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I hope he recovers.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f0lYkdA-Gtw
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/j...shot-rcna37228
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Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe gravely injured in shooting
Abe, Japan?s longest-serving prime minister, was giving a speech in the city of Nara ahead of an election for the upper house of Parliament...
I don't know who this podcaster is, but his video explains some interesting points on Japanese politics. I have a book (John Toland's The Rising Sun) that explains Japan's chaotic political situation before WWII. It's mentioned in this interview.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EozNixNWRiI
Our mainstream TV channel reported that the assassin was a fan of Che Guevara. Apparently, they mistook the culprit with Hideo Kojima, the famous video-game developer.
May he rest in peace.
While listening to a podcast detailing some of the far-right background we always heard about with Shinzo Abe - keyword "Nippon Kagi" - there was a telling factoid about Japanese sovereignty. According to the guest, Japanese military planes and helicopters are prohibited from flying low over Tokyo, yet American aviation does so regularly. Imagine UN black helicopters making routine overflight of the White House. Or, I guess similarly, Eurocopters over London?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RFIQDIFXUb4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_NaF1BD8-ew
I think China is bluffing. Attacking her plane means war, and I doubt China wants that now.
Taiwan's top defense official was associated with Taiwan's missile defense program:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YeYLn2yMzxs
https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world...rt/ar-AA10mO2R
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Amid China-Taiwan tensions, top Taiwanese defence official found dead in hotel room
Sat, August 6, 2022
Ou Yang Li-hsing, deputy head of Taiwan defence ministry's research and development unit, was found dead on Saturday morning in a hotel room in southern Taiwan, according to the official Central News Agency (CNA). According to CNA, authorities are looking into the cause of his death.
Ou Yang had assumed his post as the deputy head of the military-owned National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology early this year to supervise various missile production projects and was on a business trip, said CNA.
His death comes amidst tension between China and Taiwan following US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan.....
I wish the protesters all the best, with a state control apparatus such as the PRC has the odds are against them unless the protests/crackdown generates increased support. The ability of the PRC to use facial recognition features, the fact that they can use the cell phones locations to determine who is there, not to mention the sheer quantity of enforcers, both uniformed and plains clothes makes it very dangerous to speak out against anything PRC.
1989 was crushed, brutally and Xi Jinping has not shown any qualms about using similar force if needed as his internal control mechanisms can get the same effect now without tanks on the streets.
Meanwhile many EU countries are determined to continue heavy trade with the PRC despite it being against their own longterm interests. Given the tremendous effects of the Ukraine war energy crisis plus the COVID effects there'll be little outside support for those protesters much as there was so little said or done when Hong Kong's status went away.
Frankly, it doesn't make sense to materially (as opposed to morally) support extranational protesters just because they agree with you on something. Moderate-sized protests on a variety of issues routinely roil Chinese towns without anyone noticing, and there have been multiple waves of large anti-quarantine protests during the pandemic that had similarly localized motivations and aspirations. There's just no true mass movement that unites the Chinese core. Looking for ways to sustain given protests would do nothing against the government while harming long-term relations, regardless of the situation in Ukraine.
Since you mention Hong Kong, that the US bloc did little of anything during calmer times over the repression of a clear majority of a peripheral part of China, should indicate the impossibility of salutary measures on behalf of an indeterminate subset of the mainland (who are nowhere near as put upon as Uighurs anyway).
(By the by, it doesn't escape my notice that every time unrest flares up in Iran, the usual suspects heartily support Iranian protesters transitioning to insurgency against the IRGC in between calling for brutal crackdowns on American protesters who aren't even within an order of magnitude in violence of action.)
As for Chinese economics, it relies on agglomeration economies, which make it hard not to do business in China for many types of manufacturing. Every supply and value chain runs in and through China, an efficiency multiplier the CCP has carefully cultivated over decades. The TPP and derivatives were meant to reduplicate that agglomeration across a politicized bloc, but without the political pressure of American membership the logic of markets will disinvest only slowly.
Agreed, it can also be counter-productive. Overt US support for Iranian or Chinese protests would probably feed into the current 'foreign instigated' line used by the state to crush these protests.Quote:
Frankly, it doesn't make sense to materially (as opposed to morally) support extranational protesters just because they agree with you on something.
Measures certainly aren't impossible, just tie the response to protests to other things. Trump and Co. didn't do anything as he didn't want to upset his negotiating for a trade deal with China which certainly doesn't look worth having lost some of our moral support. Just as China adds less overt requirements when doing trade deals, negotiating factory/industry partnerships etc... those could be tied to the crack down.Quote:
Since you mention Hong Kong, that the US bloc did little of anything during calmer times over the repression of a clear majority of a peripheral part of China, should indicate the impossibility of salutary measures on behalf of an indeterminate subset of the mainland (who are nowhere near as put upon as Uighurs anyway).
For one I'd say the US and EU should at the very least look at these protests and say "we need to ensure that Chinese citizens abroad are safely able to express themselves" and then shut down and arrest/expel those overseas 'police stations' created by the PRC. Make it clear that Chinese investments in key industries will not be allowed or will be held up indefinitely pending 'concerns' over the treatment of protesters. Start doing the same with PRC athletes over concerns over their human rights, there's no shortage of ways to weigh in without meddling directly.
In short work to isolate the PRC abroad in the major economies at the same time they have domestic problems.
No shortage of hypocrites in the US. I don't support Iranian protests going fully violent as it'd more likely just lead to a draw out civil war Syrian style than a change in government.Quote:
(By the by, it doesn't escape my notice that every time unrest flares up in Iran, the usual suspects heartily support Iranian protesters transitioning to insurgency against the IRGC in between calling for brutal crackdowns on American protesters who aren't even within an order of magnitude in violence of action.)
Well, yes and no. For the past three years due to COVID problems there's be endless supply chain problems due directly to overdependence on Chinese trade and manufacturing. China has proved to be an unreliable partner in trade, protection of intellectual property, and human rights.Quote:
As for Chinese economics, it relies on agglomeration economies, which make it hard not to do business in China for many types of manufacturing. Every supply and value chain runs in and through China, an efficiency multiplier the CCP has carefully cultivated over decades. The TPP and derivatives were meant to reduplicate that agglomeration across a politicized bloc, but without the political pressure of American membership the logic of markets will disinvest only slowly.
Revisiting TPP should certainly be done by the US, unfortunately the Dems are just horrible at how to sell it domestically. It should be marketed to the US public as an anti-PRC policy not just a globalism/free-trade policy. The high-minded ideals are important, but the average-joe doesn't seem to care too much about that but does seem to have strong but poorly formed opinions on all our 'jobs' going to China.
A deliberate US policy to build trade ties to de-couple from China would take time, better to ramp up the efforts sooner than later, especially as tensions continue over Taiwan and the South China Sea. People will better support strong actions against China if it doesn't affect them too much in the supermarket or gas station.
We did just slap heavy sanctions on the pivotal Chinese semiconductor industry, heavy enough to lock us into future conflict arguably. But it was primarily about our long-term power struggle and maybe secondarily about low-key Chinese support for Russia; the feelings of Chinese citizens won't play a role in future such measures one way or another, I expect.
Those Chinese police stations... I have a strong suspicion that these ostentatious appendages in basically every single Western country were not at all under the radar, they were just part of a mutual accommodation within certain boundaries. The old 'gentlemen's agreements' are breaking down, right? The US has been charging a lot of people - mostly Chinese citizens - with espionage on behalf of China in the past year, when in the past they might have been quietly deported. We should assume our own operatives in China, and Russia, have been having a rough time of it as well.
Global, and American, popular hostility toward China is at an all-time high since the Cold War, but price shocks are baked in. Elevated inflation worldwide will be a side effect in any decoupling with China as long as that takes to culminate, if not longer.Quote:
People will better support strong actions against China if it doesn't affect them too much in the supermarket or gas station.
What we ought to be doing is selling trade blocs built around rising environmental and labor standards, including populist intent to improve standards of living in aligned middle or low-income countries (which ultimately benefits American workers too anyway). The current group of left-leaning governments in Latin America might be especially open to a legitimate offer. But it's a very difficult sell to the American Congress and business "community." Trump's NAFTA 2.0 was almost toeing the line on this where it hit upon raised wage targets for some Mexican factory workers, one of the very few genuine improvements in the agreement. I think Mexican unions have gained some leverage recently by appealing to the USMCA Rapid Response Mechanism.
Japan now describing China as a 'systemic challenge', aligning its diplomatic language with the UK mere hours before Japan/UK/Italy due to announce their Project Tempest collaboration to create a 6th Gen long range fighter jet.
That's sad to see, tragic to indoctrinate hate into kids.
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Originally Posted by spmetla
Agreed, looks like China's changing its tune now though.
had some second news of a VC meeting with a chap deep in US defence tech. the guy said he was looking for things that would be ready in 2027, anything after that was "too late".
then i saw this vid:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T72DfPEBn0A
does make you wonder if china feels boxed into resolving taiwan in the 2020's...?
p.s. "hi, lovely to be back. happy new year"
So far, Japan, Iran, South Korea, Uzbekistan, Australia, and Jordan qualified for the 2026 World Cup.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5BsX9lUqmeA
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xiheNJjEC5o
Also on the news: South Korea's new president is silent on North Korea's Nuclear Wastewater Discharge Suspicion,
but it's not being mentioned on most of the news outlets yet.
EDIT: They're starting to report it:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IcVGQxNXSEE
It was first talked about on the non-mainstream media channels such as this one:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=svPNPcIv9As
Any thoughts on Thailand v Cambodia. Seems like the scale of the fighting is so far larger than the last escalation many years ago. Wonder if both sides are just trying to take advantage of the lack of US leadership to 'fix' the border without the risk of upsetting the US.
I imagine the PRC will insert itself on Cambodia's behalf (diplomatically not militarily) as Thailand is too close to the US to allow it to get a one up on Cambodia.
I know very little about Indochina geopolitics, but AFAICT it's another case of a dictator (Hun Sen) flexing his consolidated grip over his country to advance a revision of the regional order. But I have no idea what his aims are or what his actual negotiating position for this round is, with Cambodia escalating the Preah Vihear and related issues more than ever. It can't just for the sake of squeezing out slightly expanded access to the temple complex. Regardless, by all appearances neither side appears to want a war, and Thailand itself has responded with a lot of the typical posturing. But I could be missing key factions in either country who do want war, so we'll have to watch the development of the border clashes carefully (on the grounds that it's difficult for both countries to somehow make a mistake that instigates unwanted war). As always, it is important to keep in mind the facts on the ground: neither country has the equipment available for significant combined arms operations, and Cambodia has no air force to speak of, inherently limiting the scope of any bilateral conflict.
A-a-a-nd it's over. I wonder if either side had any clear notion of what was going on, or if it really is just a process of managing internal politics (as Communists have always affirmed), where the sacrifice of a handful of soldiers is cheap fodder. Been reading in the meanwhile about the potent character of Thai and Cambodian nationalist construction of historical memory, the more important territorial contestation of the Gulf of Thailand and its resources, and moreover, the close and strange interpersonal relationships between the ruling classes of the two countries (which of course go beyond the Huns and the Shinawatras). It's not so much a question of any factions wanting war, but whether certain such factions will have enough significance to push both countries into a bilateral deadlock on co-interests, and therefore promote a more belligerent posture within this frustrated relationship.
Sample analysis of the factors peripheral to the territorial claims, which does align with my original impressions of the situation:
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Complicating the puzzle further is the fact that while appealing to international law and calling for the intercession of the ICJ and the U.N. Security Council, Phnom Penh has arguably played a disproportionate role in escalating the conflict.
...
A number of plausible theories for Hun Sen’s behavior, including the leak, have been floated. One is that Hun Sen wished to bring down the Pheu Thai government in order either to scuttle its casino legalization bill, which threatened to reduce the profits of Cambodia’s own gaming sector, and/or to forestall its crackdown on Cambodia-based cybercrime operations upon which his government’s patronage networks allegedly rely. (Thailand’s decision to go after Kok An, an important ally of Hun Sen, may well have been a red line.) Another theory holds that Hun Sen fomented the crisis in order to burnish his son’s nationalist credentials, although this has been undermined somewhat by the fact that it is Hun Sen, rather than Hun Manet, who has been depicted as leading the country through the crisis.
The one clear thing is the unanimity of public sentiment that the conflict has created within Cambodia. The government’s position – that Cambodia is a victim of premeditated Thai aggression – has reflexively been adopted by most of Cambodian public opinion, from social media users to journalists, civil society leaders, and exiled opposition figures living in exile. At the very least, anyone opposing the current course of events is loath to say so publicly.
This may point to the real reason why Cambodia’s leaders have encouraged the conflict. Since a contested election in 2013 in which opposition forces came close to victory, the CPP government, backed increasingly by China, has eliminated most sources of opposition and reverted to ruling more openly by force. In this context, stoking nationalism may be a good way of rallying the nation around the flag and compensating for the government’s dearth of democratic legitimacy. It may also serve to distract attention from more pressing concerns, including the stagnating economy, which is threatened by U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariff war, and the crime and reputational impacts stemming from Chinese-run scam operations. Robust Chinese support has also arguably made the Cambodian government more confident in asserting its interests vis-à-vis its two larger neighbors. This is even the case with Vietnam, as the recent frictions over Cambodia’s planned Funan Techo Canal have shown. However, as in 2003 and 2008, Thailand remains a safer and more manipulable target of nationalist brinkmanship.
How far things will go remains unclear – but if elements in both Thailand and Cambodia have had a political interest in pushing the dispute to the point of conflict, neither government has much interest in a full-scale war.
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All this suggests that the two nations will sooner or later find a face-saving way to pull back from the precipice... But a comprehensive solution, which would require both nations to make concessions on issues that touch on keen nationalist sensitivities, would require more political capital than either government currently possesses.
If the history of the past century is any indication, the border issue will then return to a state of dormancy. Like a landmine in the underbrush, it will remain concealed, awaiting the next incautious political footfall.
An article titled "When AUKUS Meets the Rule of Law", jumping off from a recent report on the legal and constitutional status of AUKUS in its member countries, to the question of how the changing role of courts in Anglosphere foreign policy, as well as that of political currents as such, will complicate any long-term military or diplomatic projects. In the era of the US embracing multipolarity, so to speak, while dismantling its own centuried institutions by fiat, we can really extend the parameters of the analysis to anything in international or internal politics that requires long-term planning and stability.
Although I disagree with the premise that executive privileges in foreign policy used to be unchallenged but now are challenged. As far as I know, even as the courts are more actively encountering such questions, a co-driver of that process is itself the continuing limitless arrogation of sole discretion and scope of action in the foreign policy of the American executive, and to some extent other national executives within the traditional American sphere. The relevance of the analysis to decision-making in crises is also overblown, as there is no reason to believe that participating in legal/judicial niceties will be part of most executives' concerns during world-historical international crises, which more involve the fruition of long-term planning and cooperation rather than its formation, and are also naturally statist-authoritarian moments, for better or worse.
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A new report published earlier this year, “AUKUS and Justiciability,” draws together judicial, academic, and strategic voices to revisit a legal doctrine long assumed to shield war powers from legal scrutiny. That doctrine—nonjusticiability—has traditionally insulated decisions about military deployment from judicial review. But across all three AUKUS countries, that insulation is increasingly open to challenge.
The report therefore charts a subtle but important shift. Courts are still reluctant to rule on foreign policy or defense operations, but they are no longer ruling them out entirely. AUKUS is often framed as a strategic and technological milestone, but this piece argues it is equally a constitutional experiment. As courts in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States become more willing to entertain challenges to military deployments and executive power, the long-assumed doctrine of nonjusticiability is eroding. Even unsuccessful litigation—on issues like Indigenous land rights, nuclear safety, or statutory authority—can introduce delays, caution, or political friction that undermine allied coherence. In a future crisis, this legal vulnerability could translate into strategic paralysis.
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That is why the question of justiciability matters. Not because courts are likely to overrule deployment decisions—but because they may increasingly be asked to. Once a court entertains the question, even to dismiss it, the political landscape changes. Executive power no longer enjoys the special preeminence in foreign affairs that was once presupposed by civil society. Nor are understandings of constitutional history and practice as strong as they once were, particularly in the political sphere. That perception alone is enough to embolden those seeking to delay decisions or complicate coordination among allies.
[...]
"As such, these are not just matters of legal theory. What is at stake here is the very operability of AUKUS in moments of crisis. Strategic alliances require not just political will and shared threat perceptions, but timely decisions and unified action. If a future crisis in the Indo-Pacific requires a coordinated AUKUS deployment, but one partner is faced with litigation or domestic legal hurdles, that coherence collapses. Legal uncertainty becomes strategic liability.