Countries greatest military mess-ups

From Great Britain to Ancient China to Modern France, what are the greatest military mess-ups in history.

The first that comes to mind is the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

After 3 days of fighting CIA trained refugees were defeated by Eastern Bloc trained and equipped Cuban forces.



Operation Market Garden

The plan to end WW2 by Christmas met with terrible disaster due to bad intelligence and miscommunication.


And


The Charge of the Light Brigade during the Crimean war.

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Originally Posted by Wikipedia

The Charge of the Light Brigade was a charge of British cavalry led by Lord Cardigan against Russian forces during the Battle of Balaclava on 25 October 1854 in the Crimean War. It is best remembered as the subject of the poem "The Charge of the Light Brigade" by Alfred, Lord Tennyson, whose lines have made the charge a symbol of warfare at both its most courageous and its most tragic.

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So what are some of histories major military bungles.

Battle of Cannae from Roman side.

hitler invading russia and not conquering britian.

carthage not supplying hannibal.

Market Garden was a risky operation where mistakes did play a role, but we should not forget the fast response and sheer tenacity of the German forces. It was actually very close so IMO I would not consider Market Garden to have been decided mainly by "bad intelligence and miscommunication"

And I certainly don't agree about Cannae. The Romans showed they had learned from past battles against Hannibal. They increased the chances for their biggest asset, the infantry breaking through the center, and limited Hannibal's strength, his cavalry and use of trickery.

But facing Hannibal was not easy as he could adapt and take risks when needed. Sometimes you do your best and still lose and that IMO cannot be considered a screw up.

If I am to stay within the two eras I would consider Trebia: A Roman commander being provoked into sending his army out on an empty stomach on a cold day and having them cross a river in the process. He had no reason to act like that except for being an impetuous and arrogant man.

Montgomery not taking Antwerp/Scheldt when he had the chance: obsessed with lack of supplies and wanting to do a quick rush to the Rhine, but halting instead of clearing out the Scheldt to open up Antwerp with its huge cargo handling capacity. A fantasy of an attack towards Berlin meant he overlooked what was right in front of him: the biggest harbor in Western Europe and German forces that could be trapped and eliminated.

Market Garden was no blunder military you were betrayed by our beloved royal family who were kind enough to tip off the Germans.

http://www.amazon.com/Someone-Blunde.../dp/0713450088 <-- fun read (not about what's said above)

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Originally Posted by Fragony

Market Garden was no blunder military you were betrayed by our beloved royal family who were kind enough to tip off the Germans.

http://www.amazon.com/Someone-Blunde.../dp/0713450088 <-- fun read (not about what's said above)

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Does the book claim the Dutch Royal family leaked info to the Germans? If that is the case I'm quite certain it is incorrect. A Dutch collaborator (Cristiaan Lindemans) does appear to have leaked info but apparently it was rather vague as he only mentioned Eindhoven.

Most the ones I can think off the top of my head have been mentioned so I'll give one from my own country. It's not a world shaking military mess up but other national movements did take note, many Indians especially saw that if the imperial centre could not hold then outlying regions must be vulnerable too.

Britain messed up during 1916 here in Ireland, they wanted to appear firm so General Maxwell started shooting people pretty much straight away, and of course all sorts of people were arrested (in fact more were arrested than took part).

However the overreaction to the rising in Dublin was out of all proportion to it's size and people were turned away from a mild sympathy to the British position to outright hostility. (it did not help that Britain declared martial law suspending democracy)

Finally they shot all the signatories of the 1916 proclamation bar Dev and he ended up kicking them out less than six years later, after what had seemed complete and utter defeat.(takes a special kind of incompetence on the British side to achieve that)

General Maxwell effectively lost Ireland single handed and his superiors agreed he was promoted to a dead end in York and quietly forgotten about.



I just thought of one although It's technically a political misscalculation the Khwarezmian Empire had no need to annoy Ghengis khan by killing one of his ambassadors and degrading the other two, that turned out pretty bad for the Shah in the end.

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Originally Posted by CBR

Does the book claim the Dutch Royal family leaked info to the Germans? If that is the case I'm quite certain it is incorrect. A Dutch collaborator (Cristiaan Lindemans) does appear to have leaked info but apparently it was rather vague as he only mentioned Eindhoven.

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Said the book isn't about it, it's just a book about military fail.

Bernard Lippe-Biesterfelt was a spy, yes. When teh tommies were already gushing over the idea the Germans were already at it and send in their more able troops, ones we had there so far only worked on our fields they were mere reservists, The ones you got to fight weren't, they were hauled in.

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Originally Posted by Fragony

Said the book isn't about it, it's just a book about military fail.

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You did indeed :bow:

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Bernard Lippe-Biesterfelt was a spy, yes. When teh tommies were already gushing over the idea the Germans were already at it and send in their more able troops, ones we had there so far only worked on our fields they were mere reservists, The ones you got to fight weren't, they were hauled in.

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Is there any actual evidence or is it just second guessing? The II SS corps moved into the area before the Market-Garden order was issued by Montgomery. The 9th SS division was actually preparing to send off men and equipment to Germany. That does not sound like the Germans knew much.

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Originally Posted by CBR

You did indeed :bow:


Is there any actual evidence or is it just second guessing? The II SS corps moved into the area before the Market-Garden order was issued by Montgomery. The 9th SS division was actually preparing to send off men and equipment to Germany. That does not sound like the Germans knew much.

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You are wrong they knew everything, why do you think they were there. It i'sn't exactly a secret that Lippe was nazi, as for evidence, very circumstantial. Lots of it.

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Originally Posted by CBR

Is there any actual evidence or is it just second guessing? The II SS corps moved into the area before the Market-Garden order was issued by Montgomery. The 9th SS division was actually preparing to send off men and equipment to Germany. That does not sound like the Germans knew much.

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And Model at first thought it was a mission to abduct him personally.

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Originally Posted by Fragony

You are wrong they knew everything, why do you think they were there.

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The II SS corps? To be near an important river crossing while building up their strength. The Rhine was the only barrier they had a chance at defending.

If the Germans knew about it, the British paras would never have been able to gain the northern part like they did. That happened because of surprise and very few troops near the actual bridge.

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Originally Posted by PanzerJaeger

And Model at first thought it was a mission to abduct him personally.

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Yes but that is clearly just something he said to cover for their excellent spy net among the Allied ranks...

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Originally Posted by CBR

The II SS corps? To be near an important river crossing while building up their strength. The Rhine was the only barrier they had a chance at defending.

If the Germans knew about it, the British paras would never have been able to gain the northern part like they did. That happened because of surprise and very few troops near the actual bridge.

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Who in their right mind would drop to a place like that, check a Dutch map how do you expect not to be dusted of when they know you are comming. Allies have been fooled.

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Originally Posted by Fragony

Who in their right mind would drop to a place like that, check a Dutch map how do you expect not to be dusted of when they know you are comming. Allies have been fooled.

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You should check out "It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944" by Robert J. Kershaw. The Germans struggled hard to defeat the Allies and were not prepared for the attack.

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Originally Posted by CBR

You should check out "It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944" by Robert J. Kershaw. The Germans struggled hard to defeat the Allies and were not prepared for the attack.

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They weren't supposed to be there in the first place, some old men but no SS devisions. It was pretty normal having to having to shelter German soldiers, got pictures from them are all dead I guess, all had to go to Russia. My grandma remembers one crying and her mom tried to comfort him after giving him a few cold shoulders at first

Gallipoli, admittedly the intent was logical, but there were so many obvious reasons why it was doomed to go badly, and the ramifications were quite substantial.

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Originally Posted by Wakizashi

Gallipoli, admittedly the intent was logical, but there were so many obvious reasons why it was doomed to go badly, and the ramifications were quite substantial.

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Ah Gallipoli now there is a real mess up

ACW. Gettysburg. In particular, Pickett's Charge. One of the few battles that R.E.L handled poorly. He didn't have Jackson any more and his penchant for 'suggesting' a course of action to his Corps commanders rather than demanding proved fatal.

So....Pickett's Charge is the final folly to try and win the battle the old-fashioned Southern way.

Union artillery was better that day.

A more modern example: the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. They came prepared to fight a battle, not a war.

Well, France's behavior in 1939 and 1940 obviously should be at the top of the list. The country had the means and the manpower to defeat Germany.

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Originally Posted by Meneldil

Well, France's behavior in 1939 and 1940 obviously should be at the top of the list. The country had the means and the manpower to defeat Germany.

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I guess you mean the French & British early offensive that then stalled and waited for Germany to mop up the rest of Poland before coming back west?

How about the Maginot line? Getting quite so spectacularily caught out by changes in millitary doctrine is rare among such closely competing powers (to my knowledge).

My impression of the Maginot line is that it wasn't expected that the germans would bash themselves to death on it correct? They thought more like they would have to go around it and that would give the french time to mobilize and meet the german army head on elsewhere.

The Winter War. Soviet's were overconfident, and poorly led. Thought they could just brush the Finnish aside, and even though they did technically "Win" the war, the gains were negligible compared to the humiliating losses.

I can think of a few.

Isandlwana - Not getting the camp laggard(sp?) up as well as not exactly having a person in charge of the camp (Chelmsford) ran off with a small party to chase some Zulus who were more like shadows. He left his main camp in a somewhat state of disorder which let it to being wiped out as no one knew who was really in charge. Later battles such as Rorke's Drift which had men behind fixed defenses showed how a small unit could stave off large assaults. Another issue was spreading out their defenses too far from the main encampment so that ammunition could not be adequately available to the troopers holding the line. That's all I could remember as I read a book on the battle and it has been sometime since I read up on the battle.

The Battle of the Little Big Horn - Not really much to be said about here.

Yom Kippur War - While I have not been able to read up on this war as extensively as I would like. I do remember that the Egyptians had made if very difficult for the Israelis to use combined arms forces in attempts to dislodge them from their positions after crossing the Suez. Their anti-air and anti-tank umbrella was sufficient to make it difficult for the Israelis to drive them out but then they decided to attack and suffered very badly which in turn gave the initiative back to Israel who then proceeded to drive the Egyptians back. That's about as much as I could remember.

South Ossetian War of 2008 - I'm only saying this because I think the Georgian president thought some one would throw him a line but it ended up not happening. My understanding of the details are a bit hazy, but I vaguely remember that the Georgians could have possibly fought a much better war but totally blew it.

How about some Cold War examples. The era was filled with military miss-steps and unexpected outcomes.

Korea - After almost taking the entire country, North Korean communists faced a huge disaster during the American landings at Inchon. Later, after almost taking the entire country, American forces faced a huge disaster during the Chinese intervention.

Vietnam - Not soon after the French disaster at Dien Bien Phu ended their involvement in the country, American advisors began pouring into the country in an attempt to prop up the unpopular anti-communist Ngo Dinh Diem government. After 17 years of warfare, 60,000 troops killed, and 300,000 wounded, Vietnam eventually fell to the communists.

Afghanistan - In December of 1979, the Soviet Union engaged in what it thought would be a routine suppression of anti-communist forces threatening one of their satellites, a practice the superpower had perfected in Eastern Europe. The resulting intractable conflict cost the nation 15,000 dead and 54,000 wounded. The effects it had on the Soviet system were far more disastrous.

Iran-Iraq War - Backed by America (in reaction to the Iranian Revolution), in 1980 Saddam Hussein invaded Iran with a far more advanced force and hoped for an easy victory. Iran, sometimes having to resort to human wave tactics, beat back the initial assault. Over the course of the next 8 years, both sides launched vicious attacks against each other that resulted in massive casualties but achieved little in actual gains. With a military loss of over 300,000 men, an economic loss of over $600 billion, more than $130 billion in debt, a huge military apparatus, and nothing to show for it - Hussein was in a desperate position, which ultimately led to his next military disaster.

The American Invasion of Canada 1775

Not only did the main body of the army nearly stave to death, or take its objective, but their victory in capturing Montreal was turned to utter ruin by the military governor by alienating even those who would have otherwise been supporters.

Cannae was indeed a roman disaster, if you look at all the historic battles, this battle was surely the one with most casuals. If im not mistaken died there over 70000 romans and around 5000 Carthaginians.

There are some different thoughts about how the battles was fought, the majority claims today, that the drop back in the center of Hannibal's center was intended from start.
His cav got in from the back after some skirmishes vs. the roman cav. Thats it.
The romans was so pressed into each other, that they wasnt able to move hands or swords. It was a 6 hour lasting massacre, it wasnt jsut a loss, this was a splatter killing monster massacre!

Well, hannibal won some battles, but lost the war. Still, this battle was one of the biggest mess-ups in roman history.

Battle of the Crater

July 30th, 1864, after weeks of preparation Union forces blew a hole in the Confederate lines with a massive underground charge. The blast itself was over an hour delayed due to poor quality fuse, and the initial wave of troops had to climb in and out of their own trenches just to reach "no mans land". As the union poured troops into this gap the confederates reorganized and counter attacked. Brig. Gen. William Mahone later called it a turkey shoot as union troops muddled in the crater and were shot down from all sides. It ended with 3,798 (504 killed, 1,881 wounded, 1,413 missing or captured) casualties for the Union and only Confederate 1,491 (361 killed, 727 wounded, 403 missing or captured) casualties for the Confederate troops.

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Originally Posted by Kocmoc

Cannae was indeed a roman disaster

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Yes but does not mean the Romans made serious mistakes. If Veho Nex had called the thread "greatest military disasters" or "losses" then yes Cannae should be there for the Ancient times.

Battle of the Crater can be considered messed up because Meade changed the forces meant to lead the attack. Instead of the black division that had been instructed to go around the crater, an untrained division was to lead instead. On top of that the attack got delayed because of lack of footbridges and general confusion.

“Well, France's behaviour in 1939 and 1940 obviously should be at the top of the list. The country had the means and the manpower to defeat Germany.” I wouldn’t put this as a blunder.
In 1939, the French Army wasn’t up the level.
In 1940, the Air Force just started to receive the modern Dewoitine 520 and other Lioré et Olivier 451 (too late for this one) Morane 406 and Block 152.
The French Generals were out manoeuvred so it can’t be counted as their blunder (except for ignoring the Aerial Recon Pictures showing the concentration of German Tanks in the other side of the Ardennes).
They couldn’t excepted the fall so quick of the Belgium fortress of Eben Emael…

Now, a real French Blunder is Indochina.
The Battle of the border:
That Khe, Dong Khe, Lang Son, Cao Bang. RC4.
These towns and road were the keys point for the control of the Chinese/Vietnameese Borders and became vital for the Vietminh after the fall of Chiang Kai Shek China to the Communist..
The French decided to evacuate Lang Son (after the defeat of the “fortress of That Khe”) withdrawing with all the material, in daylight, and with all the families and refugees fleeing the Vietminh. In the meantime, a column will go to meet them by the road, the Route Colonial no 4. It was a complete disaster, and then, in panic, the same officers decide to evacuate Lang Son, without any noise this time (so no destruction), leaving for the Vietminh enough material to equip 3 Divisions.
My father arriving 2 days after the evacuation and one day before the Vietminh (who was wondering where the French were and feared a trap) was still under the shock when telling me this… All supplies left intact to the enemy…

And of course Dien Bien Phu: by which aberration the French Generals (against the recommendation of the French Government) believed that the Vietminh (on foot) will not be able to move but the French Air Supply will succeed during the rain season is still a question for me.

Jutland.

Now in terms of total losses suffered by both sides and the strategic implications Jutland wouldn't initially appear to be a muckup. However considering the numerical advantage enjoyed by the Royal Navy coupled with the tactical situation available to Jellico when the High Seas fleet withdrew from combat the battle, in my opnion in a major military muck up. It wouldn't have been so bad had the Germans been opposing another of the Allies (both France and Russia prided themselves more on their land forces) but for the maritime based British Empire the failure to crush the German High Seas fleet in a single engagement was disasterous for moral and the reputation of the Royal Navy in general. I would further like to add that for the British the battle was a muck up as the British continued to adhere to the principles which it credited it's victories against Napoleon for, namely maintaining pristine ships and firing more shots per minute than the enemy. Neither of these principles were of much use at Jutland where accuracy of shots and communication between ships were of more use. The fact that the Royal Navy continued to rely on signallers rather (like my great grandfather on HMS Royal Oak) than morse code was detrimental to their performance.

Jutland-Not the biggest muck up, but certainly alot of room for improvement.

Do civil wars count? if so

1. Communists deciding to fight Republicans and Socialists during the Spanish Civil War (Does it count as surrender to Franco to kill each other when his men are right there?:help:0

2. Russian Civil War, Denikin failing to realize the enemy of my enemy is my friend untill it was too late for Petliura to be of much assistance to him

3. American Civil War, well I don't know where to start.......

People make very bad decisions in civil wars.

The Battle of New Orleans was quite small and not important to anyone except us Americans.

However ... if the plan is to use infantry to attack earthworks protected by a canal and artillery, and you know you will need fascines to cross the canal and scaling ladders to mount the earthworks, wouldn't you call it a blunder to forget to bring the fascines and scaling ladders along?

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Originally Posted by CBR

Battle of the Crater can be considered messed up because Meade changed the forces meant to lead the attack. Instead of the black division that had been instructed to go around the crater, an untrained division was to lead instead. On top of that the attack got delayed because of lack of footbridges and general confusion.

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It was a racial decision from what I understand (not sure how much of an exaggeration this is) but my understanding is that the black division had trained for some time to attack around the crater. Some white general (forget his name) didn't want the blacks to get the "glory" and the rest is as they say history. Also, even though the Confederates by this time were alerted to the attack (how could they not be), would it have been prudent to send the black soldiers around crater as prescribed? (I also thought they were just thrown into the crater along with the division that replaced them.

Meade did use two reasons: 1) that the black division had no experience and 2) in case of a defeat it would look bad, as it would seem like the Union just sent in black soldiers to spare white lives. The second reason seems to have been the important one as he apparently did not think the operation had much chance of success.

He told Burnside (the guy who had planned it all) about the change only 15 hours before so it left Burnside with little time to plan. One could fault Burnside for not having a backup plan but the problem was that his other three divisions were considered to be burned out. With no other proper options and his black troops having spent nearly three weeks training for it, and being very enthusiastic, maybe one can't blame him too much.

Some of the black regiments did manage to bypass the crater, but all surprise had been lost by then. The three white divisions had been sent in first and the black division was sent in about 2 1/2 hours after the first wave.

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Originally Posted by CBR

Meade did use two reasons: 1) that the black division had no experience and 2) in case of a defeat it would look bad, as it would seem like the Union just sent in black soldiers to spare white lives. The second reason seems to have been the important one as he apparently did not think the operation had much chance of success.

He told Burnside (the guy who had planned it all) about the change only 15 hours before so it left Burnside with little time to plan. One could fault Burnside for not having a backup plan but the problem was that his other three divisions were considered to be burned out. With no other proper options and his black troops having spent nearly three weeks training for it, and being very enthusiastic, maybe one can't blame him too much.

Some of the black regiments did manage to bypass the crater, but all surprise had been lost by then. The three white divisions had been sent in first and the black division was sent in about 2 1/2 hours after the first wave.

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Thanks for the clarification on that.

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Originally Posted by Decker;2053265912[I

The Battle of the Little Big Horn[/I] - Not really much to be said about here.

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Not too long ago, I read an interesting article in Armchair General about this. I wish I could remember more about it, but the main thrust was that Custer in his initial execution of the attack. Military doctrine and practice showed that a determined attack against even large numbers of enemy warriors would cause them to break and run. Also, in such situations, dividing your force was common practice to encircle the enemy and capture prisoners. Attacking an overwhelming force while dividing your own may sound foolish to us now with hindsight- but then it was known as a reliable tactic. :shrug:

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Originally Posted by Xiahou

Not too long ago, I read an interesting article in Armchair General about this. I wish I could remember more about it, but the main thrust was that Custer in his initial execution of the attack. Military doctrine and practice showed that a determined attack against even large numbers of enemy warriors would cause them to break and run. Also, in such situations, dividing your force was common practice to encircle the enemy and capture prisoners. Attacking an overwhelming force while dividing your own may sound foolish to us now with hindsight- but then it was known as a reliable tactic. :shrug:

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Oh I understand that being a valid target. However I read and heard that his scouts told him a really big group was headed his way yet he preceeded on instead of being more cautious which led to most of the 7th Cavalry to being decimated (Reno's small force came out relatively intact iirc as well). [Feel free to correct me if I'm wrong.]

Custer’s Indian Fighting reputation was made at the Battle of the Washita where instead of attacking the hostile fortified camp of the Comanche’s, he instead attacked the village of Black Kettle, a Peaceful Cheyenne.

Dividing his troops to attack women and children rather than face the warriors at Little Big Horne was what was also planed but the Cheyenne and a few Arapaho were waiting for him at the ford this time.

Going into a defensive position had worked on a few occasions when forces were nearer to equal, but not this time.

All of Custer’s decisions that day were the wrong ones based on attacking isolated encampments. Not what he faced this day.

He should have listened to his Crow Scouts and run like the devil until the other forces came up.

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Originally Posted by Brenus

They couldn't excepted the fall so quick of the Belgium fortress of Eben Emael...

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Yeah that always made me chuckle. One of the reasons, this fort fell as fast as it did was because the German gliders could land on the roof. The trees and bushes on the roof of the fort, which would have prevented the gliders to land there, were cut down so that the soldiers stationed at the fort would have a place to play football.

It's not a big blunder but an amusing detail non the less.

Cannae was great mistake from Roman side. Before battle Hannibal destroyed 2 consular armies (Trebba and T. Lake). Romans knew that he is dangerous and like untypical fights. They had only one way of fighting - brutal attack directly in the middle of enemy formation. No matter that elite of enemy forces was on flanks.

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Originally Posted by KrooK

Romans knew that he is dangerous and like untypical fights.

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Yes, they could see what had happened at Trebbia and corrected it: not being tricked into attacking, and they picked a battlefield where no ambushes were possible.

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They had only one way of fighting - brutal attack directly in the middle of enemy formation.

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Yes that was the primary way of fighting for the Romans, and even when things were falling apart at Trebbia the center had cut through Hannibal's infantry. For Cannae they more than doubled the size of the army.

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No matter that elite of enemy forces was on flanks.

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Yes so the Romans had an even larger army, including more cavalry than at Trebbia, and picked a spot with a narrow frontage with a river on their right wing and hills on the left. They also seemed to have been defensive with the cavalry to ensure that it would not be easily defeated and the two consuls each picked a wing to ensure the best control and encouragement.

So unless we should fault the Romans for not being psychic I still can't see their big mistake. Unless it is merely in hindsight knowing they lost and therefore should not have fought the battle at all.

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Originally Posted by CBR

Yes, they could see what had happened at Trebbia and corrected it: not being tricked into attacking, and they picked a battlefield where no ambushes were possible.

Yes that was the primary way of fighting for the Romans, and even when things were falling apart at Trebbia the center had cut through Hannibal's infantry. For Cannae they more than doubled the size of the army.

Yes so the Romans had an even larger army, including more cavalry than at Trebbia, and picked a spot with a narrow frontage with a river on their right wing and hills on the left. They also seemed to have been defensive with the cavalry to ensure that it would not be easily defeated and the two consuls each picked a wing to ensure the best control and encouragement.

So unless we should fault the Romans for not being psychic I still can't see their big mistake. Unless it is merely in hindsight knowing they lost and therefore should not have fought the battle at all.

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Didn't the Romans make their units much bulkier and closer together than ever before instead of making a longer line?

I interpreted the battle as the middle of Hannibal's line giving away making a sort of "V" in the Roman formation giving the impression that they had made their army bulkier as you say.

Yes the Romans increased the depth of their maniples. We are unfortunately not told specifically by how much. Polybius says it was several times deeper than its front. He also say the legions had been boosted in size to 5000 infantry, so the maniples of Hastati and Principes could have been perhaps 160 men each and in standard formation 8 ranks and 20 men wide. If they went to 16 ranks and just 10 wide, and with the depth per man described as 6-7 feet, then it would been something like 30 feet wide and 100+ feet deep. I think that would fit the "several times deeper than its front" bit.

Why would the Romans do such a thing? Well, a standard Consular army consisted of two Legions and two allied Alae of more or less similar size. If it was needed then two consuls could combine their army. At Cannae each of the consuls had a double consular army and Polybius writes the Romans never had recruited 8 legions before.

So the Romans did not have the experience in handling a army that was four times the width of what they normally operated with, and still twice the width of what only occurred rarely (happened at Trebbia though). Such an army would have had a width of perhaps 3.5 Km just for the infantry, it would have taken twice as long to deploy and it might even have been difficult to find a spot big enough to deploy and fight.

Doubling the ranks of each maniple is a simply thing do and would IMO have made the army manageable within the level of experience the Romans had for that time. But I don't think it was a cause to the Roman defeat though.

So you're essentially saying they were out fought at Cannae?

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Originally Posted by Decker

So you're essentially saying they were out fought at Cannae?

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Hannibal took a big but calculated risk with his cavalry. He put all his heavy cavalry on his left wing and let the Numidians handle the right wing. The Numidians would never have defeated a similar size of Roman allied cavalry if the allied cavalry had attacked but (and this is me guessing) he must have assumed that the Romans would try to be defensive. He had seen the Roman army deployed just one or two days before so maybe he spotted something in how they deployed.

We should also not forget the fog of war, there were no binoculars and lots of dust so there was a good chance that the Romans would never notice the weak right wing.

The concave infantry formation is more up for debate as historians don't agree on what happened. I don't think there was any planned retreat and the losses among the Celts suggest a tough fight and rout with many being cut down. But the formation meant the Roman infantry would not just move forward when in pursuit but also inwards. That would increase the disruption and give a better chance for his Africans in their counter attack.

The Battle of Teutoberger Forest. Marching two whole Legions, totaling 1/15 of the entire Roman military, straight to their deaths because of an incompetent commander is sure to be a large military blunder.

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Originally Posted by CBR

Hannibal took a big but calculated risk with his cavalry. He put all his heavy cavalry on his left wing and let the Numidians handle the right wing. The Numidians would never have defeated a similar size of Roman allied cavalry if the allied cavalry had attacked but (and this is me guessing) he must have assumed that the Romans would try to be defensive. He had seen the Roman army deployed just one or two days before so maybe he spotted something in how they deployed.

We should also not forget the fog of war, there were no binoculars and lots of dust so there was a good chance that the Romans would never notice the weak right wing.

The concave infantry formation is more up for debate as historians don't agree on what happened. I don't think there was any planned retreat and the losses among the Celts suggest a tough fight and rout with many being cut down. But the formation meant the Roman infantry would not just move forward when in pursuit but also inwards. That would increase the disruption and give a better chance for his Africans in their counter attack.

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But there lies the problem I brought up before, Varro made his formation deeper instead of longer, Hannibal's cavalry could not have charged the infantry, we have hindsight but didn't the Romans come up with the standard depth and length of their maniples as a result of centuries of experience?

I agree with you that Hannibal had the advantage of being just a soldier with other soldiers; he never had to factor in or care about if any of them survived and could sacrifice formations for victories to his hearts content, the Romans however were elected politicians leading many of their constituents into battle, and had to worry not only about victory but about being scene to do everything they possibly could to bring a maximum amount of soldiers home alive. Ironically against an enemy like Hannibal trying to plan for a scenario of returning as many people home as possible actually meant doing everything exactly by the book/the standard rules and Hannibal was an expert at defeating Romans who played by the rules.

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Originally Posted by OvidiusNasso

But there lies the problem I brought up before, Varro made his formation deeper instead of longer, Hannibal's cavalry could not have charged the infantry, we have hindsight but didn't the Romans come up with the standard depth and length of their maniples as a result of centuries of experience?

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Armies in general went for a rather symmetrical deployment with cavalry on both wings. We could wonder why the Romans went for that at Cannae when they had such a numerical superiority in infantry. Maybe there are factors that we don't understand?

A lot of the heavy cavalry did use throwing spears and even the threat of a charge might have made infantry slow down. If one wanted to attack then maybe it was wise to have some cavalry to threaten and counter the enemy cavalry? Otherwise it would simply cause too big a disruption and leave gaps between legions. We should also not forget about the light infantry. A combo of light infantry and cavalry could perhaps be even worse for a force purely of infantry trying to advance.

I'm sure the Romans felt the basic 6 to 8 ranks (and sometimes up to 10 ranks) worked fine, but Cannae was special because of the sheer size of the army. The Greeks used 8 ranks as standard yet they sometimes went to 16 for some of the larger battles, even when outnumbering the enemy.

Either they doubled the ranks in the maniples or they could have put half the legions behind the first line. The latter might not be good because it would have taken even longer to fight the battle, and I don't think I have read about Romans ever doing that apart from perhaps using a legion or two as a special reserve. Or as you say, fill the whole front, but again it does not seem to have been a viable tactic either.

Varro does not seem to have hurt his political career after losing at Cannae. Most likely because he did what Romans expected of him: engage the enemy, and that he did not give up after the battle but gathered and reformed the survivors.

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Originally Posted by Brenus

The French Generals were out manoeuvred so it can’t be counted as their blunder (except for ignoring the Aerial Recon Pictures showing the concentration of German Tanks in the other side of the Ardennes).

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:inquisitive:

:laugh4: @ PJ

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Originally Posted by Brenus

“[B]Well,
And of course Dien Bien Phu: by which aberration the French Generals (against the recommendation of the French Government) believed that the Vietminh (on foot) will not be able to move but the French Air Supply will succeed during the rain season is still a question for me.

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To understand , one must look at the whole picture of the French political and military situation inIndochina in 1954 . With Mao's victory and the arrival of Chin com on Sino Vietnamese borders in 1949 , the strategic situation in Tonkin ( north Vietnam) have become desperate in 1954 after many years of fighting . So General Navarre , Frenh commander-in -chief at France's behest and with US coordination concocted a plan which has 2 aspects :
1°) militarily to shorten French lines of supply
2°)politically try to salvage French positions in Indochina to preserve its interests in Laos , Cambodia and mostly in central (Annam) and southern Vietnam ( Cochinchina )
Cochinchina was relatively safe in French hands . The Vietminh had solid positions in Annam .
The Dien bien phu ploy meant to attract Giap main divisions in Annam and to lure them to move to DBP . French main thrust was the Atlante operation in Annam where they would wipe out Vietminh infrastructure and military forces and consolidate French rule in Annam
The DBP garrison was meant as a bait ; hopefully with some luck it would inflict sever casualties on Vietminh forces to impair their fighting capabilities ; if it were to fail as expected, the garrisoned troops would be mauled and that would fulfill one hidden purpose : France was expecting defeat and intended to transfer the burden to the USA ;French expeditionary force would have to retreat , the French government and general staff were afraid that the French forces which consist mainly of foreign legionaires ( ie merrcenaries ) and gung ho paratroopers would mutiny when confronted with a shameful retreat .
The Navarre plan was much coherent in its many aspects , it stood on paper a good chance of success.And it did succeed despite the DBP defeat and Atlante failure . The Geneva agreements validated the plan: thanks to Russian and Chinese help in pressuring the Vietminh , the agreements allowed French and US a political victory despite the military defeats . Vietnam was divided in two , the Vietminh were forced to evacuate their forces from Annam . French forces regrouped in what would become South Vietnam , theirs not to continue the fighting according to plan Navarre ; that would be devolved to US forces that would do the containment strategy on new and sounder political and military basis . Under the bait of elections to unify Vietnam , France and USA got from the Geneva accord a cease fire which gave them 2 year respite from Vietminh .Despite their victory , the Vietnamese were the big losers in Geneva .

This one definetely belongs here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kar%C3%A1nsebes

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Originally Posted by Kagemusha

This one definetely belongs here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kar%C3%A1nsebes

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Holy cow.

The Greatest Military Messups would be

Napoleon's campaigns of Egypt and Russia. Very bad campaigns, great battles nonetheless, but it proved nothing. Egypt was a major blow, and Russia was only a reminder, Thats in my opinion of course

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Originally Posted by Kagemusha

This one definetely belongs here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Karánsebes

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Ouch...

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Originally Posted by Kagemusha

This one definetely belongs here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Karánsebes

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Wow. I never knew that one. Ottomans counted 10.000 dead, eh ? Wow.

It reads very plausible, but only one account? A pity we will never know for certain.

Aside from that, my own contribution to the thread: Battle of Acheloos.
Unfortunately, the Wiki entry reads as if it was heavily edited by Bulgarian "patriots", I'm sure you know the kind. I read a lot more scholarly accounts here, but I don't have the books on hand at the moment. Still, losses were disastrous and the battle was a genuine turning point.


EDIT: Oh and, welcome to the .Org mister Do doan, enjoy your stay!

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Originally Posted by Nowake

It reads very plausible, but only one account? A pity we will never know for certain.

Aside from that, my own contribution to the thread: Battle of Acheloos.
Unfortunately, the Wiki entry reads as if it was heavily edited by Bulgarian "patriots", I'm sure you know the kind. I read a lot more scholarly accounts here, but I don't have the books on hand at the moment. Still, losses were disastrous and the battle was a genuine turning point.


EDIT: Oh and, welcome to the .Org mister Do doan, enjoy your stay!

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Something against the Bulgarian patriots? :wink: By the way, thank you for including that battle. While the numbers were more or less equal, I think the Byzantines have more elite (of course, they also used lots of unprofessional force at that time) regiments than the Bulgarian army. And yet, critical analysis does not show that this was the greatest military mess-up of the Byzantine Empire. Leo Phocas was not a bad general, he was successful againt the Arabs. Victory was to great extend due to the talent and knowledge of the Bulgarian ruler at that time Simeon who spent several years of Constantinople and was educated by Byzantine scholars aside with the children of the Byzantine Emperor. This heavily influenced his external policy but also made him quite familiar with the Byzantine tactics and way of thinking.

Actually, it was not the entry, which is disturbing, Bulgaria really controlled most of the Balkan peninsula at that time without what is now Bosnia, Croatia (we suffered a defeat there) and Thessaloniki + Constantinople and Peloponessus. It also controlled Transylvania at that time (I won't go into discussions here; I know the Romanian historians have a different version). It was the estimation of the aftermath. I definately did not like the sound of 40 years of peace that brought the prosperity and etc. and etc. That was not true because of Hungarian raids for example. Some scholars even claim that it was mistake of Bulgaria ot concentrate that much on the conquest of Constantinople as it distracted the attention from other frontiers such as Transylvania (and wasted resources) and eventually lead to loss of the territory to Hungary only few decades later.

Anyway, I would like to add the Battle of Manzikert here. A batte in 1071 between the Byzantines and the Turks ended with decisive Turkish victory. The battle was actually lost because of the intrigues of the various commanders who were disloyal to the Emperor Romanus IV. As a result, battle that could have been won for Romanus ended with defeat and his capture. Battle was not that crytical from military point of view: the causalties were not that high, the Emperor was released and even the Turkish Sultan conditions were not that heavy as he still considered the Byzantines a formidable enemy and potential ally against the Fatimids of Egypt. However, to make the mess bigger, a civil war erupted in the Byzantine Empire, a war that allowed the Turks to take control over Minor Asia, which used to be the core of the Empire. This severely weakened the Byzantine Empire in the following centuries and directly contributed to the fall of the Empire several centuries later.

Not at all, I've something against patriots in general, be they Romanian, Bulgarian or any other :bow:

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I know the Romanian historians have a different version

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Who doesn’t? Everyone inside or around Transylvania has its own particular version. We occupy it all now and hold a crushing demographic superiority, that’s what’s important.
EDIT: Plus it is not at all implausible to consider the Vlach voyevods of Transylvania accepting of a nominal Bulgarian rule and settlers. You have to consider the fact that the Vlachs were a very large and important minority throughout the Bulgarian Empire, not far from matching in numbers the Slavs from southern Thrace to Transylvania. Our only point of contention would be whether the Transylvanian voyevods were indeed Vlach or Bulgarian. That is something impossible to settle.
As to Acheloos being qualified as a blunder, I would pose that, for one, this was a campaign sought by the Byzantines, assured of this being their opportunity to use their combined (European and Asian) military strength to crush the Bulgarians. On the field, they failed to secure their flanks and they allowed their troops to break ranks – were they to have kept a semblance of a dispositive at least, they would not have been totally annihilated and would’ve perhaps had a chance at an orderly retreat.

Well, I did not really plan to reply but as I see our points are not that different as they seem, I can make some remarks here and be confident this won't spiral into a boring dispute.

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Not at all, I've something against patriots in general, be they Romanian, Bulgarian or any other :bow:

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:bow:

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Plus it is not at all implausible to consider the Vlach voyevods of Transylvania accepting of a nominal Bulgarian rule and settlers. You have to consider the fact that the Vlachs were a very large and important minority throughout the Bulgarian Empire, not far from matching in numbers the Slavs from southern Thrace to Transylvania. Our only point of contention would be whether the Transylvanian voyevods were indeed Vlach or Bulgarian. That is something impossible to settle

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No dispute here. In fact, the demographic situation in Transylvania in the IXth-Xth century would be interesting to research. I only claimed that the Bulgarians had control, one way or another.

But I am going too off-topic here. And I would agree Phocas underestimated their opponents and partly this was due to the idea of superiority of the Byzantine Empire in the existent European medieval world (which was partly justified). I think the Bulgarian monarch was aware of that + he was also familiar with the tactics the Byzantines employed.

I shall put the most infamous battle of Portuguese history: The Battle of Alcacer Quibir

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For Portugal, the battle was an unmitigated disaster. Despite the lack of a body, Sebastian was presumed dead, at the age of 24. In his piety, he had remained unmarried and had sired no heir. His aged, childless uncle Henry of Portugal, a Cardinal of the Roman church, succeeded to the throne as closest legitimate relative. His brief reign (1578–1580) was devoted to attempting to raise the crippling financial reparations demanded by the disastrous Morocco venture. After his death, legitimate claimants to the throne of the House of Aviz, which had ruled Portugal for 200 years, were defeated by a Castilian military invasion. Philip II of Spain, a maternal grandson of Manuel I of Portugal, and nearest male claimant (being an uncle of Sebastian I), invaded with an army of 15 000 men, defeating the troops of Anthony, Prior of Crato at the Battle of Alcântara and was crowned Philip I of Portugal by the Cortes of Tomar in 1581.

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