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Hey,
I’ve been trying to figure out a certain kind of troops.
I’m certain they fought with the Union , don’t know about the confederate’s though.
Problem is that I don’t know the name in English.
In Dutch it’s “Zoeaven”
They wore red trousers, blue jackets with red stripes and a strange kind off red kepi.
You mean 'zouaves' I think, just google it.
Some of the most famous Civil War units, and those probably with the most distinctive uniforms, were the Zouaves (pronounced zoo-AHV). Many wore red baggy pants, white leggings, a jacket trimmed in red, and a tasseled red fez or turban. Their uniforms made them stand out on the battlefield, but many of these units also stood out because of their reputations as hard and steady fighters.
The Zouave uniform of the American Civil War actually had its origins in North Africa in the 1830s. Men from the Zouaoua tribe of Algeria were organized into the French army in 1831 (France had colonized parts of North Africa). They wore this distinctive uniform, and as their fame as fighters grew, more and more French soldiers joined their ranks. By the time of the Crimean War in 1854, the Zouave units were composed entirely of Europeans. Their exploits in that war added to their reputation gained in North Africa. When newspapers from around the world, including the American Harper's Weekly, ran stories and illustrations, their fame spread. In the mid-19th century, it was France that set the tone for military fashion and tactics.
With the outbreak of the Civil War, many Zouave units were raised on both sides. For example, Ellsworth raised the 11th New York Infantry or "Ellsworth's Fire Zouaves" from the New York City Fire Department. Louisiana, with its French culture and traditions, raised the majority of Zouave units for the Confederacy. Their uniforms and experiences in the war varied greatly, but many served with great distinction and upheld the tradition established by the Algerians and the French. After the first year of the war, most Confederate Zouave units shed their flashy garb. However, many in the Union army kept their Zouave uniforms for the entire conflict.
Source: http://www.nps.gov/anti/zouaves.htm
That can't be true, we all know that frenchmen are just a bunch of cowards. ~:rolleyes:
:)
Their not cowards,...
They just don't know how to fight ^^
Is that really necessary? Why go around picking a political fight in a thread like this?Quote:
Originally Posted by Meneldil
Upxl,
Look up "Wheat's Tigers." It was a distinguished Confederate battalion that fought at 1st Manassas (Bull Run) and in many other battles.
Zouaves were a mixed bag. Some fought well, some didn't. It was just a uniform afterall. Much of this has to do with who led them, "luck of the draw" on the field, and how their initial fight went.
In several respects the uniforms were a poor choice for the ACW battlefield, as they made men more prominent targets. The flashy uniforms were a powerful recruiting tool.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Red Harvest
Well, it was quite tempting, given the things we can read there and there in the backroom. Not a political fight at all, just pointing out the really crappy attitude shown by some members (except if the level of suckyness of my ancestors is now a common political topic)
But yeah, it doesn't belong to this topic, and I shall refrain from spamming it with non-related stuffs.
A link with infos about the 'french' zouaves (in french only):
http://g.lacoste.free.fr/table_des_matieres.htm
Another link about the Zouaves during the Civil War (in english) :
http://www.geocities.com/zouavedatabase/usa/8thmo.html
Tnx Harvest.
Quote:
After watching some of the Tigers break through a stubborn federal line, a jubilant and grateful Gen. Jubal A. Early shouted, "Those damned Louisiana fellows may steal as much as they please now!"
Though bunch of blokes.
*cough Burnetts 13th calvary cough* here is all you need uxplhttp://www.angelfire.com/tx/RandysTexas/
hehe
http://www.angelfire.com/tx3/RandysTexas/list.html
This wouldn't have anything to do with Texan pride now would it? :)
If anyone has some more on the civil war you’re more then welcome to share.
Of course not... SFTS is the most anti-nationalist there is around, the epitomy of non-bias.~;)Quote:
Originally Posted by Upxl
Anyway, Harvester in Red, the uniform really did make the soldiers stand out, but at the time it was only just becoming half-bad. The infantry still stood tall and in dense formations, it would have made little difference if they had worn olive drab, khaki or even splintered camo from what they did wear. Even less compared to the semi-dark blue of most Union units. And the Confeds simply ran out of uniforms, but at least they were sensible enough to use grey (as fights might go into forests where you could hide).
The big problem with red is that the enemy will see you before you see them in most instances. It also means that they are likely to know which side you are on immediately, while you might not be so sure about their identity (or might even be wrong.) Identification was a big factor in many ACW battles, particularly early ones. True open field, set-piece battles were rare. A lot of it was fields broken by trees, streams and hills as well as large tracts of timber.
Never understood the uniforms of the Union.
After all those centuries of warfare you would expect them to know the colors where a bad idea.
Anyway,
Here's another question...
Who would you say was the greatest officer in the civil war?
As if there was a contest... ROBERT E LEE:charge:Quote:
Originally Posted by Upxl
Agreed!Quote:
Originally Posted by strike for the south
Depends on what your criteria for it is.
If it is Broad Tactician (managing the entire army within a battle), then most certainly Lee, is it Motivation and Morale, then I don't know (it could perhaps even be argued that it could be McClellan~:eek:). If it is Strategist and Logistics then Grant is by far the best...
Too many factors and too many were only good in on particular department.
Harvest, I agree that Zouaves were not dressed for efficiency in concealment, that much is obvious I think. But their particular dress did make them feel better, and fostered a stronger esprit de corps. At the time of the war it was perhaps still better than efficient and rather boring clothes (would of course only work if only a minority were dressed this way).
And the identification... Well Zouaves had little trouble getting identified, while several Union units that wore grey got blasted by FF. Grey was better, but obviously not a good choice (and was dropped quite soon from the Union forces).
In forests the Zouaves might have been identified earlier, but given the range of the weapons inside woods it made little difference. When the musket or rifle became efficient enough to use in woods there would be no chance of mistakes (the enemy would clearly be blue or grey/mottled collection) unless it was a case of those grey Union forces.
Not really. Europe had no idea, and that is what the uniforms were modeled on. Actually there was a mix of colors used: butternut, gray, blue (various shades), red, even green (Vermont, I think.) Early in the war both sides had many state and local militia regiments in the "other side's color." Caused a lot of trouble with friendly fire as well as lack of fire, as did the similar flags (no, not the later rebel battle flag; the original Stars and Bars.) And rebels often used captured blue jackets and pants.Quote:
Originally Posted by Upxl
Depends on category. Lee was probably the best battlefield full army commander. Nathan Bedford Forest was the best small army commander (wasn't really suited stylistically for full corps level command.)Quote:
Anyway,
Here's another question...
Who would you say was the greatest officer in the civil war?
Grant was strategically/logistically probably the strongest. Sheer determination and bold action were probably his greatest strengths. He could fail repeatedly, and still keep working the problem until he solved it. He had great composure when things seemed to be out of control around him. I didn't appreciate him early on, but after studying his Vicksburg campaign, Fort Donelson, and what he did at Chattanooga, I've gained great respect for him despite the many mistakes he made. The man was not afraid to make a mistake...unlike McClellan or Joe Johnston.
What Lee did for Southern survival, Grant did for eventual Northern victory. Both were masters of those they faced, until the only thing left was for them to face one another.
Time for some controversy - I think Lee was the best defensive general - his attempts at attacking (strategically) never worked very well. His victories tended to be defensive battles based on an agressive stance. If you consider some of his best performances - especially Chancerlorsville, his greatest in my opinion, - his basic stance was in defence.
To my mind the best all round general was Stonewall Jackson. His Valley campaigns were exemplar examples of a smaller force pinning down larger forces and taking an aggresive strategic stance. Add to that the way he inspired his troops and terrified the enemy then I think Stonewall is your man - he probably saved the Confederacy at the 1st Manassas.
Finally - how can you call Bedford Forrest a fine general - the man was not much more than an outlaw, who showed his true colours when he founded the KKK.
I will now retire to my bunker and await the brickbats!!~:hide: :cheers:
But you are ignoring the difficulty of strategic attack. Nobody did it particularly well all the time. The defender has too many advantages, and these pile on the longer an offensive continues, and the deeper an attacker tries to push. You see this on both sides with many different commanders. You can make many more mistakes on defense than you can on offense.Quote:
Originally Posted by King Kurt
Lee used aggressive defense. He attacked while on defense and tried to dictate the campaigns that way. Until he met Grant he was successful in that regard.
And no, his stance at Chancelorsville was not defense. Instead it was an aggressive offense against a formerly pursuing foe. Lee knew how to "play the man" on the other side. Lee took chances and in many cases it worked.
Stonewall was good, and he had great strategic sense for fighting in the Valley. However, if you study his campaigns closely there are some big problems.Quote:
To my mind the best all round general was Stonewall Jackson. His Valley campaigns were exemplar examples of a smaller force pinning down larger forces and taking an aggresive strategic stance. Add to that the way he inspired his troops and terrified the enemy then I think Stonewall is your man - he probably saved the Confederacy at the 1st Manassas.
Jackson was extremely harsh on subordinates. Some of it was justified, some of it was not. Nearly everyone around him tendered their resignations at one point or another. Study the mutiny that occurred in the Romney campaign, or his mistreatment of Garnett after Kernstown. Jackson was brilliant in many ways, but he had personality traits not unlike Bragg.
Jackson had some major problems at times too, and had he not been so successful in other ventures he might be remember for Kernstown or Cedar Mountain.
I suspect that Stonewall would not have been effective at full army command (for some of the same reasons as Forrest.)
Have you actually studied Forrest? It doesn't sound like you have. I loathe his politics and his view of people's "place" in society, but at war he did not operate as an outlaw. In fact, he despised irregulars who preyed on the civilians of both sides. Forrest did not operate as an irregular. There were plenty who did in various theaters, those are your outlaws.Quote:
Finally - how can you call Bedford Forrest a fine general - the man was not much more than an outlaw, who showed his true colours when he founded the KKK.
I will now retire to my bunker and await the brickbats!!~:hide: :cheers:
When I studied Forrest I didn't expect to find much in common with him. Instead, I found someone with vastly different racial/political views but who I share a number of personality traits with (some good, some bad.) NBF had a strong sense of right and wrong--it's just that many of us would disagree about certain aspects of what he considered so. When those lines were crossed and he felt wronged he reacted strongly. He had a "get more than even" approach. NBF was passionate, and he let this cloud his judgement at times. He also did not fight by the book, or accept conventional wisdom as gospel. He was not afraid to challenge conventional wisdom. And when he got into the thick of things he became larger than life, doing things people didn't think possible. All of these are similar to my own personality--so studying his mistakes helps remind me of my own weaknesses and temper some of my own tendencies. I know it may sound wierd, but I can understand this guy and connect in a way that I can't with many historical figures.
Regardless of his personality or politics, he was a genius on the field. He knew how to conduct the warfare of the time. He used other's traditional tactics against them. He committed the bulk of his forces to the key point, and did not worry about large reserves (of the Napoleonic style.) So while outnumbered greater than 2:1, he usually had local superiority. And the man understood momentum like no other. Brices Cross Roads is one of the great masterpieces. While it was a small battle, it demonstrated his mastery of all aspects of battle.
Forrest's major blemish in war comes from the massacre at Fort Pillow. Yet from studying the incident as best I can tell he did not encourage slaughter, instead he failed in his duty to restrain it. That is a serious thing, but not the bloodthirsty vengeful rage that some would like to characterize it as. Remember, he had been injured when *several* of his horses were shot out from under him during reconnaisance of the position. He did not lead the attack as a result, so he was not there ordering a slaughter. I won't condone what happened, but there is a lot more to Fort Pillow than a superficial examination will reveal. With a small works refusing to surrender, serious carnage was almost guarranteed. That CSA soldiers often abused and killed negro soldiers is documented and happened repeatedly, not just under Forrest. My take on it is that Forrest (and his men) were angered by the refusal of the garrison to surrender an untenable position. This forced a costly assault, but one whose outcome was already certain. By staying in the rear (uncharacteristically) Forrest in effect gave his angry soldiers free hand to deal with negro troops. He should have advanced to stop it immediately but did not.
I will also point out that Forrest was the first Grand Wizard, but he did not form the KKK. More importantly he orderd the Klan disbanded in 1869, stating that it was "being perverted from its original honorable and patriotic purposes, becoming injurious instead of subservient to the public peace." It had became more a group of outlaws, and that did not fit with Forrest's personality--he hated the irregulars that acted this way during the war, and had many rounded up and shot during the war.
Forrest's views softened in later years. He is a fascinating man and defies any simple classification. He would be an excellent subject for a serious movie. If it was done right with rigorous attention to historical information the audience would both love and hate him at the same time and have trouble pigeonholing him either as a racist, or as a paragon of Southern leadership.
Red harvest
On the whole I broadly agree with your points.
Lee is arguebly the best aggressive defence general in history let alone the ACW, but was not so good on the offensive. From a strategic offensive point of view McCellan's Peninsula campaign was brilliant in its plan and concept - shame he couldn't perform on the battlefield. Strategically, Sherman's drive to the sea again was brilliant in concept, but I am not sure of the calibre of the enemy he was facing.
However, if the aim is to find the best all round general, then I still stand by Stonewall.
Maybe I was a little harsh on Forrest. I see him as a talented cavalry commander and a good mobile forces commander. But like many of these generals - and I would include Jeb Stuart and Sherman in this - I never get the feeling that they are where the really critical action was. The west was extremely important and the Union's eventual sucess in that area did put a stranglehold on the South, but I always feel that the war was always going to be won in the east in the area between Washington and Richmond. The contribution of thes generals was considerable, but they could never loose the war in an afternoon.~:cheers:
Kurt,
The war WAS won in the West. ~D The East was just a coup de grace. Even the eastern generals couldn't lose a war in an afternoon...although they tried. ~;)
Sherman had a good strategic grasp and was extremely good at the logistics. He wasn't all that great on the field...fortunately, he faced Joe Johnston, then Hood, so that his strategic/logistical skill would prevail and whatever shortcomings he had were not exploited by his enemies.
The more I study each general, the more I find lacking in each. There are few that one can look back in retrospect and find who were nearly always on top of their game. Very few of them every had sufficient command level to make a definite conclusion about. Others were very skilled in certain ways, but I think would have been unable to fulfill some of the broader requirements of higher command.
About Stuart. I don't think he was as great as his legend. He was too much into the chivalric cavalier concept and daring deeds. He had the fortune of having the finest cavalrymen available early in the war, and he was quite gifted in using them effectively. However, he seems to have failed to grasp what was happening as the war changed around him. This was shown at Brandy Station, Gettysburg, and his mortal wounding at Yellow Tavern.
Red
You could argue that the war was won in the west in that it enabled the North to strangle the South by cutting off its resources - but you could say the same about the naval blockade and the diplomatic efforts to keep the south isolated.
If you consider the ACW as the first modern war and the first where resources and industrialisation were critical, then it is inevitable that the South will loose, despite the skill of its generals and men - the North just has too many men and resources. The only way they could pull the rabbit out the bag is by taking Washington. But both serious incursions into the North tended to be more about taking the pressure off Richmond than taking Washington - and both lead to serious Confederate losses - Anteim and Gettysburg. Maybe the only battle where it could have been won on the day was the first Bull Run~:cheers:
Seriously doubt that... While the South got the generals the North got the regulars. They were what prevented a real rout at the first Bull Run, and they would not let the Confederates do that to them, they were just that much better troops. They couldn't win the battle for th North but at the same time they would almost always be able to stall any catastrophic event.Quote:
Originally Posted by King Kurt
To me it seems that these hardened professional soldiers are always overlooked, at least in the first half of the war (after that there were many volounteers that could be equal to them).
At Antietam one of the worst mistakes was in putting the only regular corps in reserve, their abilities and tenacity could have broken the rebel lines.
I'm not convinced that resources and industrialization are critical only to modern wars. I tend to think that economic issues were critical in all conflicts. How did Rome win the 2nd Punic War if not by resource might, mostly a seemingly inexhaustible manpower?
Ajax
Capturing Washington or Richmond early in the war would have been a huge political victory, but it isn't certain that either would have ended the war. It would have ended an administration for certain. Both sides believed that it would end the war...but then again, neither side really thought the other would go to war...or that the war would continue after the first major battle...etc. Capturing Washington might have been a sufficient political disaster that the war would have ended, but it would not have been a sufficient military set back. In the end the capture of Richmond only effectively ended the war because there was really nothing else substantial left to fight over politically/geographically.Quote:
Originally Posted by King Kurt
The blockade was not all that successful in shutting off resources until the very end (last 6 to 9 months when Wilmington was taken out of the action.) It however made blockade running more expensive and unreliable as a means of support. It is surprising how effective blockade running was. The irony is that the South failed to make proper use of it when it could (the first 2 years.) That is when it most needed weapons from abroad. States Rights was a poor method of organizing a foreign supply system, since it produced uncoordinated competing efforts--often supplying high value consumer goods rather than war materiel. The CSA's King Cotton policy had effectively shot them in the foot financially in the first few years and hindered their own war effort.
When the South began to take steps to improve its supply and finances from abroad, it had already suffered sufficient setbacks (in the West ~;) that it was having trouble with credit and diplomatically the approach would necessarily be "wait and see." (What is amazing is that the European merchants actually thought the U.S. would pay the CSA's war debts if the CSA lost. It is an absolute mystery to me why they would have believed that the U.S. would pay those who had violated the blockade to supply the CSA war effort.) It took easing the self-imposed cotton blockade to provide some backing to CSA borrowing.
By the time the war ended the South was starving not because of the blockade, but because its traditional breadbaskets had been ravaged by war. This was already happening simply as a consequence of maintaining large field armies and forage, well before the policy became intentional. Several strategic CSA material sources (like copper) had been lost earlier as a result of action in the West.
In the campaigns that led to Antietam and Gettysburg, Lee sought two major things: political victory through a major victory on Union soil, and a reprieve for Virginia from occupation by several armies. Lee understood that in order to bring in the harvests, Union armies needed to be kept out of Virginia as long as possible. While he failed in the former goal, he did succeed in this latter goal to a considerable extent. The same concern about maintaining Virginia's support capacity had led to the battering of McClellan earlier to eject his massive army from the state. By 1864 Lee could no longer do this.
Lee played his cards well, I don't see that any others could have done better. Unfortunately for the CSA, he did not have a counterpart in the West. Instead the Union had Grant who made a habit of capturing whole CSA armies...Donelson, Vicksburg...and finally Lee's.
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I remember a 30 episode TV series from childhood days, it was called The North and the South. Started in pre-war years when two lads (one northern and one southern) attend the westpoint and they eventually become generals in their respective armies and fight each other, although they were pals.
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Remember that one too... Patrick S*something*ze (impossible name). It even aired again not too long ago here in Denmark.
I believe there is a point when one of the two meet another friend on the field of battle, and being enemies. Quite odd really if that happened.
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It's a fond childhood memory for me. ~:) I was about 7 when they aired it.
Not much older than that, I was reading a book; largeish size, paperback, like 300 pages, published by the American counsel or something, on a part of American history. I remember reading about the civil war with great interest for hours. For whatever reason mom removed it later. ~:mecry:
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Maybe she was just cleaning up?
I have lost countless things when my mother cleaned up my room or found stuff she didn't understand.
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Na, she purposedly threw it away but I don't remember exactly why? ~:mecry:
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Maybe the poor women was afraid her sun was turning into a commie.~:)Quote:
Originally Posted by Mouzafphaerre
Probably General Winfeild Scott Hancock and Brigadier General Lewis Armistead.Quote:
Originally Posted by Mouzafphaerre
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No, they were fictional characters. IIRC the northern one wasn't a general until very end of or after the war. Hmmm... their names were Ory Maine and George Hazard. ~;)
Good one upxl! ~:)
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About them gaudy uniforms, well, let's put it this way: anything even approacing camo, or something so little as subdued colors, didn't really become the norm anywhere before World War One - where somber colors then broke through very fast. Some armies by accident made use of relatively low-key uniforms before that (the Russians had been using dark green since the early 1700s, for example), but even then they tended to throw away any good thins might have done with assorted shake hats, unit banners and whatever.
It wasn't before around late 1800s when people really started even wondering if there would be a point in dressing the soldiers in something that didn't stand out too much on the field, seeing as how these days firepower reached all the longer and bayonet fights (where distinctive uniforms help in avoiding nasty "friendly stab" incidents in the chaos) were becoming rarer. The Prussians actually ran a series of very scientific tests with their sharpshooters to find out what kinds of colors were the hardest to pick as targets, and the Brits actually adopted khaki during their colonial wars around the turn of the century.
The Americans got a vague idea of what was going on during the Civil War, but I understand those bright brass buttons and similar acoutrements nonetheless took a while to die off; most of Europe actually didn't see a major war after the 1870 Franco-Prussian war (the colonial ones don't really count, muskets not being exactly a sniper hazard sort of weapon...), where the weapons were still breech-loader cartridge rifles and the machine gun wasn't yet on scene, so it's reallly not so odd that the Great War caught so many of them in frighteningly gaudy and visible uniforms (the scarlet French pantaloons and polished brass-and-leather German helmets being among the most infamous offenders). Well, they learned out of them right fast...
Actually the British light infantry of the Napoleonic Wars wore a dark green with no obvious add-ons that made them visible. Even their hat was subdued, and since they ran about and skirmished they were quite hard to spot (and even managed some feats of sniping without getting detected). Supposedly this was learned from the Americans who had a lot of green dressed hunters acting as minutemen and militia.
So it seems the British had understood that visibility needs to be low. But failed horribly to apply it to their lineinfantry (bright red is about the most visible colour out there), which is interesting given the dependance on the fire of their muskets.
But the Germans had possibly the best uniform in WWI as middle Grey is less visible than a light Khaki (British) or light Blue (French).
If you look at warfare of the era, up until the ACW, stealth was not really a consideration for armies as a whole in open battle. Stealth was useful on the march...such as units securing all rattling objects, unloading muskets, and muffling wheels, hooves, and feet to do night marches around the enemy. However, in battle you had banners, and all that smoke from musket discharges. The concern at the time seems to have been to make sure you could be identified by your own comrades/commanders.
I imagine siege warfare of the time was much more concerned about stealth and sniping, but the weapons weren't really up to it until about the time of the ACW.
Side note: I've found it odd that in the ACW rifling gets so much lavish mention, and that percussion caps do not. A percussion cap must have been FAR more effective than the long delay in a flintlock. I've never fired a flintlock, but I would think holding the musket on target AFTER pulling the trigger, and the getting the flash of the primer pan (but again before the main charge ignited) would be challenging to say the least. What good would a rifled bore be for accuracy at 200+ yards using a flintlock style mechanism? I suspect you needed both to make the leap forward in efficacy. There were also some manufacturing technique improvements. It took awhile for all of the various innovations to come together...and for rear sights to be added to take advantage of them (rear sights were often added when smoothbores were rifled.)
By all accounts rifling improves the accuracy quite considerably regardles sof the lock mechanism. It's just that shorter time between the trigger pull and the actual propellant ignition helps still further - I've read the fellow who invented the principle behind caplock was trying to find a way around the flash of the priming powder alerting the more skittish kinds of game animals...
Lemme dig up Newark's Book of Uniforms...Quote:
Actually the British light infantry of the Napoleonic Wars wore a dark green with no obvious add-ons that made them visible. Even their hat was subdued, and since they ran about and skirmished they were quite hard to spot (and even managed some feats of sniping without getting detected). Supposedly this was learned from the Americans who had a lot of green dressed hunters acting as minutemen and militia.
...seems like the British "grasshoppers" (as one captured French officer called them) of the Napoleonic wars were (derived from) German mercenaries; the Austrians had been employing grey-and-green -clad sharpshooters (recruited amongst foresters, huntsmen and the like and known as Jägers) since late 1700s, Prussians had copied the style after facing them, and a fashion ahd been created. The British also employed similarly clad troops in the 1700s colonial wars against the French and Indians in America; Robert Rodgers and his Rangers seem to often get cited in the context, and these early "special forces" apparently first wore their civilian hunting dresses but were later provided with green uniforms. By the War of Independence, however, rifle-toting British skirmishers were clad in the same regulation scarlet as the rest of the army - Newark cites "to show who was in command" as one of the reasons.
I've read from other sources that several veteran officers of the lost American conflict had appreciated the practicality of the American irregulars, and were somewhat dismayed when the British army was initially so reluctant to adopt the practise. This changed somewhat in the Napoleonic Wars, and one gets the impression dark green remained the uniform colour of British sharpshooters and skirmishers until khaki came by.
Well, it was partly just plain extravaganza really; after some reforms were made to render it more functional, the troops just plain liked their smart-looking scarlet uniforms - when khaki later became the uniform color, many soldiers found it "scruffy" and avoided appearing in public in it. The troops fighting out in the colonies could obviously appreciate the reduced visibility, though.Quote:
But failed horribly to apply it to their lineinfantry (bright red is about the most visible colour out there), which is interesting given the dependance on the fire of their muskets.
As a side note, Newark mentions the post-Civil War American frontier cavalry as some of the pioneers in "practicalizing" military gear and wear.
Well, after they dropped the atrocious Pickelhaube maybe... It's actually quite curious how slow many troops were to abandon assorted useless and/or overly visible acoutrements in WW1, really. Various kinds of in fact purely decorative helmets (like the spiky German one) for example were for a while stubbornly covered with clotch in the field to reduce visibility, but not ditched as pointless at least before genuinely useful steel helmets (apparently pioneered by the French) were issued.Quote:
But the Germans had possibly the best uniform in WWI as middle Grey is less visible than a light Khaki (British) or light Blue (French).
I simply do not believe this test would hold up well in battlefield conditions. Marksmen could compensate, and well drilled soldiers would as well, so it might look decent on the practice range when compared to a smoothbore. Your average soldier on the battlefield (oftentimes being in combat for the 1st or 2nd time?) Doubtful. With firing occurring all around the tendency to flinch/move after the trigger pull, or anticipate the kick would be increased by a delayed firing sequence. (I surreptitiously rig weapons for dry fire to teach friends/family not to flinch when I detect they are doing so...it is always funny watching the reaction.)Quote:
Originally Posted by Watchman
There is also the problem of the somewhat longer firing sequence of flintlocks, less reliable firing (especially in wet weather), as well as the warning that initial flash provides the intended target (ACW troops did take cover/crouch/hit the dirt.) Range is nice, but a better firing mechanism would make it truly useful.
The rifled round would do better because of higher velocity (less drop downrange) and less spread--especially compared to buck and ball. However, the improvement would only be incremental. And in some ways, at some distances additional drop would be useful with green troops...who tend to shoot high anyway.
Now you mention the 'greens shoot high', I have always wondered at that. I can understand shooting down a hill would cause that, and perhaps even shooting up (overcompensating), but flat land where they are supposed to just aim it AT the enemy and shoot?
Is it because they DIDN'T aim correctly: Looking along the barrel but looked somewhat 'over' it thus causing a slight increase in the barrelgradient from the ground.
Good question. I can't say that I have read a definitive, authoritative answer. I'll start keeping an eye out for one. However, I do know that it was a military maxim of the time. Many times during the ACW I read of officers inspecting the enemy wounded/killed only to find a high percentage of head/shoulder shots by their green troops and virtually no wounds lower. Their conclusion was that their men had fired high. Also, it was not uncommon for entire initial vollies by green troops to pass over an enemy line, sometimes hitting units 100 meters or so behind that line. They tended to correct their subsequent aim (usually from NCO and other officers commands to aim lower.)Quote:
Originally Posted by Kraxis
I can make some guesses as to why shooting high would be the norm. The first would be the anticipatory flinch which is almost always high. The second would be that we naturally tendency to aim for the chest or even the head. However, with volley fire that is probably not the best choice since anything high will pass over their head or have a chance of passing over either shoulder. The suggested aim point by ACW officers was often the belt buckle to compensate. If the round went high from a belt buckle aim point, then it was still more likely to be lethal or incapacitating by striking the torso. If it went low, it would still have a high probability of striking a leg...and that would likely be incapacitating and possibly lethal. (And really low shots in the dirt *still* might deflect into the foot or leg.) On target abdomen hits were incapacitating, and nearly always fatal if they struck intestines.
The possibility you suggest of it being the way the soldier aimed is also reasonable, particularly with smoothbores that had no rear sight (such as the common model 1842's.) Smoothbores often had only the forward sighting bead. It is very easy to shoot high with such an arrangement if you are not focused on your task and more concerned about being able to see the enemy (excitement of combat.) Smoothbores were more common early in the war when all troops were green. However, the phenomena was not limited to smoothbores.
No doubt true, but somewhat beside the point so far as I can see - after all, the same problem is going to happen with smoothbores too (assuming the same mechanism, natch), isn't it ? Hence, the rifle is still more accurate then the smoothbore; at least the damn ball flies straight...Quote:
Originally Posted by Red Harvest
...
...remind me again, wasn't the Minié ball already in use by the Civil War ? By what I recall of the dates involved it ought to have been fairly common at the time.
More accurate yes, but the fundamental detriments to aim in the flintlock system could not be changed by the rifle. These would be a problem for novice soldiers and particularly those without extensive firearms experience. My understanding is that American Revolution was one of the first substantive uses of rifles in war ("Kentucky" rifles), although they were present earlier of course. Interestingly, the "aim" command was supposedly introduced for Continental soldiers firing drill as I understand it. The men using muskets in the Continental army were accustomed to aiming at specific targets (hunting), rather than in a general direction. "Aim small, miss small" is no joke in my experience.Quote:
Originally Posted by Watchman
Yes, it came into mainstream use in the 1850's, and the 1855 U.S. rifled musket (0.58 caliber) made use of it. However, like rifled cannon, there were very limited numbers available early in the war since the peacetime army was tiny. Far more numerous in the U.S. and state arsenals were the surplus model 1816 (0.69 caliber smoothbore flintlock), model 1822 (1816's converted to percussion), and model 1842's (0.69 caliber smoothbore percussion). These weapons were reworked and rifled when possible to take the minie, often adding rear sights--and percussion locks for the flintlocks. This took time, machinery and contracts, so early in the war most regiments still had smoothbores and some of these received flintlocks until their arms could be converted or exchanged.Quote:
...remind me again, wasn't the Minié ball already in use by the Civil War ? By what I recall of the dates involved it ought to have been fairly common at the time.
A few units/individuals had 1841 model "Mississippi" rifles which came into their own during the Mexican war. These were 0.54 and 0.58 caliber percussion cap rifles and did fine work in the ACW as well. IIRC they were originally 0.54 caliber and that many were rerifled to the 0.58 so they could use standard ammo for the 1855's and such.
Imports of fine rifles like the Enfield and Lorenz were quite substantial, but again these acquisitions took time, as did domestic production. There were also some really horrible smoothbore weapons imported early on from France, Prussia, etc. (as well as a few good ones.) The bad ones are most often associated with the term "pumpkin slingers" as they had large bores (up to 0.72 caliber) and often crooked barrels and poor mechanisms. Some had a tendency to explode on their first firing. They were usually discarded on the field when the first opportunity presented itself. Even union regiments did this.
The timing of when weapons came into predominant use explains part of the change in tactics as the war progressed (as well as simple maturation of the armies and officers.)
Well, rifles weren't usually issued to the lousier shots around anyway. Heck, the designated riflemen might even actually have trained to shoot, which to my understanding was fairly rare in musket armies - why waste good gunpowder, when the main tactic is to have the entire firing line act as a sort of giant shotgun anyway ? But assorted sharpshooters and skirmishers would probably have had to be given a bit of training to be meaningfully effective at all - after all, among their jobs was to pick out officers and the like...
In any case I understand the ballistic problems of smooth bore and round ball were such that they placed far greater constraints on shooting accuracy than the lock mechanism. I've read that a skilled shot (which the average trooper, obviously, wasn't) can be expected to hit a static human-sized target about two times out of three at around fifty meters witha smoothbore matchlock (which is even slower than the flintlock, AFAIK), but past that it's increasingly pure luck. Conversely a decent shot with a rifle has *far* longer accurate range - the biggest problem tended to be the time it took to ram a sufficiently tight-fitting ball down the grooved barrel.
Methinks it's sort of like the thing with heavy cavalry and stirrups. The things aren't a prequisite, but they sure do make the job a whole lot easier. Similarly I suspect a smoothly and quickly igniting lock mechanism wasn't any sort of major hindrance to accurate shooting (compared to the issues with barrels and balls anyway) - after all, it was the *norm* which everyone had to deal with. But a better lock was certainly going to make accurate shooting that particular bit easier...
I also understand the greatest advantages of the caplock lay in the field of logistics and user convenience - the small metal cups were a lot easier to transport than spare flints or kilometers of slowmatch, and soldiers no longer needed to mess around with priming powder when reloading.
I've read that the armament of particularly early Civil War armies can only very politely described as even "haphazard" and more honestly as a horrible mess, nevermind for logistics. That assorted European countries were only too happy to dump their old surplus junk to whoever was bying must not have helped, bu them's the breaks when you suddenly have to scratch up armies from virtual nothing and somehow find weapons for them. Beggars can't be choosers and all that. On the other hand I also understand even early repeating arms were sometimes issued on at least company scale, and proved startlingly effective when properly used.
I guess another way to look at this is that as the war progressed, the county/state/nation hierarchy was reversed at army level, so that it became nation/state/county in order of priority. It wasn't so much that arming was haphazard as that it was done on a more local basis early in the war, and this of necessity changed to a more federalized approach as the war progressed. This is another reflection of the United States being forged into a nation by war...rather than a collection of allied states.
For the most part in the ACW rifles were not handed out on the sort of basis you suggest: to those who were known to be good shots. More common was regimental and company assignment/purchase. Individual assignment of superior weapons was more often reserved for sharpshooters weapons, a different class. Sharpshooters received the namesake Sharps rifle, Leonard Target, Whitworth, many custom made arms, etc. Sometimes men were selected based on shooting competitions from the companies and transferred to these new units.
I wouldn't call the arming all that haphazard, at least in the North. It was done very much on a state/local basis using what was available. Haphazard would imply every other man had a different weapon. That was rare in the North. The CSA forces were more haphazard as they sometimes relied more on self-provided guns (particularly shotguns for the cavalry), and on captured weapons. Procurement was a mix of Federal/CSA production, regional arsenal stocks, and what the individual states could buy within their borders, regionally, domestically and overseas. This meant that individual states tended to have their own peculiar arms. You find concentrations of poorer weapons in the hands of certain states' regiments (Ohio and Pennsylvania come to mind instantly) who obtained the weapons overseas, or who had obsolete weapons in an arsenal. The ironic thing is that the early war regiments often had the best quality volunteers/fighters/officers...but the worst quality weapons.
Keep in mind that the state regiments were most often mixed with other states. That would give a more haphazard appearance, but is more a result of the state-centric approach of the the time then being pressed into national service. (Companies often were organized by county, and might be equipped on that basis before being combined into state regiments.) Once brigaded in departmental commands, weapons were frequently swapped between companies and regiments to acheive desired aims.
Regiments might have mixed arms, or uniform weapons. When mixed, the better rifles/repeaters tended to be assigned to companies that served as skirmishers/specialists. (That has some Napoleonic ring to it.)
Northern arms were reasonably well standardized on specific calibers for infantry weapons. (One substantial limitation to the adoption of repeating rifles was their nonstandard ammo.) This was not so easy for cavalry carbines as the cartridges were quite varied, and production was spread among many manufacturers of many types. Logistics conformity cuts two ways. Efforts at standardization certainly helped the union with supply, but it slowed the introduction of some of the better repeaters.
Federal vs. "States Rights" standardization helped the Union considerably with logistics. With artillery for example: mixed piece batteries (2 howitzer, 2 rifled, 2 smoothbore) were eliminated in favor of uniform 6 rifled or 6 smoothbore batteries. Along with this came changes to the operational command of artillery. Union fuses were of high quality, because manufacture was rigidly standardized. Artillery calibers/types were standardized to a few specific types for specific roles.
Rifles were more accurate but had actually less muzzle velocity than smoothbores. Enfield and Springfield had something like 1000-1100 fps whereas smoothbores were in the 1400-1500 fps range.Quote:
Originally Posted by Red Harvest
The rifle gave snipers a fantastic weapon that enabled them to work at ranges of sometimes up to 1500 yards but it took time for them to find the exact range as the bullet drop meant the danger zone was something like 40 yards or less at a range of 800 yards.
Some optimistic tacticians thought the new rifles meant units would start firing at 1000+ yards but in the end the realities of war showed it was not to be like that at all. As an example the French moved from gunsights that had a max range of 900 yards down to 600 and then 400 yards during the 1850's. When their Chasseurs á Pied and Zouaves got a new carbine it didnt even have an elevating rearsight but that last bit might have been overdoing it as they were now in the "bayonet uber alles" period heh.
CBR
CBR,
I believe you are correct about the velocity. I was confusing myself with efficiency, forgetting the relative weights of minie being far greater at given caliber than that of spherical ball. That necessitates a lower velocity. I was also thinking too much about rifled cannon versus smoothbore, where the larger diameter smoothbore uses about twice as much powder to throw nearly the same weight of projectile a shorter distance. Or for about the same bore (6 pounder versus James rifle rebore) throws a 133% heavier projectile 10% farther with 33% less powder.
Where are you getting those figures from? I'm having trouble locating anything authoritative for *period* weapons ballistic charts. Instead, in a hunt around the web I see a few numbers quoted without context. I am looking for ballistics for the 0.69 caliber smoothbores compared to the 0.69 caliber rifled conversions of the same weapon, and of course the 0.58 caliber rifled rounds.
Haven't tried to work through the ballistics theoretically for the minie versus the spherical ball. Obviously, the spherical ball is going to bleed energy and speed rapidly (higher surface area to mass ratio, and poor drag coefficient.)
I got the numbers from "The Bloody crucible of courage" by Brent Nosworthy
I also found some info in the Artillerist's Manual http://www.civilwarartillery.com/books/GIBBON.PDF and it does mention numbers of 1426 fps for the .69 smoothbore and 963 for the "new rifle-musket"
A Minié should bleed less energy from air friction but I dont know how much better it is.
In the book its mentioned that the Enfield rifle was 2 pounds lighter, and had a heavier bullet than the Brown Bess (both factors meaning higher recoil) but the Enfield still had overall lower recoil and the Brown Bess had around 1500 fps in muzzle velocity compared to 1100 from the Enfield. I can now understand why soldiers liked the new weapons heh.
CBR