never actually remember existing, I just have memories.
To admit change is to admit a sustained position from which such can be noted. Otherwise it is impossible to verify the asserted change.
Well, I consider myself open for rational arguments. Therefore I feel like I should believe something if it seems rational to me. ~:)
I understand. So you are simply wanting to be consistent (a rational person holds rational positions) and not asking about any moral question per say.
Quote:
But I´m still struggling with this idea of perfection. I assume perfection means "the best that can possibly be". When you say that one aspect of perfection is non-contingency, I would argue that I simply don´t know whether non-contingency is possible at all, and I doubt that anyone (except god, if he exists) can know for sure. If I remember correctly you said earlier that a non-contingent being was necessary because otherwise there would be an infinite regress. Well, IMHO the infinite regress has the same problem: I don´t know if it´s possible, and probably nobody can know for sure. So in my view one has theses choices here:
1) Assume that non-contingent beings are possible. In this case the proof would probably convince me that there is a god.
2) Assume that an infinite regress is possible. In this case the proof would be faulty.
3) Concede that there is not enough information available to give a definite answer.
I´ll pick #3.
The proof assumes contingent beings exist. It then concludes that a necessary being must exist because of that initial assumption. This is based on a logical framework. It is valid and thereby complete in form.
To accept an infinite regress is to move outside the bounds of reason due to the absurdity such entails (this has been explained previously in the thread).
Age of arguments does not auto-validate them. It does mean we should carefully consider them rather then casually cast them off for a quick pop culture buzz...
See Roink's comments.
Quote:
7 is true if the previous ones are correct.
5 not the main thrust but why must an infinite regression be any more logically absurd then a single step?
Because it begs the question.
Quote:
3- The cause of a contingent being cannot be itself as an effect cannot be its own cause.
T
On self causality: Let me see if this explains the problem: a self caused X is an absurdity. Why? Because it is impossible for an effect to be its own cause. Why? because there is no point at which the necessary precursor (the cause) can then be established without always already positing the consequent (the effect) and also avoid a circularity. This means it begs the question (X comes from X) and simply becomes an assertion.
4 - oh dear and it was all going so well - this is logically a fallacy - a cause does not have to be a being it can in fact be anything - without some more logic to justify why it a contingent or non-contingent being are required for us to exist this statement fails
Hello,
To claim a being can be caused by a non-being is problematic.
The logical distinction between contingent and non-contingent being is inclusive of what is. Therefore, for any posited contingent being X its cause can only be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
What if nature does one and logic the other, which is correct?
It's an odd question though... :rolleyes4:
If you are positing that there is something that is empirically verifiable which contradicts a logical axiom, then you could either make the case to revise or remove the axiom or hold that the empirical phenomenon is not what it is (i.e not logically possible and therefore not possible)...
A man is walking down the street and he can't believe his eyes when he catches a glimpse of something! A four-sided triangle! He rubs his eyes, but the four-sided triangle is still there.
He has a choice to make. Mathematical axioms tell him that a four-sided triangle is impossible. His eyes tell him it is lying right in front of him.
Should he believe his sense experience and perception of his mind or should he believe the mathematical axioms?
To claim a being can be caused by a non-being is problematic.
The logical distinction between contingent and non-contingent being is inclusive of what is. Therefore, for any posited contingent being X its cause can only be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
not quite doesnt anwser my point - the difference between the two is logical - a Contingent being is one who at some point will not exist - an non-Contingent Being is one who will always exist
the point is there is no logical arguement that holds up as to why a being is required to create another being (most likely because we cannot quite understand how we came into being so cannot apply logic too it)
Ok for yourself Pindar-sama, If you found that nature says one thing and logic another, which of the two is correct?
I'm a rationalist. Some may believe that the light of the full moon can make young girls pregnant, others may believe square-circles exist, still others may believe nothing can produce something. All would be logically problematic. I agree with Kant: "sensation without an attending concept is blind" meaning: phenomena without an over arching transcendental (and thereby rational ordering principle) is meaningless.
The logical distinction between contingent and non-contingent being is inclusive of what is. Therefore, for any posited contingent being X its cause can only be another contingent being or a non-contingent being.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Sir Moody
not quite doesnt anwser my point - the difference between the two is logical - a Contingent being is one who at some point will not exist - an non-Contingent Being is one who will always exist
This is not correct. Contingent Being status does not require a given thing end (though it very well may). Rather, a contingent being is something that lacks logical necessity: it need not be. Therefore, any posit of a contingent being needs an explanation for why it is and opposed to not. In short, a contingent being, by the label, has a cause. This is the thrust of the proof. Point 4 then indicates that any cause of a contingent being must be from another contingent being or a non-contingent being. This is not a remarkable claim.
Quote:
the point is there is no logical arguement that holds up as to why a being is required to create another being (most likely because we cannot quite understand how we came into being so cannot apply logic too it)
The proof makes no demands that a given thing create another. The proof does look into the wherefore of any given contingent being. The focus is backward, not forward.
1) I am using reason simply because it is the only method that would be convincing to my audience (you). It would be more effective to use a crystal ball prediction to convince someone who holds crystal ball predictions as the epistemic foundation of knowledge, and the same is true in our case.
I could very well argue:
fripalu iu-yoi
...but somehow, I don't think you would be as convinced...
I think that there's a disconnect here. What I am arguing for is connected thought, where thoughts relate to one another, that is what I call reason. The man who claims that God exists does so for his own reason and thinks his belief is justified. In claiming the supremacy of reason, I am saying that his view can be attacked, and shown to be right or wrong. So, if "fripalu iu-yoi" means something, I should be able to learn it, and thus should also be able to evaluate what it says. In this way, crystal ball gazing is using 'reason', as ball gazers see it. The problem is that people tend to explain away things that happen contrary to their predictions or problems that arise in their systems, by relying on the systems that they already have. Their explanations of things don't necessarily reach the conclusion that they have come to; it was just one possible explanation, and they don't consider the possibility of others. The scientific method isn't to discount possible explanations, it is to try to see all possibe explanations and give reasons why one is the best.
Quote:
2) It still runs in to the problem of circularity.
I have heard people criticize the argument of:
"I believe in God because the Bible says so, and I believe in the Bible because it is from God".
...and yet would not any justification of reason would run into the same problem?
I've got class in a bit, and can't answer the question fully in the time I have.
I think that there's a disconnect here. What I am arguing for is connected thought, where thoughts relate to one another, that is what I call reason. The man who claims that God exists does so for his own reason and thinks his belief is justified. In claiming the supremacy of reason, I am saying that his view can be attacked, and shown to be right or wrong. So, if "fripalu iu-yoi" means something, I should be able to learn it, and thus should also be able to evaluate what it says. In this way, crystal ball gazing is using 'reason', as ball gazers see it. The problem is that people tend to explain away things that happen contrary to their predictions or problems that arise in their systems, by relying on the systems that they already have. Their explanations of things don't necessarily reach the conclusion that they have come to; it was just one possible explanation, and they don't consider the possibility of others. The scientific method isn't to discount possible explanations, it is to try to see all possibe explanations and give reasons why one is the best.
Interesting point.
Since "reason" is proving to be a tough thing to nail down (as you have said, crystal ball gazing could be using reason too), let us then narrow it down to the scientific method.
Now, I do think that Salmon makes a very strong case that we have no reason to prefer the methodology of the scientific method over things like crystal ball gazing or astrology.
[student mode]On self causality: Where do feedback mechanisms and freewill stand?[/student mode]
Quote:
Originally Posted by Pindar
I'm a rationalist. Some may believe that the light of the full moon can make young girls pregnant, others may believe square-circles exist, still others may believe nothing can produce something. All would be logically problematic. I agree with Kant: "sensation without an attending concept is blind" meaning: phenomena without an over arching transcendental (and thereby rational ordering principle) is meaningless.
[debate mode]Good we can at least agree on 2 of those 3 items.
Nature does create particles out of nothing. [/debate mode]
Now, I do think that Salmon makes a very strong case that we have no reason to prefer the methodology of the scientific method over things like crystal ball gazing or astrology.
Well, there is no concrete and unshakable link between the conclusions the scientific method has reached, and what's actually going to happen, so far as we know. However, astrology has not produced any concrete discoveries, whereas science has sent us to the moon, says things often seen as offensive to the norm, and at least makes an attempt to reconcile its theories with actual events that have been repeatedly seen. I'm not much of a gambler, so I'll put my confidence in something that is backed up by all previous observations when I have to make some decision about what to do. The fact that we do not know the future does not show that all methods of trying to understand what's going on around us are equal. This is mentioned in the .pdf: if the world can never be predicted in any way, then all methods of trying to predict something are equally bad and disconnected from events; and, if the world can be predicted and is governed by laws, then knowing the laws is useful. In one case, no predictions matter, in the other, it seems more productive for humans to try to observe, theorize, and test theory in hopes of finding the natural laws.
Quote:
2) It still runs in to the problem of circularity.
I have heard people criticize the argument of:
"I believe in God because the Bible says so, and I believe in the Bible because it is from God".
...and yet would not any justification of reason would run into the same problem?
Yes, though religious belief does it on a larger scale. In order for someone to claim that the Bible was made by God, they must also suppose that they can know something. In my experiences, making things more complicated than they have to be has caused me to be more prone to error.
ooo goody i love logic was one of my favorite courses in Computing
1 - This is logically correct - it is a universal truth and thus a good starting point for a logical argument - we exist, we are Contingent Beings therefore Contingent Beings Exist
2 - Again Logically correct - All effects must have a cause - we are an effect therefore we must have a cause
3 - Logically Correct - An Effect cannot be its own cause - an effect comes into existence because of a cause - if the effect is the cause it will never come into existence. We are an effect - we exist - therefore we cant be the cause.
4 - oh dear and it was all going so well - this is logically a fallacy - a cause does not have to be a being it can in fact be anything - without some more logic to justify why it a contingent or non-contingent being are required for us to exist this statement fails
5 - Logically Correct - if the cause of a contingent being is another contingent being then the cause of that contingent being is another contingent being. A is the Effect of B is the effect of C is the effect of D etc - an eternal loop therefore the Cause of Contingent Beings cannot be Contingent beings.
6 - this would be true if 4 had passed but it didnt so this falls down
7 - same as above
4 needs some work to prove this but i dont think it can be done
Doesn't the creation of the universe provide the cause without requiring a god? And seeing as the universe didn't exist prior to that, logic doesn't work, so it may not need a cause at all.
To be honest these sorts of logical arguments annoy me. They're always so... weak.
Well, there is no concrete and unshakable link between the conclusions the scientific method has reached, and what's actually going to happen, so far as we know. However, astrology has not produced any concrete discoveries, whereas science has sent us to the moon, says things often seen as offensive to the norm, and at least makes an attempt to reconcile its theories with actual events that have been repeatedly seen. I'm not much of a gambler, so I'll put my confidence in something that is backed up by all previous observations when I have to make some decision about what to do. The fact that we do not know the future does not show that all methods of trying to understand what's going on around us are equal. This is mentioned in the .pdf: if the world can never be predicted in any way, then all methods of trying to predict something are equally bad and disconnected from events; and, if the world can be predicted and is governed by laws, then knowing the laws is useful. In one case, no predictions matter, in the other, it seems more productive for humans to try to observe, theorize, and test theory in hopes of finding the natural laws.
I think this point of yours (Pragmatic justification) was anticipated in the essay:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Salmon
“Look,” you say a bit brusquely, “I see that Hume was right about our inability to prove that nature is uniform. But suppose that nature does play a trick on us, so to speak. Suppose that after all this time of appearing quite uniform, manifesting all sorts of regularities such as the laws of physics, she turns chaotic. Then there isn’t anything we can do anyhow. Someone might make a lucky guess about some future event, but there would be no systematic method for anticipating the chaos successfully. It seems to me I’ve got a way of predicting the future which will work if nature is uniform – the scientific method, or if you like, the inductive method – and if nature isn’t uniform, I’m out of luck whatever I do. It seems to me I’ve got everything to gain and nothing to lose (except a lot of hard work) if I attempt to adhere to the scientific approach. That seems good enough to me; what do you think?”
To which Salmon (Professor Philo) gives his answer concerning the difficulties of such a position, although it may be one we like.
I think it is interesting you alluded to the point that the scientific method has led to benefits for us, and it is productive to use it over astrology, religion, crystal ball gazing etc...
In reply, one could affirm that science has been productive so far (or to deny that as science has led to some extremely destructive consequences). However (or "On top of that"), previous success (or failure) has absolutely no bearing on the future, and so it is a moot and irrelevant point.
I guess to sum it up, you may not be a gambler, but the scientific method is no more likely than another methodology to pay returns.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Kanamori
Yes, though religious belief does it on a larger scale. In order for someone to claim that the Bible was made by God, they must also suppose that they can know something. In my experiences, making things more complicated than they have to be has caused me to be more prone to error.
I really don't see how religious belief would do it on a larger scale.
In order for someone to claim that the best way of gaining/deriving knowledge is by the scientific method, they must also assume that:
1) The scientific method is a reliable method for acquiring knowledge.
2) One can actually have knowledge.
3) There actually is knowledge.
Seems quite similar to the religious believer who says the best way of gaining/deriving knowledge is through religious scripture. He must assume that:
1) Religious scripture is a reliable method for acquiring knowledge.
2) One can actually have knowledge.
3) There actually is knowledge.
And you could do the same with crystal balls, astrology, etc...
[student mode]On self causality: Where do feedback mechanisms and freewill stand?[/student mode]
Feedback systems do not posit spontaneous generation or ex nihilo postures.
Freewill is concerned with moral responsibility and comes into play when looking at deterministic systems. It is an ethical consideration. The focus here is formally epistemological as far as atheism is the issue and ontology when looking at my proof.
Quote:
Nature does create particles out of nothing.
No, it does not. Heisenberg would shudder at the thought. Virtual particles do not help on this issue.
Feedback systems do not posit spontaneous generation or ex nihilo postures.
[student mode]Don't they show that a Contingent Being is the same effect and cause...so how does that play out on the idea that a thing cannot be its own cause? [/student mode]
Quote:
Originally Posted by Pindar
Freewill is concerned with moral responsibility and comes into play when looking at deterministic systems. It is an ethical consideration. The focus here is formally epistemological as far as atheism is the issue and ontology when looking at my proof.
[student mode]If I have freewill doesn't that freewill require that I make those choices internally without an external force pushing them on me. Hence my decisions (effect) are from my own freewill (cause) so as a Contingent Being I am the cause and effect. Or do we split the I Contingent Being: Human into Contingent Being: Freewill (cause) and Contingent Being: Decision (effect) [/student mode]
Quote:
Originally Posted by Pindar
No, it does not. Heisenberg would shudder at the thought. Virtual particles do not help on this issue.
Virtual Particles:
a) Spontaneously generate
b) Out of nothing
Nor is nature limited to just these instances. Where does thermodynamics, nuclear decay and quantum theory (and the foreshadowed uncertainty principle) have on spontaneous generation?
In reply, one could affirm that science has been productive so far (or to deny that as science has led to some extremely destructive consequences). However (or "On top of that"), previous success (or failure) has absolutely no bearing on the future, and so it is a moot and irrelevant point.
I guess to sum it up, you may not be a gambler, but the scientific method is no more likely than another methodology to pay returns.
It is important that you say "the scientific method is no more likely..." If nature is going to go haywire, then we have no idea about what's going to happen. Liklihood assumes that there is some pattern... it's more that no theory from us will predict what's going to happen. However, before any of that, we don't know whether or not things can be predicted, and there may easily be methods that are better than others if nature does act in a uniform way. Expanding on the argument I made before, two scenarios are possible: One, if nature is ever unpredictable, then all forms of prediction are useless; Two, if nature is uniform, then it may be predictable in some way. In the first scenario, any direction we give ourselves, including the scientific method, is equally bad. In the second, our predictions may bear semblance to the natural laws, and it may turn out to be very useful to understand things. We may be in either scenario, and the best choice of scenario 2 is a choice in scenario 1. I can cover for the whole situation of choices best by opting for the Scientific Method, so I'm going to. Now, I honestly doubt that any sane person is going to choose to operate as if they're in scenario 1 unless you also tell me that it is just blind luck that people don't waltz in dangerous places, like the middle of an interstate. (I do have the infamous Liar Argument in reserve, so don't you make me take it out!)
I don't see, anywhere in the Bible, Thou Shalt Not Waltz In The Way Of Cars.
Personally, I'm happy without taking up some religion, but if it makes somebody else happier to take up some religion, then I've got no problems with them taking it up. It's unnecessary in my life, so I'm not going to put the time into it.
It is important that you say "the scientific method is no more likely..." If nature is going to go haywire, then we have no idea about what's going to happen. Liklihood assumes that there is some pattern... it's more that no theory from us will predict what's going to happen. However, before any of that, we don't know whether or not things can be predicted, and there may easily be methods that are better than others if nature does act in a uniform way. Expanding on the argument I made before, two scenarios are possible: One, if nature is ever unpredictable, then all forms of prediction are useless; Two, if nature is uniform, then it may be predictable in some way. In the first scenario, any direction we give ourselves, including the scientific method, is equally bad. In the second, our predictions may bear semblance to the natural laws, and it may turn out to be very useful to understand things. We may be in either scenario, and the best choice of scenario 2 is a choice in scenario 1. I can cover for the whole situation of choices best by opting for the Scientific Method, so I'm going to. Now, I honestly doubt that any sane person is going to choose to operate as if they're in scenario 1 unless you also tell me that it is just blind luck that people don't waltz in dangerous places, like the middle of an interstate. (I do have the infamous Liar Argument in reserve, so don't you make me take it out!)
You are putting forward pragmatic justification here, I understand what you are saying. What I am saying is that the position was anticipated and responded to in the essay itself.
The student said this:
Quote:
“Look,” you say a bit brusquely, “I see that Hume was right about our inability to prove that nature is uniform. But suppose that nature does play a trick on us, so to speak. Suppose that after all this time of appearing quite uniform, manifesting all sorts of regularities such as the laws of physics, she turns chaotic. Then there isn’t anything we can do anyhow. Someone might make a lucky guess about some future event, but there would be no systematic method for anticipating the chaos successfully. It seems to me I’ve got a way of predicting the future which will work if nature is uniform – the scientific method, or if you like, the inductive method – and if nature isn’t uniform, I’m out of luck whatever I do. It seems to me I’ve got everything to gain and nothing to lose (except a lot of hard work) if I attempt to adhere to the scientific approach. That seems good enough to me; what do you think?”
To which the Professor replied:
Quote:
“Your suggestion is a good one,” she replies, “but modern philosophers have found it surprisingly difficult to say precisely what type of statement can qualify as a possible law of nature. It is a law of nature, most physicists would agree, that no material objects travel faster than light; they would refuse to admit, as a law of nature, that no golden spheres are more than one mile in diameter. It is not easy to state clearly the basis for this distinction. Both statements are generalizations, and both are true to the best of our knowledge.”
“Isn’t the difference simply that you cannot, even in principle, accelerate a material object to the speed of light, while it is possible in principle to fabricate an enormous sphere of gold?”
“That is precisely the question at issue,” she replies. “The problem is, what basis do we have for claiming possibility in the one case and impossibility in the other. You seem to be saying that a law of nature prevents the one but not the other, which is obviously circular. And if you bring in the notion of causation – causing something to go faster than light vs. causing a large golden sphere to be created – you only compound the difficulty, for the concept of causation is itself a source of great perplexity.
So you see, even if you were to say that the Scientific Method is the best choice for all situations, you would have the problem of these scientific laws.
What would be the criterion of these laws? Certainly the criterion used now (inference based on past events) is rendered useless.
The position just runs into serious problems of begging the question, even if you avoid the problem of induction.
As for the last part of your post:
"Now, I honestly doubt that any sane person is going to choose to operate as if they're in scenario 1 unless you also tell me that it is just blind luck that people don't waltz in dangerous places, like the middle of an interstate. (I do have the infamous Liar Argument in reserve, so don't you make me take it out!)"
This may be so. In fact, most people would question the sanity of one who does not believe in an material world or even one who does not believe in free will, but the fact is, that they are at least as justified and perhaps more justified in denying these things as compared to one who accepts them.
It just strikes me as odd that some will come out and criticize religious belief for being questionable from a rational standpoint while some of the beliefs that they posit as a replacement (i.e. scientific method) suffer from serious challenges as well. I find some of the rigorous logical arguments for God, though still limited in some ways, to be much more rationally convincing than arguments in favor for the scientific method.
Still, I cannot help but think that if I walk out of a building window 3 stories above the ground, that I will fall down, despite the fact that I have no rational reason to do so. It's pure psychological habit. Of course, it is not too much of a problem for me, as I have accepted our irrationality in many areas.
One other beef I have with the scientific method which is much more relevant is Feyerabend's critique of the concept of a scientific method, but of course, that is for another topic...
Lets say we enter a universe and that we have no prior knowledge about it.
It has an equal chance of being uniform or chaotic.
In a chaotic universe all methods of inquiry are equal. Crystal Ball Gazing is as useful as using Science, both have the same use in predictions (which include technology). In the chaotic universe if you want to make TV transistors you have as much chance to do so by playing Tarots as silicon manufacture.
In the uniform universe, science seems to yield more results then crystal ball gazing.
So in the Chaotic universe the payoff is evens.
In the Uniform universe the payoff is very much in favour of science.
So on average science has a better payoff. It works as well as everything else in a chaotic universe and it out performs the rest in a uniform one.
Well, I guess it's about time that I learn relativity and the basis of scientific theory.~:sullen: (I.e., it's probably going to be a while before I have something that adresses that well enough.)
Lets say we enter a universe and that we have no prior knowledge about it.
It has an equal chance of being uniform or chaotic.
In a chaotic universe all methods of inquiry are equal. Crystal Ball Gazing is as useful as using Science, both have the same use in predictions (which include technology). In the chaotic universe if you want to make TV transistors you have as much chance to do so by playing Tarots as silicon manufacture.
In the uniform universe, science seems to yield more results then crystal ball gazing.
So in the Chaotic universe the payoff is evens.
In the Uniform universe the payoff is very much in favour of science.
So on average science has a better payoff. It works as well as everything else in a chaotic universe and it out performs the rest in a uniform one.
Pragmatic Justification.
I understand what you guys are saying, however, even if we were to use this argument, there would still be that touchy problem of what is the criterion for our scientific laws.
Okay you show me how the internet and all the devices that you use to connect weren't based on science but instead by the equivalent of tarot reading.
And yes it is Pascal's Wager applied to the idea that we may or may not be living in a universe where science can help us predict what will happen next...
BTW I did state science not scientific method...subtle nuance.
BTW I did state science not scientific method...subtle nuance.
This was the last part of your post, but I will address it first because of it's priority.
I am speaking of the scientific method, which is generally understood to be the foundation of "science" as we understand it today. I really have no wish to go over the meaning of "science" because it is a very broad term. Ghazali, who preceded Hume in the critique of causality, used to term the Sufism he espoused to be "the Science of the Heart".
Scientific laws and scientific theories are based on the scientific method, and that is my area of critique. As the adage goes, I am going for the head, without which the body would fall apart.
The scientific method is the epistemic base on which our scientific knowledge rests.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
Okay you show me how the internet and all the devices that you use to connect weren't based on science but instead by the equivalent of tarot reading.
You are using the "Science has given us good things" argument.
It's a good response. After all, I am indebted to science who made it possible for me to use the computer (of course, we could split hairs and say it was mechanics (hardware) and mathematics (software) who made it possible for me to use the computer, but I have no wish to do that at the moment).
However, there are some responses to this response (of course keeping in mind that this does not at all justify the reliability of the scientific method in the future).
I could also say that science has brought on a host of evils in this world. Terrifying and destructive weaponry and the risk to our privacy are two main examples that pop up, and I'm sure there are others.
Also, I could say that tarot cards give other benefits, separate from a material paradigm. Obviously, given the fact that psychics, fortune tellers, crystal ball gazers, astrologers, etc, have quite a large niche following, it is reasonable to conclude that they are deriving some benefit from these things. Perhaps it gives them peace of mind, comfort, happiness, a sense of control, etc.
In fact, the things that psychics, fortune tellers, crystal ball gazers, astrologers, etc, give to some people are more important to me than material goods (I don't personally derive any of those things from the above methods). I know I could live without a computer, a TV, a phone, or even electricity.
Lastly, I would bring up one of Feyerabend's main legs in his argument against a scientific method. The fact that scientific progress is usually made by going against the grain of the scientific method. Backing his thesis up with the examples of Copernicus and Galileo (figureheads of the Scientific Revolution and paragons of Scientific progress).
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
And yes it is Pascal's Wager applied to the idea that we may or may not be living in a universe where science can help us predict what will happen next...
I found it difficult to accept the Wager, which would ask me to believe in something despite the fact that they could give no evidence for it. I find psychological experience and cosmological/ontological proofs much more convincing than the Wager.
Given that, I simply cannot accept pragmatic justification either.
I have a question for you though:
Since you put forth this type of argumentation to justify your belief in the scientific method (or if you will, that science can help us predict what will happen next), what relevant difference stops you from accept the Wager and believing in God?
Lastly, I would bring up one of Feyerabend's main legs in his argument against a scientific method. The fact that scientific progress is usually made by going against the grain of the scientific method. Backing his thesis up with the examples of Copernicus and Galileo (figureheads of the Scientific Revolution and paragons of Scientific progress).
Well, if that's one of his main legs, he's going to fall over.
It's precisely by application of scientific method (making observations, formulating a theory, testing that theory to see if it fits more observations) that Copernicus and Galileo - most especially the latter - advanced science.
They didn't go against the grain of scientific method at all - their observations challenged the existing paradigm. To explain these observations, a new theory was proposed. Copernicus was unable to demonstrate his theory effectively because he hadn't got the necessary tools, so when Galileo used a telescope to make observations that supported Copernican theory, the advance became incontrovertible.
Pure science. Excellent science. Perhaps the worst possible example that your man could have chosen to refute the method.
To say that science has given us both bad and good things is a distraction. Science is neutral - men make the choice of how to apply scientific knowledge. The acquisition of that knowledge is subject to a method that has shown its worth many times over. If we had relied on theology as our method (to take one alternative) we would still be in the Dark Ages.
Is the method able to investigate all facets of the universe? - perhaps not.
But it is safe to say that we would be unlikely to labour under the threat of nuclear war if the alchemists had attempted to discover the atom by waving the Tower of God card and shouting bang impressively. :beam:
Well, if that's one of his main legs, he's going to fall over.
It's precisely by application of scientific method (making observations, formulating a theory, testing that theory to see if it fits more observations) that Copernicus and Galileo - most especially the latter - advanced science.
They didn't go against the grain of scientific method at all - their observations challenged the existing paradigm. To explain these observations, a new theory was proposed. Copernicus was unable to demonstrate his theory effectively because he hadn't got the necessary tools, so when Galileo used a telescope to make observations that supported Copernican theory, the advance became incontrovertible.
Pure science. Excellent science. Perhaps the worst possible example that your man could have chosen to refute the method.
Do not think you quite understand Banquo, and that is probably my fault in the way I phrased it.
Feyerabend preferred to use another – more famous – example from the history of science: Galileo's work on geostaticism. His reductio consisted in three stages, designed to critique naïve empiricism, Popper's falsificationism and Lakatos' Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes in turn – each being an instance of a rationalist approach to science (in the case of the latter two, the most common even today). For the first of these, he considered the famous Tower Argument, a circumstance relied upon by Aristotelians to discount the possibility of a moving Earth. Its proponents pointed to the fact that a stone dropped from a tower lands at its base. If the Earth was moving, as some supposed, the tower would move with it and hence the stone would drop some distance away. (A variant of the same argument stated that an arrow fired vertically into the air should fall far from the firer, since he or she would have moved along with the earth while the arrow was in flight.) This was an idea everyone could understand and hence served as a powerful refutation of the notion that the Earth moves.
It matters not at this stage whether Galileo was an empiricist or not: in order to undertake a reductio, we assume that he was and see what follows. What Galileo did was to accept the observations made by those who had tested this theory (that the stone falls at the base) and then appeal to a principle of relativity (often called Galilean relativity). He asked his readers to imagine two friends throwing a ball to each other while inside a cabin on a ship alongside and then the same situation while the ship was underway, considering whether more (or less) force would be required to throw the ball when the ship was moving. This was also a test that most people could understand and it helped him to explain that there was no difference because any motion of the ship would also be shared by the passengers. That is, whichever direction the ship moved in, the cabin would, too - along with everything inside it.
As a result of this discussion, Galileo was able to demonstrate that the very same "fact" used by the Tower Argument itself - the stone falling at the base - also supported the idea that the Earth was rotating, since any evidence that the geostaticist could appeal to would likewise support the alternative (this is actually an example of underdetermination by data and the theory-ladenness of observational terms). The naïve empiricist has no means of deciding between these two rival theories and hence any choice made by Galileo would violate this form of empiricism. If our methodology insists that only those decisions made on the basis of evidence can be called rational then Galileo and the Aristotelians alike were irrational to prefer geokineticism or geostaticism respectively. We are thus forced either to give up on calling Galileo's behaviour rational or else admit that naïve empiricism is inadequate.
Galileo did indeed not only go against the paradigm, but also the scientific method.
Same with Einstien. Progress once again, after going against the grain of the (or "a") scientific method.
Quote:
If we subscribe to the tenets of dogmatic falsificationism (or else advocate basing our acceptance and rejection of scientific theories on so-called decisive experiments) and suppose Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity to have been a step in the right direction with regard to gaining knowledge of our universe, we find that we run into a problem. Falsificationists do not dispute the historical account of 1905, in which the first response to Einstein's paper noted that his theory had already been refuted by Kaufman's experimental results, published in the Annalen der Physik in that year. The dogmatic falsificationist is thus forced to admit that Einstein should have dismissed his theory as falsified – which, of course, he did not. We are led to the unfortunate position of either arguing that Einstein was irrational (or mistaken, if we wish to be more charitable) in his refusal to give up the special theory (and moreover that we, as good falsificationists, would have rejected it, along with any consequences) – a demand we would probably call absurd – or else accepting that dogmatic falsificationism fails.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Banquo's Ghost
To say that science has given us both bad and good things is a distraction. Science is neutral - men make the choice of how to apply scientific knowledge. The acquisition of that knowledge is subject to a method that has shown its worth many times over. If we had relied on theology as our method (to take one alternative) we would still be in the Dark Ages.
The exact point of Feyerabend's work was to show that:
i) Science is not neutral (or objective).
ii) Science should really abandon it's claim to be the superior methodology for deriving knowledge.
I think your comment about theology basically makes his point. What criterion do you have for saying that the scientific method is "better" then theology. I think once you begin to answer that question, you will see the obvious circularity.
Like Salmon puts it:
Quote:
The Wednesday philosophy lecture begins with a sort of rhetorical question, “What reason do we have (Hume is, at bottom, asking) for trusting the scientific method; what grounds do we have for believing that scientific predictions are reliable?” You have been pondering that very question quite a bit in the last couple of days, and – rhetorical or not – your hand shoots up. You have a thing or two to say on the subject.
“Philosophers may have trouble answering such questions,” you assert, “but it seems to me there is an obvious reply. As my physics professor has often said, the scientist takes a very practical attitude. He puts forth a hypothesis; if it works he believes in it, and he continues to believe in it as long as it works. If it starts giving him bad predictions, he starts looking for another hypothesis, or for a way of revising his old one. Now the important thing about the scientific method, it seems to me, is that it works. Not only has it led to a vast amount of knowledge about the physical world, but it has been applied in all sorts of practical ways – though these applications may not have been uniformly beneficial – for better or worse they were successful. Not always, of course, but by and large. Astrology, crystal gazing, and other such superstitious methods simply do not work very well. That’s good enough for me.”
“That is, indeed, a very tempting answer,” Professor Philo replies, “and in one form or another, it has been advanced by several modern philosophers. But Hume actually answered that one himself. You might put it this way. We can all agree that science has, up till now, a very impressive record of success in predicting the future. The question we are asking, however, is this: should we predict that science will continue to have the kind of success it has had in the past? It is quite natural to assume that its record will continue, but this is just a case of applying the scientific method to itself. In studying conservation of momentum, you inferred that future experiments would have results similar to those of your past experiments; in appraising the scientific method, you are assuming that its future success will match its past success. But using the scientific method to judge the scientific method is circular reasoning. It is as if a man goes to a bank to cash a check. When the teller refuses, on the grounds that he does not know this man, the man replies, ‘That is no problem; permit me to introduce myself – I am John Smith, just as it says on the check.’
“Suppose that I were a believer in crystal gazing. You tell me that your method is better than mine because it has been more successful than mine. You say that this is a good reason for preferring your method to mine. I object. Since you are using your method to judge my method (as well as your method), I demand the right to use my method to evaluate yours. I gaze into my crystal ball and announce the result: from now on crystal gazing will be very successful in predicting the future, while the scientific method is due for a long run of bad luck.” You are about to protest, but she continues.
“The trouble with circular arguments is that they can be used to prove anything; if you assume what you are trying to prove, then there isn’t much difficulty in proving it. You find the scientific justification of the scientific method convincing because you already trust the scientific method; if you had equal trust in crystal gazing, I should think you would find the crystal gazer’s justification of his method equally convincing.
To Feyerabend, he certainly accepts the fact that the scientific method can bring results that other methodologies cannot, but it is equally obvious that the scientific method has serious limitations and cannot bring results that other methodologies can.
From this, he wonders why we can apply the scientific method to say, theology, but not the latter to the former?
I think he does a very good job of bringing the obvious circularity present when the scientific method is claimed to be superior to other methods.
Feyerabend essentially "exposes" Galileo (and naive inductionism) for being, essentially a con-artist. Galileo, according to Feyerabend, was irrational because he induced more than the facts would allow, and yet used persuasive rhetoric (which was more than any hard science he had), to sell his ideas.
OK, I had better read his book, because I think he is way off beam if that's his assertion. Some of Galileo's work was speculative, but demonstrating Copernicus was not. You can do it yourself on a few clear nights.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
The exact point of Feyerabend's work was to show that:
i) Science is not neutral (or objective).
ii) Science should really abandon it's claim to be the superior methodology for deriving knowledge.
I think your comment about theology basically makes his point. What criterion do you have for saying that the scientific method is "better" then theology? I think once you examine that question, you will see the circularity...
To Feyerabend, he certainly accepts the fact that the scientific method can bring results that other methodologies cannot, but it is equally obvious that the scientific method has serious limitations and cannot bring results that other methodologies can.
From this, he wonders why we can apply the scientific method to say, theology, but not the latter to the former?
I think he does a very good job of bringing the obvious circularity present when the scientific method is claimed to be superior to other methods.
Well, I can see the value in challenging accepted paradigms, but many, many other methods for advancing our knowledge have been tried and all found wanting save the scientific method.
It works, which is why its "superior." If Mr Feyerabend can show me another methodology that works as well or better for explaining the world and thereby being able to manipulate that world for advancement, I'm all ears. Maybe his book details how this computer works other than through scientific understandings.
For example, you ask for theology to be applied to science but what is the theological method? Which theology? Do I have to have a revelation of faith to be able to do this, or can I learn it independently and have others verify my conclusions?
Paul Feyerabend’s Against Method (originally published in 1975) is another one of those books I have been meaning to read for years, but never got around to before now. Feyerabend (1924-1994) was a philosopher of science, famous (or notorious) for his “epistemological anarchism,” his insistence that “the only principle” that can be justified for scientific research is that “anything goes.” I’ve turned to him now, partly out of my interest in science studies, and partly because I’m supposed to give a talk in a few months at a symposium on “foundations and methods in the humanities,” a task I am finding difficult because I have no belief in foundations, and little use for methodologies.
Feyerabend critiques and rejects the attempt — by philosophers of science, primarily, but also by popular apologists for science, and sometimes by scientists themselves — to establish norms and criteria to govern the way science works, and to establish what practices and results are valid for scientific research. Feyerabend’s particular target is Karl Popper’s doctrine of “falsification,” but more generally he opposes any a priori attempt to legislate what can and cannot be done in science.
Feyerabend’s argument is partly “deconstructive” (by which I mean he showed how rationalist arguments were necessarily internally inconsistent and incoherent — though he does not seem to have much use for Derridean deconstruction as a philosophy), and partly historical and sociological. He argues that actual scientific practice did not, does not, and indeed cannot, make use of the rationalist norms that philosophers of science, and ideologists of science, have proclaimed. He analyzes Galileo’s defense of heliocentrism at great length, and shows that Galileo’s arguments were riddled with non sequiturs, loose analogies, ad hoc assumptions, self-contradictory and easily falsifiable assertions, rhetorical grandstanding, and so on.The point is not to undermine Galileo, or to assert that there are no grounds for choosing between seeing the earth and the sun as the center. Rather, Feyerabend wants to show that such (disreputable) strategies were strictly necessary; without them, Copernicus and Galileo never could have overthrown the earth-centered view, which had both the theoretical knowledge and the “common sense” of their time, as well as the authority of the Church, on their side. It was not a matter of a “more accurate” theory displacing a less accurate one; but rather, a radical shift of paradigms, one which could only be accomplished by violently disrupting both accepted truths and accepted procedures. It is only in the hundreds of years after Galileo convinced the world of the heliocentric theory, that the empirical evidence backing up the theory was generated and catalogued.
Feyerabend is drawing, of course, on Thomas Kuhn’s work on “paradigm shifts,” but he is pushing it in a much more radical direction than Kuhn would accept. Kuhn distinguishes between “normal science,” when generally accepted research programs and paradigms are in place, and rationalistic criteria do in fact function, and times of crisis, when paradigms break down under the weight of accumulating anomalies, thus forcing scientists to cast about for a new paradigm. For Feyerabend, however, there is no “normal science.” There was no crisis, or weight of anomalies, that forced Copernicus and then Galileo to cast about for a new astronomical paradigm; it would be more to the point to say that Galileo deliberately and artificially created a crisis, in order to undermine a paradigm that was generally accepted and that worked well, and put in its place a new paradigm that he supported more out of passion and intuition than out of anything like solid empirical evidence. Because “facts” are never independent of social contexts and theoretical assumptions, Galileo could not have provoked a shift in the theoretical assumptions of his time merely by appealing to what were understood then as the “facts.”
Such an argument was quite shocking in 1975. It has become much less so in the years since, as rhetorical theorists, sociologists, and others in “science studies” have studied in great depth the way science actually works, and have contested many other instances of (capital-S) Science and (capital-R) Reason on historical and sociological grounds.
There remains a subtle but important difference, however, between Feyerabend and more recent science studies historians and thinkers like Bruno Latour, Stephen Shapin, Steve Fuller, and many others. Feyerabend justifies his “epistemological anarchism” on the ground that it is necessary for the actual, successful practice of science, and indeed for the “progress” of science — though he explicitly refuses (page 18) to define what he means by “progress.”What this means is that Feyerabend opposes methodological norms and fixed principles of validation largely on pragmatic grounds : which I do not think is quite true of Latour et al. Where Latour sees a long process of negotiation, and a “settlement,” between Pasteur and the bacilli he was studying, Feyerabend doesn’t see Galileo (or Einstein, for that matter) in engaging in any such process vis-a-vis the earth, or the sun, or the universe. Instead, he sees them as blithely ignoring rules of evidence and of verification or falsification, in order to impose radically new perspectives (less upon the world than upon their own cultures). Galileo’s and Einstein’s justification is that their proposals indeed worked, and were accepted; this is what separates them from crackpots, though no criteria existed that could have assured these successes in advance.
What I don’t see enough of in contemporary science studies — though one finds it in Deleuze and Guattari, in Isabelle Stengers, and in the work of my friend Richard Doyle — is Feyerabend’s sense of the kinship between scientific and aesthetic creativity, in that both are engaged in creating the very criteria according to which they will be judged.
More generally, Feyerabend, like Latour and other more recent science studies thinkers, is deeply concerned with democracy, and with the way that the imperialism of Big Science threatens democracy by trying to decree that its Way is the Only Way. Indeed, one probably sees more of this threat today — in the “science wars” that reached a flash point in the mid 1990s, but that are still smouldering, in the popularization of science, and in the pronouncements of biologists like Richard Dawkins and Edward O. Wilson, and physicists like Steven Weinberg and Alan Sokal — than one did when Feyerabend was writing Against Method. But Feyerabend wisely refuses to get lost (as I fear Latour does at times) in the attempt to propose an alternative “settlement” or “constitution” to the one that Big Science has proclaimed for itself. Feyerabend’s genial anarchism, pluralism, and “relativism” (a term he accepts, but only in certain carefully outlined contexts) simply precludes the need for any single alternative account, such as the one Latour struggles to provide. Finally, for Feyerabend, there is no such thing as Science; we should rather speak of the sciences, as a multitude of often conflicting and contradictory practices, none of which can pretend to ultimate authority, and all of which have to be judged and dealt with according to a range of needs, interests, and contexts.
Pluralism is often derided as wishy-washy, wimpy, “soft,” unwilling to take a stand. None of this is true of Feyerabend’s pluralism, though I am not sure how much of his exemption from such charges is due to the rigor of his arguments, and how much to the charm of his rhetorical style — he’s an engaging, inviting, and unaffected writer, able to be clear and focused without becoming simplistic, and able to argue complexly without becoming abstruse. Of course, the attempt to separate logical rigor from stylistic effects is precisely the sort of pseudo-rational distinction that Feyerabend is continually warning us against.
I know some of my posts are convoluted, so I'm just going to clarify some things:
i) I think it's basically uncontroversial that so far, the scientific method (very broadly and generally) has been the one of the better methodologies when it comes to knowledge about the material world (theology is really a different game altogether as it is unconcerned about this).
ii) That being said, I also think it quite clear that we have no reason to believe that the scientific method will be a good method in the future. In fact, I would say that holding that belief is clearly irrational.
iii) I also think that the current criterion for what is a scientific law is quite arbitrary and confused.
iv) I do have suspicions on whether the scientific method actually inhibits progress in some ways (if Galileo and Einstein had followed the scientific method, they would have to reject their conclusions).
I know some of my posts are convoluted, so I'm just going to clarify some things:
i) I think it's basically uncontroversial that so far, the scientific method (very broadly and generally) has been the one of the better methodologies when it comes to knowledge about the material world (theology is really a different game altogether as it is unconcerned about this).
ii) That being said, I also think it quite clear that we have no reason to believe that the scientific method will be a good method in the future. In fact, I would say that holding that belief is clearly irrational.
iii) I also think that the current criterion for what is a scientific law is quite arbitrary and confused.
iv) I do have suspicions on whether the scientific method actually inhibits progress in some ways (if Galileo and Einstein had followed the scientific method, they would have to reject their conclusions).
And in fact therefore, we agree in the main. Point iv might have some life in it, because it tends to expect that the formulator of a theorem must also then gain all the observations necessary to prove it - which is actually more of a problem for Darwin and Copernicus say, than for the two noted - but the role of inspiration or intuition in the formulation of theory is not disputed, by me at least.
I'm still not getting how necessary being could in any way be construed as proof of a perfect being.
Agreed, and furthermore, one may ask: what is a perfect being? Something that a certain person thinks is perfect? Something that everybody thinks is perfect, assuming all people think the same thing is perfection? Something that is perfect - but perfect in what aspect? An optimally fast algorithm for computing the sum of a list of numbers is perfect in the aspect of being fast, but that doesn't make it a God. Perfection is a partially defined word which requires an extra attribute explaining in which aspect are we checking perfection/optimality. To say "God is perfect" contains about as little information as when a little child says "I'm the best". Best in what aspect? Perfect in what/which aspect/aspects? The even more interesting case is when someone says: "but we are just humans, so we can't know what perfection is, only God can know that". Well, if we don't know what perfection is, we certainly can't prove the existence of something that is perfect. It would be like trying to prove that there exists something that is "fdastfdsfg". What is "fdastfdsfg", you may ask. I answer: we can't know what fdastfdsfg is, only the being that is fdastfdsfg can know what it is, but I have proven that fdastfdsfg exists because it is more fdastfdsfg if it exists than if it doesn't exist. :rolleyes:
I haven't really seen a reason for why Einstein's relativity wouldn't fall in the scientific method, just some claims that it doesn't...
Short answer - Falsification
Quote:
If we subscribe to the tenets of dogmatic falsificationism (or else advocate basing our acceptance and rejection of scientific theories on so-called decisive experiments) and suppose Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity to have been a step in the right direction with regard to gaining knowledge of our universe, we find that we run into a problem. Falsificationists do not dispute the historical account of 1905, in which the first response to Einstein's paper noted that his theory had already been refuted by Kaufman's experimental results, published in the Annalen der Physik in that year. The dogmatic falsificationist is thus forced to admit that Einstein should have dismissed his theory as falsified – which, of course, he did not. We are led to the unfortunate position of either arguing that Einstein was irrational (or mistaken, if we wish to be more charitable) in his refusal to give up the special theory (and moreover that we, as good falsificationists, would have rejected it, along with any consequences) – a demand we would probably call absurd – or else accepting that dogmatic falsificationism fails.
Alright then, I see the problem... and it's a pretty big one. Namely, why explain it with limiting the speed of light, and not something else? I'll try to come up w/ another definition, or understanding that I don't have now. Wish me luck.:laugh4:
This was the last part of your post, but I will address it first because of it's priority.
I am speaking of the scientific method, which is generally understood to be the foundation of "science" as we understand it today. I really have no wish to go over the meaning of "science" because it is a very broad term. Ghazali, who preceded Hume in the critique of causality, used to term the Sufism he espoused to be "the Science of the Heart".
Scientific laws and scientific theories are based on the scientific method, and that is my area of critique. As the adage goes, I am going for the head, without which the body would fall apart.
The scientific method is the epistemic base on which our scientific knowledge rests.
Like Democracy, find me a better system and I will employ it.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
You are using the "Science has given us good things" argument.
It's a good response. After all, I am indebted to science who made it possible for me to use the computer (of course, we could split hairs and say it was mechanics (hardware) and mathematics (software) who made it possible for me to use the computer, but I have no wish to do that at the moment).
However, there are some responses to this response (of course keeping in mind that this does not at all justify the reliability of the scientific method in the future).
I could also say that science has brought on a host of evils in this world. Terrifying and destructive weaponry and the risk to our privacy are two main examples that pop up, and I'm sure there are others.
Actually I am using the "Science has given us the ability to understand the world around us, and hence the ability to employ technology be they good or bad"... or more blithely "Science has led us to things". Good or Bad, science has helped us to achieve things that other ways have not.
I don't think the employment of technology disproves science. Having nuclear weapons does not disprove the scientific method. The onus is on you to show how other ways could have done it, and more accurately you have to show which way is equal to or superior in understanding the (physical) world around us.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
Also, I could say that tarot cards give other benefits, separate from a material paradigm. Obviously, given the fact that psychics, fortune tellers, crystal ball gazers, astrologers, etc, have quite a large niche following, it is reasonable to conclude that they are deriving some benefit from these things. Perhaps it gives them peace of mind, comfort, happiness, a sense of control, etc.
In fact, the things that psychics, fortune tellers, crystal ball gazers, astrologers, etc, give to some people are more important to me than material goods (I don't personally derive any of those things from the above methods). I know I could live without a computer, a TV, a phone, or even electricity.
Staying in ones comfort zone isn't science. Nor does sheer numbers make an argument or a model for our world correct. Science isn't a democracy, reality is not decided in a vote... their might be the most popular flavoured theory of the moment, but that is a fault in the human group think. A good scientist needs to test their ideas and be prepared to be wrong.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
Lastly, I would bring up one of Feyerabend's main legs in his argument against a scientific method. The fact that scientific progress is usually made by going against the grain of the scientific method. Backing his thesis up with the examples of Copernicus and Galileo (figureheads of the Scientific Revolution and paragons of Scientific progress).
Actually it is done by going against not the scientific method (even Feyerabend's examples don't show that the scientific method is wrong, just the group think of scientists), progress is often done by exploring the edge...which often includes re-examing past dogma and seeing if it is correct, hence progress can be found by going against the communities group think. Feyerabend's examples show the scientist using the scientific method to disprove the group think in the scientific community.
A more careful consideration of Feyerabend's technique beyond the slavering slave sequences yields that the scientific community and bad scientists are often at fault and the the scientific method when properly employed is a useful way of lifting the veil of ignorance.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
I found it difficult to accept the Wager, which would ask me to believe in something despite the fact that they could give no evidence for it. I find psychological experience and cosmological/ontological proofs much more convincing than the Wager.
Given that, I simply cannot accept pragmatic justification either.
I have a question for you though:
Since you put forth this type of argumentation to justify your belief in the scientific method (or if you will, that science can help us predict what will happen next), what relevant difference stops you from accept the Wager and believing in God?
Testability.
Every time I spill coffee on myself my lack of physical coordination, the sequence verifies gravity.
Every time as the hot coffee scolds my crotch and I utter His name in vain, I'm not turned into a pillar of salt, disproves Him. ;)
Like Democracy, find me a better system and I will employ it.
The entire point is that the we have as good of a reason to believe that the scientific method will be reliable in the future as any other method (i.e we have no reason either way)...
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
Actually I am using the "Science has given us the ability to understand the world around us, and hence the ability to employ technology be they good or bad"... or more blithely "Science has led us to things". Good or Bad, science has helped us to achieve things that other ways have not.
I don't think the employment of technology disproves science. Having nuclear weapons does not disprove the scientific method. The onus is on you to show how other ways could have done it, and more accurately you have to show which way is equal to or superior in understanding the (physical) world around us.
I don't think I ever claimed employment of technology disproves science or nukes disproves the nuclear method. I claimed that for advances in technology made possible by science, there was both good and bad. I affirmed that science did indeed lead to advances in technology.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
Staying in ones comfort zone isn't science. Nor does sheer numbers make an argument or a model for our world correct. Science isn't a democracy, reality is not decided in a vote... their might be the most popular flavoured theory of the moment, but that is a fault in the human group think. A good scientist needs to test their ideas and be prepared to be wrong.
These points are irrelevant at hand. If one is going to attempt to justify the scientific method by point out "good" things it has given us, one must know that other methodologies also give "good" things as well.
I stated that we could not justify our beliefs of the reliability of scientific laws/scientific theories/scientific method's in the future.
You basically stated:
"Okay you show me how the internet and all the devices that you use to connect weren't based on science but instead by the equivalent of tarot reading."
I took that as you appealing to science's success in the past. Now, it's clear to me that no matter how successful science has been in the past concerning our knowledge of the material world, we have no rational justification to think it will be successful in the future.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
Actually it is done by going against not the scientific method (even Feyerabend's examples don't show that the scientific method is wrong, just the group think of scientists), progress is often done by exploring the edge...which often includes re-examing past dogma and seeing if it is correct, hence progress can be found by going against the communities group think. Feyerabend's examples show the scientist using the scientific method to disprove the group think in the scientific community.
A more careful consideration of Feyerabend's technique beyond the slavering slave sequences yields that the scientific community and bad scientists are often at fault and the the scientific method when properly employed is a useful way of lifting the veil of ignorance.
I'm afraid this is a misunderstanding of Feyerabend. He seems to conclude himself that any attempt at methodology in science constricts knowledge, not that "the scientific method when properly employed is a useful way of lifting the veil of ignorance".
In fact, if you'll examine what Feyerabend suggested about science in schools, you will see that your interpretation cannot be a correct interpretation of Feyerabend's conclusion:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Stanford Enclyclopedia of Philosophy
Feyerabend saw himself as having undermined the arguments for science's privileged position within culture, and much of his later work was a critique of the position of science within Western societies. Because there is no scientific method, we can't justify science as the best way of acquiring knowledge. And the results of science don't prove its excellence, since these results have often depended on the presence of non-scientific elements, science prevails only because “the show has been rigged in its favour” (SFS, p. 102), and other traditions, despite their achievements, have never been given a chance. The truth, he suggests, is that
science is much closer to myth than a scientific philosophy is prepared to admit. It is one of the many forms of thought that have been developed by man, and not necessarily the best. It is conspicuous, noisy, and impudent, but it is inherently superior only for those who have already decided in favour of a certain ideology, or who have accepted it without ever having examined its advantages and its limits (AM, p. 295).
The separation of church and state should therefore be supplemented by the separation of science and state, in order for us to achieve the humanity we are capable of. Setting up the ideal of a free society as “a society in which all traditions have equal rights and equal access to the centres of power” (SFS, p. 9), Feyerabend argues that science is a threat to democracy. To defend society against science we should place science under democratic control and be intensely sceptical about scientific “experts”, consulting them only if they are controlled democratically by juries of laypeople.
(bold emphasis mine)
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
Testability.
Every time I spill coffee on myself my lack of physical coordination, the sequence verifies gravity.
Every time as the hot coffee scolds my crotch and I utter His name in vain, I'm not turned into a pillar of salt, disproves Him. ;)
Now this statement makes me wonder if I've just been talking past you the entire time... :wall:
You are essentially saying that because up to this point, the coffee, when spilled, falls on your lap, then gravity is verified.
OK, but how does this apply to the future?
The entire point of Salmon is to show that we have no rational justification to believe that scientific laws/theories will hold up in the future at all.
This is the problem of induction, and is a serious (currently fatal) problem for scientific laws and theories.
The entire point is that the we have as good of a reason to believe that the scientific method will be reliable in the future as any other method (i.e we have no reason either way)...
If one method leads to models with a 99% accuracy and another has 1 in 12 track history... you would say both are as reliable in the future.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
I don't think I ever claimed employment of technology disproves science or nukes disproves the nuclear method. I claimed that for advances in technology made possible by science, there was both good and bad. I affirmed that science did indeed lead to advances in technology.
So, doesn't that prove that the science method works in some way...
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
These points are irrelevant at hand. If one is going to attempt to justify the scientific method by point out "good" things it has given us, one must know that other methodologies also give "good" things as well.
The weight of achievements in the physical world is weighted towards those of science above those of alchemy.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
I stated that we could not justify our beliefs of the reliability of scientific laws/scientific theories/scientific method's in the future.
You basically stated:
"Okay you show me how the internet and all the devices that you use to connect weren't based on science but instead by the equivalent of tarot reading."
I took that as you appealing to science's success in the past. Now, it's clear to me that no matter how successful science has been in the past concerning our knowledge of the material world, we have no rational justification to think it will be successful in the future.
Show me that there is no link between past and future and you have a case.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
I'm afraid this is a misunderstanding of Feyerabend. He seems to conclude himself that any attempt at methodology in science constricts knowledge, not that "the scientific method when properly employed is a useful way of lifting the veil of ignorance".
In fact, if you'll examine what Feyerabend suggested about science in schools, you will see that your interpretation cannot be a correct interpretation of Feyerabend's conclusion:
You see, I was a good little scientist and didn't take what was at face value. I read some of his work and found what he said didn't hold up to what he tried to achieve nor the group think that has sprung about it:
====
Quote:
Originally Posted by Feyerabend
Science, on the other hand, is characterised by an essential scepticism; 'when failures start to come thick and fast, defence of the theory switches inexorably to attack on it'.' This is possible because of the 'openness' of the scientific enterprise, because of the pluralism of ideas it contains and also because whatever defies or fails to fit into the established category system is not something horrifying, to be isolated or expelled. On the contrary, it is an intriguing 'phenomenon' - a starting-point and a challenge for the invention of new classifications and new theories. We can see that Horton has read his Popper well. A field study of science itself shows a very different picture.
Such a study reveals that, while some scientists may proceed as described, the great majority follow a different path. Scepticism is at a minimum; it is directed against the view of the opposition and against minor ramifications of one's own basic ideas, never against the basic ideas themselves.
This is the point where he switches from scientific method, to look at the scientists. He goes and shows how what they do is wrong.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Feyerabend
]Attacking the basic ideas evokes taboo reactions which are no weaker than are the taboo reactions in so-called "primitive societies." Basic beliefs are protected by this reaction as well as by secondary elaborations, as we have seen, and whatever fails to fit into the established category system or is said to be incompatible with this system is either viewed as something quite horrifying or, more frequently, it is simply declared to be non-existent.
Yeap, in agreement scientists can be bad when they commit to group think.
Then still not able to do more then say that some scientists are not critical enough he goes on to a broad slander attack:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Feyerabend
We need not fear that such a separation will lead to a breakdown of technology. There will always be people who prefer being scientists to being the masters of their fate and who gladly submit to the meanest kind of (intellectual and institutional) slavery provided they are paid well and provided also there are some people around who examine their work and sing their praise. Greece developed and progressed because it could rely on the services of unwilling slaves. We shall develop and progress with the help of the numerous willing slaves in universities and laboratories who provide us with pills, gas, electricity, atom bombs, frozen dinners and, occasionally, with a few interesting fairy-tales. We shall treat these slaves well, we shall even listen to them, for they have occasionally some interesting stories to tell, but we shall not permit them to impose their ideology on our children in the guise of 'progressive' theories of education. We shall not permit them to teach the fancies of science as if they were the only factual statements in existence. This separation of science and state may be our only chance to overcome the hectic barbarism of our scientific-technical age and to achieve a humanity we are capable of, but have never fully realised. Let us, therefore, in conclusion review the arguments that can be adduced for such a procedure.
Wow, can't get enough proof he attacks the people that use the method. :laugh4: Still hasn't actually disproved the method. Just debased himself.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Feyerabend
The image of 20th-century science in the minds of scientists and laymen is determined by technological miracles such as colour television, the moon shots, the infra-red oven, as well as by a somewhat vague but still quite influential rumour, or fairy-tale, concerning the manner in which these miracles are produced.
According to the fairy-tale the success of science is the result of a subtle, but carefully balanced combination of inventiveness and control. Scientists have ideas. And they have special methods for improving ideas. The theories of science have passed the test of method. They give a better account of the world than ideas which have not passed the test.
Again can't disprove it with evidence, so sweep it under the carpet by calling the methods used rumour, fairy-tales and miracles.
No actual substantive disproving of the scientific method. Just name calling of scientists who use it and pointing out how it is often incorrectly used.
====
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
Now this statement makes me wonder if I've just been talking past you the entire time... :wall:
You are essentially saying that because up to this point, the coffee, when spilled, falls on your lap, then gravity is verified.
OK, but how does this apply to the future?
Again prove that there is no link between past and future and you may, just may have a sense of justification. If you can show that just because a 6 sided dice has always in the past rolled a number from 1 to 6 that there is no way to state it won't roll a twelve in the future then do so... or transform into a handsome prince.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
The entire point of Salmon is to show that we have no rational justification to believe that scientific laws/theories will hold up in the future at all.
This is the problem of induction, and is a serious (currently fatal) problem for scientific laws and theories.
As above, show the disconnection between past and future and you may have a point.
You've seen the sun rise in the morning for a good chunk of time correct?
Based on the fact that the sun has risen in the past, does it follow that the sun will rise tomorrow?
The answer is no. There is no logical reason for it to do so.
You may say:
"Ah, but I believe the sun will rise tomorrow, not because of the fact that it has risen in the past, but because it is a scientific law".
I will reply:
"The law is a generalization based on the fact that the sun has risen in the past".
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
You see, I was a good little scientist and didn't take what was at face value. I read some of his work and found what he said didn't hold up to what he tried to achieve nor the group think that has sprung about it:
You bring up certain quotes where Feyerabend attacks scientists for their groupthink, dogmatism, and hypocrisy, and say that he is only able to attack them, and not the scientific method.
You say he is unable to "disprove" the scientific method, and now we have a disconnect.
Feyerabend is not trying to "disprove" the scientific method so he can replace it with another methodology, he is trying to show that a scientific "method" itself hinders progress and should be done away with.
I find it hard to believe that someone who had read his work would not see the epistemological anarchism he advocates (and he advocates very little, preferring to criticize).
I find it hard to believe that someone who had read his work would have missed his examples of Galielo and Einstien of how exactly the scientific method hampers progress.
After all, Einstein would have had to reject his theory if he had stuck by the scientific method and it's falsification clause. Feyerabend makes sure to include that.
Quote:
If we subscribe to the tenets of dogmatic falsificationism (or else advocate basing our acceptance and rejection of scientific theories on so-called decisive experiments) and suppose Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity to have been a step in the right direction with regard to gaining knowledge of our universe, we find that we run into a problem. Falsificationists do not dispute the historical account of 1905, in which the first response to Einstein's paper noted that his theory had already been refuted by Kaufman's experimental results, published in the Annalen der Physik in that year. The dogmatic falsificationist is thus forced to admit that Einstein should have dismissed his theory as falsified – which, of course, he did not. We are led to the unfortunate position of either arguing that Einstein was irrational (or mistaken, if we wish to be more charitable) in his refusal to give up the special theory (and moreover that we, as good falsificationists, would have rejected it, along with any consequences) – a demand we would probably call absurd – or else accepting that dogmatic falsificationism fails.
By the way, Feyerabend was quite caustic and rude to those he disagreed with, true, kind of like how you are to Feyerabend... :wink:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
Again prove that there is no link between past and future and you may, just may have a sense of justification. If you can show that just because a 6 sided dice has always in the past rolled a number from 1 to 6 that there is no way to state it won't roll a twelve in the future then do so... or transform into a handsome prince.
Done.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
As above, show the disconnection between past and future and you may have a point.
Done.
It is not me who has a point. It is rationality...
You've seen the sun rise in the morning for a good chunk of time correct?
Based on the fact that the sun has risen in the past, does it follow that the sun will rise tomorrow?
The answer is no. There is no logical reason for it to do so.
You may say:
"Ah, but I believe the sun will rise tomorrow, not because of the fact that it has risen in the past, but because it is a scientific law".
I will reply:
"The law is a generalization based on the fact that the sun has risen in the past".
Actually the Sun doesn't rise... so we have a disjunction in the discourse.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
You bring up certain quotes where Feyerabend attacks scientists for their groupthink, dogmatism, and hypocrisy, and say that he is only able to attack them, and not the scientific method.
You say he is unable to "disprove" the scientific method, and now we have a disconnect.
Feyerabend is not trying to "disprove" the scientific method so he can replace it with another methodology, he is trying to show that a scientific "method" itself hinders progress and should be done away with.
I find it hard to believe that someone who had read his work would not see the epistemological anarchism he advocates (and he advocates very little, preferring to criticize).
I think he assumes that the scientific method is the only tool of science. He makes a few assumptions and if tested they fall not true.
For instance:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Feyerabend
The questions reach their polemical aim only if one assumes that the results of science which no one will deny have arisen without any help from non-scientific elements, and that they cannot be improved by an admixture of such elements either. 'Unscientific' procedures such as the herbal lore of witches and cunning men, the astronomy of mystics, the treatment of the ill in primitive societies are totally without merit. Science alone gives us a useful astronomy, an effective medicine, a trustworthy technology.
Science uses the knowledge of others, but goes and tests it. For instance a lot of chemistry is based on the knowledge from Alchemy that has been tested by the scientific method, and this is taught at school and undergrad level. Herbal lore is used by drug manufacturers (there is even a movie with Sean Connery about that very detail), elements of astrology were used as knowledge for astronomy. Read Guns, Germs and Steel and you will see how a scientist uses local 'primitive' societies to help gather information about flora and fauna... to the point that he is in awe about their wealth of information.
So that paragraph is patently untrue.
Look at the uncertainty principle and look at the influence of eastern mysticism on some of the ideas seen in quantum physics.
Scientists don't reject other ideas out of hand. They will test them, use them as is, refine them, or use them as inspiration. Science is about understanding the laws of nature, no reason for a good scientist to cut themselves off from those who live closest to it.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Feyerabend
I find it hard to believe that someone who had read his work would have missed his examples of Galielo and Einstien of how exactly the scientific method hampers progress.
After all, Einstein would have had to reject his theory if he had stuck by the scientific method and it's falsification clause. Feyerabend makes sure to include that.
Incorrect, G's and E's theories were both tested using SM. The group think of the time may have not liked it, but empirical testing proved otherwise.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Feyerabend
By the way, Feyerabend was quite caustic and rude to those he disagreed with, true, kind of like how you are to Feyerabend... :wink:
If I didn't respect him, I would have rejected him out of hand. His insights are good even if his conclusions are in my experience incorrect.
I won't let you evade the point so easily though...
Now, you asked me to show you that there is no link between the past and future (in the context of our discussion).
I was first going to simply reply that it is you who needs to show me that there is a necessary link between the past and future concerning the uniformity of nature as it is one of the assumptions of all scientific laws.
However, I decided to go ahead and show you that there is certainly no necessary link anyway (using the sun example).
I will use another example now (it follows the exact same pattern):
Whenever I have in the past, broken into art galleries, I proceeded to drop the fine crystal vases on exhibit (after I raided the vending machines for my Twix).
Everytime in the past, I have seen the crystal vases fall downward and break when I drop them.
Now, I’m planning another hit tomorrow as I heard they got some new Twix (old ones were getting stale) and new vases from Polynesia.
I want to drop and break the vases again.
Now, based (and only based) on the fact that they have fallen down and broken in the past, does it follow that they will fall downward and break if I drop them tomorrow?
The answer is of course, no. There is nothing that necessitates them falling downward and breaking just because they have done so in the past. I have no reason to believe that the vases will fall downward and break tomorrow. If I do believe that, it will be irrational.
Now, you may reply: “Ah, but our belief that the vase will fall downward and break if dropped is not based on the fact that it has happened in the past, it is because of the law of gravity”.
I will respond: “The law of gravity is simply a generalization based on the fact that things have fallen downward in the past when dropped".
Here is the central problem of scientific laws, scientific theories, and scientific predictions.
The entire Salmon article is on this point.
That article is simply wonderful, as it states the problem, and all the possible replies to the problem, as well as the replies to those replies.
In the end, Salmon (Professor Philo) is forced to admit that there is no solution (yet) to the problem raised by Hume (which is another reason that article is great because he is so intellectually honest :smiley:).
*********
Now to Feyerabend (who is making a completely distinct point from anything we have discussed above).
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
I think he assumes that the scientific method is the only tool of science. He makes a few assumptions and if tested they fall not true.
I don’t think it is him who assumes that the scientific method is the only tool of science, I think it is the scientists he criticizes who do that…
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
For example:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Feyerabend
The questions reach their polemical aim only if one assumes that the results of science which no one will deny have arisen without any help from non-scientific elements, and that they cannot be improved by an admixture of such elements either. 'Unscientific' procedures such as the herbal lore of witches and cunning men, the astronomy of mystics, the treatment of the ill in primitive societies are totally without merit. Science alone gives us a useful astronomy, an effective medicine, a trustworthy technology.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
Science uses the knowledge of others, but goes and tests it. For instance a lot of chemistry is based on the knowledge from Alchemy that has been tested by the scientific method, and this is taught at school and undergrad level. Herbal lore is used by drug manufacturers (there is even a movie with Sean Connery about that very detail), elements of astrology were used as knowledge for astronomy. Read Guns, Germs and Steel and you will see how a scientist uses local 'primitive' societies to help gather information about flora and fauna... to the point that he is in awe about their wealth of information.
So that paragraph is patently untrue.
Look at the uncertainty principle and look at the influence of eastern mysticism on some of the ideas seen in quantum physics.
Scientists don't reject other ideas out of hand. They will test them, use them as is, refine them, or use them as inspiration. Science is about understanding the laws of nature, no reason for a good scientist to cut themselves off from those who live closest to it.
I think you need to look a bit more closely at what Feyerabend is saying. On this point, I think you and him are just talking past each other…
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
Incorrect, G's and E's theories were both tested using SM. The group think of the time may have not liked it, but empirical testing proved otherwise.
You have simply restated you conclusion, provided no argument for it, and ignored my argument against it.
If Einstein was following the scientific method, he would have to declare his theory as falsified. He did not. Einstein ignored the issue of falsification and pushed his theory ahead anyway.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
If I didn't respect him, I would have rejected him out of hand. His insights are good even if his conclusions are in my experience incorrect.
You would reject him if you didn’t respect him? I don’t have respect for some people, but I would not reject their arguments if they were valid.
Besides, it’s kinda hard to to get the vibe that you don’t respect him given your previous posts concerning him.
Anyway, I think his insights are good, if a bit too radical, but not incorrect. He has certainly shown (me) that following the scientific method will hamper progress using the paragon cases of Einstein and Galileo to back him up no less.
Anyway, I think his insights are good, if a bit too radical, but not incorrect. He has certainly shown (me) that following the scientific method will hamper progress using the paragon cases of Einstein and Galileo to back him up no less.
The great thing about philosophy is that it can discuss very silly ideas and seem relevant. :stupido2:
The last question I have for you, esteemed Reenk (and I've learned a lot here, even if I dispute the conclusions) is:
Will your pal's insights still be good for you next morning?* :wink3:
*Let's assume, for the argument's sake, the sun does indeed come up tomorrow. Indulge me.
What chance would you assign to seeing the sun as the earth rotates?
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
I won't let you evade the point so easily though...
Now, you asked me to show you that there is no link between the past and future (in the context of our discussion).
I was first going to simply reply that it is you who needs to show me that there is a necessary link between the past and future concerning the uniformity of nature as it is one of the assumptions of all scientific laws.
You have to disprove it. You cannot play word games and whoosh there disappears a set of laws. The link between past and future is the same as the link between one location and another. You will have to disprove the existence of space if you want to disprove time.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
However, I decided to go ahead and show you that there is certainly no necessary link anyway (using the sun example).
I will use another example now (it follows the exact same pattern):
Whenever I have in the past, broken into art galleries, I proceeded to drop the fine crystal vases on exhibit (after I raided the vending machines for my Twix).
Everytime in the past, I have seen the crystal vases fall downward and break when I drop them.
Now, I’m planning another hit tomorrow as I heard they got some new Twix (old ones were getting stale) and new vases from Polynesia.
I want to drop and break the vases again.
Now, based (and only based) on the fact that they have fallen down and broken in the past, does it follow that they will fall downward and break if I drop them tomorrow?
The answer is of course, no. There is nothing that necessitates them falling downward and breaking just because they have done so in the past. I have no reason to believe that the vases will fall downward and break tomorrow. If I do believe that, it will be irrational.
Actually the link would be the number of times the vase have broken divided by the number of times the vase has dropped. And to be really conservative you would add one to the denominator.
So if you had done 6 twix runs and destroyed 6 vases. I would assign at least a 6 out of 7 chance that you would break the 7th vase on the 7th run.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
Now, you may reply: “Ah, but our belief that the vase will fall downward and break if dropped is not based on the fact that it has happened in the past, it is because of the law of gravity”.
I will respond: “The law of gravity is simply a generalization based on the fact that things have fallen downward in the past when dropped".
Here is the central problem of scientific laws, scientific theories, and scientific predictions.
Sorry I fail to see the problem. There only is one if you can show that time does not exist.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
The entire Salmon article is on this point.
That article is simply wonderful, as it states the problem, and all the possible replies to the problem, as well as the replies to those replies.
In the end, Salmon (Professor Philo) is forced to admit that there is no solution (yet) to the problem raised by Hume (which is another reason that article is great because he is so intellectually honest :smiley:).
Couple of pages into Salmon's article. There is a point I would like to raise, if he is correct then what use is his ideas... wouldn't all ideas have zero ability in predicting the future... including his own... so wouldn't it be self annulling?
*********
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
Now to Feyerabend (who is making a completely distinct point from anything we have discussed above).
I don’t think it is him who assumes that the scientific method is the only tool of science, I think it is the scientists he criticizes who do that…
Yet as a student of science I have seen that there is more to science then just the method. A healthy injection of humour and self reflection is needed. One needs to be flexible. And like poker you have to understand the correct context in which to use it. What he criticizes is (bad) scientists. He does not successfully disprove the SM, he just shows that some scientists are not using their full faculties. He criticizes quite soundly poor scientists, he doesn't look at the wider field of good, knowledgeable scientists. He disproves SM by using guilt by association... the guilt of being associated with people who don't use the method very well.
The equivalent of this would be going: Look formula one drivers cars can't function because learners have accidents in their cars. Yes some car drivers have problems driving cars, this is not the cars, it is the drivers.
Blaming the tool and not the user is not a valid disproof.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
I think you need to look a bit more closely at what Feyerabend is saying. On this point, I think you and him are just talking past each other…
No, I think not. He states that science is exclusive and ignores all other formats of knowledge. I show very quickly that science does use other forms of knowledge. Simply put he is not talking past me, he is wrong.
Also I find it ironic and amusing that he refers to 'primitive' societies... primitive in what aspect?
Different DNA? No
No Language? No
No Social Rules? No
No social customs, mythologies or religion? No
Oh the big difference is :drummer: toolsets. Wow calling a society more primitive because your own has more technology which is derived from what?
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
You have simply restated you conclusion, provided no argument for it, and ignored my argument against it.
If Einstein was following the scientific method, he would have to declare his theory as falsified. He did not. Einstein ignored the issue of falsification and pushed his theory ahead anyway.
I think you will have to show proof of this before I have to disprove it. If his theory has been show to be falsified that should be an easily enough thing to properly reference. I don't think I have to create the proof of the disprove to this to then disprove it. Apologies to Yes, Minister.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
You would reject him if you didn’t respect him? I don’t have respect for some people, but I would not reject their arguments if they were valid.
Besides, it’s kinda hard to to get the vibe that you don’t respect him given your previous posts concerning him.
If I thought he was an out and out idiot I would be far more gentle with my comments. An intelligent person who makes such claims will have his remarks dealt with in a more stringent and caustic manner, particularly when the most he comes up with is obfuscation and misdirection.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
Anyway, I think his insights are good, if a bit too radical, but not incorrect. He has certainly shown (me) that following the scientific method will hamper progress using the paragon cases of Einstein and Galileo to back him up no less.c
I really do think he is misrepresenting these scenarios. He shows that the establishment was wrong he their beliefs, he doesn't be any means prove that the scientific method doesn't work nor does he come close to proving it is a fairy tale. Very much a man with an agenda finding bits of data to fit it.
The great thing about philosophy is that it can discuss very silly ideas and seem relevant. :stupido2:
The last question I have for you, esteemed Reenk (and I've learned a lot here, even if I dispute the conclusions) is:
Will your pal's insights still be good for you next morning?* :wink3:
*Let's assume, for the argument's sake, the sun does indeed come up tomorrow. Indulge me.
Banquo, it is I who should be addressing you as esteemed... :bow:
As to your question, it is an interesting one.
Are you speaking of his insights in the broad sense, or his concept of epistemological and methodological anarchism?
I would say that as long as his insights avoid the problem of induction, they are fine.
I guess you could say that any method, is equally doomed to having no way to predict the future if it relies on observations of regularities in the past. Be it scientific laws or crystal ball predictions...
By the way, I already assume that the sun will come up tomorrow. I just don't have any pretensions of it being a rational assumption... :wink:
What chance would you assign to seeing the sun as the earth rotates?
I have no rational reason to believe the earth will continue to rotate in the future. Chance and probability don't matter.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
You have to disprove it. You cannot play word games and whoosh there disappears a set of laws. The link between past and future is the same as the link between one location and another. You will have to disprove the existence of space if you want to disprove time.
Actually, the principle of the uniformity of nature is a key assumption in scientific laws. That means that proponents of scientific laws must show why we should hold it.
However, I have already shown that it does not follow ("disprove"/"prove" are the wrong words to use) rationally.
Even if things have always fell downward in the past when dropped, there is no rational reason to conclude that they will fall down in the future, as it does not follow. The arguments form is invalid. An invalid argument cannot be sound. Unsound arguments are not convincing.
No word games there, just basic logic...
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
Actually the link would be the number of times the vase have broken divided by the number of times the vase has dropped. And to be really conservative you would add one to the denominator.
So if you had done 6 twix runs and destroyed 6 vases. I would assign at least a 6 out of 7 chance that you would break the 7th vase on the 7th run.
No, you are saying that there is an inferential link between the past occurrences and what will happen in the future. That argument form is invalid.
To show how mistaken your probability example is, say you have flipped a coin 6 times and it has shown up heads 6 times. There still remains a 50/50 chance for heads on the next flip, not a 6/7 chance.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
Sorry I fail to see the problem. There only is one if you can show that time does not exist.
I have stated it above (form invalid), and no, it is not only a problem if time does not exist. How did you come to that conclusion?
Reading the Salmon article, or better yet, Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding may clear the problem up...
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
Couple of pages into Salmon's article. There is a point I would like to raise, if he is correct then what use is his ideas... wouldn't all ideas have zero ability in predicting the future... including his own... so wouldn't it be self annulling?
No. Only methods that rely on the inductive reasoning abovementioned would run into that problem. That is why he says that scientific laws have as good of a chance as predicting the future as blind guessing.
Salmon does not propose an alternative method (indeed, he is sympathetic to the scientific method).
*********
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
Yet as a student of science I have seen that there is more to science then just the method. A healthy injection of humour and self reflection is needed. One needs to be flexible. And like poker you have to understand the correct context in which to use it. What he criticizes is (bad) scientists. He does not successfully disprove the SM, he just shows that some scientists are not using their full faculties. He criticizes quite soundly poor scientists, he doesn't look at the wider field of good, knowledgeable scientists. He disproves SM by using guilt by association... the guilt of being associated with people who don't use the method very well.
The equivalent of this would be going: Look formula one drivers cars can't function because learners have accidents in their cars. Yes some car drivers have problems driving cars, this is not the cars, it is the drivers.
Blaming the tool and not the user is not a valid disproof.
Feyerabend in his introduction (where all the excerpts you quoted come from) does not really get into the problems of the scientific method just yet. You are right that he criticizes bad science and their supercilious attitude towards "nonscientific" methods. His critique of the scientific method is later on in his book. It is not in the introduction or conclusion.
His critiques of the scientific method are not the "guilt by association" type, but rather by the reductio ad absurdum type.
I have pointed out some examples he brings up (Galileo, Einstien).
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
No, I think not. He states that science is exclusive and ignores all other formats of knowledge. I show very quickly that science does use other forms of knowledge. Simply put he is not talking past me, he is wrong.
No, now I see that you are not talking past him (nor him you) but rather you have completely misinterpreted him.
Feyerabend also shows that science relies on other forms of knowledge. He only criticizes the attitude of closed minded scientists. If you had read carefully, you would see this:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Feyerabend
The questions reach their polemical aim only if one assumes that the results of science which no one will deny have arisen without any help from non-scientific elements, and that they cannot be improved by an admixture of such elements either. 'Unscientific' procedures such as the herbal lore of witches and cunning men, the astronomy of mystics, the treatment of the ill in primitive societies are totally without merit. Science alone gives us a useful astronomy, an effective medicine, a trustworthy technology.
This is what you quoted to make your point. If you had read the next few lines down, you would have seen this:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Feyerabend
One must also ' assume that science owes its success to the correct method and not merely to a lucky accident. It was not a fortunate cosmological guess that led to progress, but the correct and cosmologically neutral handling of data. These are the assumptions we must make to give the questions the polemical force they are supposed to have. Not a single one of them stands up to closer examination.
Modern astronomy started with the attempt of Copernicus to adapt the old ideas of Philolaos to the needs of astronomical predictions. Philolaos was not a precise scientist, he was a muddle-headed Pythagorean, as we have seen, and the consequences of his doctrine were called 'incredibly ridiculous' by a professional astronomer such as Ptolemy. Even Galileo, who had the much improved Copernican version of Philolaos before him, says: 'There is no limit to my astonishment when I reflect that Aristarchus and Copernicus were able to make reason to conquer sense that, in defiance of the latter, the former became mistress of their belief' (Dialogue, 328). 'Sense' here refers to the experiences which Aristotle and others had used to show that the earth must be at rest. The 'reason' which Copernicus opposes to their arguments is the very mystical reason of Philolaos combined with an equally mystical faith ('mystical' from the point of view of today's rationalists) in the fundamental character of circular motion. I have shown that modern astronomy and modern dynamics could not have advanced without this unscientific use of antediluvian ideas.
While astronomy profited from Pythagoreanism and from the Platonic love for circles, medicine profited from herbalism, from the psychology, the metaphysics, the physiology of witches, midwives, cunning men, wandering druggists. It is well known that 16th- and 17th-century medicine while theoretically hypertrophic was quite helpless in the face of disease (and stayed that way for a long time after the 'scientific revolution'). Innovators such as Paracelsus fell back on the earlier ideas and improved medicine. Everywhere science is enriched by unscientific methods and unscientific results, while procedures which have often been regarded as essential parts of science are quietly suspended or circumvented.
The process is not restricted to the early history of modern science. It is not merely a consequence of the primitive state of the sciences of the 16th and 17th centuries. Even today science can and does profit from an admixture of unscientific ingredients. An example which was discussed above, in Chapter 4, is the revival of traditional medicine in Communist China. When the Communists in the fifties forced hospitals and medical schools to teach the ideas and the methods contained in the Yellow Emperor's Textbook of Internal Medicine and to use them in the treatment of patients, many Western experts (among them Eccles, one of the 'Popperian Knights') were aghast and predicted the downfall of Chinese medicine. What happened was the exact opposite. Acupuncture, moxibustion, pulse diagnosis have led to new insights, new methods of treatment, new problems both for the Western and for the Chinese physician.
And those who do not like to see the state meddling in scientific matters should remember the sizeable chauvinism of science: for most scientists the slogan 'freedom for science' means the freedom to indoctrinate not only those who have joined them, but the rest of society as well. Of course - not every mixture of scientific and non-scientific elements is successful (example: Lysenko). But science is not always successful either. If mixtures are to be avoided because they occasionally misfire, then pure science (if there is such a thing) must be avoided as well. (It is not the interference of the state that is objectionable in the Lysenko case, but the totalitarian interference that kills the opponent instead of letting him go his own way.)
Combining this observation with the insight that science has no special method, we arrive at the result that the separation of science and non-science is not only artificial but also detrimental to the advancement of knowledge. If we want to understand nature, if we want to master our physical surroundings, then we must use all ideas, all methods, and not 'just a small selection of them. The assertion, however, that there is no knowledge outside science - extra scientiam nulla salus - is nothing but another and most convenient fairy-tale. Primitive tribes have more detailed classifications of animals and plants than contemporary scientific zoology and botany, they know remedies whose effectiveness astounds physicians (while the pharmaceutical industry already smells here a new source of income), they have means of influencing their fellow men which science for a long time regarded as non-existent (Voodoo), they solve difficult problems in ways which are still not quite understood (building of the pyramids; Polynesian travels), there existed a highly developed and internationally known astronomy in the old Stone Age, this astronomy was factually adequate as well as emotionally satisfying, it solved both physical and social problems (one cannot say the same about modern astronomy) and it was tested in very simple and ingenious ways (stone observatories in England and in the South Pacific; astronomical schools in Polynesia - for a more detailed treatment and references concerning all these assertions c.f. my Einführung in die Naturphilosophie). There was the domestication of animals, the invention of rotating agriculture, new types of plants were bred and kept pure by careful avoidance of cross fertilisation, we have chemical inventions, we have a most amazing art that can compare with the best achievements of the present. True, there were no collective excursions to the moon, but single individuals, disregarding great dangers to their soul and their sanity, rose from sphere to sphere to sphere until they finally faced God himself in all His splendour while others changed into animals and back into humans again. At all times man approached his surroundings w' h wide open senses and a fertile intelligence, at all times he made incredible discoveries, at all times we can learn from his ideas.
Look at what he is saying. All your allegations against him are false, and it is probably because of misinterpretation.
Do you actually have his book (Against Method) or were you getting select quotes off the internet? If it is the latter, I can see why this happened.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
Also I find it ironic and amusing that he refers to 'primitive' societies... primitive in what aspect?
Different DNA? No
No Language? No
No Social Rules? No
No social customs, mythologies or religion? No
Oh the big difference is :drummer: toolsets. Wow calling a society more primitive because your own has more technology which is derived from what?
Again, read above. I would find it hard to believe Feyerabend, such a critic of Western imperialism and such a relativist would hold those views. The irony is right, as if he had held those views (which he clearly did not) it would kinda be contradictory to what he was saying...
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
I think you will have to show proof of this before I have to disprove it. If his theory has been show to be falsified that should be an easily enough thing to properly reference. I don't think I have to create the proof of the disprove to this to then disprove it. Apologies to Yes, Minister.
There is a well documented experiment by Kaufman published in the Annalen der Physik in 1905 (contemporary with Einstein's theory).
The very first response to Einstein's paper noted that results by the experiment had already falsified Einstein's theory.
Had Einstein been a good boy following the scientific method, he would have discarded his theory as falsified.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
If I thought he was an out and out idiot I would be far more gentle with my comments. An intelligent person who makes such claims will have his remarks dealt with in a more stringent and caustic manner, particularly when the most he comes up with is obfuscation and misdirection.
I really do think he is misrepresenting these scenarios. He shows that the establishment was wrong he their beliefs, he doesn't be any means prove that the scientific method doesn't work nor does he come close to proving it is a fairy tale. Very much a man with an agenda finding bits of data to fit it.
We have to backtrack significantly due to the misinterpretation, so I will leave personal opinions on Feyerabend and his views for the moment.
Reenk Roink. Regarding Feyerabend's example regarding Einstein's special relativity. The scientific method specifically says that in order for a hypothesis to be correct, multiple different scientists must perform the experiment multiple times and reach the same results before the hypothesis has a chance of being deemed true. Walter Kaufmann's experiments does seem that it disproved Eistein''s theories, but it was just one experiment and have not been properly analyzed by other scientists. Planck would later analyze Kaufmann's findings and find that the Lorentz theory would more accurately describe the electric field of the electrons from the data of kaufman's experiments which would support Einstein's theory. Further experiments done by Bestelmeyer, Bucherer, and Neumann that were replicas of those done by Kaufman would find that they were all inconclusive or in support of Lorentz which was contrary to what Kaufman's experiment suggested. Kaufman only had a couple of experiments not confirmed by anyone else which in reality should have made Einstein challenge the validity of.
Furthermore, even if several scientists had found results similar to those of Kaufman, the scientific method generally states that all hypothesis and theories are subject to disproof which means that one such as Einstein could have still pondered on special relativity.
Reenk Roink. Regarding Feyerabend's example regarding Einstein's special relativity. The scientific method specifically says that in order for a hypothesis to be correct, multiple different scientists must perform the experiment multiple times and reach the same results before the hypothesis has a chance of being deemed true. Walter Kaufmann's experiments does seem that it disproved Eistein''s theories, but it was just one experiment and have not been properly analyzed by other scientists. Planck would later analyze Kaufmann's findings and find that the Lorentz theory would more accurately describe the electric field of the electrons from the data of kaufman's experiments which would support Einstein's theory. Further experiments done by Bestelmeyer, Bucherer, and Neumann that were replicas of those done by Kaufman would find that they were all inconclusive or in support of Lorentz which was contrary to what Kaufman's experiment suggested. Kaufman only had a couple of experiments not confirmed by anyone else which in reality should have made Einstein challenge the validity of.
Furthermore, even if several scientists had found results similar to those of Kaufman, the scientific method generally states that all hypothesis and theories are subject to disproof which means that one such as Einstein could have still pondered on special relativity.
This is not what Popper's dogmatic falsificationism claims (the Einstein example of Feyerabend was specifically directed at the Popper's falsificationist horn of the scientific method, Feyerabend uses other examples to pick at other aspects of the method (i.e Galileo and naive inductionsim)).
Besides, at that time, Kaufman's experiments were verified by some others, including the person who wrote the first response to Einstein's paper...
I have no rational reason to believe the earth will continue to rotate in the future. Chance and probability don't matter.
Actually they possibly matter more then logic. ~;)
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
Even if things have always fell downward in the past when dropped, there is no rational reason to conclude that they will fall down in the future, as it does not follow. The arguments form is invalid. An invalid argument cannot be sound. Unsound arguments are not convincing.
No word games there, just basic logic...
No, you are saying that there is an inferential link between the past occurrences and what will happen in the future. That argument form is invalid.
I think this is were your understanding of nature is falling down. You have to disprove space to disprove time... they are essentially the same thing.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
To show how mistaken your probability example is, say you have flipped a coin 6 times and it has shown up heads 6 times. There still remains a 50/50 chance for heads on the next flip, not a 6/7 chance.
Incorrect. Total tests on vases 6, total time broken 6. Therefore on the 7th attempt a conservative chance of 6/7 of breaking.
Coins, previous tests over the long term have determined that a coin is true and has a 50/50 chance of being heads or tails. It has been heads the last 6 times. It has a 50/50 chance of being a head on the next throw.
Two different probability sets.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Reenk Roink
I have stated it above (form invalid), and no, it is not only a problem if time does not exist. How did you come to that conclusion?
Reading the Salmon article, or better yet, Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding may clear the problem up...
No. Only methods that rely on the inductive reasoning abovementioned would run into that problem. That is why he says that scientific laws have as good of a chance as predicting the future as blind guessing.
Salmon does not propose an alternative method (indeed, he is sympathetic to the scientific method).
I'm reading it.
I will leave most of Mr F for another day... except one point. Disproving a theory... a disproof has to be repeatable. That is why Einstein still stands, the 'disproof' of it was not found to be valid. This is similar to the guys who published cold fusion... no one could repeat what they did, so it was considered invalid.
Actually they possibly matter more then logic. ~;)
OK, this statement makes me suspect that you are just not getting the problem of induction at all. You are just continuing to assume that which is called into question, and irrelevantly adding probability to the mix.
Before I proceed with addressing your statements, I will try one more time to make this clear.
The problem of induction is an issue looking at the relation between inductive reasoning and empirical facts.
It is a serious problem for those who accept the inductive method (very critical to the broader scientific method) as a good and reliable way to obtain knowledge.
This Britannica short on the topic puts it succinctly:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Encyclopedia Britannica
induction, problem of:
Problem of justifying the inductive inference from the observed to the unobserved.
It was given its classic formulation by David Hume, who noted that such inferences typically rely on the assumption that the future will resemble the past, or on the assumption that events of a certain type are necessarily connected, via a relation of causation, to events of another type.
(1) If we were asked why we believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, we would say that in the past the Earth turned on its axis every 24 hours (more or less), and that there is a uniformity in nature that guarantees that such events always happen in the same way. But how do we know that nature is uniform in this sense? We might answer that, in the past, nature has always exhibited this kind of uniformity, and so it will continue to be uniform in the future. But this inference is justified only if we assume that the future must resemble the past. How do we justify this assumption? We might say that in the past, the future turned out to resemble the past, and so in the future, the future will again turn out to resemble the past. The inference is obviously circular: it succeeds only by tacitly assuming what it sets out to prove, namely that the future will resemble the past.
(2) If we are asked why we believe we will feel heat when we approach a fire, we would say that fire causes heat—i.e., there is a “necessary connection” between fire and heat, such that whenever one occurs, the other must follow. But, Hume asks, what is this “necessary connection”? Do we observe it when we see the fire or feel the heat? If not, what evidence do we have that it exists? All we have is our observation, in the past, of a “constant conjunction” of instances of fire being followed by instances of heat. This observation does not show that, in the future, instances of fire will continue to be followed by instances of heat; to say that it does is to assume that the future must resemble the past. But if our observation is consistent with the possibility that fire may not be followed by heat in the future, then it cannot show that there is a necessary connection between the two that makes heat follow fire whenever fire occurs.
Thus we are not justified in believing that:
(1) the sun will rise tomorrow or that
(2) we will feel heat when we approach a fire.
It is important to note that Hume did not deny that he or anyone else formed beliefs about the future on the basis of induction; he denied only that we could know with certainty that these beliefs are true. Philosophers have responded to the problem of induction in a variety of ways, though none has gained wide acceptance.
Scientific laws and theories are built upon the very kind of inductive reasoning that is seriously (and as of right now, fatally) called into question. The very scientific method operates on this form of inductive reasoning.
I have not seen one convincing response to the problem of induction, though there have been many attempts.
Salmon does a great job of stating many of the responses, but he also (disappointingly) shows that these response are not going to cut it.
So...
This is why when asked questions like:
"Don't you believe that the sun will rise tomorrow?"
"Don't you believe that if you drop something it will fall downwards?"
I will have to reply:
"Well, technically, I believe them, though I have absolutely no reason to do so; they are irrational beliefs".
I will have to dismiss all scientific laws and scientific theories based on this inductive method as irrational.
I will have to dismiss all scientific predictions based on these laws and theories as irrational (even though I still may personally believe that I will fall downward if I jump off a cliff).
So if someone is criticizing someone else for being irrational in his faith of God while touting that the law of universal gravitation is the way to go, I will be forced to say:
"Hey man, it is actually you who holds the considerably irrational belief, as while arguments for God may have limitations (mainly in their difficulty of proving a sectarian God), the modern forms of the Modal Ontological Argument and the Kalam Cosmological Argument are much stronger than any response to the problem of induction".
"His belief is sounder than yours".
So now to your statements:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
Actually they possibly matter more then logic. ~;)
No, chance/probability don't matter at all in this discussion*.
*There is an attempted response to the problem of induction using Baysean probability, but it is not the chance/probability you were talking about at all.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
I think this is were your understanding of nature is falling down. You have to disprove space to disprove time... they are essentially the same thing.
No. See above.
By the way, I have no idea where you are pulling this "disprove space"/"disprove time" thing from. :huh:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
Incorrect. Total tests on vases 6, total time broken 6. Therefore on the 7th attempt a conservative chance of 6/7 of breaking.
Coins, previous tests over the long term have determined that a coin is true and has a 50/50 chance of being heads or tails. It has been heads the last 6 times. It has a 50/50 chance of being a head on the next throw.
Two different probability sets.
You are assuming uniformity of nature, thus begging the question. Adding probability does nothing to remedy that.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
I will leave most of Mr F for another day... except one point. Disproving a theory... a disproof has to be repeatable. That is why Einstein still stands, the 'disproof' of it was not found to be valid. This is similar to the guys who published cold fusion... no one could repeat what they did, so it was considered invalid.
You actually have to read his book to avoid misunderstandings like before.
As to the Einstien/Galileo examples, there is much more analysis in the book itself that I have omitted. Feyerabend obviously has a good grasp of scientific theories and the history of science. I think, even though you may disagree, you will find it an interesting read. I did (this coming from a guy who hates reading and reads less than 10% of books assigned in school).
Howdy, Sorry for the delay. I was engaged in making a better Fatlington, but now I'm dead. :skull:
Below I've put my earlier statements along with your comments/questions so you may recall.
Quote:
Originally Posted by me
Feedback systems do not posit spontaneous generation or ex nihilo postures.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
[student mode]Don't they show that a Contingent Being is the same effect and cause...so how does that play out on the idea that a thing cannot be its own cause? [/student mode]
No, they do not. A feedback system first requires a system. This means the larger operata that allow any looping of energy to commence in the first place. A simple example would be a water clock: without the mechanic of the clock the water can't be about its business to tell me the time. This alone indicates a prior causative. There is also the issue of the X that is being looped. Whether water or electricity or whatever, there is that T1 point from which the operation begins that leads to the feedback.
Quote:
Originally Posted by me
Freewill is concerned with moral responsibility and comes into play when looking at deterministic systems. It is an ethical consideration. The focus here is formally epistemological as far as atheism is the issue and ontology when looking at my proof.
Quote:
[student mode]If I have freewill doesn't that freewill require that I make those choices internally without an external force pushing them on me. Hence my decisions (effect) are from my own freewill (cause) so as a Contingent Being I am the cause and effect. Or do we split the I Contingent Being: Human into Contingent Being: Freewill (cause) and Contingent Being: Decision (effect) [/student mode]
You are mixing categories which will lead to confusion. Even so, any free will schema requires space for the agent to choose and be amenable for that choice. That is correct. However, the effect of that choice extends beyond any choosing alone. For example, if I pull the trigger and take down grandma: my choice to pull the trigger at T1 is distinct from grandma's injury and/or death at T2 though they are casually linked.
As far as a simple logical posture: any effect is necessarily subsequent to its cause.
Quote:
Originally Posted by me
No, it does not. Heisenberg would shudder at the thought. Virtual particles do not help on this issue.
Quote:
Virtual Particles:
a) Spontaneously generate
b) Out of nothing
Nor is nature limited to just these instances. Where does thermodynamics, nuclear decay and quantum theory (and the foreshadowed uncertainty principle) have on spontaneous generation?
Virtual particles do not spontaneously generate out of nothing. Look at Feynman again. Virtual particle is an unfortunate name as it leads people to think such are actual and distinct things. This is an error. The dynamic or process where virtual particles are meaningful is necessarily tied to a prior extant.
Regarding thermodynamics, nuclear decay, and quantum theory: have nothing on spontaneous generation. Each involves things that then undergo a process.
I looked over the exchanges you've had with Roink. I don't think you understand the issue. Science is part of the Rational Tradition. This means it appeals to rationality. Rationality is logic. The logical basis of Science is induction. What Feyerabend, Kuhn and Hume before them are about is that by looking at the logical structure of Science, its inductive method, certain issues arise regarding epistemic claims. This same issue came to the fore when Vico went after Descartes.
Because the arguments are formal (dealing with the structure of the knowledge claim), pragmatic retorts do not address the critique.
If the philosophers believe this, then why don't they live their lives as if they do?
At least scientists and religious followers (and some are both) live their lives according to their thought systems. A lot of them die following these idealogies.
But I find that there is a large gap between what these philosophers say and what they do.
If they truly believe that there is no connection between past, present and future laws of nature then why haven't we seen a mass lemming like extinction in the past of philosophers testing their theories?
For instance if there is no link between what has happened in the past and future, why don't we see them testing it by playing Russian roulette with automatic pistols, parachuting without the parachute, embracing crystal healing in equal abundance to chemotherapy etc etc
The biggest assumption that I can see in what Salmon writes is that Iff the universe becomes chaotic then the laws of science won't predict the future. True change the game and the rules change. Rather childlike in its simplicity. The issue I have, is that I neither see any evidence that the game has changed, and no reason to play the game as if the rules of the universe are about to change. Nor do I see those who tout it, play the game of life as if the rules of the universe are about to change. That leaves me wondering how true they are or if they truely believe it why they don't live like it? Truly their is a gap between what they derive and what they do. And the most important question is why?
If the philosophers believe this, then why don't they live their lives as if they do?
At least scientists and religious followers (and some are both) live their lives according to their thought systems. A lot of them die following these idealogies.
But I find that there is a large gap between what these philosophers say and what they do.
If they truly believe that there is no connection between past, present and future laws of nature then why haven't we seen a mass lemming like extinction in the past of philosophers testing their theories?
For instance if there is no link between what has happened in the past and future, why don't we see them testing it by playing Russian roulette with automatic pistols, parachuting without the parachute, embracing crystal healing in equal abundance to chemotherapy etc etc
Question has already been answered by Hume (and it's in the Salmon article):
Psychological habit.
Even so, it is recognized that it is not rational...
Oh, just to tell you, Feyerabend used to see a healer instead of go to the hospital. He advocated teaching voodoo among other things. He used to jump out of a window after giving his lecture (1st story). Very eccentric man...
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
The biggest assumption that I can see in what Salmon writes is that Iff the universe becomes chaotic then the laws of science won't predict the future. True change the game and the rules change. Rather childlike in its simplicity.
Why would you call it "childlike"? Do you even have an answer to it?
Some of the greatest minds have tried to tangle with the problem and have not gotten far.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
The issue I have, is that I neither see any evidence that the game has changed, and no reason to play the game as if the rules of the universe are about to change. Nor do I see those who tout it, play the game of life as if the rules of the universe are about to change. That leaves me wondering how true they are or if they truely believe it why they don't live like it? Truly their is a gap between what they derive and what they do. And the most important question is why?
There no evidence to say that the game won't change. That's the point. The skeptical argument is not proposing an alternative, it is questioning our assumption.
Also, just by looking at the number of innovative attempts to bypass this problem, one can tell that people don't like the problem. Professor Philo is disappointed when he has to tell the student that the proposed solution doesn't work.
Yet all of the stuff you have said, Papewaio, doesn't put a dent in the problem of induction...
If the philosophers believe this, then why don't they live their lives as if they do?
But I find that there is a large gap between what these philosophers say and what they do.
If they truly believe that there is no connection between past, present and future laws of nature then why haven't we seen a mass lemming like extinction in the past of philosophers testing their theories?
I don't understand the above. If 'philosophers' believe that induction has inherit epistemic limits then why don't they live their lives like they believe this? Is this meant as a retort that induction doesn't have limits? If not, then I don't see the value. Are you wanting to argue that sacrificing one's life for a thing makes that thing more true or valid?
One other thing to note: philosophy is theoretical, not practical: theoria not praxis.
Quote:
For instance if there is no link between what has happened in the past and future, why don't we see them testing it by playing Russian roulette with automatic pistols, parachuting without the parachute, embracing crystal healing in equal abundance to chemotherapy etc etc
To point out the limits of a thing does not in itself mean a rejection of that thing.
