Musket Warfare (Napolean style)

I've always wondered at the logic in some of the tactics used in musket warfare. One thing I never got was that lines of armies just march up to one another and shoot each other until someone routs. What about cover and formations(aside from rotating lines)?

I also noticed the complete lack of armor or protection on the average soldier (unless you count several layers of wool or cotten protection.) This may just be because there was nothing available at the time that could stop bullets and let you move around, but come on! Atleast wear a breastplate or helmet or something!

Taking the above into consideration, wouldn't Cavalry completely dominate the battle field? Infantry wore no armor and their only weapons were short bayonets and maybe a saber. If you equip some cavalry with heavy armor and lances they should they be able to shred infantry, no?

Please note that I'm really ignorant when it comes to the warfare of this period as I'm sure what I just stated are common misconceptions.

Thanks in advance.

I'll try and help you a little. I'm not an expert but I think I can provide some answers.

Dense formations tended to work well for a variety of reasons. Among them:

- the native inaccuracy of the weapons
- lack of widespread marksmanship training
- the benefits of concentrated firepower
- vulnerability to infantry charges
- vulnerability to cavalry charges

Cavalry was a big concern during this period and the infantry would form massive squares to protect themselves. The only problem was that squares were extremely vulnerable to artillery fire.

It is interesting that you should mention armor. The armor of the day pretty much couldn't stop musketballs. Also, armor is pretty flocking expensive.

Cuirassiers-- elite cavalry-- did wear breastplates and helmets, but this was probably less to stop musketballs than to protect from bayonets and sabers, and give the men a certain *cavalier* sort of extra confidence. And they were a small percentage of most calvary forces.

As far as anti-musket armor, in theory I suppose they could have filled lots of small bags with gravel and fitted them like mail onto a leather jerkin-- but do you have any idea how heavy that would be? The sons of bitches would barely be able to waddle up to the line! And a cannonball would kill them anyway. And they would probably be too encumbered to fight off even a simple bayonet charge!

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Based on accounts I've read, cavalry charges were indeed effective, but the cavalry of the day tended to be expensive and not very numerous. They also tended to die very quickly if directly subjected to musket or cannon fire, and had near zero chance of defeating a properly-formed square.

The success of a charge also seemed to depend very heavily on three intangible elements-- a fearless, ferocious leader; high ferocity and courage among the men; and timing, timing, timing, also heavily dependent on the leader and the swift obedience of his men. The cavalry had to be the best or they were next to worthless. If the aim of the defending musketry was true and they did not panic and they presented a steady wall of bayonets and bodies, losses would be high for the attackers. Cavalry charges depended heavily on their opponents tendency to panic and run.

For that matter, so did bayonet charges. Pitched melee was not common.

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With the widespread introduction of improved rifles, cavalry became much less effective and was mostly limited to scout duty and guerilla raids. Cavalry charges continued to be viable even through the initial years of WW2, but much much less so and in much more limited circumstances.
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But to sum up, with regards to your initial questions about infantry-- musketry was not terribly accurate or deadly until improvement in rifle technology. If the men stuck together, formed a straight, orderly line, marched where they were told and fired straight ahead; they were basically safe. Unless they came under massed artillery fire. Or were the object of a sudden cavalry charge. Or were confronted with a massed column of charging infantry.

DA

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I've always wondered at the logic in some of the tactics used in musket warfare. One thing I never got was that lines of armies just march up to one another and shoot each other until someone routs. What about cover and formations(aside from rotating lines)?

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The musket age army did use cover, mostly inform of terrain and trenches though. Due to the musket inaccuracy you'll need plenty of muskets to compensate. Formations did change, for example the Spanish tactic (were slow moving, constant fireing squares) were outshoot by the Swedish/Dutch tactic (three rows, all fire at the same time= line infantery) during the 30-years war (1631). The problem is firepower, lines did have maximum firepower and to deploy into any other formation facing a line is going to cost you more men.
Think of this, person A is deploying his 100 men in a square with 10 men in each row. Person B got his 100 men in a line. Say you got in one volley with 20% accuraccy. Person A fires a volley, 2 dead, at the same Person B got his volley, 20 dead. Now person B can use the rest of the men, but now they can only kill 1,6*9= 14.4 men (because he only got 80 men left) with the rest of the unit, thus killing 16.4 men altogether. So now does person A have the most men and is gaining more and more for each volley. And this is without the morale effect that is greater for person A. And a line is better against cannons too.
And don't forget it was a lot of other things to consider. You could deploy dragoons and light cannons in your cav for nasty surprices, your cannons needed good deployment and were preferbly movable during the battle and things like that.
And ofcourse the fact that you as a general had severe problem of controling your army for really complicated movements, made things harder to control.

And I almost forgot, the commanders DIDN'T want a long shootout between two units, it caused too much losses, but tried to get another advantage to change the situation.

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I also noticed the complete lack of armor or protection on the average soldier (unless you count several layers of wool or cotten protection.) This may just be because there was nothing available at the time that could stop bullets and let you move around, but come on! Atleast wear a breastplate or helmet or something!

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To expensive for the relative small gain. You could stop a musket bullet with armour, but it needed to have slow down quite a bit. Only cav would need it and as Del Arroyo said, they already had units with armour for use in melee.

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Taking the above into consideration, wouldn't Cavalry completely dominate the battle field? Infantry wore no armor and their only weapons were short bayonets and maybe a saber. If you equip some cavalry with heavy armor and lances they should they be able to shred infantry, no?

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Considering that the musket units had men with pikes until the bayonet, cavalry had to fight pikewalls with support of musket fire if the enemy was well prepared. The bayonet is worse than the pike, but as the replacing of pikes with muskets shows is that improved muskets gave enough fire to kill of the cav thus making the bayonet more of a ok weapon to take out the few remaining cavs than the cav killing weapon. Catching the enemy unprepared with cav is a massacre though.
And the cav importance changed during the musket period, to get very important during the 30-years war to slowly reduce in importance as time passed, so it wasn't stagnant there either.

just to add a bit more to this:

Some cavalry were armed with pistols as well as swords/lances. Pistol balls had much less power than muskets. Therefore in a cav on cav action there would be some advantage in a breastplate (as there would in hand to hand cav actions of course). Most likely though cavalrymen were simply richer and could afford it.

Infantrymen could afford to laugh at most cavalry IF they were in (square) formation, and kept their nerve. Few horses will charge a wall of bayonets (the musket and bayonet are reasonably long). I've read cavalry fans claiming this is not so, but all I say to them is, Waterloo. If cavalry could take out infantry in square Wellington would have lost the battle.

As noted above, armies did use cover, or at least the lie of the land. Wellington habitually drew up his infantry on the reverse slope of a ridge in the Peninsular campaign so that it could not be fired on by artillery. Eventually the French learnt to treat apparently empty ridge lines with appropriate caution.

Finally, I think inf tactics were more varied than you suggest. The French were fans of attacks in column, for instance.

Depending on what period of time you are talking about, the tactics were indeed obsolete. This may not have been true for the Napoleonic Wars, but it was certainly true in the US Civil War. The original 'musket lines' were essentially designed for concentration of firepower due to a lack of accuracy. Before rifling, you couldn't really aim and hit anything that wasn't directly in front of your face. Large lines allowed the attackers to throw a wall of bullets forward, thus guaranteeing that something would be hit.

The invention of rifling changed this though. By the US Civil War, the guns that both sides used were relatively accurate and individual targets could be accurately hit from a reasonable distance. The fact that they kept lining up and volleying away at each other was simply a lack of tactical evolution. At that point in time, the technology had outpaced the school of military thought. The exact same mistake was made during the first few years of WWI.

While it's evident that there was some anachronism in ACW tactics-- what exactly would you have had them do? The Springfield muzzle-loader could still only fire 3 shots per minute-- a thin line would have left them outgunned and vulnerable to a strong enemy advance.

There was a regular application of a thin line in combat-- otherwise known as a skirmish line-- but it had very little staying power, as all the enemy had to do was advance. While it is certainly true that Battle Lines would have been more effective if they would have trained to take cover (as they surprisingly often learned to do!), a full and true evolution in tactics was not feasible until further advances in both range and rate of fire-- and the amorphous lines of today were not even concievable until the introduction of the light machine gun as the Main Fire weapon.

DA

Just adding a bit to the discussion..

Firepower is all about how much lead you can throw at the enemy and how much is needed to defeat him or keep him away so he doesnt just charge in and rout you.

As muzzle loaded muskets are not that quick firing (2-4 shots/minute IIRC) and dont have that long effective range (100 yeards or less) you need soldiers to stand in very close formation and 2-3 ranks in order to produce the firepower needed.

Compare that to a modern day infantryman who can have an aimed rate of fire 5+ times higher and with an effective range of 400+ meters (especially against massed formations) and of course the ability to shoot even faster at short ranges. Having machineguns to support him just makes it even worse for an enemy that tries to charge in big massed formations.

If we then go back to the later Renaissance where muskets were even slower to load as well is soldiers standing in looser formation (the matchlock used required a safety distance) we see 10 ranks and later 6 ranks used to produce enough firepower (compared to 18th-early 19th infantry that only used 2-3 ranks). They used revolving ranks as not all could fire at the same time.

Skirmishers were used but that was more for harassment. They couldnt produce the firepower to stop any infantry or cavalry attack and always needed formed up infantry in the rear to fall back to. But they could be very effective and was an essential part of infantry tactics.

So for us it might look strange and suicidal how they stood in close formation but it was the only way to stop an enemy with firepower.

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Cavalry could indeed rout big numbers of infantry but doing a frontal attack against an infantry line (that didnt panic) was not the best way of doing it as a musket salvo could stop it.

The square formation meant that most infantry could hold, as a line formation could be routed very quickly if cavalry came in from a flank.

It takes a determined cavalryman to charge into a square and a lot of cavalry was not up to it but the heavy cavalry was definitely a threat.

Waterloo might not be the best example of the true power of cavalry as they charged forward expecting to face a retreating English infantry line. Instead they encountered prepared squares and that was a bit of a surprise.

Large cavalry attacks like at Eylau did AFAIK destroy squares. Here is a link about the French cavalry doctrine: http://www.napoleon-series.org/milit...n/c_eylau.html

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In the US Civil War the infantry line cant really be seen as obsolete. The rifle gave infantry better range and accuracy so overall the firepower was improved but in the end you still needed a lot of soldiers to stop a determined enemy attack.

But the rifle did cause problems for both cavalry and artillery. The typical cavalry shock attack that could win a battle in Napoleonic times were not as likely to succeed and artillery couldnt use the devastating tactic of moving into grapeshot range. So infantry overall became much stronger compared to the two other arms.


CBR

I agree that the lines were needed due to the heavy use of single-shot muskets during the US Civil War. However, these weapons were only used because the two sides refused to accept technological advances of the time. The Henry Repeating Rifle was available in 1860, but was not used by the Union until 1862, and even then in only small numbers. The Gatling Gun was also available at the time, and the only thing that kept the US Civil War from being the first 'machinegun' war was the refusal of the North to adapt to the new technology. One General (Burnside I believe) even bought 12 of the things out of his own pocket because he saw the value in them, even if the government did not.

Civil War battle lines were just as obsolete a tactic as trench warfare & "going over the top" was in WWI. Just because you ignore the technology that could have solved the problem for you doesn't mean your methods aren't obsolete. If the US military destroyed all of its equipment and went back to single-shot rifles and Civil War lines, would they be using obsolete tactics?

In the current day and age it would almost certainly be possible for us to launch powerful lasers into space and vaporize key targets from there, saving the risk of man and plane. We could also launch an army of kill-satellites to knock our enemy's communications out of the sky.

If a symmetrical war began tomorrow and we did not have access to these technologies, would we be using obsolete tactics? IMO, no, we'd just be a bit slow on the uptake.

It usually takes a big push like a war to really get people ready to innovate. Look at the light-speed improvement in tanks and AT-weapons in just five years of WW2. You can't possibly say that the industry and materials necessary to produce a T-40, a KonigsTiger or a Pershing weren't available in '39, can you?

DA

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Originally Posted by Del Arroyo

In the current day and age it would almost certainly be possible for us to launch powerful lasers into space and vaporize key targets from there, saving the risk of man and plane. We could also launch an army of kill-satellites to knock our enemy's communications out of the sky.

If a symmetrical war began tomorrow and we did not have access to these technologies, would we be using obsolete tactics? IMO, no, we'd just be a bit slow on the uptake.

It usually takes a big push like a war to really get people ready to innovate. Look at the light-speed improvement in tanks and AT-weapons in just five years of WW2. You can't possibly say that the industry and materials necessary to produce a T-40, a KonigsTiger or a Pershing weren't available in '39, can you?

DA

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Completely true, but there is a difference between failure to develop new weaponry and failure to use existing weaponry.

The US doesn't use such weapons because we don't want them used on us. We have the advantage in a conventional war, and we want to keep it that way. We don't want to start a space weapons race.

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The US doesn't use such weapons because we don't want them used on us. We have the advantage in a conventional war, and we want to keep it that way. We don't want to start a space weapons race.

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Oh really!?!?

I have read numerous sources quoted from U.S government personell that seemed very interested in exploiting space for their own purposes.

In fact, I believe the USA is one of the few countries who have not (suprise, suprise) signed an international agreement stipulating that space is not for national exploitation and is for "everybody"

And to believe a nation would 'prefer' to send men off to die rather than obliterate cities from the comfort of the Pentagon games room strikes me as a bit far-fetched. Why bother with Nuclear weapons or germ/gas etc etc

And to get back on topic.

Napoleonic combat-I can see the 'sense' behind it.

WW1-running towards a machine gun!?!? Not too bright.

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Originally Posted by lancelot

And to get back on topic.

Napoleonic combat-I can see the 'sense' behind it.

WW1-running towards a machine gun!?!? Not too bright.

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But the big question is, what would you do instead?

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But the big question is, what would you do instead?

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Try and come up with a better idea! ~:)

Invent the tank...Oh, wait, we did.

It seems to me that between 1914 and 1917 the technology was so overwhelmingly in favour of the defender (at least if he was prepared) that its very hard to see how any sort of attack would succeed without huge casualties. Everyone knows about machine guns but even humble barbed wire had a huge impact. The principle benefit of the tank was not that it could cross no mans land without being vulnerable to machine gun fire, but that it offered a way to crash though barbed wire entanglements without a preliminary bombardment. the trouble with the bombardments was that they had to go on soe so long that it was obvious where the attack was coming, thus ensuring that the second and third lines of defence were fuklly manned and no breakthrough would be possible.

Back to Napoleon though, standing in line firing I understand, and the failure to take cover man by man I understand (you have to stand to load a musket), what I don't understand is why there wasn't more hand to hand combat. As people say above the maximum effective range of a musket would be about 100 yds. Two shots a minute a man would be good (three in the first minute as the muskets would be ready primed). Even a fat soldier on rough ground could cover 100 yds in well under 30 seconds, AND pause to fire his volley on the way, and receive only one full volley in return. Thereafter it would be bayonets.

there must be a reason why that wasn't done but I'm not sure what.

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Originally Posted by lancelot

Try and come up with a better idea! ~:)

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They did, but it took them about 3 years. :charge:

They tried concentrated artillery fire (needed to be VERY concentrated), gas, airplanes, and probably some methods I missed that was unsuccessful and they had tanks and huge mines as more successful methods.

The principle of a mass charge was to out-number the machine guns.
Unfortunally was the generals dreaming of the "breakthrough", that with the mass charge principle is doomed to cost you a massive numbers of casualities, even if you win.

Some kind of stealth unit that could advance before the charge and take out the German lines could work, but they needed to pass a no-mans land undetected. Another method is to get behind the enemy line with the navy, but that option had to been considered during the war and still unused, so it's probably some downside with that.

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Even a fat soldier on rough ground could cover 100 yds in well under 30 seconds, AND pause to fire his volley on the way, and receive only one full volley in return. Thereafter it would be bayonets.

there must be a reason why that wasn't done but I'm not sure what.

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Would you like to face a musket volley at point blank range? ~D

What I don't understand about Napoleonic warfare is why entrenchments were not more common on the battlefield.

I know entrenchments were used in Napoleonic times - for example, by the Russians at Borodino - but they seem the exception rather than the rule. By contrast, by towards the end of the American Civil War, they were pretty universal (and warfare resembled that of WW1 trenches).

Granted muskets and smoothbore cannons are less accurate than rifled small arms and artillery, but if you were fighting a defensive battle, surely your men would survive cannon and musketry better if behind a redoubt? Plus if it came to melee, defending such an obstacle would be an important psychological and physical advantage.

For anyone doubting the effectiveness of entrenchments in the Napoleonic period, consider the Chateau Hougomont at Waterloo - this acted like a mini-castle and allowed a few battalions of guards to tie up the better part of a French Corps.

My point of view is well illustrated by the computer wargame Age of Rifles - this makes entrenching incredibly powerful but players have to abjure it in Napoleonic scenarios to get historical gameplay.

It was not easy to assault an enemy formation even though the rate of fire was low. The effect of a point blank salvo was devastating. Firepower by Major-General BP Hughes has some examples of it.

At Blenheim in 1704 where 5 English battalions lost about a third of its strength in just one salvo from the French defenders, fired at about a distance of 30 paces. He estimates it to about 20% of all muskets fired found a target.

At Fontenoy 1745 the English attackers did get the first salvo, also at 30 paces, with about 25% of the muskets hit. Its described how some of the French battalions lost their whole front rank in just one salvo.

Losses like that is enough to disrupt an enemy unit so any further advance would most likely cause a quick rout before any actual melee started.

These are extreme examples as other attacks bugged down at 100+ yards with both sides engaging in a firefight.

A battalion would not fire all its muskets in one salvo in such prolonged firefights but it would be done by platoons to create more or less a continous fire. Its difficult to get soldiers to advance in such circumstances.

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It is interesting to see how entrenchments was used a lot more in the Civil War compared to the Napoleonic Wars. But I think the best reason for it is that the increase in firepower meant attacking was more difficult than earlier and that eventually meant that a defender had the time to actually do the digging needed for such positions. Maneuver warfare was simply more difficult to achieve.

WW1 is of course a more extreme example of that: airplanes to discover any large enemy maneuvers, more defensive capabilities using bolt-action rifles and machine guns as well as having very big armies so no open flanks.

All these elements made attacking difficult as it was nearly impossible to achieve any kind of breakthrough so the lines settled and gave time to develop extensive entrenchments that just made attacking even worse.

The fixed positions and help of telephone lines just gave long range artillery even more power. A vicious circle really.


CBR

The failures of WWI are more obvious than in the Civil War. In WWI, the means were readily available to circumvent trench warfare, but they were heavily resisted by the old guard. Most military leaders still thought of warfare in the sense of two armies pulling up face to face and slogging it out until one broke. They intentionally ignored and inhibited the development of technology and tactics that would have resolved the situation. The development of the tank was heavily resisted and only came to fruition after the horrendous slaughters began to have a huge impact on the home front. Even after the development of the tank, it was used rarely and improperly. Even AFTER WWI, where its usefulness had been proven decisively, most armed forces resisted the development of tank corps or the use of tanks in anything other than a support role.

Most of the major breakthroughs in WWI were done by (relatively) small units operating on local tactical level using stealth, speed and/or surprise. What is most remarkable is not that the "over the top" charges occurred at all, it is that they persisted throughout the war. Military leaders refused to accept the idea that it was a futile tactic that achieved nothing more than slaughter of both sides. This eventually evolved into an Allied strategy to simply fight trench warfare until the Germans ran out of men. That is not tactics, that is simply slaughter.

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It was not easy to assault an enemy formation even though the rate of fire was low. The effect of a point blank salvo was devastating. Firepower by Major-General BP Hughes has some examples of it.

At Blenheim in 1704 where 5 English battalions lost about a third of its strength in just one salvo from the French defenders, fired at about a distance of 30 paces. He estimates it to about 20% of all muskets fired found a target.

At Fontenoy 1745 the English attackers did get the first salvo, also at 30 paces, with about 25% of the muskets hit. Its described how some of the French battalions lost their whole front rank in just one salvo.

Losses like that is enough to disrupt an enemy unit so any further advance would most likely cause a quick rout before any actual melee started.

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Yes, I can see that, although it must be a moot point whether one volley at 30 yards was any worse than four at 100 yards. And the charging infantry would of course have their own volley, as the Fontenoy case showed.

There's another thing, which is that if you are getting 25% hits at 30 yards, 75% of your infantry are not contributing killing power to the battle. (I realise that is too simplistic because of course you need the 100% firing to get the 25% hits, muskets being what they were. Say that you cause casualties of 25% of your number then). Whereas bayonet to bayonet, even in three lines, 33% of the infantry are directly engaged in killing the enemy (and vice versa of course). And whats more I think a bayonet duel would last less time that the 30 seconds needed to get off a musket ball (I have never fenced with a bayonet, but I have with a foil, and if you are both going for the point you rarely have to wait even ten seconds for a hit) So if we said the average bayonet duel would produce a casualty in, say, 20 seconds (which is surely very conservative indeed), and you have third of your infantry causing casualties rather than a quarter, you are causing (and taking) casualties at, err, roughly double the rate, if my maths is right.

Ultimately I think the reasons for prefering volleys to closing to hand to hand must be psychological?

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Originally Posted by English assassin

Ultimately I think the reasons for prefering volleys to closing to hand to hand must be psychological?

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Warfare is done by humans and not machines so psychology is basically everything. The point blank salvoes produced devastating losses that would completely disrupt and collapse a unit. If a countercharge is done right after such a salvo not many units would be able to hold with such losses and the confusion and panic that was caused by them. And the salvo would most likely be enough to rout the unit.

You will find many attacks that stopped before they got to the point blank range as the men would rather stay at a "safe" distance and shoot back than doing something that feels suicidal. Having battalions fire by platoons meant the enemy never could feel safe for 20+ seconds as they faced continous shooting.

An attacker who outnumbered the defender wanted to close in as the melee would be fast and a defender would rout quickly but the guns simply prevented most attacks for reaching their target.

IIRC there is an incident where the soldiers in an English batallion all turned around to get their backpacks off. That made the French unit facing it to suddenly charge. But there were time enough to turn around and fire a salvo and then they charged to scatter the surprised French. That is all about psychology as the French thought it was safe to advance.

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Whereas bayonet to bayonet, even in three lines, 33% of the infantry are directly engaged in killing the enemy (and vice versa of course).

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Hm If I use same logic I would say that with muskets you have all 3 lines (100%) engaged in killing the enemy ~;) IIRC in most cases one side routed very quickly and not many men were actually killed by bayonets. Even in the melee oriented ancient/medieval battlefield not that many men were killed in actual fighting but in the pursuit after a unit had routed.

The ability of an outnumbering attacker to win quickly in a melee is not in doubt, its the ability to close in that is. Psychological factors are important in both situations.


CBR

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What I don't understand about Napoleonic warfare is why entrenchments were not more common on the battlefield.

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I can think of some few things. First, you need time to dig yourself down, like a day. Second you're quite stuck in that position, so the enemy can simply move around you. Third, this I don't know but at the Napoleonic age perhaps a disrespect for trench warfare was in place?
And the Forth point, the biggest one. Are you going to attack an entrenched enemy? Atleast during the 30-years war, a good way to avoid a battle was to dig yourself down.

That's why there was so few trenches in the big battles, when the enemy was digged down, you didn't attack him, but tried to flank him or tried to cut of his supplies.

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Ultimately I think the reasons for prefering volleys to closing to hand to hand must be psychological?

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Mostly yes, but that volley is going to take the edge of the attack due to problems passing the bodies. Still, the Caroliners (Karl XII troops) was trained for attack and to be completly silent to get extra morale decrease for the enemy. Taking a charge was always morale decreasing.

Wait I almost forgot one important thing. Cannons. In close range the accuracy increased and they changed ammonition to shotgun type (I'm not sure of the name in English). This is probably a big reason not to go into melee.

Does anyone have any idea of the frequency of hand to hand combat in the Napoleonic Wars? I know that despite common perceptions, the charge to melee was relatively rare as far back as the US Civil War. Does this apply even farther back as well?

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They intentionally ignored and inhibited the development of technology and tactics that would have resolved the situation.

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And that is actually a bit harsh. Tank technology was still new and a lot of them had mechanical breakdowns. It takes time to figure out what to do and then the find the best way of implementing them.

When they faced the horrors of trench warfare they did try new things trying to break through it. One way was to produce huge numbers of heavy artillery in a way to smash the enemy bunkers and machinegun positions before the big attack. At Somme 1916 the English were confident that the week long barrage (more than a million grenades fired IIRC) had done the job.

When the war started all armies had mainly medium artillery meant for the fast maneuver warfare that everyone expected it to be. It took time to produce the newer heavy types.

Germans used gas already in 1915 hoping that would be the thing.

Later on the Germans started using modern day infantry tactics but even that was no miracle as it still wasnt easy to get supplies forward after the first advance as railways were still the best way to do that.

The fact is that the tanks and trucks that was needed simply wasnt there and it took time to develop them as well as getting them in sufficient numbers and be reliable enough.

Sure you can always find some stupid general/poltician but overall they did try to new ways to win the war.


CBR

TinCow - I think I have seen some statistics that the number of bayonets wounds in Napoleonic Wars was less than 1% or so of all wounds through combat. I am not sure if that included melee causalties due to cavalry (sabre and lance), but that probably does not alter the conclusion much.

Shock combat was more common in the Napoleonic period than in the ACW but even then I suspect it was more a psychological contest over ground - a test of wills - rather than a means of killing. I suspect there is something like a "fight or flight" issue going on, and that when one determined side starts to get close enough to fight at hand to hand, the other side falls back or breaks. This is my reading of occaisions when French assaults broke the enemy and of other occaisions when they French assaults were repulsed by British counter-charges.

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Originally Posted by Simon Appleton

What I don't understand about Napoleonic warfare is why entrenchments were not more common on the battlefield.

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Well, the Peninsular (in particular) was a war of movement. Wellesley knew his teeny British army hadn't a chance in hell of beating the massive French ones - although a large proportion of the French in Spain and Portugal were tied up guarding supply lines, messengers etc (note of interest: reports from the time suggest that a single mesenger required 40 dragoons escort) against the guerilleros. Wellesley had to maneuvre himself into positions where he could take advantage of his strengths (the British infantryman fired 4 rounds per minute, to the French 3, allowing them to deploy in 2 ranks to the French 3, and so have more firepower than the French, but the same rate of fire).

A great example of this is Busaco. Wellesley used his 'passive agression' tactic (advance, grab the high ground, and make the French counterrattack him over easily defensible terrain) to perfection here. His 50,000 British and Portuguese were then able to beat the 65,000 French under Marshal Massena very convincingly. Wellington then continued his retreat towards Lisbon, having done the French some serious harm.

Because Wellesley was constantly shifting his army around, and the sucession of Marshalls had to chase him, there simply wasn't much time for fortifying positions. The notable exception, of course, is the lines of Torres Vedras.

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In close range the accuracy increased and they changed ammonition to shotgun type (I'm not sure of the name in English).

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In English, case, or caseshot. Often but inaccurately called grapeshot , which was a naval load only.

What's the difference between caseshot and canister? Or are they the same thing?

I agree with all here who say that the degree of fortification is dependent on the nature of the engagement, not the weapons involved. Even the ancient Akhaians threw up a wall by the beach to protect their ships, and dug a shallow moat, with spikes, in front of it.

DA

As far as bullets versus armor. When guns first came about the armour would usually protect the wearer. But once guns became more advanced wearing the armour was deadlier than wearing none, mainly due to the fact that both the bullet and the area of the armour being hit would turn into shcrapnel. So this would more likely cause vital organs to get hit.