MMG has released a demo of Civil War Bull Run. You can grab it at their website here. It is a nice little game for $20. You will find the AI much more challenging than RTW...
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MMG has released a demo of Civil War Bull Run. You can grab it at their website here. It is a nice little game for $20. You will find the AI much more challenging than RTW...
Downloading the demo now, thanks Red Harvest.
Did you ever play the Sid Meier civil war games?
Agh! Just ordered the full game a few days ago.
Oh well ,pretty sure I won't regret it.
SpencerH .Played Gettys Burg all the time ,and it's still one of my all time favorite war games.
And everything I've read about Bull Run ,makes it sound even better.
Yeah I thought it was a good game that seems to be very overlooked.
Okay, I played some of the demo and I'm impressed. Pretty cool, but for a demo I was surprised at how much marching along the road through the woods there was - it really slowed things down, but the fighting was pretty good. I'll play a little more of the demo to be sure, but it hardly seems like you can go wrong for $20. I like it so far.
If you like Cossacks, the same people are making a civil war game now.Quote:
Originally Posted by Gelatinous Cube
As for CWBR, just download the demo and see for yourself ~D
my only knock on this game so far is that the gamespeed adjustment is utterly useless. i mean, some people might enjoy watching sprites march down a road for 10 minutes, but i'll take a pass. i popped on time compression only to find that it barely increases the game speed. instead of marching like arthritic senior citizens with a broken hip, they march like arthritic senior citizens after the hip's healed up. besides that nag, this game does indeed seem very cool. a lot like sid meier's gettysburg, but updated.
Here's a pretty thorough review from The Wargamer
http://www.wargamer.com/reviews/civilwar_bullrun/
Yep, unfortunately XP SP2 effectively kills both Gettysburg and Antietam. I enjoyed both of them. I think CWBR is considerably tougher.Quote:
Originally Posted by SpencerH
There are some facets of the CWBR game that are going to need some adjustment for the next in the series, but they have made a very good start.
There is no campaign as it only focuses on the battle/scenarios. We can just hope they eventually will make it MP.
But I do find US Civil War tactics to be pretty boring compared to Napoleonic warfare. But its definitely a good game considering it was made by two guys in their spare time.
CBR
Oh yes they just never had the good quality cavalry for the shock action plus the terrain was not always suited for the cavalry. That and the tendency to dig in whenever they could which you rarely saw in earlier times.
But apart from that it was still very Napoleonic in its basics.
CBR
An interesting subject and one I've been trying to come to grips with for some time. I'm not as familiar with Napoleonic cavalry as I would like to be, but in most cases, cavalry of the pre-ACW period seems to be overrated or remembered for a few dashing moments such as dealing the coup de grace to a wavering foe. They were certainly difficult to maintain with real quality.Quote:
Originally Posted by CBR
The problem is that the type of cavalry you describe was obsolete, as were most Napoleonic tactics by the end of the American Civil War. Entrenchment became common because of improved rifles and artillery--these forced the infantry to dig in. And even the best shock cavalry in the world would have been reduced to a useless state by the end of a season of campaigning--making extended elite training of questionable value. Weapons and warfare had advanced to the point that Napoleonic cavalry were not effective. It simply would have been a waste of resources to even fully develop shock cavalry. They couldn't be employed against entrenched forces, and mounted infantry were far more effective in wooded terrain. JEB Stuart was a big fan of saber fighting and all that, but it wasn't terribly practical against ordered or disciplined infantry (or even at times in the American revolution...such as at Cowpens.) NB Forrest used his cavalry to get to the point of action/decision and dismount. He preferred arming his men with revolvers and carbines that were more versatile and deadly in thickets (where much of the fighting happened) than long rifles would be. In the ACW cavalry became almost completely mounted infantry.
In few places would the terrain favor mounted combat against an organized foe. And even on open ground, a man with a revolver or a breach loading carbine was going to be quite effective vs. mounted cavalry--not to mention a repeater. And good breachloaders could be used from the saddle. The mobility of a horse was highly useful, but in getting infantry to key points rapidly, not so much in actual combat. Major force deployments still relied on foot slogging, but also on trains and by boat. During the ACW mounted infantry developed to the point that it could be deployed to hold against formed infantry. This was particularly true of units such as Wilder's Lightning Brigade that used Spencer repeaters to hold off a confederate infantry division at Hoover's gap. Has shock cavalry ever existed that could prove more effective than trained repeater armed mounted infantry?
Cavalry's weakness is that it was a dependent arm. It relied on artillery or infantry action to first disorder enemies so that they would break when charged. While infantry rifles and artillery advanced, horses were not going to become an order of magnitude faster. Cavalry is also an offensive arm. Cavalry did not hold ground in the face of an infantry attack. Mounted infantry could and did as their weaponry improved.
In the ACW cavalry/mounted infantry were mainly used for screening, raids, protecting lines of communication, and probing. The density of troops required in most campaigns in the ACW almost invariably led to problems with finding adequate forage. The animals were ridden hard, poorly fed, and soon broken down. Cuirassiers could hardly be expected to fluorish in such an environment. The men were often poorly fed as well...so this wasn't necessarily animal neglect, but men lasted longer. How many infantry could be fed and maintained for the cost of maintaining a single horse?
So that is my conclusion: Logistics, terrain, and weaponry all made traditional cavalry obsolete by the time of the ACW.
P.S. Although this has an "America-centric" ring to it, I believe that the major developments that occurred during the ACW were really a matter of timing on the world stage. The conflict started at a time when many new technologies were coming to the forefront around the world and it involved two highly literate societies (for the time.) It lasted long enough that the new tech was encouraged and implemented.
It's been said many times that the ACW was the first 'modern' war and in many ways, including the virtual elimination of the effectiveness of the massed cavalry charge and the change to using cavalry as mobile inf, it was.
My only knowledge of the ACW is basically the Osprey series (oh yes I knew the way the war was fought and by whom for what reason and where, but never any details on the battles themselves), and I must say that compared to the Napoleonic battles there is a severe lack of subleties and refined tactics. And those books were in many cases written by authors who are very proud and perhaps suffer from a bit of a minority complex, so it isn't as if the authors are biased against the ACW.
Take a look at Shiloh or Antietam and you will find mishmash battles where the initial plan was fine, but the generals were simply not up to the job, and thus the battle devolved into a scrum where it was basically who could deal out the most damage the fastest head on.
Many would argue that the CSA had good generals, but I think it came more down to their troops than their generalship, but I would agree that the CSA generals were better commanders (than their northern counterparts, save Sherman and Grant), just not anything great.
Yes, that pretty much says how I have felt it was fought. Two sluggers going at it in the ring, Ali dancing, no fancy overhand-rights, just pure straight rights and lefts.
Jamestown (or what it was called, you know the one where the Union tried to get across a river and had to fight uphill), is the epithomy of tactical forgetfulness.
But was it really a volounteer war all the way through? I mean it was almost every ablebodies male in the south, and a serious part of the same population on the north. That has only been done since by conscription.
But I do know of the 90-day heroes (which in their own right forced a number of hasty battles because the generals didn't dare to extend their terms).
It cost half that of RTW but no campaign or replayability? I reckon only two factions and not a lot of unit variety. And the graphics look MTW-ish.Quote:
Originally Posted by CBR
On the scale of 1 to 5 how would you guys rate this game? ~:)
Well I must say that I havent played it much and dont plan to either, mainly because the tactics are poor (and thats the era and not some game mechanic problem) and that there is no MP.Quote:
Originally Posted by Quietus
I bought MTW for MP only as the campaign simply doesnt interest me, so a game with no campaign doesnt bother me of course. But I did feel it was worth the to support the creators of CWBR. Afterall they managed to make a battle engine with less bugs than RTW...
So I would say its a good game (4/5) for any who is interested in the Civil War but for others it would be too limited. But do try the demo (dont know whats in it actually heh) as it is afterall a tactical battle engine and interesting to try out.
CBR
Gelatinous Cube, the Battle of the Crater was at Petersburg, not Jamestown. There were so many things screwed up by the Union in that battle it is unlikely they could have tried to screw up and been any more effective. In addition to what GC mentioned, the Union dictated when the attack would start, yet amazingly, the units that were to participate in the attack weren't ready when the explosion happened. The Confederates around the Crater where stunned for several minutes. A Union attack at this time would have collapsed the Confederate defenses and ended the trench warfare stalemate. Would have... There is a great quote from Grant about the missed opportunity, but I can't find it.
I rate it a 4/5. It is narrow in scope, but executes well in that scope. Graphically it is using 2D images on the 3D map. Replay is limited because it is a single battle--just like the Sid Meier's Antietam and Gettysburg, or the Waterloo game. However, in addition to the scenarios there is "open play". And open play is interesting because you never know what you will face or from what direction. You might get an absolute walkover, or something completely impossible, or something in between--just like real life.Quote:
Originally Posted by Quietus
RTW fails in both the strategic and tactical level. They didn't execute well at either and there is little challenge vs. either. RTW is like playing checkers with an ornate chessboard, a beautiful setting with so much lost potential. Most players (including myself) won't be able to beat a CWBR scenario on the normal play level the first time out. Contrast that with RTW.
Shiloh and Antietam were early war battles. The generals were indeed not up to the job in the early years. In the East it was the Union generalship that was poor. In the West it was the CSA generalship that was terrible while Union generalship was largely mediocre.Quote:
Originally Posted by Kraxis
Shiloh had problems from the outset with the CSA deployment. The attack was carried out with the 3 corps attacking in 3 successive parallel waves. It should have been done with the corps divided into 3 wings. Shiloh was thicket and creeks interspersed with fields. No corps commander could maintain control over several miles of front through such terrain (or even open terrain for that matter.) Once the initial attacks had stalled, the corps commanders took command of the intermingled forces in their area as wings. Bragg failed to use flanking forces to envelope the hornet's nest, and thereby blunted his attack by successive piecemeal frontal assaults.
Antietam I am less familiar with since I haven't studied it in detail. I've read some accounts of it and other battles where Union commanders stuck to the Napoleonic tactic of holding 1/3rd of their forces as a reserve. That worked when your opponent did the same...but wiley folks like Lee and Forrest would throw in everything they had at the decisive points, giving them localized superioriety in attack or equivalence in defense that was sufficient to hold. These generals were more modern in their approach...and less traditional.
Much of the war was bludgeon style, but terrain was a large part of it. As best I can tell, europeans at the time were not fighting the majority of their battles in heavy forest and thicket. It was hard to see the ends of a regiment in such conditions or even to identify the enemy. Once division or corps commanders sent their forces into the woods, much of the fighting devolved to brigade control (at best) or regimental level control.
There are plenty of examples of large scale flanking moves and such. Bull Run was such an attack, and nearly succeeded. Most ACW battles revolved around gaining or holding some vital transportation link (cross roads, or rail hubs, or mountain passes.)
Wilson's Creek is an interesting very early battle. I've been over this battle field a few times and the woods and hills make it tough to maneuver or see (only about 60 miles from where I grew up, and very much the same type of hills woods, and streams.) The Union commander Lyon had quite a few 90 day men who were about to complete their tour. His force was only about 40% of the size of the CSA and Missouri State Guard units nearby who were massing for an attack. So Lyon did a night march out of town and attempted a daybreak pincer attack to disperse them and thereby gain time for his Federal forces. His main body fought very well. Interestingly, his pincer attack failed to have the desired effect, arguably because it was led by an experienced European (German) of mediocre skill and poor judgement, Franz Sigel--who had fought in the German revolution of 1848. While Sigel was initially successful in scattering the rebel forces by bombarding their camp, he mistook an advancing CSA regiment for the gray clad 1st Iowa. When they unexpectedly fired on his force from 40 yards, his men scattered. This doomed the vastly outnumbered main force, which repulsed three counterattacks on their line, losing Lyon in the process. Despite being very early in the war, the Federals withdrew in good order even though they had suffered 25% casualties, lost their commander, and had a handful of cavalry while the rebels had thousands of mounted men.
I give it a 4/5.
I particularly like the GUI it gives it that sense of realism
give the orders and wait.
CBR i heard you were off playing Silent Hunter III,
is it as good as the mags say it is ?
Antietam was quite interesting.
The battleplan was to attack the CSA forces in succession. Each corps mounting an attack to draw in the neighbouring the units, then the next corps would come in against a weaker line and so on. It was done in mainly open terrain with some hills and cropfields. But there was a major bungle up in getting off too late, the individual corps attacked too late comparatively to each other, so instead of the CSA getting depleted, it was themselves that got defeated in detail.
The major problem was that the only true regular force in the Union army, 5th Corps I believe, made up entirely of regulars was not used at all.
While European forces had about 1/3 in reserve that was to counter any enemy surprises, to stiffen attacks and throw back counterattacks. Basically a firebrigade. Had the 5th corps been used as such, it would without a doubt have been a Union victory, ending the war right there.
As I said earlier, the plans were sound enough, but often they were not up to the task of actually carrying them out. Shiloh is a definate proof of overcomplicating the task, as well as the order: "if you don't know where the battle is, head for the sound of the guns". Not that great in a forest where you suddenly face a canister spewing 6 pounder.
Chancelorsville, or what it was, was also a major tactical bungle. The list goes on... Quite simply it was often a a realist knowing his own quite limited abilities up against a one of equal limited abilities not knowing his limitations.
And you can't hold it against Sigel that he made an error like that. His enemy didn't have that problem with him. It happene all the time in the early war, and mostly with Union troops firing on Union troops. With that in mind I find it likely that Lyon had made it specific to his subordinates that he didn't want any FF at all, he simply couldn't afford it. So the CSA troops marching on Sigel realized that he didn't know they were his enemies marched as close as possible before firing. The fact that they did that would have confirmed for Sigel that they were friendly (they haven't fired yet... good... an enemy would have done that long ago). Especially considering the abilities and experince of the troops that early in the war. Such daring and nerve would have been almost unthinkable.
Interesting that two small developer games are getting a lot of attention on this forum lately.
CWBR ,and Mount and Blade.
Got them both ,and they're two of the best games I've played in years.
Anyway ,thought I'd get that one in .
Yes, McClellan was far too timid. Great organizer and trainer, charismatic, but a poor battlefield commander because he lacked boldness. However, his basic concept for Antietam was flawed in my opinion. Trying to coordinate successive attacks across a wide front invites timing errors from the outset. His men had to march to position and develop the enemy positions...one can see how trying to time series assaults would have little hope of proper coordination under the circumstances. And series attack vs. arced defensive formations also allows defenders to support one another via interior lines. This is the recipe for defeat in detail because the defender's flanks are protected, while the attacker's flanks are necessarily exposed by each advance. Much better to call for a general advance so that fighting will still be ongoing in each sector and therefore mutually supporting and denying the enemy the ability to shift units from sector to sector. Whichever enemy sector is nearest collapse is the one to hurl the reserves at.Quote:
Originally Posted by Kraxis
I can hold this one against Sigel. There is a lot more to the story. He pressed Lyon heavily to have his german regiments detached to do this flank attack. Lyon was actually opposed to splitting the force as were the other commanders, but after a private discussion consented and provided Sigel with some dragoons to guide him.Quote:
And you can't hold it against Sigel that he made an error like that. His enemy didn't have that problem with him. It happene all the time in the early war, and mostly with Union troops firing on Union troops. With that in mind I find it likely that Lyon had made it specific to his subordinates that he didn't want any FF at all, he simply couldn't afford it. So the CSA troops marching on Sigel realized that he didn't know they were his enemies marched as close as possible before firing. The fact that they did that would have confirmed for Sigel that they were friendly (they haven't fired yet... good... an enemy would have done that long ago). Especially considering the abilities and experince of the troops that early in the war. Such daring and nerve would have been almost unthinkable.
Sigel misread the lull after the first confederate counterattack on Lyon as a general withdrawal by the confederates. He ceased fire from his battery and did *nothing* as he assumed the rebels were in full retreat while they were actually regrouping for another assault. Sigel then utterly failed to properly secure his position and did not send an officer forward to determine the nature of the approaching troops until they were quite close. The officer, a Capt. Tod, realized too late and was shot as he attempted to raise his weapon, just before the rebels attacked. A bit earlier Sigel did have his regiments wave their banners to signal they were union since they were also not wearing regulation blue. That prompted fire from a rebel battery along a wooded hill to his right which he had failed to identify. Sigel's brigade was also flanked a few seconds later by two other regiments of which he was apparently unaware. He made too many mistakes at once for me to dismiss this one. He was on some of the more open terrain (a small plateau) and yet saw nothing before it was too late. Incidentally, two of the same CSA regiments that defeated him had just repelled a small federal task force's attempt to silence a battery enfilading Lyon's line from across Wilson's Creek. These CSA units had done quite a bit of marching to reach Sigel. Had Lyon had the Sigel's extra men with him, he could have used a larger force to successfully deal with the battery that enfiladed his own position on Bloody Hill. Being short a brigade was critical.
Sigel had a "history" of poor judgement. A few weeks before he had rashly charged out to Carthage, Missouri (without authorization if memory serves) with the same two german regiments, intent on kicking the secessionist Missouri State Guard out of the state. That edge of the state is mostly prairie and gently rolling hills--ideal terrain for MSG cavalry to gobble up his infantry only force...particulary since he was outnumbered 4:1. Luckily for him, his Germans were well drilled and did good work. (German militia groups in St. Louis had been drilling continuously before the war.) At Carthage Sigel realized after aligning for battle and after an artillery duel that he was going to be enveloped by the cavalry proceeding along his flanks. He was able to retreat in good order using successive creeks as barriers. Fortunately for him MSG cavalry were largely worthless at the time (other than Shelby's tiny command) and the MSG cav commander Rains was one of the most inept cavarly commanders of the ACW (perhaps only matched by Stahel, Sigel's close friend and cavalry commander at New Market.) A battalion of Sigel's Missouri infantry performed a bayonet charge on some cavalry that blocked their escape route, scattering the riders. One thing Sigel was competent at was retreat. He wasn't really a bad person and he was a decent organizer, but he had poor strategic judgement and he fumbled badly in key situations, resulting in disaster for his commands at Wilson's Creek, MO later at New Market, VA and finally at the supply depot Martinsburg where he abandoned all the stores and retreated his command without a shot. The fiasco at Martinsburg got him relieved of all command.
Another of McClellan's failings at Antietam (and other battles), was that his intelligence network was bad - run by Allen Pinkerton (later the founder of the famous Pinkerton Detectives). Pinkerton and his people were terrible spies and the numbers on Lee's strength where always over inflated. Then when McClellan got the numbers, he inflated them even more. McClellan had just under 90000 men at Antietam. Lee had only about 35000 men, but McClellan was convinced Lee's army numbered over 100000. McClellan was being "courageous" by taking the attack to Bobby Lee even though he was "outnumbered".
Well I liked the demo so much I went out and bought the game. Only problem is for some reason I cant see any units in the game :furious3:
Confederate and Union Battlefield Ninjas maybe?~:joker:
I have played a bit of MP but I dont think its very suited for that. The campaign on the other hand is very good IMO.Quote:
Originally Posted by IceTorque
CBR
Cavalry was certainly expensive but definitely worth it. Napoleon actually changed the way it was used and formed whole divisons of cavalry and Im pretty sure some of the largest cavalry charges in Western history happened during these years.Quote:
Originally Posted by Red Harvest
A bit of info on it here:
http://www.napoleon-series.org/milit...n/c_eylau.html
AFAIK this book did dispell some of the myths about the US Civil War: Battle Tactics of the American Civil War by Paddy Griffith. Just using my (perhaps) corrupted memory right now:Quote:
The problem is that the type of cavalry you describe was obsolete, as were most Napoleonic tactics by the end of the American Civil War. Entrenchment became common because of improved rifles and artillery--these forced the infantry to dig in.
Cavalry that could make fast maneuvers to outflank enemy infantry and rout them quickly was by no means obsolete. It was used in the Franco-Prussian war too. The frontal assault might have been made slightly more difficult but was not easy during Napoleonic times anyways. There was just no large numbers of cavalry nor was it trained for such attacks (being used more as mounted infantry) and the terrain didnt help on it either.
The doctrine about digging in started before artillery and rifles changed any tactics. The main reason for it was that the Americans saw their militia infantry to be not as strong as regular infantry so fortifications were a must to bolster the defense.
Most artillery were 12 pounder muzzleloaders and in the beginning of the war a lot of infantry still used smoothbore muskets too as well as getting nearly no proper traning to use their weapons. Collected data on average ranges for musket/rifle engagements suggests a small increase in the later years but nowhere near the potiential the rifle had compared to the musket. And overall the ranges doesnt seem to be much different than what was seen during Napoleonic times. The main explanation for that would be the lack of training and the general confusion during a engagement meant that soldiers didnt aim very well, so the rifle's potiential was more or less wasted.
The last stage of the war there as some aggressive use of cavalry (more or less the first time IIRC) which showed how good cavalry was, instead of just doing raids and recon. In most occasions it was used dismounted but IIRC at one point cavalry frontally attacked some trenches.
I cannot comment on how logistics in USA would have made it worse for cavalry compared to say Europe but that is a local thing and nothing to do with technology and tactics. But that along with the terrain might have given ACW shock cavalry some problems. But nonetheless it still took nearly 4 years IIRC before we see some good battlefield use of cavalry (actions leading up to Appomattox). Cavalry was always good at pursuing and enhancing an enemy rout but was simply not present at all and that IMO made way too many battles indecisive.
CBR
Quote:
Originally Posted by Gelatinous Cube
No doubt about that. But I really wish I had a few good regiments of Cuirassiers when playing CWBR ~:)
CBR
That may be so, but it has always puzzled me why Napoleonic era generals did not dig in more[1]. The fact that you can get your regulars to line up close together and get shot does not necessarily mean it's the smart thing to have done. Reflecting on the dominating effect of, say, Hougomont at Waterloo or even the redoubts at Borodino, I can't help feeling the American "militia" generals could have taught the Europeans a thing or two. Actually, I guess they tried to at Bunker Hill. I read an interesting account of how a British flanking attack there was thwarted because overnight the Americans constructed a wall (!) that blocked its intended path. Indeed, I am not sure it was a one-off - I recall there being a pretty impressive line of fortified defences at Saratoga, although Benedict Arnold showed that the Americans did not need them.Quote:
Originally Posted by CBR
[1]This is frighteningly demonstrated in the computer wargame Age of Rifles. There are a lot of great Napoleonic scenarios available on the web, but they are ruined as simulations if you order your men to dig in - the battles will degenerate into a series of Hougomonts.
Well that is a good question. At several battles one side had lots of time to do some kind of fortification.
One reason for it, would be that it does take a certain amount of work to get a fortification that will actually do anything good:
A foxhole might be nice in modern warfare but wouldn't do a damn thing 200 years ago. Same thing with a trench. If you want to stop an enemy attack you need concentrated firepower from a 2-3 rank line or have some kind of fortification that will help you stop the enemy from reaching you or at least give you some kind of advantage like the big redoubts at Borodino. That and having a ordered line of infantry that are ready to counter attack.
In the ACW you see lots of trench lines and infantry digging foxholes whenever they could, so why would that have helped them at all?
My bet is that the US generals were right when they spotted the weaknesses of their militia infantry. Sure they could drill them well to do the maneuvers needed but they couldn't expect them to do the things regular infantry could do like a proper assault. Lots of attacks stalled during Napoleonic times and ended in a missile fight at 100-200 yards so I would expect ACW infantry to do the same or perhaps be even more inclined to stop before being able to charge in.
If the tendency for infantry was to engage in missile fights and rarely go in for the assault then it makes sense with trenches and foxholes. There are actually a few example of regiments where the officer managed to get his troop to just fire one salvo only and then charge but it does seem to be very rare. And these attacks were actually successful.
The book mentions some of the troop density of defensive lines to be very weak but the enemy still didnt even try to attack. How to explain that? The attacker didnt rush the defenses because he had a good reason of course. With the statistics we have of firerate as well as length of engagements compared to losses etc there is nothing the suggests that missile fire was that strong to justify such a weak line holding. So it can only be explained by the troops not going in even when facing relative weak enemy fire, and perhaps looking at that enemy fortification just added to the fear so troops preferred to fight at a "safe" distance.
From what I have read on the ACW it was more the uniqueness of the situation in USA: rapid and large buildup of the army added to the doctrine of protection/fortification and defensive terrain that made the tactics of the war and not new techology.
CBR
You have the advantage of me in having read up on the subject! But speaking from comparative ignorance, I am sceptical of the argument of "American exceptionalism" (read "inferiority"). I suspect fortifications were more used in the ACW because of the greater killing power of the rifle compared to the Napoleonic musket, coupled with a more pragmatic, less hide-bound, approach to warfare by Americans in evidence from the birth of their nation.[1] My hunch is that a trench would have some merit even in a Napoleonic battle, but that it would be much more valuable in the age of rifles. Similarly, a foxhole (essentially a trench in loose order!) would be worthwhile when the scales had finally tipped decisively from shock combat to firepower.Quote:
Originally Posted by CBR
You mention the surprisingly low casuality rate from the new rifles as an argument for dismissing the technological explanation. But I wonder if that is not because the American soldier could not shoot straight, but rather because the tactics had adapted to accommodate the greater lethality? Rifles against infantry in loose order or cover might do less damage than muskets against infantry in close formation. An extreme analogy would be nowadays when it is estimated that an American soldier must expend thousands of rounds to kill one enemy - it's not that the American grunt with an M16 could not do a lot of damage to a Napoleonic line, but rather that opponents have adapted enough to keep their heads down. My impression of ACW engagements is that at the tactical level they were often very influenced by the availability of cover - not just trenches and fortifications, but walls, fences, sunken roads, woods etc. More so than with the Napoleonic batttles, where formation, facing etc seem more important. Where Napoleonic style formations were used out in the open in the ACW - e.g. with Pickett's charge - the casualty rates seem to be as high as one would expect.
It would be interesting to look at other European wars around the time of the ACW. I seem to recall fortifications played a rather large role in the Crimean war (when the technology was largely still Napoleonic, at least in the British and Russian armies). And my image of the Franco-Prussian battles is often of bitter fights for towns/villages rather than ranks of close order troops blazing away at each other, but I may be wrong.
I'm also not even convinced that the ACW soldier was of lower quality than the Napoleonic one. Yes, it must be true if we are comparing 1st Bull Run with Austerlitz, but the reverse would be true if we compare Gettysburg with Valmy. My hunch is that the quality of troops at Gettysburg and Austerlitz was probably even (yes, the French were on fine form but I have a lot of respect for the accomplishments of the Army of North Virginia too). While some Napoleonic armies - such as the British - might have relied on "regulars" that were markedly better trained than ACW troops, on the whole Napoleonic wars were the start of the era of mass warfare. French Napoleonic tactics seem partly to have evolved from the starting point of having a revolutionary mob of enthusiastic but not highly trained men at your command. Most rival armies - notably the Prussians and the Austrians - adapted to the French levee en masse by enlarging their armies with conscripts, reservists, part-time soldiers etc (landwehr etc). I also question whether the citizen soldier (often well motivated, in physically good shape) was necessarily inferior to the regular (the "scum of the earth"). The ACW troops might have been less well drilled than the Napoleonic armies, but I am not convinced they were inferior on the battlefield.
[1]Greater availability of trees might also have been a factor - IIRC, it was common in the ACW to construct breastworks from felled trees. Easy to do in the woods of Chickamauga, maybe harder on the farmland of Waterloo.
CBR,
I think the problem is that trying to apply Napoleonic tactics just wasn't going to work in the ACW theaters, even if the units were well drilled. The terrain and logistics wouldn't make them practical here. Simply put you could field a more versatile force for much lower cost. If the US had to fight a large war at that time in Europe, no doubt the tactics would not have been the same as the ACW. A war lasting this long with as many men engaged tends to find its own efficiencies based on the whole environment.
The first time cuirasseurs attempt a charge against a position that doesn't break, you've lost them as an effective force. (Reminds me of the Japanese losing their elite pilots at Midway...their pilot pipeline was too long to replenish.) Even worse in the ACW, you are not going to find many times where that shock cavalry will be more effective than a rifleman. Shock cavalry couldn't find enough open ground in which to operate in most ACW battles--not in the numbers you favor. (Not that a commander could even *see* far enough on most fields to make this possible. Visibility was a big factor in armies groping their way towards one another.) The U.S. had become reasonably adept at replacing 10,000 rifle men after each major battle. Replacing horses was more problematic...
Cavalry pursuits were often attempted against beaten armies in the ACW. Unfortunately, usually even a broken army could find some piece of terrain that acted as a bottleneck to the cavalry (or pursuing infantry.) Burn a bridge. Set up a battery in a road and wait for them with double canister. Fell trees as you withdraw... Take a battalion and ambush the pursuers alongside the road. Nightfall usually settled the matter as units would have reformed overnight. Too much virgin forest perhaps? That certainly played a part in the lack of suitable forage--and therefore the number of horses that could be supported in a theater.
Classifying veteran ACW regiments as militia is erroneous. There were militia as well, and they were considered unreliable. Conscripts and true militia are weak. The volunteers still drilled and they "did drills by the numbers." They were not like militia who wouldn't leave their home state/region. It took time for them to become reliable veterans, but they eventually reached the proficiency level that was needed.
Yes, most of the cannons were 12#'ers but they had switched to rifling. Projectiles and fuses had improved greatly. Twelve pounder smoothbores were on the way out by the middle of the war although present in great numbers. In 1863 at Gettysburg they were 39% of the total. 6#'ers were almost completely gone by midwar (a single one at Gettysburg). The smoothbores were deadlier at close range than rifled weapons, but less effective at extended range. The CSA had trouble producing quality fuses and the like, somewhat limiting the value of rifled pieces for them since they couldn't properly regulate explosive shells. The Federal ammunition had tight quality control and better raw materials, plus, the Federal artillery arm was excellent. A mix of rifled guns with 12# smoothbores was often considered ideal for a battery.
And I disagree with the assertions about accuracy/range not being all that much different. I think you are comparing apples to oranges. What happens when accuracy and range improve? Combat occurs at longer ranges...at least across open ground. Why advance to 100 yards when I can do the work at 200 yards? The loss rate doesn't change in these circumstances because the loss rate is *what the men will tolerate.* You could throw in comparisons of rounds fired per casualty in WWII as well. In the ACW the officers and men did whatever they could to take advantage of fences, cover, or even lying prone to fight. He who held the better piece of cover or got off the first devastating volleys would usually win a firefight unless flanked, out of ammo, etc. Officers and color bearers fell like leaves when on open ground exchanging volleys...that's no accident, they were targeted. In the ACW, it was not uncommon for a regiment to lose all officers above captain in a single tough fight, sometimes leaving only two or three captains.
Not sure where you are going with the trenches bit. Defenders tended to dig in, because they could hold a given piece of ground with fewer men (or fewer casualties.) Why would I stand out in the open to get shot at when I could use a nice trench with a headlog and perhaps a ditch out in front? Let me pare his regiment by 10, 15 or 20% before it can even start to reach my line. Earthworks worked just fine in the ACW...and in the War of 1812. A scratch force of "militia" cut the British to shreds at the battle of New Orleans. And I can find no fault with courage or discipline of those Brits. In the ACW, men got pretty good at building earthworks in just a few hours. Headlogs/rails would be used so that they were essentially using firing slits. With such works attackers often couldn't see them or how many they faced until they took an initial volley...or two...or three...or until they actually reached the works. Defensive works hide one's strength, and that is often critical. Longer range weapons also provide better coverage to the flanks for an entrenched defender. A given gun could cover a lot more area...and enfilade fire was increased, not just frontal fire.
Yes, if you want to take a position via melee, then you should hold fire while advancing. That was used on quite a few occasions in the ACW. Much of this is morale. If an assault force has good morale and is bold, the defenders will often not put up much of a fight when the attacker closes. However when morale was good for the defenders, even massing versus thinly held positions had problems--there was some good use of assault columns by Upton (think it was him) at Spotsylvania. His timing, tactics, and choice of location was good so the massed assault columns were not slaughtered by cannon. And the rebels threw everything they had at his men to succussfully repel them from the rupture. Weak defensive lines typically work because they are reinforced as the attack unfolds. If Upton had been properly reinforced, the breakthrough might have grown to a full rupture. However, his columns did not face galling fire when they attacked either. This was another fight in the woods... And the density of his columns exceeded the defender's by many times.
Oh dont worry. I am by no means an expert on ACW as I havent read that much ~:)Quote:
Originally Posted by Simon Appleton
Oh its not a question of inferiority. The ACW infantry would have been better than say the early French Revolutionary infantry: better drilled, and using doctrines that focused on higher movement rate as well as having rifles. I dont know if the French Elan made any differences.Quote:
But speaking from comparative ignorance, I am sceptical of the argument of "American exceptionalism" (read "inferiority"). I suspect fortifications were more used in the ACW because of the greater killing power of the rifle compared to the Napoleonic musket, coupled with a more pragmatic, less hide-bound, approach to warfare by Americans in evidence from the birth of their nation.[1]
Where the French had advantages of better speed and good use of skirmishers, because their enemies still used the old Prussian liniar style, the ACW infantry faced en enemy that was just like themselves. There were no advantages from better organisation either.
So when ACW infantry did their best to outflank an enemy there was a good chance of the enemy being able to follow and counter the outflanking. And frontally there would be no advantage as both sides would use skirmishers.
It might have been good in some cases yes. Its all a question of how strong firepower is and how good morale the attacker has. Trenches and foxholes reduce your available firepower as you cant use same close order as if standing in the open, but if that is enough to stop the enemy anyway then it will give an advantage. If you cant stop the attack its a deathtrap to sit in holes and trenches in a scattered formation.Quote:
My hunch is that a trench would have some merit even in a Napoleonic battle, but that it would be much more valuable in the age of rifles. Similarly, a foxhole (essentially a trench in loose order!) would be worthwhile when the scales had finally tipped decisively from shock combat to firepower.
Napoleonic infantry didnt use their muskets to anywhere near its potiential. Even the effective British infantry had much lower accuracy than the theoretical. Reasons for it was lack of training and battlefield conditions like smoke, being scared, targets moving etc.Quote:
You mention the surprisingly low casuality rate from the new rifles as an argument for dismissing the technological explanation. But I wonder if that is not because the American soldier could not shoot straight, but rather because the tactics had adapted to accommodate the greater lethality? Rifles against infantry in loose order or cover might do less damage than muskets against infantry in close formation. An extreme analogy would be nowadays when it is estimated that an American soldier must expend thousands of rounds to kill one enemy
I have seen some statistics that points towards British infantry producing around twice the hits IIRC, than the French infantry they faced in some engagements. That shows the effect of training and good fire discipline.
If the training is not better or battlefield conditions changed then its not gonna help much having a rifle instead of a musket. The book mentions some regiments that had been in the field for IIRC two years and involved in several engagements before actually getting any training with their rifles.
AFAIK a lot of engagements during the ACW were very Napoleonic in nature as infantry stood in lines firing just like they had done 50 years earlier. And the smoke wouldnt have been less either so I doubt most of the battlefield conditions were that much different.
Antietam is supposed to be one of the most open battlefields during the ACW and apparently the average engagement range is 107 yards. Smoothbores might have meant something for this average range but it just doesnt look like rifles did that much as one would expect. Data from later parts of the war does suggest a longer range but there is also less data IIRC.
There are some examples of troops being very close to each other but the terrain and fortified positions (on both sides) meant losses were low and the units could be there for hours if not days yes.
If we compare with the modern day soldier, he has an automatic rifle and fires at targets that no longer stands in neat lines and that would cause a big increase in number of rounds used yes. But ACW doesnt appear to be that much different to Napoleonic times.
You're not wrong about the Franco-Prussian War. I know some historians consider that to be the real first modern war. Both sides used breechloaders that gave them a high rate of fire compared to muzzle loaders. I think some French used a method of planting the rifle butt into the ground at an angle of about 45 degrees and just fire away thereby creating a rain of fire one kilometer away. Not very lethal apparently but enough to make the Prussians stop up.Quote:
It would be interesting to look at other European wars around the time of the ACW. I seem to recall fortifications played a rather large role in the Crimean war (when the technology was largely still Napoleonic, at least in the British and Russian armies). And my image of the Franco-Prussian battles is often of bitter fights for towns/villages rather than ranks of close order troops blazing away at each other, but I may be wrong.
The overall lethality of the breechloaders as well as longer range artillery using improved shells compared to ACW meant a very different war and using the old liniar tactic started to be suicidal
Im not that familiar with the Crimean War but wasnt most of the action around the siege of Sevastopol so fortifications would be more natural.
Let me expand a bit on my first comments:Quote:
I'm also not even convinced that the ACW soldier was of lower quality than the Napoleonic one
When we look at the Napoleonic wars the armies had the advantage of time as the conflict lasted more than 20 years. Of course a bit on and off but nonetheless it produced a lot of veterans and experienced officers and sergeants. The Americans only had 4 years.
ACW regiments had the advantage of good drill manuals and they used them well so maneuvers were not a problem (something early French regiments was not good at AFAIK). But IMO having to fight equals did mean ACW looks more like a stalemate than the early years of the Revolutionary Wars even though they were actually better trained.
One thing that might have made the ACW infantry "inferior" would be a lack of good officers and experience in war. Sure they would stand and shoot the enemy but it would be difficult to make them advance. The early years had produced a lot of tired veterans that were good at surviving and perhaps made it even more difficult to make assaults. But that of course is not just an American thing as there are examples like the French at Albuera that were stopped by British troops even when outnumbering them 3 to 1
So I would say that the overall lack of differences between the two sides in ACW made it all worse. Both the units as well as the generals operated under the same principles. And when you no longer have the ability to use massed cavalry attacks like the French could at say Borodino it doesnt improve on the tactical situation.
But IMO the British infantry would be one higher class than ACW infantry. Fire discipline does seem to be better for the British.
Actually I have one example from Total War. I know.. just a silly game that has nothing to do with real life but anyway:
I played MTW online for about 2 years and it was always a much more dynamic game when one side didnt use optimal armies or was of equal skill. But gameplay was very different when you faced armies that was near copies of your own and controlled by players who no longer made any simple mistakes for you to exploit. Suddenly the game was very much a stalemate as the limited sword and cavalry armies did not give that good gameplay as the rock-scissor-paper was not there anymore.
I can compare that to mods that improved the RPS and unit choice and suddenly the dynamic was there again as it was no longer clone armies that faced each other and players have more options than just desperately trying to outflank each other.
For the Napoleonic Wars I would say there is a difference between the early and later years and it was nowhere this "perfect" place for a wargamer but it still has the three elements/arms on the battlefield and the ACW only had two really. Doesnt matter if it was a question of politics or logistics or terrain that meant cavalry wasnt used much but it had a drastic effect on how battles were fought as the combined arms were simply no longer there.
In CWBR the engagement range is not that big really (100-150 yards IIRC) so I think the designers actually made it pretty historical.
CBR
In same way as Pickett's divison was more or less lost at Gettysburg and not easily replaced either.Quote:
Originally Posted by Red Harvest
Cavalry can be used in two ways: the frontal charge or as flanking force.Quote:
Even worse in the ACW, you are not going to find many times where that shock cavalry will be more effective than a rifleman. Shock cavalry couldn't find enough open ground in which to operate in most ACW battles
If you want to see the differences in the way they were used during the ACW just look at Stuart at Gettysburg and then Sheridan around Appomattox.
Nonetheless they rarely used the cavalry they had, for much else than raids. Combined arms on the battlefield or more strategical flanking maneuvers could still be done. There is no real excuse for the lack of agressive use of the cavalry but wrong doctrine. They still used the European concept of massed cavalry but applied it to big cavalry raids instead.Quote:
The U.S. had become reasonably adept at replacing 10,000 rifle men after each major battle. Replacing horses was more problematic...
With the lack of cavalry on the battlefield I doubt they used them well enough as pursuers, neither in the numbers nor soon enough after the battle. But yes in some cases terrain would give advantages to the defeated side, we just cant give terrain all the blame. When most fighting consists of infantry firefights with no proper combined arms its gonna be difficult to rout an enemy and he would just do a organised retreat. It was difficult enough in the age of smoothbore musket warfare to crush an enemy army.Quote:
Cavalry pursuits were often attempted against beaten armies in the ACW. Unfortunately, usually even a broken army could find some piece of terrain that acted as a bottleneck to the cavalry (or pursuing infantry.)
According to Paddy Griffith the Union forces complained about an overabundance of rifled artillery. McClellan only wanted 1 rifled for two smoothbores but never manged to get it down to less than two to one. Hunt got rid of some of rifles after Fredrickburg. A Union army at Mine Run left all its rifled cannons and only took the smoothbores with it for the battle.Quote:
Yes, most of the cannons were 12#'ers but they had switched to rifling. Projectiles and fuses had improved greatly. Twelve pounder smoothbores were on the way out by the middle of the war although present in great numbers. In 1863 at Gettysburg they were 39% of the total. 6#'ers were almost completely gone by midwar (a single one at Gettysburg). The smoothbores were deadlier at close range than rifled weapons, but less effective at extended range.
The extended range of rifled cannons didnt give that big an advantage as artillery did most of its work at shorter ranges where the bigger calibre of the smoothbores (using canister) gave an advantage. The high velocity shells also had a tendency to dig into the ground. And actually ranges to targets didnt always give rifled cannons a chance to use its better range.
If there is one big difference from Napoleonic times then its the fact that 6 pounders were more or less gone by the time of the ACW.
I already commented on that in my post above. A well trained marksman would be able to use the better accuracy and range but if he is poorly trained and/or battlefield conditions are not very good he will not get much more out of it. The theoretical performance increase from musket to rifle was big but actual battle statistics doesnt show it at all. Apples and oranges..yes that is a good way of describing theoretical v actual performance of a weapon as the human factor is the most important one.Quote:
And I disagree with the assertions about accuracy/range not being all that much different. I think you are comparing apples to oranges. What happens when accuracy and range improve? Combat occurs at longer ranges...at least across open ground. Why advance to 100 yards when I can do the work at 200 yards?
And sometimes they didnt have any cover and would stand up in the open. Napoleonic infantry could use cover too. The days of neat lines shooting at each other is something from the wars of the 18th century.Quote:
In the ACW the officers and men did whatever they could to take advantage of fences, cover, or even lying prone to fight.
At New Orleans the American army was behind fieldworks that required ladders to scale them, ladders the Brits didnt bring with them so they got slaughtered.Quote:
Not sure where you are going with the trenches bit. Defenders tended to dig in, because they could hold a given piece of ground with fewer men (or fewer casualties.) Why would I stand out in the open to get shot at when I could use a nice trench with a headlog and perhaps a ditch out in front? Let me pare his regiment by 10, 15 or 20% before it can even start to reach my line. Earthworks worked just fine in the ACW...and in the War of 1812. A scratch force of "militia" cut the British to shreds at the battle of New Orleans. And I can find no fault with courage or discipline of those Brits
What Im talking about is how strong the fortification is. Sure I would love to stand on top of a redoubt but a foxhole/trench is not as good although it would give same protection versus enemy guns and artillery. Why? because it would not help me in melee and might actually be bad as I have to get up to fight. The instant you have defenses that will disorder and even stop regular infantry from getting close to you then you have a great defensive line, but also a line that does take time to build.
The ACW armies had a doctrine for fortifications which the Napoleonic armies lacked. Was that an advance in tactics or a local American phenomenon that suited their infantry dominated armies in defensive terrain? Maybe it was a combination as it might not have given European armies the same type of advantage but it would still have been nice in some circumstances.
Yes that would be important too of course. Also Im not sure how strong the defensive lines were. Have to check it out and see if there are any details. The stronger it the less men you would need.Quote:
In the ACW, men got pretty good at building earthworks in just a few hours. Headlogs/rails would be used so that they were essentially using firing slits. With such works attackers often couldn't see them or how many they faced until they took an initial volley...or two...or three...or until they actually reached the works. Defensive works hide one's strength, and that is often critical
CBR
Antietam is some of the more open ground in ACW battlefields, yet the defense relied on the use of the terrain. Some of the critical fighting occurred at a sunken road, a ready made entrenchment. 107 yards is still longer effective range than the earlier smoothbores had, and Antietam was particularly bloody, with nearly 1/3rd of the rebels falling. Smoothbore muskets often lacked rear sights...that is how limited their ranges were. 100 yards was considered the outside effective range of the smoothbores. Hence, the massed rifle fire tactics that developed. Technology guided the tactics. When ACW smoothbores were converted they often added a rear sight.
The chassepot rifle on the surface looks like an inferior arm to a number of late ACW weapons. A paper cartridge? Why? The Spencer rifle appears to be a much better weapon. Metallic cartridge...seven shot magazine. I don't doubt the chassepot had longer range, but for an american battlefield I would sacrifice extreme range for fire rate and a more weather friendly cartridge. The early war single shot breach loading Sharps rifles were very accurate...it is from them that we got the term sharpshooters. Spencer's were larger caliber and had only slightly lower muzzle velocities. Roughly 100,000 were issued to U.S. troops--I've got a list of over 60 known ACW regiments armed with them. And the Henry rifle was used by about a dozen regiments. Whatever, the case, the French didn't last very long in the Franco-Prussian War.
I don't think the popular perception of ACW lines standing on open ground blazing away is particularly representative. Yes, it happened and was part of maneuver to contact, but usually one of the lines was in some form of cover or rapidly sought some: rail fence, sunken road, stand of trees, stone wall, etc. The other line typically would stand there and trade volleys either waiting for a flanking move or preparatory to an advance or charge. Most charges/advances were repulsed (something like a dozen to one are the stats I've heard...don't know the methodology.) Maneuver under fire was in line formation, but standing erect blazing away was not something that usually lasted very long. Men were cut down too rapidly that way. After a company or two took 1/4 to 1/3rd losses they would waver and fall back. This exposed their neighboring companies who usually followed shortly thereafter.
As mentioned, Pickett's charge is a good example of how deadly open field attacks had become. It was tough to make men advance because that is exactly the sort of fate that awaited even a determined attack in most instances. At Fredricksburg and Cold Harbor the strength of rifle power was pretty clearly demonstrated. The men did indeed go forward but they were cut to pieces. Unlike TW, once a unit has taken 10 or 20% casaulties, it has expended at least half of its fighting potential. While on the surface there may be plenty of men, they are already reaching a critical state.
I still see this as a case of tactics evolving to match terrain and technology--war forced certain efficiencies. Trying to lay this on skill levels of the forces just doesn't stand up to scrutiny.
True enough about cannon ranges. In wooded setting interspersed with fields, a 12# napoleon was a better weapon than a rifled gun. The 12#'er had greater bore. However, on open ground at range the rifled piece would and did knock out the napoleon's. Artillery had both counterbattery and anti-infantry duty. Bowling with solid shot cannon had become less effective on the ACW field, but so were massed formations. If the ground wasn't open or wasn't firm, it didn't work that well anyway. And men parted lines to let the rounds pass (or lay prone). They could see the projectiles coming. One considerable advantage of the rifled guns was that the gun tube weighed 70% of what the 12# Napoleon weighed, making them a more flexible piece. Powder charge for a Napoleon was 2.5 lbs, while it was only 1 lb for the 3" Ordnance and Parrott rifles. So there is efficiency to be had with the rifles both in production and in use.
Production/conversion of Federal rifled field guns was 2:1 vs. that of 12# Napoleon's (~2300 vs. 1100). Rifled field cannon were split among 10/20# Parrot, 3" Ordnance, with lesser James rifle conversions, and James rifle production. I've not heard of McClellan's preference for smoothbore cannon, but that would be early war, and McClellan was only a genius in his own mind. I'm wondering what that Mine Run reference is to? I've got a book on Mine Run which I've only scanned, but I found Federal rifled cannon in use in several instances. I think much of the campaign was in heavily wooded terrain such as "The Wilderness", so it would favor big smoothbores. At Mine Run, Meade decided not to send his forces into a bloody assault against Lee's works--and Lee and even the men in the trenches were eager for it to happen. Meade thereby didn't make the mistakes of the others. But he also failed to be aggressive in catching Lee's army one the move, which is why he faced earthworks.
Yes, I'm aware of flanking efforts with mounted infantry and the final efforts that succeeded. These had been attempted many times before, but the rebels had sufficient resources to counter them. Even if mounted infantry were able to sweep away any mounted defenders (and at times they did), it typically gave the enemy infantry enough time to deploy to counter their moves. Why were they used largely in raids? Because the land could not support the horses--insufficient forage. Also, there was a mounted force available to the infantry sufficient to provide a defensive counter. What good would a cuirasseur be in the woods with an emaciated horse? The mounted arms went through horses at a fast pace.
As far as pursuits go, there were some rather large mounted forces (whole mounted divisions) that could be used for pursuit and at times they were. However, you fail to appreciate the significance of the bottlenecks. Mostly they had to pursue through passes and along roads. In doing so they were quite vulnerable--far more so than infantry. Since they could not know what they would face (visibility again), they were forced to deploy when they found a rearguard was found formed in front of them. Coming around a turn to charge headlong into cannister or an infantry volley was rather devastating and that is is usually what happened to deter mounte pursuit. By using successive units retiring in such a fashion, headlong pursuit was quite difficult and few succeeded. Success generally came from blocking the path of a withdrawing army rather than chasing its tail, not an easy thing to accomplish. It also tended to require that the victor was not too badly bloodied to pursue aggressively--again not a common outcome of battle.
For infantry arms I'm sure we aren't going to agree about the effectiveness of the rifled guns vs. smoothbores. Soldiers of the time considered the smoothbores a real burden, particularly in long range encounters. They exchanged weapons on the field as rapidly as they could, throwing down their smoothbores to pick up Springfield's and Enfields and Lorenz rifled muskets. And the results of troops armed with Spencers and Henry's speak for themselves. This isn't a case of marksmen vs. untrained masses, it is case of more effective arms vs. less effective ones. Wilder's brigade signed promissary notes to buy their own weapons, horrendously expensive at the time, that is how strongly they felt about it. The key limitation to repeaters was the concern the Federal Ordnance bureau had about increased supply logistics. When you quoted a 107 yard separation average at Antietam, it only reinforced the argument that weapons had improved. Some of those forces still used smoothbores, which had a truly effective range less than that. If weapons had not improved I would have expected a closer engagement range. I think the author has cause and effect reversed, an all too common failing.
Hm a lot of missile fights were done at more than 100 yards. Tests done in 18th century showed the musket could produce a good amount of casualties at 200 yards but it would drop a lot at 300. Battlefield conditions were the main reason why it never got close to the theoretical values just as with rifles later on.Quote:
Originally Posted by Red Harvest
Im not saying rifles didnt improve the firepower just that it didnt mean a big change in tactics was needed. Determined infantry could still close in for a bayonet charge but a well disciplined defender could stop a charge with a short range salvo just as we have examples of that in the 18th century.
Oh yes if I could pick the weapon for an army I would rather have a magazine rifle as it would have a higher volume of fire when needed. When soldiers could lie down and still shoot and reload as well as having a higher rate of fire thats when the older tactics started to become outdated.Quote:
The Spencer rifle appears to be a much better weapon. Metallic cartridge...seven shot magazine. I don't doubt the chassepot had longer range, but for an american battlefield I would sacrifice extreme range for fire rate and a more weather friendly cartridge. The early war single shot breach loading Sharps rifles were very accurate.
But overall most soldiers used muzzleloaders during the war. The later phase saw some use of Spencers and Sharps and showed how good they were. Compare that to the French and Prussian armies that all had breechloaders and the Prussians who had breechloading artillery too. I would saythe battlefield was much more lethal compared to the ACW but the later phase of the ACW did show the potiential of the next generation of weapon just on a limited scope.Quote:
Spencer's were larger caliber and had only slightly lower muzzle velocities. Roughly 100,000 were issued to U.S. troops--I've got a list of over 60 known ACW regiments armed with them. And the Henry rifle was used by about a dozen regiments.
Yes a good example but how much different from a later Napoleonic battle? The Union had more than 300 artillery pieces in that battle. Making attacks against such an amount of firepower would never have been easy.Quote:
As mentioned, Pickett's charge is a good example of how deadly open field attacks had become.
I dont see how rifles showed to be something spectacular better in these battles. The Union wave of attacks against Marye's Heights faced an brigade behind a wall and artillery on the height right behind them. It was a formidable position that would have been difficult to assault 50 years earlier.Quote:
At Fredricksburg and Cold Harbor the strength of rifle power was pretty clearly demonstrated. The men did indeed go forward but they were cut to pieces.
If you wanted to take such a position I see no other way but to mass 3-4 brigades in attack columns and go straight at it with bayonets on and not 1-2 brigades in line as they did it. And you can even find examples of attacks like that that failed during Napoleonic times. Some of the attacking brigades did manage to get within 30 and 50 yards before falling back though, but most stopped at the ravine 150 yards from the wall.
Cold Harbor was against well fortified lines that had artillery support too IIRC. I have seen one description of how the Confederates were massed in 5 ranks behind the fortifications and just handed loaded rifles up to the front rank. That would mean something like 3 times the fire volume compared to a normal defending infantry line.
Oh I would agree on rifles being better than smoothbores. The question is just how much better and if tactics changed a lot because of it. From what I have read the smoothbore was already a pretty good weapon but the weapon itself didnt do the job as troop quality was important just it was in the ACW.Quote:
For infantry arms I'm sure we aren't going to agree about the effectiveness of the rifled guns vs. smoothbores. Soldiers of the time considered the smoothbores a real burden, particularly in long range encounters. They exchanged weapons on the field as rapidly as they could, throwing down their smoothbores to pick up Springfield's and Enfields and Lorenz rifled muskets. And the results of troops armed with Spencers and Henry's speak for themselves. This isn't a case of marksmen vs. untrained masses, it is case of more effective arms vs. less effective ones.
Good troops facing not so good troops could close in for a charge and I see the same in both eras. A defender backed up by guns took a big effort to have success against. You can find examples of attackers failing to reach the defenders even though they were 3 times as many and on the other hand you can find examples of regiments charging in only losing 6 men although the defender started shooting at 500 yards, the first is from Napoleonic times and the later is from the ACW.
IIRC ACW infantry generally used higher movement rate than Napoleonic infantry: 165 paces/minute compared to 120 when doing an assault. I think that would negate part of the increase in firepower in ACW.
He does provide a few examples of regiments that considered 300 yards as being too far even though they were armed with Enfields.Quote:
I think the author has cause and effect reversed, an all too common failing.
I think one reason for it is simply that the Napoleonic Wars are not that well understood. It was not just a question of charging in with the bayonents. Firepower was important but it was also a question of training and doctrine. The Brits had a discipline that gave them an edge both on the firepower and ability to successfully charge the enemy. If the discipline wasnt good units would be more inclined to stop up and start a long firefight and you see the same tendency in the ACW.
CBR
Yes, a fair amount of shooting was done at 200 and 300 yards in the ACW when the ground was open enough to see one another. (Snipers were using much longer ranges of course.) However, extended firing was generally discouraged at such ranges unless just holding a position awaiting developments/orders, support, etc. since the proximity was not enough to dislodge an opponent for the expenditure of ammunition. With the smoke and men taking cover you could expend a lot of ammo at such ranges. Better to move up to increase effect.
No doubt the Brits had excellent fire discipline, and their navy was especially proficient in that regard.
I also agree about proper assault tactics on positions such as walls and the like. The tactic generally worked where it could be applied and Upton was the key Union practitioner. But trying to form up such columns under fire is going to be a disaster. Artillery would shred it, unless it had cover (woodline), fog, or darkness or some other screen. If anything, it shows how far the fire power had come because you can't march up with superior fire discipline and a moderate advantage and numbers and take it. You have a catch 22: you need several times as much force density to take a position, but amassing this force and planning the attack takes time and good inteligence, and when amassing it one is vulnerable to artillery or flank attack.
The mounted troops used sharps carbines and other breach loading carbines from very early on. Spencer use came later. True there was some reliance on saber early on for cavalry, and some plans for lancers, but soon the cavalry was copying the mounted infantry. They wanted breech loaders that could be loaded in the saddle. The first use of the Sharps by U.S. forces was in 1854. In the ACW there were at least 60 U.S. cavalry regiments equipped with Sharps (more than 50,000 less than 95,000.). Looks like well over 100 cav/mounted infantry regiments using weapons like Burnsides (50,000), Merrill (15,000), Maynards (couple thousand primarily by CSA), Starr (20,000), Ballard (21,000), Cosmopolitan (9,000), Gallager (18,000), Smith (31,000). In essence, the higher tech weapons went to the cavalry. There were also some Colt revolving rifles in service, but they were too long for good mounted use and some times more than one chamber discharged at once (good bye fingers.)
Saw an interesting Feb. 1865 correspondence while perusing the ACW Official Records for Armstrong rifle info last night. It was the Army of Northern Virginia cavalry ordnance chief if I recall. He was trying to get rid of his horse arty's Parrott's/Tredegar rifled cannon in favor of smoothbores, for the reasons we discussed earlier: 1. He didn't need the range for his horse artillery, they rely on moving in rapidly, setting up close and blasting away, then withdrawing quickly if threatened. 2. The smaller rifled shell had less effect and was unreliable (CSA ammo on the reliability.) 3. Shell could not be used to fire over the heads of his own men--because of the lousy quality of CSA fuses and ammunition. This latter part applied to both smoothbore and rifled weapons, but it meant that for the CSA, smoothbores were more practical since rifled weapons lost their main advantage of shell/shrapnel at medium, long range. And of course, by Feb. 1865 the CSA's supply and quality woes were limitless.
CBR,
I've enjoyed our discussion and I looked into buying Paddy Griffith's books this past week...but fortunately I read the reviews first. From reading the reviews, and from what I've read of the ACW from the pens of the officers and men themselves (and visiting a few of the fields) I'm inclined to believe the reviewers are correct in their criticism of Paddy's work. Paddy seems to have some sort of grand British Empire agenda, and twisted information to fit his agenda while ignoring considerable evidence that is incorrect. I might check out a library copy to read some time, but it is not something I would put great stock in or support with a purchase. It is more something I would tend to read cautiously looking for a few kernels of truth hidden inside. One of the reviewers also mentioned that Paddy's cited references often contradict his claims when read.
It is particularly interesting that according to reviewers, in other books he goes to great lengths to defend British problems with WWI trench warfare, while at the same time denigrating the formidability of ACW earthworks. I can't take him seriously.
I know some of the criticism of his book and there are a few flaws in it but nothing that deserves the harsh criticism like in the amazon reviews I have seen heh.
His conclusion (to cut is short) is that the weapons did not revolutionise the tactics. As long as we can read about attack columns and lines and drill manuals for battlefield usage I tend to agree with him.
A few tidbits:
Upton wrote the "New System of Infantry Tactics" that appeared in 1867. Quote from Strategy & Tactics article:On officer training:Quote:
Upton was responding to the appearance of significant numbers of breechloading rifles on the Union side in 1865, and the formal adoption of such weapons in Europe. Although he addressed skirmishing and long-range firefights, he retained close-order drill and advocates firing and at "deadly ranges." This indicates that in practice the rifle-skirmisher revolution had not truely arrived after the Civil War
On D.H. Mahans influence as he advocated extensive use of field fortifications:Quote:
Lack of effective tactical doctrine and hands-on experience had an enormous impact on the conduct of battle, something which historians have largely overlooked. The best most officers could do was to bring troops within rifle range and engage the enemy frontally.
But enough with the quoting. I can scan in the article if interested.Quote:
..to bolster the morale and performance of militia troops in battle. This was an attempt to deal with the practical problems of a large volunteer army
And very soon I will start reading "The American Civil War and the Origins of the Modern Warfare" by Edward Hagerman. From the introduction "The rifled musket, the weapon that first challenged traditional tactical forms, made its full impact felt during the Civil War. This devastating increase in firepower doomed the frontal assault and ushered in the entrenched battlefield"
With such an introduction I just know Im gonna have fun reading it ~:)
CBR
Given the timeline I think a comparison with the Maori Wars is useful. In particular the use of fortifications and how night would bring the battles to a standstill.
Fortifications even against artillery can be formidable if designed well like that of the Maori Pa's.Quote:
What Im talking about is how strong the fortification is. Sure I would love to stand on top of a redoubt but a foxhole/trench is not as good although it would give same protection versus enemy guns and artillery. Why? because it would not help me in melee and might actually be bad as I have to get up to fight. The instant you have defenses that will disorder and even stop regular infantry from getting close to you then you have a great defensive line, but also a line that does take time to build.
The Maori wars fought in the 1840s to 1860's had Pa's (forts made out of log posts with gaps). They proved to be very good in withstanding cannon fire and the Maori would hide in bomb shelters. They would also abandon the Pa's when they where no longer strategically viable.
trench warfareQuote:
Maori Pas
The Maori of New Zealand had built stockades called Pa on hills and small peninsulas for centuries before European contact. These resembled the small Iron age forts which dot the British and Irish landscapes. When the Maori encountered the British they developed the Pa into a very effective defensive system of trenches, rifle pits and dugouts, and which pre-dated similar developments in America and Europe. In the Maori Wars for a long time the modern Pa effectively neutralized the overwhelming disparity in numbers and armaments. At Ohaeawai Pa in 1845, at Rangiriri in 1864, and again at Gate Pa in 1864 the British and Colonial Forces discovered that a frontal attack on a defended Pa was both ineffective and extremely costly.
At Gate Pa during the Tauranga Campaign, in 1864 the Maori withstood a day long bombardment in their bomb shelters. One authority calculated that Gate Pa absorbed in one day a greater weight of explosives per square metre than did the German trenches in the week-long bombardment leading up to the Battle of the Somme. Having destroyed the pallisade, the British troops entered the Pa whereupon the Maori fired on them from hidden trenches, killing 38 and injuring many more in the most costly battle for the Pakeha of the Maori Wars. The Maori then abandoned Gate Pa. The Maori developed their ideas on Pa design over a very short period, from the stoneage to the level of World War One in little over 30 years.
BATTLE OF GATE PAQuote:
"Powerful as they were, these weapons were conventional, single-cast and muzzle-loading, but the British were also equipped with the latest science could provide: the Armstrong gun. This gun was both rifled and breech-loading, and a new process was used to cast it which made possible the use of a huge weight of shell without a corresponding increase in the weight of the gun. Invented in 1854, the Armstrong had first been used at the attack on the Taku forts in China in 1860. These were tremendously strong masonry fortifications of the conventional type and the Armstrongs used were only twelve-pounders. Nevertheless ... their shells succeeded in 'actually knocking the wall about.' At Gate Pa, apart from two six-pounder Armstrongs, there were two 40-pounders and one enormous 110-pounder - 'probably the heaviest gun ever used on shore against tribesmen'. It is scarcely surprising that the naval crew of this early Big Bertha maintained that they were 'going to blow the Pah to the devil'.
The concentration of British artillery was of considerable power even in absolute terms. When it is considered that these guns fired unhampered by enemy artillery from a distance of 350 to 800 yards [320 to 730 meters] at a target of less that 3,000 square yards [2,500 square meters], their power appears awesome. Gate Pa was the ultimate test of strength between British and Maori military technologies, between modern artillery and the modern pa. In a wider sense, it was to be the first of many contests between breech-loading, rifled, composite-cast heavy artillery and trench-and-bunker earthworks."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maori_Wars
From what I can read here it seems like strong fortresses so no wonder it was difficult to attack them. But the Maori were not armed with Minié type rifles in 1845 (it wasnt invented yet) so the rifle that is supposed to have revolutionised warfare wasnt the reason for the failed frontal assaults. It took lenghty sieges to attack European style fortresses too in the era of muskets, so I fail to see a big difference really apart from better terrain for the defender so its strength was just enhanced even more.Quote:
A Māori pa was not the same as a European fortress, but it took the British years to appreciate the difference—not until after the First World War. The word “pa” meant a Māori village or community. They were always fortified and built with a view to defence, but primarily they were residential. Puketapu Pa and then Ohaeawai Pa were the first of the so-called “Modern Pa”. They were built to engage enemies armed with muskets and cannon. A strong wooden palisade was fronted with woven flax leaves (Phormium tenax) whose tough, stringy foliage took a lot of penetrating. The palisade was probably lifted a few centimetres from the ground so that muskets could be fired from underneath it rather than over the top. Sometimes there were apparent gaps in the pallisade, which led to killing traps. There were trenches and rifle pits to protect the occupants and, later, very effective bomb shelters
But the Maori showed they understood modern warfare and used fortification and firepower in the best way.
CBR
CBR and Papawaio,
The Maori info is interesting. In at least one aspect the Brits were learning the same lesson the Union was learning the hard way in 1864...rifled cannon are extremely effective at destroying masonry works and dismounting the guns, but have no advantage versus earthen works defended in a mobile fashion. The Gate Pa battle is a microcosm of the many aspects that can go wrong for an attacker--each are lessons that were being learned in the ACW as well. If salients were not exploited properly and immediately, they became death traps.
I'm not sure why people think there is a black to white transition. Authors are terrible about trying to neatly categorize all of this and overstate their cases. While masonry forts might become obsolete overnight, most things are gradual. The militia/scratch force defenders of New Orleans slaughtered the disciplined British with simple earthworks in 1812. (Sure the Brits forgot their ladders, but they would have taken very high casualties even if they had ladders and had carried the works--a phyrric victory? Had they won and the war still been going on would they have been willing to try such an assault again at a later date? Would the defenders have used two lines of works next time around?) Any fortification throughout history has had such potential when held by those with any sort of effective ranged weapon. Thick and high walled fortifications were impenetrable and simple short range bows were all that was needed until the Assyrians introduced real siege warfare.
What changed about the time of the ACW was that simpler fortification was made more effective by more reliable, more accurate, faster firing weapons. Because of the weapon's improvements, in an hour or so in the field a man could prepare an effective defensive position which could then be improved over hours/days. And this could be done most anywhere (with varying degrees of effectiveness of course.) Now, hidden from view, the entrenched defender's strength was not visible, but their firepower could be felt--and with greater effect at greater range than in the past. The change in the defender's weapon wasn't earth shattering, but it tipped the scales sufficiently in his favor that standing in the open to maneuver no longer made sense...or perhaps a better way to state that is...neatly organized maneuver exposed the attacker too often and no longer conferred sufficient advantage to the attacker. It isn't that drill went away.
Instead of trying to look at this as step changes, it makes more sense to look at it as shifting probabilities that varied with terrain and theater. For example traditional cavalry became less effective in the ACW because they: 1. Often had to contend with forest fighting--something that put them at a disadvantage, making them a lower percentage useful force than in the past. 2. They couldn't dig in to hold a position as cavalry--that was a mounted infantry function and true cavalry made poor infantry. 3. Their highly trained mounts would be lost during any campaign through the border wastelands that developed during the war (and rather early too, armies could not be sustained in the field in many locations unless they were at a rail or shipping hub, cavalrymen went through horses like socks when away from their supply hubs.) The whole of Northern Arkansas couldn't sustain more than a single division of ~5,000 mixed infantry/cav by 1863 (and had trouble sustaining more than that in 1862.) That drove the move toward mounted raids and quick strikes by armies to seize vital strategic supply points--before the horses of their cavalry, supply wagons, and artillery batteries starved. The men lasted a bit longer since they didn't eat as much per man.
By the same token, various tactics had increased or decreased chances of success. Massed attacks could break trench works...but massing exposed the men greatly to improved artillery and even long range rifle fire...so some sort of cover (night/fog/forest/etc.) was needed. Plus massing also allowed defenders time to reinforce their positions. And taking the works in the ACW didn't guarrantee success, because of defense in depth. The salient was often encapsulated and broken down, resulting in a slaughter of the now trapped/surrounded attackers. By 1864/1865, the ACW was largely trench warfare--at least for the larger armies.
One thing that had not advanced rapidly enough for the ACW was signalling, especially in the wooded and hilly terrain. (I'm not as well versed on WWI, but lack of real time communication appears to have been a factor in the static positions there as well.) Attack and defense were seriously hampered by the lack of communications or tremendous lag in communications (often half a day.) Most major assaults came apart because of timing/coordination issues, while the defender with interior lines usually was given an edge/ability to recover from communications mishaps. Again it is probability that favored the defender, quite a few more things needed to go well for the attacker to succeed than needed to go well for the defender to succeed. In the ACW grand napoleonic battles were not feasible on most fields because the commanders could not effectively see their men or commands well enough, let alone be certain enough of the enemy's position. Chickamauga, Shiloh, Stones River...all like this.
So I see it as more of shifting chances of success leading to a change of strategy and tactics. There are always times when older or different methods would have been superior, but there is usually a very good reason those were no longer in use. By the end of the war, the repeating rifles made defense far easier than it had been earlier. This repeater advantage was largely reserved for the North who really didn't need this defensive advantage by then, since the CSA was in defensive mode with single shot rifles.
Battle of Gate Pa was in 1864 with the 240 Maori against 1800 Pakeha including British Regulars, nor is it important what the Maori had, it was how they defended themselves against the weapons. Also the Maori where a lot smarter in knowing when to fight and when to retreat, they had a very modern view of treating the enemy:Quote:
Originally Posted by CBR
I don't think a single weapon has revolutionised modern warfare. Artillery and machine guns has more to do with WWI style trench warfare then rifles.Quote:
March 28, 1864
Potiriwhi, District of Tauranga.
To the Colonel,
Friend, -Salutations to you. The end of that. Friend, do you give heed to our laws for regulating the fight.
Rule 1. If wounded or captured whole, and butt of the musket or hilt of the sword be turned to me, he will be saved.
Rule 2. If any Pakeha, being a soldier by name, shall be travelling unarmed and meets me, he will be captured, and handed over to the direction of the law.
Rule 3. The soldier who flees, being carried away by his fears, and goes to the house of the priest with his gun (even though carrying arms) will be saved. I will not go there.
Rule 4. The unarmed Pakehas, women and children, will be spared.
The end. These are binding laws for Tauranga.
By Terea Puimanuka
Wi Kotiro
Pine Amopu
Kereti
Pateriki.
Or rather by all the Catholics at Tauranga
Tank warfare is really a form of heavy cavalry where the infantry don't really have an effective weapon against mobile, well armed and armoured foes. Tanks have alot of the same problems as cavalry. (Woods, marshes, lack of infantry support, spears/anti-tank weapons, all have similar problems for Cavalry be they horse or tank).
It is interesting how quickly armies lost sight of the lessons learnt in the earlier conflicts. After the ACW you would expect the USA army to be better prepared for their entry into WWI. Apparently they where good troops but a bit too green.
In the end of the day the best commanders adapted to the situation, use terrain to their advantage, planned properly, could improvise and used combined arms where possible.
But that is precisely whats being said by several ACW historians I have seen so far: the rifle turned the ACW into a modern war/trench war. The rifle made frontal assaults impossible, removed cavalry from the battlefield and pushed artillery back to use longrange fire only. Edward Hagerman is one of those historians while Paddy Griffith claims the ACW is still clearly within the Napoleonic style wars: artillery was still important and used in large numbers while cavalry wasnt used in the battlefield role (creating good shock cavalry takes 2-3 years to train, terrain wasnt suited in some places, logistics and doctrine)Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
How the rifles could turn the ACW into a trench war while European wars didnt is not explained and (although I have not read that many ACW books) so far I see some historians miss the overall picture and dont compare the ACW to contemporary wars that didnt see extensive use of trenches:
Franco-Austrian War 1859 (both sides used rifles)
Austro-Prussian War 1866 (one side used breechloaders and other side rifles)
Franco-Prussian War 1870-71 (both sides used breechloaders)
And of course ignoring a lot of similarities with the Napoleonic Wars.
Helmuth von Moltke described the ACW as "two armed mobs chasing each other around the country, from which nothing could be learned." Now that might have been a bit harsh but I do think that he was right about the learning bit. The ACW was fought with methods that had more to do with the terrain and doctrines of the American armies, than it was a question of technology that dictated the "new" style of war. Moltke definitely showed how wars in Europe could be fought and won.
The Wilderness and Atlanta campaigns of 1864 saw extensive use of trenches and fortifications but was also fought in terrain that favored the defender and AFAIK was slow and methodical advances. I dont see rifles as being the reason for trenches there. And most soldiers were still armed with muzzleloaders so newer weapons cannot have been the reason for it either.
No single weapon did it all but magazine rifles and machineguns did change tactics a lot. That and the ability to have enough soldiers to make one long front as we saw in WW1 made it impossible to go for the flank as generals would have done in other/earlier conflicts.
Fixed fronts gave artillery even more power as it was easy to use telephone lines to get firesupport to make it even worse.
And having aircrafts that made it near impossible to make large offensives without being spotted before the attack started.
The fixed fronts and use of large amount of artillery tore up the ground to make movement difficult and also made supply lines difficult when/if one actually broke through a front.
It all added up to make WW1 as horrible as it was. Improved infantry tactics and tanks did improve the situation a bit though.
USA went back to a small regular army after the ACW so when they entered WW1 they had to create a large army from scratch (a bit like the situation in the ACW) You dont do that without a lot of time and training and even then you lack experienced NCO's/officers. I dont see that as lessons not learned but simpy a matter of experience that takes time to build up. It took a while for USA to build up the army in WW2 too.Quote:
It is interesting how quickly armies lost sight of the lessons learnt in the earlier conflicts. After the ACW you would expect the USA army to be better prepared for their entry into WWI. Apparently they where good troops but a bit too green.
CBR
I don't get that from the ACW historians, some overstate the part of the rifle of course, but there are a host of other things being attributed to the changes in warfare. The rifle, and repeaters are just part of that. What clearly no longer worked was the frontal assault against entrentments and carrying works by the bayonet as Griffith seems to propose.
Moltke's view doesn't make sense, but has a stereotypical aristocratic snobbery about it. From what I can tell he already had the organization to fight his early wars, totally unlike the ACW, where both sides had no army of any size at the beginning and had to build armies from a small core of trained men. As a result Moltke's early wars were incredibly short. Take the Franco-Prussian War: he didn't face competent defense from what I can tell. They tried to use their machine guns as artillery. Why wasnt the infantry of both armies using repeaters? And what happened when repeating type weapons became the norm? Trench warfare in WWI. What I read into it is that Moltke didn't learn much from the ACW and stuck to understanding and exploiting European wafare.
Moltke's derision reads more like one who failed to grasp the terrain/population/logistics of the theater. The lessons might not have applied well to his own theater at the time. However, he might also have been forunate that neither the Austrians, nor the French had fully learned the lessons either. The Austrians were using mass tactics weren't they? Seems like a condemnation of the old system to me...
The logistical aspects alone could define the ACW as a modern war.
Crumbs, you're really going out on a limb siding with Moltke there, CBR. It kind of makes me feel all warm and fuzzy knowing what the descendants of the "armed mobs" did to the descendants of von Moltke in 1918! ~;)Quote:
Originally Posted by CBR
I'd have to read up more on the wars of German unification to take part very intelligently in this debate, but I suspect they were far from Napoleonic. I doubt you'll find many Eylau style cuirassier charges turning the battles. I'd wager that you might find ACW style carnage due to increased firepower meeting formations that have failed to learn the lessons from the armed mobs over the water. My impression is that the German wars of unification were won more at the strategic (and higher) levels than due to tactical finesse - the enemy were outmaneouvred and so the battles pretty were much won before they started.
I don't know if you've ever tried the computer wargame, "Age of Rifles"? It nicely models the transition from the Napoleonic musket to WW1 in a way that matches my imperfect understanding. Entrenching is always good, but when you get to the machine guns and heavy artillery of the Russo-Japanese war, it becomes essential. IIRC, the Franco-German scenarios were not markedly different from the ACW ones in terms of appropriate tactics.
Moltke might have been a aristocratic snob..doesnt surprise me much if he was. Viewing ACW infantry as being a mob does sound like one who favors soldiers in neat uniforms with polished boots ~:)
But with the terrain and much lower population density in America, that made for more difficult logistics compared to western Europe (less railways etc), the way the Americans fought in the ACW didnt give much for Europeans to learn from, as the firepower from muzzleloader rifles didnt give a defender that much more to stop frontal assaults compared to the earlier musket.
The British still found a good use for their bayonets at the Battle of Inkerman 1854 even when armed with good rifles AFAIK.
So I dont think he failed to grasp the differences but actually saw the differences and knew they wouldnt apply to a European war. That he, being arrogant, was also dismissing it on the apparent looks and ragged order of the infantry doesnt change that IMO.
I have been going through some articles that described the Atlanta campaign and the Seven Days Battles and especially in the later it seems like insane attacks on very strong positions that had lots of artillery support: attacking positions that had support from perhaps 100 guns and I understand why brigades took 25% losses before reaching it.
IIRC Griffith doesnt say such positions were to be assaulted but questioned the effectiveness of some positions that had a very low troop density but still somehow prevented the enemy from attacking them. But as you said being prevented from seeing how many troops were in them might have made an attacker think twice about assaulting them.
------------
The large armies created by quick mobilisation does mean you dont find the cav/inf ratio we can see in Napoleonic and earlier that is true. But what we do see is quick manuevers and fast battles deciding the issue. That is definitely different than the slow approach/trench war like conditions we sometimes see in the ACW.
I dont know..I guess its a question of how to define Napoleonic and Modern warfare. I have seen the Franco-Prussian War described as the last of the Napoleonics as the new weapons stretched the old system to its limits. Breechloader rifles/artillery increased firepower to such a level that troop density had to go down so the old lines and columns was of no use anymore.
I have not played Age of Rifles but IIRC its not a realtime tactical game is it? At least nothing like Sid Meiers civil war games or the Napoleons Greatest Battles series?
CBR
It's something of an "old school" wargame - turn-based with hex-based maps. It's designed by a former physicist, Norm Koger, so the combat system is not a boring CRT but rather one where the computer does lots of number-crunching based on exact numbers of weapons of different classes and many soft/hard factors. The IGO-UGO mechanics are somewhat mitigated by the ability to reserve some movements for opportunity fire and by frantic reaction fire if the enemy closes. It's close to Sid Meier in its attention to period detail - you can deply skirmishers, chose a formation from line/square/assault column/entrenched/road column/open/ordre mixe (sp?) etc. In fact, it's maybe more of a hardcore wargame but the engine is very different. The closest thing to it in terms of its engine might be Steel Panthers, if that means anything to you, but it is at a much higher scale.Quote:
Originally Posted by CBR
The best thing about the game is that it has an editor and there are hundreds of battles created by modders available on the web, covering virtually every engagement of significance from 1800-1914 and many lesser known insignificant ones (one of my favorites is Hlobane, an incident in the Zulu war where a small British column blunders into a Zulu impi). It provides a decent simulation of most battles, whether its a few redcoats facing Indian mutineers or Japanese assault troops trying to storm Russian entrenchments. It's not quite so good on Napoleonics - cavalry is not given the love it needs - but I have not found a better Napoleonic computer wargame (I've got the SMG Waterloo one and the old Talonsoft one, but both are pitched at such a small scale, you can't fight out an entire battle in a feasible amount of time).
Its abandonware, available at the home of the Underdogs. For once, I can say this without guilt, as I read a post from Norm Koger on usenet praising the Underdogs. It's DOS based, though, so it may be a job getting it to work on a modern computer. (Although I last played it a year or so ago). The graphics might grate, although I still find them fine. If you try it, seek out Norms FAQs and make sure you use the "oldrules+" switch for more historical combat.
CBR-sama, what style of war would you call the Boer War then?Quote:
Originally Posted by CBR
Im not that familiar with the Boer War as I only have a few articles about it. Bur from what I can read it seems to have trenches and longrange firefights involved. Both sides had magazine rifles and used loose order formations AFAIK. So a regular (modern) war that turned into a guerilla war.Quote:
Originally Posted by Papewaio
CBR
Something else to consider regarding fortifications in the ACW might be these
1. Abundant resources (I think this has been mentioned already)
2. Americans were still a frontier country and very practised in the construction of fortifications. Americans had been building forts to guard the frontier for 200 years prior to the ACW. Western Europe hadn't been considered a "frontier" since probably Roman times (and the Romans were very practised in the art of putting up a fortification.)
3. Not sure about this one, but mass production of the necessary tools could have played a part. The ability to easily supply an army with all the necessary axes, picks and shovels would have made entrenching easier.
I haven't read all the posts, so if I've duplicated anything, my apologies.
Certainly true to a degree. But when I read of the trench warfare there was a passing of rifles going on. The better shooter would sit there doing his work while others loaded. Don't forget that there was also a move to breachloaders happening. The mounted infantry progressed as the war went on. Several hundred thousand breachloaders were used.Quote:
Originally Posted by CBR
What really puzzles me is the failure to recognize the lessons learned with repeaters. Logistics was the biggest concern that slowed adoption in the ACW. Lincoln himself began breaking the logjam The south couldn't produce the cartridges, and the northern ordnance bureau was afraid it couldn't supply enough. I've read that there were some demonstrations to Austria etc. that didn't go well. (Rejected by the sovereign when the first round he tried to fire was defective.)
Yes, this was a fairly ugly series of battles, but it acheived its strategic objective of driving McClellan out. (Also somewhat dispels the contention of insufficient morale/discipline to advance into massed defense--althouth that is true on many fields of the ACW.) Lee was pushing hard for psychological reasons. It certainly worked with McClellan. Afterall, he thought he must have faced uncounted hordes because he was hammered at daily.Quote:
I have been going through some articles that described the Atlanta campaign and the Seven Days Battles and especially in the later it seems like insane attacks on very strong positions that had lots of artillery support: attacking positions that had support from perhaps 100 guns and I understand why brigades took 25% losses before reaching it.
In many other campaigns you will find that logistics limitations determined that only one major engagement could be fought without a long rest or resupply. Even if the attacker won convincingly, they often withdrew or were prevented from follow up if they had expended too much of their arty ammo, or the horses were too worn, supply line was threatened, etc. Some of this was commander timidity, but the concerns were real when in hostile territory and never knowing when someone would be reinforced.
That would depend very much on circumstance. Those low troop densities often didn't remain low very long when that point was attacked. Plus, a major advantage of the time (before aerial reconnaisance and improved signaling) was that your opponent could not necessarily see your weakness IF you were entrenched.Quote:
IIRC Griffith doesnt say such positions were to be assaulted but questioned the effectiveness of some positions that had a very low troop density but still somehow prevented the enemy form attacking them.
Question: Are there records currently available of the Napoleonic wars to the detail of the "Official Records" of the ACW (detailed AAR's and maps?) I'm wondering if some of this might be attributable to differences in documentation levels.
AORII is a good turn based hex game. I'm going to try it again to see if there is any way to get it to work in XP. It's been a few years since I had it working, it was having issues with sound on my later 98SE machines.
Just adding a bit of info that was relevant to the prior discussion:
I found the weights for the rifled 10# carriages vs. the 12# Napoleon smoothbores. My hunch was correct. The rifled guns had a 900# carriage that was also used by 6 lb smoothbores, while the big 12# Napoleon smoothbore used an 1128 # carriage. The tubes weighed about 1227 #'s for the 12# gun, and 800 to 900#'s for the 10lb/3" rifled guns (depending on type.) So the net weight difference was on the order of 500 to 600 lbs. This would have had some noticeable impact on the relative mobility of the guns over anything but firm even ground (where they would be equal.)
I think the conversion to percussion caps deserves considerable credit for altering fighting styles rather than just the focus on rifled weapons (and later repeaters and breechloaders.) The accuracy (and firing cycle time) of a flintlock was considerably hurt by the flintlock system's slow ignition--several seconds from the time the trigger was pulled. It wasn't until the 1830's that the brass percussion caps were really reaching the field. I've read that this was one of the advantages the U.S had vs. the Mexican army in the 1840's--the Mexicans relied primarily on flintlocks and less maneuverable artillery. Again, just another in a series of incremental changes that tilted the balance away from older fighting styles.
Another factor I came across was actually some descriptions of how the Brits would drop down when the enemy line fired (flintlocks during earlier battles with Napoleon)--think it was the Brits anyway. Also how they used the reverse slope and lying prone to endure artillery bombardment that was central to Napoleon's attacks. This matches better with ACW tactics of seeking cover, firing or reloading prone. I've also read about how the Brits picked apart Napoleon's assault columns.
I've also been reading some American Revolution battle descriptions, and was struck by how badly the Brits got chewed up by militia at Bunker Hill. Despite superior Redcoat discipline, their attack stalled repeatedly. (And they were completely repulsed in their flank attack.) They suffered very high casualties overall (something like 75% if the info I've seen is correct) while not inflicting many casualties despite being victorious. The Americans lacked bayonets and had little ammo, so they could not really hold the position, only put up a firm defense until their bluff was called. Again as with New Orleans, I see this as a clear indication of the value of earthworks, even without rifled muskets, or trained/disciplined troops. On open ground the disciplined Redcoats would most likely have made short work of the militia in either case. Earthworks were a substantial force multiplier and from what I've read, I don't think Paddy is giving them ample credit. If British regulars had trouble penetrating them vs. militia, then it is hard for me to believe that many infantry were really capable of doing as Paddy suggested.