Could the Mongols have conquered Europe?

I came across this link on the com, featuring a series of posts by a guy called Lord of Hosts at heavengames who took a detailed look at the Mongols' chances of conquering Europe. Quality stuff and well worth the read IMO.

I'd always pretty much assumed that Europe had no tactical answer to the tide of horse archers and was probably only saved by the death of the Khan, but LoH puts a very strong case that the Mongols would not have stood a chance in European conditions.

Thought I'd repost it here because of its potential relevance to M2TW. With thanks to HaakonV at the com for providing the original link.

Could the Mongols have conquered Europe?

Oh, this is interesting, eventhough i'd still bet on the Mongols....Kalka, Liegnitz...they always managed to cope with new conditions and didn't tend to underestimate the enemy in those years....

O.k., the Mamluks managed too defeat an weakened army. Still....

I have read sources before that stated the only reason the mongols turned back (and hence didnt conquer europe) was because when the Khan dies it was tradition for them to return home to choose his succesor...

And as such, a freak death, saved europe...

Something I read a long time ago now...I think I remembered the basics correctly.

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Originally Posted by lancelot

I have read sources before that stated the only reason the mongols turned back (and hence didnt conquer europe) was because when the Khan dies it was tradition for them to return home to choose his succesor...

And as such, a freak death, saved europe...

Something I read a long time ago now...I think I remembered the basics correctly.

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Did you read the link? Doesn't sound like you bothered.

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Originally Posted by Subedei

Oh, this is interesting, eventhough i'd still bet on the Mongols....Kalka, Liegnitz...they always managed to cope with new conditions and didn't tend to underestimate the enemy in those years....

O.k., the Mamluks managed too defeat an weakened army. Still....

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I think he made some very strong points. It's well known that siege warfare in that era was not very effective, and Europe had far more castles and strongholds - and better ones - than any other part of the world. Also, the point about the decentralized nature of decision making in Europe - that there was essentially no "head" to cut off because the power was so broadly distributed amongst barons, nobles etc. The Mongols would basically have been at it forever.

But it always seemed to me that the Mongols' weakness was the need to feed its horses, I've thought up to now the best way to combat them would have been to adopt a scorched earth policy but LoH makes the very telling point that there simply wasn't nearly enough pastureland in Europe to feed all those horses anyway - which is probably why the Mongols decided to turn back in the first place.

I think they could have done it yes but it would have collapsed pretty quick anyway.
There is no way they could maintain control over such a large area but that's another topic.:book:

This is a question that was asked and debated some time ago in the Monastry. All the points put forward, as in that link, have been made before but there are counters to them all.
At the point where Ogodei died, the gateway to europe was well and truly open for a new Mongol objective. Let us look at some reasons other than Ogodei's death that prevented this.
The only reason that Batu withdrew to Sarai was not because of pasture, it was a strategic move made out of necessity. During the Russian campaign there was a growing friction amongst the Mongol princes (10 of whom were present) and this friction, fuelled by jealousy erupted into a huge argument at a victory banquet. This may not sound like much but one of the princes in question was Guyuk, who went on to succeed his father. Could Batu afford to push into hostile territory with an enemy to his rear? Batu did NOT return to Qaraqorum with the other princes, instead he sent his brother as his representative. His decision was a sound one, in 1248 Guyuk summoned him to meet him in the Ili valley to swear allegiance and reconcile their differences. The truth proved to be quite the opposite. Sorkaktani, wife of Tolui (Chingis Khan's youngest son) and mother of Mangku had sent warning that Guyuk planned to arrest Batu and have him executed. Batu set out with an army to meet him but Guyuk died before the meeting (and inevitable civil war). Batu was by now probably the strongest figure in the ruling house but declined the position of Khan in favour of Mangku, who also received the backing of most of the Mongol Noyans. An assassination plot was foiled and there followed a series of purges. The Chagadai and Ogodei houses would not be allowed a claim to the throne and princes and noyans loyal to these houses were cruelly executed, Buri (who as a young prince had been so contemptuous towards Batu) was sent to Batu for his execution. Under Mangku (1251-1259) there was reform, a new push into China and plans for a return to europe. Batu, however died in 1255 and when his Ulus eventually passed to his brother Berke, internicine strife began to resurface. We all know the rest, Hulegu executes the Caliph of Baghdad, Berke (a Moslem convert) is appalled and allies with the Mamluks, Ariq Buka and Qubilai civil war over the throne, Qaidu (of Ogodei descent) is a constant problem.
You see there was no chance of a european campaign materialising because there was no unity amongst the Mongols after 1241.

The lack of pasture has been put forward as a huge contributary factor but is one that I do not accept. The Huns raided far into France and also into northern Italy, they adapted (in their brief time) their tactics and it must be remembered they were never numerous. The Mongols on the other hand had far greater numbers and had they returned to europe would have swelled their ranks even more. I doubt they would have sold their prisoners as slaves as they had done earlier with the Qipchaqs, these would have been pressed into service. Lack of pasture in Song China did not prevent their armies, they adapted as they would have done in europe. Their successes in Poland (with a small diversionary force) and Hungary were such that I am in no doubt that the rest of europe would have fallen to them. As to how long this would take is another matter but all the countries would have needed a strong alliance in order to pose any real threat and even then I doubt the campaign would have lasted more than 20 years. Subedei suggested 18 years, who am I to question him? Was he unaware of what he would face? Again I doubt that very much.

The european question and the likes of Ain Jalut are mentioned regularly but people fail to research the Mongol situation, which was anything but a united one. Had it been, european history would have been very different

.........Orda

Comments on conjectures about conjectures are always a favourite pastime heh
Without saying anything more, I'll only mention that, although mostly portayed negatively by westerners (quite understandable i guess), I believe the Mongols could have found "allies" of sorts within Europe, internal rivalries can always be exploited by an outside force as people are, more or less, doomed to commit past mistakes.
Direct conquest isn't very effective in many occasions.
Afterall, if you 're having your hands full, better the devil you don't know:
https://img126.imageshack.us/img126/...roix3zj.th.jpg

BTW, I might be mistaken, but isn't this thread galloping towards the Monastery in full speed, arrows poised to pierce the resident monks' frail bodies? - Although I guess the previous threads have already covered to a satisfying degree the whole issue. Not that a definite answer should be the expected outcome of such discussions;)

There is a infinate supply of 'what if' . Like what if Casear didnt get assasinated and went to fight the Parthians? Would he have conquered them or have lost everything like crassus.

Nobody will or ever know...

Somebody would learn to counter their tactics. It is evolution. Though the Mongols would also change their tactics again.

Hussite War Wagons + Longbowmen and Crossbowmen could beat HAs. I know Hussites did not exist then, somebody could have had the same idea.

Crossbows didn't save the Chinese.

With a situation as stated before, had the mongols invaded Western Europe, how the politics would be played out. Although Chivalry was the reigning mindset of the period, could the mongols depend on the Europeans to be honorable in battle? Or would they use ambush techniques? Also, what would the situation have been, say, had the pope declared an all out crusade against the mongols, every Christian man and woman was to take up arms and prepare to defend the realm. Or would the Europeans willfully bend the knee as to not cause too much destruction?

It has to be remembered, at the period of the mongol invasion, Europe had less people combined than Japan did at the same time. The what-ifs are too many, and I fear, far to late to speculate predictably.

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Originally Posted by Wakizashi

It has to be remembered, at the period of the mongol invasion, Europe had less people combined than Japan did at the same time. The what-ifs are too many, and I fear, far to late to speculate predictably.

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I get the impression from most of the posts so far that few people actually bothered to read LoH's posts, and are just giving their stock responses to the matter.

I really think you guys ought to go and read the posts first before commenting on them.

And I don't know where you get the idea that medieval Europe had "fewer people than Japan at the same time". That sounds preposterous to me. LoH gives the total population of Europe at the time as around 60 million (IIRC) and cites that number as one of the reason a Mongol conquest would have been impossible.

Edit: Here's a link to a population table of Medieval Europe, showing that LoH's estimate would be about right.

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/pop-in-eur.html

I 've read that post more than a year or two ago and even at that time it didn't make a convincing case IMO, due to its overeliance on the standard arguments used to explain a possible mongol failure. One of the "opposite camp" wouldn't have to adress each specific point to draw a different conclusion, simply because some things aren't measurable,like (enter classic pro-mongol statements: resilience, adaptability, genious etc).
And I have this gut feeling that when the movie with the fictional invasion of western Europe comes out, it'll be showing the noble crusade of all Europeans, united to repel the pagan invaders, longbowmen next to France's finest chevaliers and all that. Too bad that such ideas started getting old by the 6th or 7th crusade, when Latin states in the Middle East had almost fallen apart. After all, the Pope would have already declared a crusade after Mohi, but, alas, would anyone hear him in time with more pressing domestic issues?

On a sidenote, I believe higher population levels wouldn't have made the "conquest" (what is actually meant with 'Mongols conquering Europe' btw heh) harder, maybe the opposite...an early "Black Death" would have saved all parties involved many efforts and years. But who cared about the general populace in order to get them behind walls heh

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I get the impression from most of the posts so far that few people actually bothered to read LoH's posts, and are just giving their stock responses to the matter.

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LoH gives the total population of Europe at the time as around 60 million (IIRC) and cites that number as one of the reason a Mongol conquest would have been impossible.

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Judging by these two quotes, we should suspect that you agree with him? As I stated above, maybe some research of the Mongols would help him in his spurious claims. What was the population of China? What was the population of Khwarazm? What was the population of Russia? Or better still, what was the combined population of all these areas and more? It had not made an impression upon the Mongols thus far so why would it now? Europe posed no greater difficulty than China, in fact probably far less and a united Mongol empire would have reached the Atlantic within 20 years.
L'Impresario was right, this is a Monastery debate, but it has all been done before

.......Orda

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Originally Posted by Orda Khan

Judging by these two quotes, we should suspect that you agree with him? As I stated above, maybe some research of the Mongols would help him in his spurious claims. What was the population of China? What was the population of Khwarazm? What was the population of Russia? Or better still, what was the combined population of all these areas and more? It had not made an impression upon the Mongols thus far so why would it now? Europe posed no greater difficulty than China, in fact probably far less and a united Mongol empire would have reached the Atlantic within 20 years.
L'Impresario was right, this is a Monastery debate, but it has all been done before

.......Orda

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According to LoH, the population of China at 70 million was roughly the same as that of Europe. But the difference is that China was on the Mongolian border and had much territory which was ideal for horsed armies. Even so it took the Mongols a generation to subdue China. Europe was 4000 miles away, heavily wooded, and with little if any pastureland to support the large numbers of horses the Mongols employed.

Yes, I think LoH's arguments are compelling, and I've certainly seen nothing on this thread yet which would cause me to change my mind.

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Yes, I think LoH's arguments are compelling, and I've certainly seen nothing on this thread yet which would cause me to change my mind.

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Not even the fact that they defeated China? It took a generation to do so? Hardly surprising really, since at the same time they were operational on all the other fronts. The rest of their conquests took place during the same time and we have to remember the implications of the Mongol empire during that period. In any case southern China was a myriad of waterways and anything but suited to cavalry warfare. Seige warfare not horse archers defeated China.

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Europe was 4000 miles away, heavily wooded, and with little if any pastureland to support the large numbers of horses the Mongols employed.

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The Mongols were in both Poland and Hungary, they reconnoitered Austria. Hardly 4,000 miles away. Why would they need to have troops from Mongolia? Even if this were the case, we should remember they fought and seiged their way to europe's border in 4 years any reinforcements would cover the distance in less time again

.......Orda

One question:

Why would they invade Europe?
What did Europe do to them?

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Originally Posted by The_Doctor

One question:

Why would they invade Europe?
What did Europe do to them?

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Here let me fix it, why invade the world at all? ~;p

What did the world do to them?

They believed all land 'from sunrise to sunset' had been granted to them

........Orda

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Originally Posted by The_Doctor

One question:

Why would they invade Europe?

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Same reason most invasions in history were/are conducted. In a word, loot.

"What If" questions are useless...

But fun :tongue3:...

So, my guess would be:

Maybe (I answer that to all "what if" questions)

The biggest thing is how the Mongols would adapt their tactic to the forests of Europe as they pushed westward. It just wouldn't be as easy to win as on the steppes.

As for Ain Jalut, I recall reading that the Arabic could have been mistranslated to be 20000/120000/200000 troops for the Mongols... I was always interested in this triumph over the Mongols, could someone provide more information...

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Originally Posted by screwtype

I'd always pretty much assumed that Europe had no tactical answer to the tide of horse archers and was probably only saved by the death of the Khan, but LoH puts a very strong case that the Mongols would not have stood a chance in European conditions.

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I find it quite simple that the mongols reached natural limits, their domain became so large that it was not possible to control it and the resources were depleting so it was not possible to expand. Because of large territory mongols were in process of splitting to separate households and any one of them would have to consider the safety of its brother-facing rear.

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Originally Posted by Dark_Magician

I find it quite simple that the mongols reached natural limits, their domain became so large that it was not possible to control it and the resources were depleting so it was not possible to expand. Because of large territory mongols were in process of splitting to separate households and any one of them would have to consider the safety of its brother-facing rear.

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Yes, I agree. They had already reached the natural limits of expansion (arguably exceeded them) and lacked the political development to enable them to hold onto their gains.

However, they did in their short time manage to do an incredible amount of damage to other cultures, particularly the Muslim and Russian. Which is why I can't understand why they'd be heroes to anybody. IMO a lot of the problems of the modern world can arguably be traced back to the destruction wrought by the Mongol hordes.

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Which is why I can't understand why they'd be heroes to anybody.

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Perhaps because people like myself do not judge them by the standards of todays 'so called' enlightened morals but rather by their military achievements. To condemn the Mongols without first gaining any insight into their culture and beliefs at the time is like reading the end of a book and writing a critique about its content. There are understandable (if we remain impartial and unbiased) reasons for the large scale killings in both China and the Moslem countries. After Khwarazm fell, there was every likelihood that a resurgeance under Jelal ad Din who was a very able commander, could have proved very costly to the new Mongol empire. Their armies, already logistically stretched (and outnumbered) entered into a phase of consolidation and made thoroughly sure that there would be no backlash. Xi Xia paid the ultimate price for treachery and indifferent arrogance. Harsh treatment this may be but in the 13th Century, who with the ability would allow vassals to treat them with contempt? If the Crusaders were able, do you not think they would have eradicated Islam? Because they were nomads, the Mongols and other nomads before them have been labelled, as if they were lesser beings simply because they chose a pastoral existance. They did not build marvellous cities and impressive Cathedrals or Mosques. What good would these be to them and their way of life? Conquered nations enjoyed considerable securities under Mongol administration, the freedom to worship whatever faith being but one of them. People were not despised simply because of their faith as was generally the case in the civilised cities of europe and the middle east.

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IMO a lot of the problems of the modern world can arguably be traced back to the destruction wrought by the Mongol hordes.

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An argument commonly used to explain why Russia lagged behind during the renaissance period. This may or may not be the case, personally I feel there are plenty of other Russian based considerations for this fact. The irrigation systems of Persia suffered irreparable damage and the area is a shadow of the fertile place it once was. Was this entirely thanks to the destruction caused by the Mongols? A certain Timur, a Turk, arguably wrought greater havoc in this area than the Mongols before him

........Orda

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Originally Posted by Reenk Roink

As for Ain Jalut, I recall reading that the Arabic could have been mistranslated to be 20000/120000/200000 troops for the Mongols... I was always interested in this triumph over the Mongols, could someone provide more information...

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There are wide ranging figures, historical accounts notoriously exaggerate numbers. Likewise there are notoriously exaggerated accounts of battles also. Ain Jalut was basically a victory by Sultan Kutuz and all the troops he could muster over a rearguard force of Georgian and Armenian conscripts and a small contingent of Mongols under the leadership of Ked Bukha. Whatever the accounts on numbers, Ked Bukha commanded about a quarter of the number that followed Kutuz. The Mongols attacked and broke the Mamluk left, desperate pleas by Kutuz to stand firm, redeployment of troops and the timely strike by Baybars into the Mongol flank won the day.
Troop numbers are not really important, it was the reversal of fortune and the great boost to morale that this Mongol defeat gave to the Mamluks. As I mentioned above, the political implications and uncertainties in the Mongol empire prevented Hulegu from achieving his aim. He dared not risk his position, which was anything but secure. An example of this.....there were Golden Horde troops among the Mamluk ranks!
For an astonishing insight of the Mongol empire I would really recommend reading ...Qaidu and the Rise of the Independant Mongol State in Central Asia .. by Michal Biran. The facts unearthed in this study make for some surprising reading

.........Orda

I do not know if the Mongols could have subjugated Europe, but there were several factors working against them. Tactically at the time, nobody had beaten them in open battle. The only major battle I know of between the European powers (28,000 men) and the Mongols (less than 20,000 men) resulted in a crushing defeat of the European powers. Two other points.

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But the difference is that China was on the Mongolian border and had much territory which was ideal for horsed armies.

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The western 2/3 of China is rugged country, much of it still today sparsely populated. Not good country to fight in at all. Still, most of the population was/is on the costal area. Perhaps it was Russia that was intended.

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Europe was 4000 miles away, heavily wooded, and with little if any pastureland to support the large numbers of horses the Mongols employed.

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I can only scratch my head, since Europe at that time was a very agrarian economy, with a polulation of about 60 million, and if grassland/pasture did not exist to sustain ponies used to subsisting on steppe grass, Europe could not have supported half that number of people.

As a subset of this, the Mongols were always strategically, and often tactically, outnumbered by their enemies. The Europeans of 1150-1300 could not conceive of an enemy capable of moving from the shores of the Baltic sea to the Carpathian mountains in weeks rather than months. It was believed, at the time (~1241), that the Mongol forces in Europe alone exceeded 500,000, when the population of Mongolia at the time was less than half that. The Mongol "Horde" was a creation of their enemies imagination, and one that the Mongols did not discourage.

The main problems facing the Mongols were logistics and the nature of tribal succession, which caused more problems than their external foes did for several decades.

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Originally Posted by Orda Khan

There are wide ranging figures, historical accounts notoriously exaggerate numbers. Likewise there are notoriously exaggerated accounts of battles also. Ain Jalut was basically a victory by Sultan Kutuz and all the troops he could muster over a rearguard force of Georgian and Armenian conscripts and a small contingent of Mongols under the leadership of Ked Bukha. Whatever the accounts on numbers, Ked Bukha commanded about a quarter of the number that followed Kutuz. The Mongols attacked and broke the Mamluk left, desperate pleas by Kutuz to stand firm, redeployment of troops and the timely strike by Baybars into the Mongol flank won the day.
Troop numbers are not really important, it was the reversal of fortune and the great boost to morale that this Mongol defeat gave to the Mamluks. As I mentioned above, the political implications and uncertainties in the Mongol empire prevented Hulegu from achieving his aim. He dared not risk his position, which was anything but secure. An example of this.....there were Golden Horde troops among the Mamluk ranks!
For an astonishing insight of the Mongol empire I would really recommend reading ...Qaidu and the Rise of the Independant Mongol State in Central Asia .. by Michal Biran. The facts unearthed in this study make for some surprising reading
.........Orda

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Good points. Though that is why I brought up the numbers. With Ain Jalut, either the forces were even, or the Mamluks outnumbered the Mongols depending on the translation.

I also recently read something about the Mamluks being created as a counter to the Mongolian warriors and being able to defeat them in close combat.

I'll be sure to pick that book up... :book:

An excellent link, screwtype! Bookmarked, for future reference!

I have to agree with you and Lord of Hosts - to me, it seems, that the Mongols were reaching their limit, both internally and externally. I also think that the territorial difficulties they would have faced are being underestimated in this thread, but what do I know? I'm no scholar, and I wasn't there.

And the Mongols would have had to be very, very good to win 100% of the time against the might of the West - and they still would have had a rough time subduing the conquered area even if they mystically cut swathes through kingdom after kingdom.

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I also recently read something about the Mamluks being created as a counter to the Mongolian warriors and being able to defeat them in close combat.

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A huge number of them had already been defeated by the Mongols as they mopped up the steppes and Russia. At one stage the number of Turkic prisoners were almost equal in size to their captors. They were sold into slavery, many of them ending up in Egypt. After the execution of the Caliph of Baghdad, there were hostilities between Berke of the Golden Horde and Hulegu and what became the Ilkhanate. These hostilities between cousins and the fact that Berke had allied with the Mamluks, prevented any further expansion by Hulegu and the subsequent Ilkhans. Many Golden Horde troops serving in Mamluk ranks never returned. The Mamluk position thrived on its security. Later they were utterly crushed by Timur

........Orda

This thread is still in the wrong forum.

To me it seems the main points presented here are 1)the decentralized nature of European authority 2) the number of fortifications and 3) the lack of pasture.

The decentralized hierarchy is not an advantage in itself. The Mongols were good at conquering by a settlement by settlement strategy and they wouldn't have required to decapitate other hierarchies since they were the stronger. It may even have ment a disadvantage as Europe had by far not the same logistical capacities as the Mongols. The Mongols could send a messanger from Kharakorum to Poland in 6 days. The same message would probably have taken longer just through Germany.

Lack of pasture would require that the Mongols were not adaptive to their environment. Europe has some of the most fertile regions in the world and the Mongols excelled in much more barren territories, I can't believe they couldn't have managed gathering food.

The castles of Europe would have been the main problem. It would have slowed down the advance for sure but wouldn't stop it as the Mongols would have been able to await the fall of every fortress. They came to stay after all.

I think this thread is pure speculation.We know that the edges the Mongols had over their opponents were:The Mongol Bow,The horse army tactics and last but not least the iron dicipline of the Mongol army in battle.If infact these would have been effective in Western and Central Europe.How long it would have taken from Europeans to adopt the mongol way of warfare?
The Timurids in Middle east were a fine example of the results when others adopted The mongol way of warfare and used it also against the mongols themselves.

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Originally Posted by A.Saturnus

This thread is still in the wrong forum.

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Well, much as I love historical discussion and welcome it in this forum (where relevant to M2TW), I have to agree. The Monastery is a more suitable location for this topic.

Despite Leignitz and Kalka it was impossible. Mongols wouldn't manage to hold Western Europe because there were no steppe. Mongols could hold steppe countries (or sandy deserts) but not forests. Look at Vietnam - 100.000 Mongols entered the country, left it 20.000. Guerilla killed them. Similar thing would happen into Poland and Germany. Furthermore Mongols wouldn't easy capture Alps and Italy.

A more important consideration would be what implications such a conquest would have had. Nomad empires are, after all, notoriously lacking in stability and tend to fall apart as quickly as they rise, and then completely vanish from history, very much unlike sedentary polities.

What effects would a Mongol conquest have had on the long-term development of Europe, besides some Mongol genomes and perhaps some fancy fur-hats?

Probably the introduction of some neat Chinese inventions sooner than actually happened. Although I've read the Persians point blank refused to accept the paper money their new overlords tried to introduce, despite death threats, so that's not a given...

The Medieval European fortification system was a pretty damn frustrating one by what I've read, and I strongly suspect the Horde would've ran out of horses through sheer starvation owing to the lack of decent pasture while being bogged down in endless sieges of mutually supporting forts from the ground up planned to make life miserable for anyone sitting around them. Not all that much grasslands to go around in Germany for example.

And once they started running short of ponies I suspect the nomad cavalry would've suddenly started getting rather vulnerable to the kinds of shock raids that were SOP for European troops to carry out against armies besieging their fortifications. When you think about it, they were really designed more for that kind of warfare anyway than set-piece battles, or in any case tended to have way more practical experience with the former than with the latter...

I think the Mongols could have conquered Europe but they definately couldn't have held it. In the first instance the lack of strong central power would have meant the Mongols would either have had to adapt and keep the Barons or exterminate the nobility. Neither is very practical as the first will eventually lead to insurrection and the aecond will need a total re-structuring.

As to pastureland, well yes Europe was very fertile but things like crop rotation and fallow pasture were what kept it that way. It would be impossible to convert farmland into pasture on a sufficiant scale. Remember the general population of Europe is already badly under nourished, hence quite short.

As to actually fighting the Mongols, all the Europeans needed was dicipline and they had dicipline in their infantry, that battle between 26,000 Knights and 20,000 Mongols was just that, add in heavily armoured infantry, crossbows, longbows, those fancy new halbards and it doesn't look quite so good for the Mongols.

What would be needed would be a dedicated Alliance, which is possible given the infidel horde and a Papal edict for a Crusade, and someone smart enough to work out glory charges don't work. Admitedly neither are garrentied

Don't wanna cause more confusion, but: does anybody remember Hülegu's conquest of the Assassinis's fortresses, a couple of them were classified as invincible? Don't forget the fact they had Chinese engineers.

The logistic problem is a very good point.

Anyhow, Venice had a secret contract with the Mongols. They informed them about geography, weather & any major changes in power constellations, army sizes, wars, treaties etc... in Europe (goes back to the first encounter on the Crimea). Why would the Mongols wanna have that info, if not for conquering. And they were adaptable....in their Empire were enough folks, trained in infantry warfare & siege (e.g. the Sung...) and as everybody knows: the Mongols liked auxiliary forces.

The keeping of Europe would have been harder, that is for sure. It's always the same with those unresty nomads...isn't it? But who could blame 'em.... :eyebrows:

By the way: i love to ask myself "What if" questions, because they make you rethink your history knowledge and U can play around with it. But facts are still the most important thing, please don't get me wrong.

Yes, those impregnable fortresses from which the Assassins terrorised the local Moslems for years. Hulegu and his ox bows destroyed them and rather quickly. People keep stating lack of pasture as if the Mongol army would grind to a halt without it. They were quite capable of conducting seiges, they did so throughout China and they were more capable than most at adapting. Attila marched his army as far as Orleans and the Huns were never really numerous why would the Mongol army struggle where the Huns had not?

......Orda

By Attila the Huns had largely settled down and fought as infantry. Besides, the Big A didn't have to work his way through endless webs of fortifications specifically designed to grind down the momentum of invaders.

As for pasture, the Mamluks made a point of burning the grasslands of Syria and destroying or appropriating the local granaries which duly caused the Mongols fairly severe logistical issues. Go fig.

I strongly suspect the Mongols abandoned their Hungarian aquisitions and retreated back to the steppes partly because they had amassed enough intel on Europe to decide the poor, backwards sub-continent chock full of forts and highly territorial, xenophobic bastards just plain wouldn't be worth the trouble to try to take over. Most likely they also noticed they had run out of steppe, and if they were going to keep going and hold their new aquisitions they'd be forced to abandon the nomadic life - the same, after all, had happened to the Hungarians only a few hundred years earlier, and I'd be very surprised if the Mongols didn't pick that detail up at some point from their new subjects.

Then there's also the little fact they'd suffered comparatively high losses in that famous river battle against the Hungarians and Templars when trying to force a bridge crossing in the face of astonishingly small number of knights (I've read the night-time attempts were repulsed almost entirely by just the bodyguards of the Hungarian King and the Templar Grand Master - that more troops could not be thrown into the fray, and that the crossing attempt was noticed purely by luck, incidentally tells something of the degree of professionalism and discipline involved...). If they were at all informed of the geography ahead it is perfectly conceivable they weren't one bit happy about the prospect of having to fight over several similar chokepoints for the fairly meager gains Europe promised, nevermind now the projected logistical problems.

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By Attila the Huns had largely settled down and fought as infantry. Besides, the Big A didn't have to work his way through endless webs of fortifications specifically designed to grind down the momentum of invaders.

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Yes I am well aware that the Huns adopted infantry in their armies, it was the point I was making. Something similar happened in China, where the Mongol armies conducted seige after seige not feigned retreat with horse archers.

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As for pasture, the Mamluks made a point of burning the grasslands of Syria and destroying or appropriating the local granaries which duly caused the Mongols fairly severe logistical issues. Go fig.

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The Mongols succeeded in taking Syria. Logistics was a problem more so because of the constant Mongol threat posed by the Golden Horde and Qaidu. They failed to keep Syria because they were too strategically stretched.

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I strongly suspect the Mongols abandoned their Hungarian aquisitions and retreated back to the steppes partly because they had amassed enough intel on Europe to decide the poor, backwards sub-continent chock full of forts and highly territorial, xenophobic bastards just plain wouldn't be worth the trouble to try to take over. Most likely they also noticed they had run out of steppe, and if they were going to keep going and hold their new aquisitions they'd be forced to abandon the nomadic life - the same, after all, had happened to the Hungarians only a few hundred years earlier, and I'd be very surprised if the Mongols didn't pick that detail up at some point from their new subjects.

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With one of the finest intelligence systems I doubt they suddenly discovered any of these things. We all know that Ogodei died and we also know that the majority of Mongol contingents also returned for the Quriltai. Nomadic life was not maintained in China either.

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Then there's also the little fact they'd suffered comparatively high losses in that famous river battle against the Hungarians and Templars when trying to force a bridge crossing in the face of astonishingly small number of knights (I've read the night-time attempts were repulsed almost entirely by just the bodyguards of the Hungarian King and the Templar Grand Master - that more troops could not be thrown into the fray, and that the crossing attempt was noticed purely by luck, incidentally tells something of the degree of professionalism and discipline involved...). If they were at all informed of the geography ahead it is perfectly conceivable they weren't one bit happy about the prospect of having to fight over several similar chokepoints for the fairly meager gains Europe promised, nevermind now the projected logistical problems.

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Sure, they did suffer heavy losses at Sajo, not so much while re-taking the bridge but rather, after they had succeeded and when they were now outnumbered and hemmed in with the river at their backs. The second crossing being found purely by luck is somewhat fanciful to say the least, made even more so when we consider it was they and not the Hungarians who chose the battlefield. What is more, I hardly see Subedei relying on chance and we have an account of the day at a celebratory banquet, where Batu was reminded by Subedei that he should have delayed his first assault knowing that timing was crucial. Hardly the words of a general who had just been blessed by good fortune

......Orda

I have only briefly skimmed this article, and I have already detected several errors and misrepresentations. Stuff like the overpimping of European fortifications, the lack of knowledge on Mongolian military organization (he seems to forget that Russia, even with "six million inhabitants," was still six times as big in that aspect than Mongolia at the time, according to modern estimates), ignorance of the characteristics of the steppe pony that carried the tumens wherever they wanted, too much concentration upon the Blue Horde as opposed to the Mongol Empire -- it all already adds up to me raising my two eyebrows and wondering. But, I won't make up an opinion yet, having failed to read all.

My own opinion -- conquest would have been a breeze. European armies, even if well-led and well-organized by the standards of the time (something that they weren't) still stood before the mammoth task of trying to defeat a force which had been on a world war for twenty years without failure. A force which had made extensive intelligence breaches into the European kingdoms, playing on their weaknesses and comparative division, as they had done with the Russians. No, it would have been very hard indeed for European armies to defeat the Mongols, as shown at Kalka, Legnica and Mohi; had they unified into one large force, their differences and inner division would have cracked the relatively weak façade of feudalism quite readily -- see what the Duke of Austria did in regards of the Cumans and the King of Hungary.

Fortifications? Please. European castles were privately built affairs. They did not follow geographical or political (i.e. border) lines, but simply what the local ruler saw as the best location. A direct result of this was that European fortifications ran pretty haphazardly through the landscape, making it easy to bypass each; this in comparison to the fortifications built in less feudal states, such as those protecting the main trade arteries of Central Asia and China.

Forests? Come on. Did that stop them in Russia -- a nation which still has much deeper and larger forests than Western Europe, even today? I'd surmise they'd use them to their advantage, as they tried to do with everything.

Conquest -- a comparative breeze. Consolidation? Nah. But that is so far ahead of the death of Ögedei and the events that followed that that would turn into pure speculation and fantasizing, as opposed to the discussion surrounding the mere possibility of conquest. I, for one, will steer well clear of the former.

Here's a little tidbit about the Mongols, Mamluks, and Syria:

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Originally Posted by The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War

For sixty years, commencing in AD 1260, the Mamluks of Egypt and Syria were involved in a more or less constant struggle with the ilkhanid Mongols of Persia. During this period, the Mongols made several concerted efforts to invade Syria: in AD 1260, 1281, 1299, 1300, 1303 and 1312. With one exception, all the Mongol expeditions were failures. Even the one Mongol victory on the field, at WadJ al-Khaznadar in AD 1299, did not lead to the permanent Mongol occupation of Syria and the ultimate defeat of the Mamluks, as the Mongols evacuated Syria after an occupation lasting only a few months. Between these major campaigns, the war generally continued in a form which in modern parlance might be described as a "cold war": raids over both sides of the border, diplomatic maneuvers, espionage and other types of subterfuge, propaganda and ideological posturing, psychological warfare, use of satellite states, and attempts to build large-scale alliances against the enemy. Here, as in the major battles, the Mamluks usually maintained the upper hand. Yet, in spite of a conspicuous lack of success on the part of the Mongols, they continued to pursue their goals of conquering Syria and subjecting the Mamluks, until their efforts began to peter out towards the end of the second decade of the fourteenth century. It was only then that the Mongols initiated negotiations which led to a formal conclusion of a peace agreement in AD 1323.

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Quite a good read so far, The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War...:book:

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/052...Fencoding=UTF8

Might I please add the slight nuance that we are speaking of real Mongol tumens, that is to say composed of Mongols from Mongolia -- and not the Mongol successor states, ruled by a Mongol nobility but defended by locals?

These states were constructed upon a fragile equilibrium, namely that of the locals accepting the Mongols on the basis that the Mongols kept supplying goods and prosperity over the Silk Road. Once that Silk Road is crippled by the advancing Black Death, you see that the different Mongol states collapse quick succession, the less Mongol the locals the faster the process takes place.

In no way can one compare, for instance, the forces of the Il-Khanate and the forces of the Mongol Empire proper, as they invaded Europe.

Hey Wiz, not seen you around for a while.

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In no way can one compare, for instance, the forces of the Il-Khanate and the forces of the Mongol Empire proper, as they invaded Europe.

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Precisely!
The majority who rejuvenate this discussion do not fully understand the nature of Mongol culture or its empire and the political implications of this period in Mongol history. As you have pointed out, the battles and armies mentioned are anything but 'Mongol' and they had ceased to be such since at least 1241 (one could justifiably argue 1236) Since the Ilkhanate was as much at war with the Golden Horde and Qaidu (Mongols), considering the Golden Horde were allied with the Mamluks and the White Horde also had a score to settle with the Ilkhanate after at least two of its princes had 'disappeared' whilst serving with the Ilkhanate, is there any wonder that further expansion would be anything but long lived?

.......Orda

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Originally Posted by The Wizard

Might I please add the slight nuance that we are speaking of real Mongol tumens, that is to say composed of Mongols from Mongolia -- and not the Mongol successor states, ruled by a Mongol nobility but defended by locals?

These states were constructed upon a fragile equilibrium, namely that of the locals accepting the Mongols on the basis that the Mongols kept supplying goods and prosperity over the Silk Road. Once that Silk Road is crippled by the advancing Black Death, you see that the different Mongol states collapse quick succession, the less Mongol the locals the faster the process takes place.

In no way can one compare, for instance, the forces of the Il-Khanate and the forces of the Mongol Empire proper, as they invaded Europe.

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Yet one can assume that the Ilkhanate probably used the same Mongolian tactics, and was composed of related Turkic tribes. I fail to see a great difference. The Mamluks essentially defeated the Mongols using their tactics. What I am pointing out here is that the Mongolian battle tactics could be used to defeat the Mongols themselves.

I must also say I don't really see the difference between an "ethnic" Mongol soldier in the Mongol military system and a, for off-the-top-of-head example, Iranian Turkish soldier in the Mongol military system. The two - steppe nomad warriors organized to fight under the same methods - ought to be about the exact same thing in just about all practical respects.

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European castles were privately built affairs. They did not follow geographical or political (i.e. border) lines, but simply what the local ruler saw as the best location. A direct result of this was that European fortifications ran pretty haphazardly through the landscape, making it easy to bypass each;

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And that "best location" just so tended to happen to be the best location for defying incursions and raiders. European feudalism to a large degree developed to defeat mobile raiders (the Moors, Hungarian-Magyars and Vikings originally), and its later internal wars primarily consisted of laying waste each others' holdings (as taking fortified places tended to be a bit of a challenge); the fortress networks were quite good indeed for checking enemy movements and supporting each other as needed. You could say that "area control" in more ways than one was what they were all about.

The only "haphazard" about them was where a lord was able to build them in the face of his competitors and within the limits of his territory; they were certainly expensive and important enough that they weren't just scattered about randomly.

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Forests? Come on. Did that stop them in Russia -- a nation which still has much deeper and larger forests than Western Europe, even today?

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Uh... you know, I don't think the Mongols ever ventured too far into the coniferous forest belt, save for raids. No nomads who'd been inhabiting the region since before they learned to ride horses ever tended to, either.

Due to the simple fact they didn't need to, nor want to because especially after they went on horseback they'd have been at quite the disadvantage there.

The Mongols, like all the nomad empires before them, took over the steppe part of Russia. The forested bit was largely left alone, or in any case not actually conquered and at best adminstered by local vassal lords under the threat of punitive expeditions.

Actually when you look at it, China - which was half plains anyway, and could be conquered relatively easily by taking control of the strategic nerve centers - and Korea were about the exact only places where Mongol dominion actually went well past the limits of the Great Eurasian Steppe Belt. They kind of seemed to hit a wall (à la Vietnam, Java, Japan and Egypt/Asia Minor for some), or just give up and leave (à la Hungary and Poland), almost everywhere else.

I'd say the pattern is a bit too pronounced to be coincidential.

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Originally Posted by Watchman

I must also say I don't really see the difference between an "ethnic" Mongol soldier in the Mongol military system and a, for off-the-top-of-head example, Iranian Turkish soldier in the Mongol military system. The two - steppe nomad warriors organized to fight under the same methods - ought to be about the exact same thing in just about all practical respects.

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Except for the glaring difference that occurs in most conscripted soldiers.

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Uh... you know, I don't think the Mongols ever ventured too far into the coniferous forest belt, save for raids. No nomads who'd been inhabiting the region since before they learned to ride horses ever tended to, either.

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Jochi ventured quite a way into the Tigra.

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Due to the simple fact they didn't need to, nor want to because especially after they went on horseback they'd have been at quite the disadvantage there.

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On the contrary, he suppressed the 'peoples of the forest'

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The Mongols, like all the nomad empires before them, took over the steppe part of Russia. The forested bit was largely left alone, or in any case not actually conquered and at best adminstered by local vassal lords under the threat of punitive expeditions.

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During this campaign, Siban,Budjeq,and Buri rode so far north that they reported there was 'hardly any night'.

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Actually when you look at it, China - which was half plains anyway, and could be conquered relatively easily by taking control of the strategic nerve centers - and Korea were about the exact only places where Mongol dominion actually went well past the limits of the Great Eurasian Steppe Belt. They kind of seemed to hit a wall (à la Vietnam, Java, Japan and Egypt/Asia Minor for some), or just give up and leave (à la Hungary and Poland), almost everywhere else.

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China was hardly easy to conquer otherwise it would have been conquered before. With the incursions into southeast Asia, I will refer back to conscripted soldiers. These were naval battles, hardly a nomadic strong point, that were fought by armies that consisted hugely of Song Chinese and against countries that had been trading with the Song for years and built up good relationships. Hardly the best morale booster for soldiers who had until recently been fighting against the Mongols.
In Asia Minor, Jebe and Subedei had destroyed the armies of Georgia with a reconnaisance force of some 20,000 odd men twenty years previous. That area became a flash point between the Golden Horde and Ilkhanate

.......Orda

Orda do you refer to Siberians as the "Forest People" or Novgorod? Becouse i was under the impression that there was pretty much no fighting with Novgorod,becouse Nevski was smarter then that.And if you talk about the Siberian forest Nomads i dont think there was any Mongol campaigns in there.

[IMG]https://img392.imageshack.us/img392/...ons12mz.th.jpg[/IMG]

Here are the climates of the same Area:

https://img482.imageshack.us/img482/...abig3sb.th.jpg

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Originally Posted by TB666

I think they could have done it yes but it would have collapsed pretty quick anyway.
There is no way they could maintain control over such a large area but that's another topic.:book:

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Don't think they did try to maintain control. Everything went on as before, but people occasionally payed the Mongol Conquerors tribute. This kept the Mongolians with their hands free to fight and have enough wealth to sustain their army.

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Originally Posted by Kagemusha

Orda do you refer to Siberians as the "Forest People" or Novgorod? Becouse i was under the impression that there was pretty much no fighting with Novgorod,becouse Nevski was smarter then that.And if you talk about the Siberian forest Nomads i dont think there was any Mongol campaigns in there.

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"In the year of the hare [1207] Chingis Khan made Jochi to set forth with the soldiers of the right hand unto the people of the forest. Jochi brought into subjection the Oyirad, Buriyad, Barqun, Ursud, Qabqanas, Qangqas, Tubas, Qirgisud, Sibir, Kesdiyim, Bayid, Tuqas, Teleng, To'eles, Tas and Bajigid and made them present themselves to Chingis Khan bringing white Gyrfalcons, white geldings and black sables. Chingis Khan made a decree that having so successfully brought the people of the forest into subjugation he would give these people unto Jochi."

This is a quote from the Secret History of the Mongols (editted slightly into more understandable English)

Nevski was smart enough to know that resistance was futile, Novgorod had only been saved by the spring thaw. He made a point of presenting himself to Guyuk in Qaraqorum and again to Batu at Sarai, when Mangku became Khan. Novgorod was spared and was a vassal state of the Golden Horde. Nevski had enough on his plate with the Teutonic Order and Sweden, as a Mongol subject he had powerful overlords that he could use to his advantage which he did at the battle of Lake Peipus

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Originally Posted by Tiberius

This kept the Mongolians with their hands free to fight and have enough wealth to sustain their army.

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Unfortunately, with their hands free they fought each other as much and as often as they fought anyone else. Even with tribute, their armies were being eroded.
Is anyone aware that there was evidence of disunity as early as 1227? Ogodei was not pronounced as Khan until 1229 and one of the main reasons was that Tolui was not happy about the decision made by his father. Tolui had not been present when Chingis Khan named his successor and as the youngest son, he received the Mongol heartlands. More importantly, the army that came with it was a good deal larger than those of his brothers. This was still the case even when Ogodei eventually became Khan

.......Orda

Orda have you ever thought that the mongols could also little biased towards their accomplishments.Secret history is mongol history written by Chinese slaves or servants to their Mongol Masters.You must have also read also books like Caesars conguest of Gallia.It has been just little bit controversed after it was written.You must aknowledge that as much Mongols were Warriors but also tacticians and one of the primary things in tactics is to make one indefeatable against his enemies.:shakehands: The fact was that Mongols never saw Icy sea with their armies.Also i would like to hear how Mongol cavalry would have penformed in Siberian forest?That is a trap my friend. Please explain me?:bow:

Kagemusha,
I posted that account because it is the one that goes into greatest detail regarding the tribes, however it is quantified in most of the literature (if not all) that covers the rise of the Mongol empire under Chingis. It is to Jochi's credit that he managed this while only in his twenties

Jochi had proved himself to be a very able general, later he figured prominently during the invasion of Khwarazm, where he was given the most difficult objective. He was more compassionate than his father or brothers and during the mass destruction and killings that followed in Khwarazm, carried out by his father and Tolui in particular, he took his troops north to his Ulus (the land he had been granted) in open defiance; he had been vociferous over what he felt was unnecessary brutality and had argued with his brother, Chagadai.
He had learnt his skills as a commander under the guidance of Jebe and he knew the wisdom of negotiation. The forest people had been subjugated without warfare, through skillful diplomacy and it was this in particular that Chingis Khan commended him for

.......Orda

If you do not see the difference between a proper Mongol soldier and those soldiers that defended the territories of the successor ulus then you possess a fundamental misunderstanding of the Mongol army -- if not the nation -- as a whole.

What I see here is people trying to compare a typical Mongol who served under Chingis, Jochi, Subedei and the other generals prior to the withdrawal from Europe following Ögedei's death, with a typical Turkic tribal levy and/or mercenary ghulam.

This is fundamentally flawed. The Mongol state, and then particularly its army, was far more advanced than any of its foes. It needed to be -- the population of the tribes Chingis had brought under his control by the time of the khuriltai acclaiming his title is estimated at about a million souls. From these was drawn a professional army of a hundred thousand men, all Mongols. This entire levy system was ordained by law, and turned the Mongol state from a collection of disparate nomad clans and tribes into a nation ready for an assault on the world. This was the first professional army integrated into the state since the legions of Rome, and the entire institution was even closer to the state than the Roman one. What we are talking about here is one of those very few examples that comes close to the Spartan example, the way the state was the army and the army was the state (the truth is more complex, indeed, but this comment best embodies the character of the Mongol army and state in a few words).

This entire political structure differed hugely from the states surrounding it -- especially its nomad neighbors. Oh, sure, they used approximately the same tactics, but they were nothing compared to the Mongols strategically. In discipline and morale, the Mongol ruled supreme. No force on the face of the earth at the time shared the ferocity, esprit de corps, determination, not to mention leadership that the Mongol army possessed. No other state was as much a state as the Mongol one, not even the Chinese dynasties. No-one had the same logistical abilities and way of securing an effective manpower pool.

Simply put: there was not an army in sight which was on par with the Mongol army as we see it thundering across Central Asia and into Iran and India. Even when Batu and Subedei invaded Europe -- with the large amount of Chinese and Muslim support personnel involved -- the Mongol army was incomparable to its contemporaries, the less sedentary the less comparable.

The entire power of this force is collaborated by the way we see the state decline as time goes by. Once the distance to the Mongolian heartland became too great to be able to directly administer (or more importantly, back up) the policy in the conquered territories, Mongol rulers there were forced to rely on the weaker systems that had been employed there for centuries already. They did not have the flair nor intelligence -- not to forget the platform nor the situation -- to create the institutions that had catapulted Chingis Khan from Beijing to Kaffa. Once again, they had become the equals rather than the betters of their neighbors, and their military endeavors show the results of that change.

It sounds to me like you're saying the Mongols weren't able to properly integrate the subjugated nomad peoples into their military system. This would frankly be a rather severe demerit, as being able to effectively integrate your new aquisitions is damn near what becoming a succesful empire is all about. All the more so as replacing campaign attrition and combat casualties in the armies goes.

The Romans managed it. Pretty darn well too.

In any case, if we accept the argument that the re-trained nomads picked up along the way weren't the equals of the original Mongols (which I'm a bit sceptical about, but anyway), it raises the question if, ineed, the Khanate had genuinely reached its logistical breaking point by the time it started bothering the Europeans and butting heads with the Mamluks, Byzantines and Anatolian Turks. Besides the inevitable attrition of campaigning and fighting, the simple fact the Khanate had swollen to such a vast size in such a short time would have reduced the Mongols proper to an uncomfortably thin crust in the officer corps and, presumably, some elite units (presumably also somewhat depleted). The rank-and-file would be newer non-Mongol recruits, and if the system wasn't able to get enough oomph out of them to maintain its momentum past a certain point...

Well, all premodern empires had their "natural furthest borders", in the majority of cases dicated by ecology and their particular internal circumstances. Most had to find them out the hard way, too, and a persistent denial of the fact (usually expressed in exepnsive and largely futile continued exansion attempts) seems to have been rather typical.

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It sounds to me like you're saying the Mongols weren't able to properly integrate the subjugated nomad peoples into their military system.

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Not quite. Throughout this thread and other threads before it that have covered the same question, I have continually tried to paint a picture of the Mongol empire so that people can discount the factors, like Ain Jalut and take them for what they were which was not a defeat of THE Mongols.
The Mongol incursions into eastern Europe after those of Batu can not be regarded in the same way as his invasion. Up until 1241, regardless of some unrest, the Mongols were at least united, this was not the case after the death of Ogodei and it became less and less so. As you know, the 'Golden Horde' was more Turkic than Mongol and even during Batu's invasion the Mongol tumens probably contained more Turks than Mongols. They were still successful but let us not forget, they had been defeated by Mongol tumens before they were conscripted. When Ogedei died the vast majority, with the exception of Batu's personal army, of these Mongol tumens returned east. After this point and with time, the Golden Horde obviously became less Mongol and this can be seen with Mongol being replaced by Turkic on coins and the spoken language and eventually culture and names.
Hulegu suffered in a similar way, only this time a Civil War broke out between Qubilai and Ariq Bukha, he also had to consider hostilities from both the Golden Horde and Qaidu, so his position was probably worse than that which Batu had experienced.
Wizard and myself have been trying to make people forget the facts after 1241 and only consider what might have happened had Ogodei's death not changed things because after that event, Mongol minds were preoccupied with 'turf wars' and the empire was no longer a whole, but quite segmented. Even attempts by Bayan of the White Horde, to bring about a coalition and so end disputes failed.
Had Ogodei not died I have no doubt that within Subedei's projected 18 years, Europe would have fallen

........Orda

Orda, my point here is that the Mongols could be defeated, when similar tactics were deployed against them. Very well, you wish to discount Ain Jalut, claiming that the very nature of the soldier had changed (I would argue that the larger factor was that there was no military genius like Genghis or Subotai present).

But my point that the Mongols could be (and were) defeated when similar tactics were used against them stands. Recall Parwan in 1220, where Jalaladin of the already teetering Khwarizm Empire defeated a Mongolian army with the tumen warriors, renowned for their discipline, morale, and prowess, under the leadership of Genghis himself on the steppes of Central Asia.

Of course, this battle was swept away into the pages of insignificance when Genghis reattacked and won, sealing the end of the Khwarizm Empire, but the question remains? What if Jalaladin, in 1221, in that fateful second battle, was able to lure the Mongols into the hills and crush them like he had an year earlier, using that good ol' feigned retreat? He would have stopped them at the Indus, and certainly, at the least bought some time. Would Genghis attack again? Perhaps, the Mongols were persistent. But this would add a steely resolve to their foes, as well as disheartening them.

As for the conquest of Europe, it seemed almost inevitable at that stage, I will post more on it tommorow.

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Originally Posted by Reenk Roink

Orda, my point here is that the Mongols could be defeated, when similar tactics were deployed against them. Very well, you wish to discount Ain Jalut, claiming that the very nature of the soldier had changed (I would argue that the larger factor was that there was no military genius like Genghis or Subotai present).

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I discounted Ain Jalut for more than one reason. It was an army versus a rearguard. The rearguard comprised many Georgian and Armenian auxiliaries so was hardly 'Mongol'. On the contrary, Ked Buqha was an established, competant and experienced commander of standing, which is why the battle was a considerable struggle for Kutuz. He had crushed the Seljuks at Kose Dagh and was a favourite of Hulegu.

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But my point that the Mongols could be (and were) defeated when similar tactics were used against them stands. Recall Parwan in 1220, where Jalaladin of the already teetering Khwarizm Empire defeated a Mongolian army with the tumen warriors, renowned for their discipline, morale, and prowess, under the leadership of Genghis himself on the steppes of Central Asia.

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Jalal ad Din did not defeat an army under the leadership of Chingis Khan.
Shah Muhammad inherited the Khwarazm empire and with it a huge army. The army were Turkish descendants of the mercenary army of Khutbeddin who had declared independence from the Seljuks, plus Qangli Qipchaqs that made up his bodyguard. He annexed Khurasan and refused to pay further tribute to Qara Khitai. Osman of Transoxiana switched allegiance to Khwarazm. When Qara Khitai fell to the Mongols, Muhammad marched almost unopposed into Transoxiana and became the richest ruler in Islam.
By the time of his treachery towards Chingis his army was truly massive, reportedly 400,000 in Transoxiana alone, twice the size of any army the Mongols had ever managed. The Khwarazmian army was deployed along the Syr Darya in a 500 mile front. Jalal ad Din saw the folly of this and wanted an immediate strike against the Mongols. When news arrived that a Mongol army was approaching Ferghana, he took 50,000 men to meet them. The Mongol army, led by Jebe and Jochi had crossed the Tien Shan range with the task of creating a diversion. They suffered horrendous conditions losing men, horses and supplies in the freezing mountain passes. Jalal ad Din met around 30,000 wretched, starving Mongols in the Ferghana valley, as he advanced so they withdrew. They turned to face him in the foothills and after massive losses to both sides they retired. Jalal ad Din's men were not capable of pursuit but he could at least claim a victory.
Only about half the Mongol army returned to Kashgar but their objective had been achieved, the Mongol army was now assembled and ready to go on the offensive. Chingis Khan realised the difficulties ahead and had requested help from his Tangut subjects, all he received was a contemptuous refusal. Regardless of this the Mongols went on to destroy the armies of Khwarazm in an incredible campaign.
As usual, religious tolerance was exercised by the Mongols but was questioned by the Moslems who resented the fact that others shared the same rights, they began to revolt. Chingis turned to his youngest son Tolui to set about suppressing these revolts. A very ruthless commander, Tolui embarked on a path of extermination. News arrived that Jalal ad Din had defeated a Mongol detachment at Ghazni. Shigiqutuqu was sent to deal with him but his force was insufficient and Jalal ad Din was not fooled by dummies on Mongol mounts. The Mongols were forced into retreat. Chingis decided to march on this irritable foe and as he approached over the hills, Jalal ad Din was forced to withdraw. Cornered, with his back to the Indus, he made a resilient stand but with another example of tactical skill, Chingis sent a small force which hit and routed the seemingly safe Khwarazmian right flank. After a second desperate charge, Jalal ad Din turned and fled, swimming across the river.

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Of course, this battle was swept away into the pages of insignificance when Genghis reattacked and won, sealing the end of the Khwarizm Empire, but the question remains? What if Jalaladin, in 1221, in that fateful second battle, was able to lure the Mongols into the hills and crush them like he had an year earlier, using that good ol' feigned retreat? He would have stopped them at the Indus, and certainly, at the least bought some time. Would Genghis attack again? Perhaps, the Mongols were persistent. But this would add a steely resolve to their foes, as well as disheartening them.

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It has been mentioned in Persian sources that the armies of Mongolia and Khwarazm had met in the past. In 1209 while pursuing Naiman fugitives, Jebe and Subedei ventured into Transoxiana (at that time vying between Qara Khitai and Khwarazm). After defeating the last of these Naimans, they were attacked by a Khwarazmian army from Samarkand. There was no real outcome however the Mongols withdrew in the night. There is also a possibility that Khwarazmian forces were encountered again by Jochi during his march west but these are inconclusive and possibly a confusion with the earlier meeting.
So you see, this notion of invincibility is something that was perpetuated in the west, however losing a battle does not necessarily affect the outcome of a campaign. The Mongols suffered many set backs in Korea which is more or less on their doorstep but Korea too became part of their empire.
In 1236, Batu's younger brother Suntai had been forced to halt his advance on the Bulgars when reinforcements from Smolensk and Kiev arrived. A year later would see the Bulgars defeated and from there, Russia, Poland and Hungary would crumple before the Mongol advance. Poland was left defenseless by a simple diversionary force that defeated all that she could field. Hungary was left so weak that parts of it were annexed to Austria.
Anyway, the question is about Europe and having studied Mongol history and researching information about their various campaigns and their opponents, I still have yet to find a reason to believe that European armies would pose any realistic threat to the Mongol advance

........Orda

As for the conquest of Europe, it seemed almost inevitable at that stage, I will post more on it tommorow.[/QUOTE]

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Originally Posted by Orda Khan

Jalal ad Din did not defeat an army under the leadership of Chingis Khan. Shah Muhammad inherited the Khwarazm empire and with it a huge army. The army were Turkish descendants of the mercenary army of Khutbeddin who had declared independence from the Seljuks, plus Qangli Qipchaqs that made up his bodyguard. He annexed Khurasan and refused to pay further tribute to Qara Khitai. Osman of Transoxiana switched allegiance to Khwarazm. When Qara Khitai fell to the Mongols, Muhammad marched almost unopposed into Transoxiana and became the richest ruler in Islam.
By the time of his treachery towards Chingis his army was truly massive, reportedly 400,000 in Transoxiana alone, twice the size of any army the Mongols had ever managed. The Khwarazmian army was deployed along the Syr Darya in a 500 mile front. Jalal ad Din saw the folly of this and wanted an immediate strike against the Mongols. When news arrived that a Mongol army was approaching Ferghana, he took 50,000 men to meet them. The Mongol army, led by Jebe and Jochi had crossed the Tien Shan range with the task of creating a diversion. They suffered horrendous conditions losing men, horses and supplies in the freezing mountain passes. Jalal ad Din met around 30,000 wretched, starving Mongols in the Ferghana valley, as he advanced so they withdrew. They turned to face him in the foothills and after massive losses to both sides they retired. Jalal ad Din's men were not capable of pursuit but he could at least claim a victory.

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And yet the army of the Sultan faced equally difficult conditions themselves. They were also an exhausted bunch and also not very well equipped. Not only that, but the army of Khwarizm was hated by the populous and had questionable loyalty. And yet Jalaladin was able to repel the Mongols after a one day battle. My point is, had he been able to do it again at the Indus, where Genghis was brilliantly able to seperate the army from the refugees and slaughter both, this would greatly affected future expeditions by the Mongols. Would there be more? Most probably, but then again, Jalaladin could also make preparations.

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Originally Posted by Orda Khan

Only about half the Mongol army returned to Kashgar but their objective had been achieved, the Mongol army was now assembled and ready to go on the offensive. Chingis Khan realised the difficulties ahead and had requested help from his Tangut subjects, all he received was a contemptuous refusal. Regardless of this the Mongols went on to destroy the armies of Khwarazm in an incredible campaign.
As usual, religious tolerance was exercised by the Mongols but was questioned by the Moslems who resented the fact that others shared the same rights, they began to revolt. Chingis turned to his youngest son Tolui to set about suppressing these revolts. A very ruthless commander, Tolui embarked on a path of extermination. News arrived that Jalal ad Din had defeated a Mongol detachment at Ghazni. Shigiqutuqu was sent to deal with him but his force was insufficient and Jalal ad Din was not fooled by dummies on Mongol mounts. The Mongols were forced into retreat. Chingis decided to march on this irritable foe and as he approached over the hills, Jalal ad Din was forced to withdraw. Cornered, with his back to the Indus, he made a resilient stand but with another example of tactical skill, Chingis sent a small force which hit and routed the seemingly safe Khwarazmian right flank. After a second desperate charge, Jalal ad Din turned and fled, swimming across the river.

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I find it odd how you try to downplay Jalaladin as an "irritable foe" when Genghis himself had such respect for the man that he prohibited his archers from shooting him while he fled.

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Originally Posted by Orda Khan

So you see, this notion of invincibility is something that was perpetuated in the west, however losing a battle does not necessarily affect the outcome of a campaign. The Mongols suffered many set backs in Korea which is more or less on their doorstep but Korea too became part of their empire.

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My point exactly. The Mongols were always able to follow up their defeats with victories (until Ain Jalut), due to their brilliant leadership, unmatched organization, and their unquestionable battle prowess.

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Originally Posted by Orda Khan

In 1236, Batu's younger brother Suntai had been forced to halt his advance on the Bulgars when reinforcements from Smolensk and Kiev arrived. A year later would see the Bulgars defeated and from there, Russia, Poland and Hungary would crumple before the Mongol advance. Poland was left defenseless by a simple diversionary force that defeated all that she could field. Hungary was left so weak that parts of it were annexed to Austria.
Anyway, the question is about Europe and having studied Mongol history and researching information about their various campaigns and their opponents, I still have yet to find a reason to believe that European armies would pose any realistic threat to the Mongol advance

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It was the internal difficulties withing the Mongol Empire itself that prevented an full scale invasion of Europe. Germany would have been easy, as the emperor was not on the Pope's good side then, and I don't believe that France or the low countries would have been able to put up much resistance. However, I do think that the Mongols would have been frustrated by the numerous fortifications around the continent, which were much more frequent than the Assassin strongholds...
The biggest problem, however, was that the Mongol borders were too overextended, and such an ambitious campaign as to conquer Europe would require many men, resources, and time. Subotai predicted that it would take 18 years to complete. In short, it was simply too difficult for the Mongols to invade and control Europe without jeapordizing their previous holdings.

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Originally Posted by Orda Khan

I discounted Ain Jalut for more than one reason. It was an army versus a rearguard. The rearguard comprised many Georgian and Armenian auxiliaries so was hardly 'Mongol'.

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I'll give you another reason; even though this rearguard was outnumbered, tricked into an ambush and completely surrounded by the Mamluk forces, the Mongols still held fast when they were charged on all flanks and battle ensued. Their defence was so vigorous that the enemy ranks at one point actually wavered, despite fighting an outnumbered and surrounded foe. The Mamluk commander, Qutuz, had to enter the fray himself and rally the men to further efforts before they were finally able to grind the Mongols down. Such prowess is outstanding in the military history of the period.

As for the whole debate on whether or not they could've conquered Europe, speculative and pointless though it may be, I must admit that as much as I dislike the thought of Europe being trampled by the Mongols, I can't really see any reason why this would've proved too much of a challenge to them. When I read all these contra-arguments I see nothing but hoping against hope, refering to exceptional losses that happened under exceptional circumstances, or close-run battles that the Mongols might have lost.

The truth is no European potentate could field more men than the Mongols, none of them had a comparable apparatus for logistics and intelligence gathering, and the tight discipline and organization of the Mongol army had no counterpart in Europe, in fact, this is something the European armies were notoriously bad at, with the exception of a few City-State infantry forces. Not a single fortification existed in Europe that was beyond the capabilties of the Mongol siege machinery to deal with, Orda has already mentioned how they were able penetrate many of the Middle-East's greatest fortresses and walled cities in record time. And forests? Now that's a desperate hope.

Look no further than how the attack on Europe was carried out; two large co-ordinated forces attacking from two corners. What European force could work that way? We're talking warfare on a whole new level, this isn't your typical raid, counterraid with impetous individuals seeking personal glory in battle. Europe's only chance of gaining an advantage, if we accept the accounts of how the Mongols seemed to be severly hampered by outnumbered knights in heavy armour at Sajo and Legnica, would be to lock the Mongols in melee with the heavy cavalry as often as possible, and maybe with some luck wear them down this way. Still, that'd be a miracle, as I can't see any force in Europe with the necessary resources, administration and authority to implement a grand strategy for Christendom. The German princes had just recently been left to their own devices by the Emperor Frederick II, who focused all his energies on Italy, a concerted attack by France and England seems unlikely, remembering their recent conflict, while nearby Denmark is completely flat and ideal for Mongol horsemanship. And still, if we just suppose that a grand strategy could be put into action, there remains the problem of numbers. The French Royal army at the time has been estimated to about 15000 men, the English a bit less, meaning that even if these and more had united, the Mongols would still be more than able to outnumber them if they desired to do so.

Forgive me if I just repeated a lot of which has already been said, as I haven't read all the replies in this thread yet. In any case my conclusion is that only an effort outstanding in the military history of medieval Europe would be good enough to repel the Mongols, and it would be against all odds. But if we stick with logic instead of hope, I must concur with Orda Khan and admit that conquest seemed inevitable.

Betcha that back in the day it also seemed inevitable the Ottomans, who had even better logistics and adminstration nevermind the best damn siege train in the world at the time, would've overrun at the very least Central Europe and prolly quite a bit more too.

They didn't though. The logistical leash simply ran out. It's a pain and a half to enact lasting conquests once you get past certain distance from your actual power centers, nevermind now over rather uncooperative geography. That's what ultimately stumped all empires until the Europeans went and changed the paradigm half by accident in the Early Modern period, and even then they only got really going (with the exception of America) in the 1800s. Think of the way the Romans never made permanent inroads into Germania proper and had trouble holding even parts of Central Europe, or how the ancient Mesopotamian empires could never rid themselves of the pesky barbarians of the highlands to the north. Pretty much the same issues, far as I can tell.

I've no doubt the Mongols could have sent serious attack wedges all the way to the Atlantic if they really wanted, but I also suspect that's have gotten dreadfully expensive in men and materials (chiefly horses) for relatively little gain, a real pain in the ass to do given the fortress-field nature if the subcontinent, and unlikely to accomplish much else than to cause some major mayhem and spread some appropriate fear of their betters around on a liberal basis.

But taking, holding and consolidating territory, especially in conditions as were the norm in medieval Europe, with an army ultimately revolving around steppe-based nomad troops, is a whole different beast entirely from laying waste to the land with large-scale chevauchees. Put this way: assuming they conquered everything in Poland and Germany and Hungary, what'd they use to replace the inevitable campaign-attrition and siege-assault casualties nevermind the steady inevitable trickle of dead men from even victorious battles ? And garrison their conquests with ? Subjugated Europeans perhaps ? Or where'd they get enough remounts to maintain their military backbone, or for that matter even keep all those horses they needed fed outside the grazing-grounds of the steppe ? Or push further with ? I'm pretty sure a steppe army simply could not be maintained in fighting shape in Europe proper for an extended period due to sheer ecology (at its most basic, not enough pasture for all the horses - there's good reasons why cavalry were so few in number in the local armies after all), so they'd have to be largely withdrawn to the steppe proper during the necessary consolidation phases. Even if they tried to take care of the whole thing in one swoop (probably impossible if only given the amount of siege warfare involved), they'd still run into the very real problem the nomadic army would be operating far beyond the limits of its logistical leash, with seriously stretched lines of communications to their "home bases" and reinforcement recruiting grounds on the distant plains.

All of which would only be getting worse the further westwards they went. In essence if they really wanted to "take and hold" the subcontinent they'd sooner or later have had to convert to more sedentary forms of warfare out of the sheer ecological impossibility in keeping a steppe army operational there over the long term - and they'd also have to deal with nearly every damn baron and other lordling who now happened to have some forts and armed men to his name more or less separately, which gets sort of frustrating right quick.

Throw the Khanate's little domestic troubles into the mix (and such considerations as the no doubt rather dubious loyalty of for example the various Russian vassal states), and I can actually quite well see why they decided they didn't actually want even Hungary. Not Worth The Trouble, and quite possibly deemed borderline impossible.

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Originally Posted by Reenk Roink

And yet the army of the Sultan faced equally difficult conditions themselves. They were also an exhausted bunch and also not very well equipped. Not only that, but the army of Khwarizm was hated by the populous and had questionable loyalty. And yet Jalaladin was able to repel the Mongols after a one day battle. My point is, had he been able to do it again at the Indus, where Genghis was brilliantly able to seperate the army from the refugees and slaughter both, this would greatly affected future expeditions by the Mongols. Would there be more? Most probably, but then again, Jalaladin could also make preparations.

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Please explain how conditions were equally bad for an army that marches to a valley from its homeland, while the other army has just crossed mountain passes of 13,000ft and almost frozen and starved to death.

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I find it odd how you try to downplay Jalaladin as an "irritable foe" when Genghis himself had such respect for the man that he prohibited his archers from shooting him while he fled.

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Downplay? An irritable foe he was indeed and a capable commander also. Why did you not use my quote that depicts this?

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Originally Posted by Orda Khan

Jalal ad Din saw the folly of this and wanted an immediate strike against the Mongols

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My point exactly. The Mongols were always able to follow up their defeats with victories (until Ain Jalut), due to their brilliant leadership, unmatched organization, and their unquestionable battle prowess.

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They did not win a victory after Ain Jalut? I think you will find that they actually managed to take Syria after Ain Jalut.

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It was the internal difficulties withing the Mongol Empire itself that prevented an full scale invasion of Europe.

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No. Initially it was the news of Ogodei's death.

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The biggest problem, however, was that the Mongol borders were too overextended, and such an ambitious campaign as to conquer Europe would require many men, resources, and time. Subotai predicted that it would take 18 years to complete. In short, it was simply too difficult for the Mongols to invade and control Europe without jeapordizing their previous holdings.

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They were not over extended at that time and at that time the empire was a united one.

.......Orda

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No. Initially it was the news of Ogodei's death.

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Even if the leader needs to go away for a while (and I've read he never bothered going past his Russian power base - no doubt full well aware that he was altogether too far away to be able to have any effect on the outcome), that doesn't explain the complete pull-out from Hungary (where, I've read, the Mongols had already started minting their own coinage by that point) and total abandonement of further major invasions into the subcontinent.

Frankly, something doesn't add up here. We're talking about a world-empire which had pretty much gotten started by taking over China (albeit one in yet another period of internal strife) and rolled over the whole damn Great Eurasian Steppe Belt, and by what I've read of it had in place a pretty serious case of imperial expansionist ideology ("manifest destiny" to take over the world, as it were). And when they hit the edges of that great stretch of plains and grasslands, their procession suddenly came to a screeching halt. Not only was there a marked absence of any meaningful further expansion where it was seriously attempted - the Ilkhanids being stymied in Syria, the Yuan failing their overseas adventures - the different segments of the great empire under different and to a large degree competing potentates were already coming to loggerheads in mid-1200s, and by what I've read pretty much in open hostilities by the end of 1260s (which looks suspiciously like them turning inwards to savage each other in absence of real opportunities to expand outwards).

All this smacks of them hitting their "point of maximum expansion", an ephemereal thing all empires possess; sooner or later they simply run out of the resources and/or opportunities to expand further, and in practice have to settle down to rule and defend what they have aquired thus far (although further developements may allow succesful conquest to be taken up again later on; this is what happened to the Europeans). Every single empire in history, particularly the premodern ones, hit this point sooner or later; and there is nothing so special about the Mongols as to make them immune to this conspiracy of ecology, logistics and politics.

And against this mountain of evidence of their blunt loss of momentum - blatant inability to enact further conquests of any note and falling to internal squabbling - we are to believe that they could have completed a project as time-consuming as actually conquering and consolidating the vaporous fortress-field of Europe "with ease", or that their patent inability to overpower the Mamluks resulted from lack of "proper Mongol" troops ?

No offense but bollocks, in my humble opinion. That, or what I tend to unkindly term fanboy apologism - the phenomenom where the ultimate failure of a well-liked actor, in this case the Mongol Empire, is attempted to cover up and/or explain away by such cheap excuses due to a basic unwillingness to admit they, as all men and things, were and are not perfect or infallible or unbeatable or whatever.
I occasionally find myself falling guilty of the same fault, if that helps. :shame:

Nonetheless, besides the Romans, Spartans (particularly the bunch at Thermopylae), the Samurai and the English longbowmen (and umpteen national-romanticist fantasies I prefer to not touch with an eleven-foot pole), the Mongols seem to firmly sit in the Fanboy Top Ten as far as the premodern period goes. And I daresay I'm finding altogether too many clues of this principle here.

That aside, it's linky time. I've been seeing some pretty curious claims from time to time, which curiously don't seem to quite add up with somewhat more thorough and deeper-going accounts of the same things I've read. Here are some highly interesting and quite varied articles on the topic - De Re Militaris is a pretty good site from what I can tell, and tends to turn up nice and well-researched stuff most of the time. Of particular interest to the topic at hand would be Mamluks and Mongols: an overview, which IMHO puts forth some pretty sensible theories as to why the Ilkhans failed in Syria but nonetheless kept trying for half a century.

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Originally Posted by Orda Khan

Please explain how conditions were equally bad for an army that marches to a valley from its homeland, while the other army has just crossed mountain passes of 13,000ft and almost frozen and starved to death.

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Jalaladin had many disadvantages going into Parwan, especially concerning his forces. Remember, the soldiers of the Khwarizm Empire were recruited Turks who were unloyal and hated by the populous. Contrast that with the soldiers of the Great Khan. Also, By the time of the battle, they were an exhausted bunch, on top of not being well equipped.

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Originally Posted by Orda Khan

Downplay? An irritable foe he was indeed and a capable commander also. Why did you not use my quote that depicts this?

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"Irritable foe" stands out as the only direct characterization of Jalaladin you make. If I read you wrong, forgive me; it happens constantly in message boards where there is no voice tone/body language to aid the communication.

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Originally Posted by Orda Khan

They did not win a victory after Ain Jalut? I think you will find that they actually managed to take Syria after Ain Jalut.

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I was not stating that they did not win a victory after Ain Jalut. I was stating that Ain Jalut was the first time they were not able to follow up a defeat with a decisive victory. If you believe the successful invasion in 1299 (after which they were repelled again shortly) was a decisive victory, consider the fact that the Il-Khanate invaded again in 1300. The Il-Khanate invasions Syria were also repelled in 1281, 1303, and 1312...

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Originally Posted by Orda Khan

No. Initially it was the news of Ogodei's death.

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Hence the beginning of internal difficulties...

Someone remind me, who became the Head Honcho after Ogedei and how did the selection process work out de facto ?

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Someone remind me, who became the Head Honcho after Ogedei and how did the selection process work out de facto ?

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His son, Guyuk. The same son who had been so outspoken during a heated argument during the campaign in Russia; the son who could not stomach the fact that Batu, merely his cousin, was commander of this campaign. Knowing this, Batu chose not to return for the Quriltai (justifiably he realised that if he had, he would lose everything including, probably, his life)
Guyuk did not become Khan until 1246 and from 1241 until that time, Batu did everything he could to prevent the outcome. Ogodei had favoured his grandson Siremun whose father was Kochu. Kochu had been Ogodei's first choice but he died in 1236. Kadan was his son by one of his concubines, Guyuk was eldest son of his wife Toregene who was left as regent and was making sure her son won the position. Is it a little more apparent now why he chose to secure his position by withdrawing from Hungary? Do you not agree that to push on into Europe, with the loss of the backbone of his army thanks to the Mongol tumens returning, would have been complete folly? Even by the time news arrived of Ogodei's death, Kadan had secured the subjection of Bulgaria.

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Jalaladin had many disadvantages going into Parwan, especially concerning his forces. Remember, the soldiers of the Khwarizm Empire were recruited Turks who were unloyal and hated by the populous. Contrast that with the soldiers of the Great Khan. Also, By the time of the battle, they were an exhausted bunch, on top of not being well equipped.

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The Khwarazmian armies were not as well equipped as the armies of Mongolia? I dispute that. They belonged to the richest empire in Islam and had been maintained both in size and weaponry by Shah Muhammad. They were hated by the populace for their plundering activities and the fact that they were Turkish, however this does not alter the fact that they were amply equipped and had been for a long time.

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"Irritable foe" stands out as the only direct characterization of Jalaladin you make. If I read you wrong, forgive me; it happens constantly in message boards where there is no voice tone/body language to aid the communication.

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Again this is another quote by myself.....

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Originally Posted by Orda Khan

Jalal ad Din saw the folly of this and wanted an immediate strike against the Mongols

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Therefore meaning he could see how a 500 mile front had no area of concerted strength and that a direct strike was the best course of action.

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Hence the beginning of internal difficulties...

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Which is what I have said all along. The question of taking Europe has to be aimed at the time the campaign was underway and therefore, before Ogodei died. After that point, frankly, the question is pointless. It was Ogodei's death that halted the advance, not internal disputes or difficulties. One such dispute was settled before the advance on Hungary, that of Guyuk and Buri.

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Even if the leader needs to go away for a while (and I've read he never bothered going past his Russian power base - no doubt full well aware that he was altogether too far away to be able to have any effect on the outcome), that doesn't explain the complete pull-out from Hungary (where, I've read, the Mongols had already started minting their own coinage by that point) and total abandonement of further major invasions into the subcontinent.

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Who are you talking about Ogodei or Batu? Ogodei never even went to Russia and I can assure you that Batu went much further, like Buda and Pest.

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No offense but bollocks, in my humble opinion. That, or what I tend to unkindly term fanboy apologism

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Mongols seem to firmly sit in the Fanboy Top Ten as far as the premodern period goes. And I daresay I'm finding altogether too many clues of this principle here.

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Then there is no point debating this subject further. Throughout this thread I have pointed out misguided thoughts of Mongol invincibility, Mongol warfare and even Mongol culture. I still suggest that people do some research (and something more reliable than the net) into Mongol culture and politics of the day, maybe in that way the picture will become clearer. You obviously consider me a mere 'Mongol fanboy' thank you for that insult ... and just who would you be?

........Orda

Someone with an avid and universal loathing of all fanboyism, actually. Particular in historical contexts.

Anyway, thanks for the explanation on the internal tensions of the Khanate in the 1240s. While I've long been under the strong impression the whole thing was rapidly cracking up under its own sheer size and the fact its far-flung parts and potentates were running seriously short of reasons to keep listening to the nominal top of the hierarchy at an alarming rate, details are always nice.

However, even if Ogedei's death was the breach in the floodgate that let the torrent loose it remains a fact the deep divisions were already in place. Ogedei the Drunk doesn't exactly give off the air of a strong ruler of considerable authority, either. Which in practice makes one strongly suspect it was only a matter of time before the empire ruptured at the seams into splinter states, even had the Great Khan not managed to perish at the time.

Which, in turn, makes the Mongol ability to militarily take over Europe or lack therof largely irrelevant. Conquering and consolidating such a large tract of so unmanageable and uncooperative territory would have required the investement of considerable time and manpower in a frankly rather high-risk low-profit endeavor at a time when every sub-ruler worth the title not only was fast developing his own ideas of how to run his particular segment of the realm, but also knew it was merely a matter of time before the stuff hit the fan and everyone stopped pretending.

Which is not a time to have the better part of your decent troops mired in subduing unruly big-nosed Europeans in some worthless stretch of woods, especially given that AFAIK Batu's little slice of the empire shared border with a couple of other fairly major and not excessively trustworthy peers.

All those internal tensions and erosion of central unifying authority incidentally make your earlier statement "they were not over extended at that time and at that time the empire was a united one" look simply weird. Regional honchos starting to go their own way has always been a pretty sure sign of imperial overreach.

Batu probably had some intentions of staying in Hungary; he'd in any case ended up taking over much of it anyway during the whole "punish the Cumans and uppity Hungarians" thing, and extra tax base never hurt anyone. This doesn't mean too much by itself though - the Great Hungarian Plain is something every nomad conqueror wandering towards Europe seems to have made a point of taking over; those who stayed for any lenght of time, such as the Huns, this particular branch of Avars and the Hungarian-Magyars, also had to abandon nomadism for the simple reason the mountain-ringed plain simply didn't have enough pasture. This - the ecological impossibility of maintaining a strong nomad presence in the region - may actually well have been a contributing factor in Batu's decision to ditch it; it'd have caused some potentially quite serious trouble with garrisoning the place, and the year or thereabouts he occupied it would've been quite enough time to realize this logistical limitation.

Being the furthest Western tip of the Great Steppe Belt, it'd also have been a natural invasion route for his main forces based on the steppes proper further east in any campaign deeper into Europe. If it was incapable of supporting even a decent nomad population in residence, the logistical strain of campaigning beyond the damn place would presumably have been rather daunting and maintaining steppe armies that long away - ie. actually occupying and conquering land beyond it - essentially impossible.

Vassals and client rulers are another thing, but then that's sort of difficult to count as real "conquest" anyway and those have ever been notoriously unreliable anyway. Heck, the Horde was eventually taken down by a runaway Russian Grand Vassal... Plus any sustained operations past them would in practice have to be carried out by their troops, and/or Mongol armies reconfigured to operate in the local conditions - in practice settled down, and hence bereft of their greatest military advantages over the sedentary armies.

I'm under the impression neither the Avars nor the Hungarian-Magyars - or even the Huns, despite having settled down - actually even tried serious expansion either. They seemed to be content with raiding, meddling in neighbours' internal affairs (the Magyars made a killing as mercenaries too) and sheer tribute extortion. Indeed, aside from Hungary (which was really an ecological trap for pastoralists) and parts of Poland Europe (here not counting southern Russia, which is high steppe) seems to have been historically essentially "ecologically proof" against nomad conquests - the pastoralists seem to have been bluntly incapable of sustaining operations far from their home turf for any longer amount of time.

Which actually makes one suspect Batu and Co. would just have done the usual number of reducing the immediately nearest realms into one degree of client/tributary degree or another by sheer intimidation if possible and punitive expeditions (which are far less affected by the logistical/ecological issues, being of short term and temporary presence) if necessary, and not bothered wasting resources in futile expansion attempts into territory they quite possibly frankly didn't even want (as the idea of settling down - as happened in China, and would have been necessary in Europe - may well have been genuinely repugnant to most of the nomads; all the more so as they were in an excellent position to observe what it had done to the Hungarians). The Ilkhanids took that approach in Asia Minor, it had been taken with the nomads of the Caucasus, the Horde took it with the Russian principalities - because it worked and saved them inordinate amounts of potentially quite embarassing trouble.

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Originally Posted by Watchman

Nonetheless, besides the Romans, Spartans (particularly the bunch at Thermopylae), the Samurai and the English longbowmen (and umpteen national-romanticist fantasies I prefer to not touch with an eleven-foot pole), the Mongols seem to firmly sit in the Fanboy Top Ten as far as the premodern period goes.

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It is true, yes, I'm convinced most history buffs will second that statement. However, no matter how many fanboys the Mongols might have, this doesn't mean the conclusions reached about their superiority through empirical reasoning is any less correct. And Orda Khan knows his stuff, I would say he is more educated on this subject than anyone else on the forum, before arguing with him I'd first do some serious research.

The entire discussion on conquest, and then specifically consolidation of said conquest is quite useless, in my opinion.

You see, such speculation is so far from what we know that we cannot use coherent arguments, complemented by facts and research, to defend our points of view. It is speculation, in its purest form. We simply don't know what would have happened. As such, discussing that is like trying to hold a debate over tastes in music, art or clothing: it's a trading of opinions rather than a debate of arguments. It is not commanded by logic, but by feeling, and such a debate can never end well.

In contrast, debating about the simple topic of "could the Mongols have finished what they started" can be debated using facts. Why? It wasn't a long shot from the Mongol positions on the eve of Ögedei's death to the walls of Paris, Carcassone, London and Toledo. What was a long shot is the question if the Mongols could have held on to what they would have taken from the European feudal nobility. Fact is: I don't know. And I'm not about to go venturing into those murky waters either.

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Originally Posted by Spartakus

It is true, yes, I'm convinced most history buffs will second that statement. However, no matter how many fanboys the Mongols might have, this doesn't mean the conclusions reached about their superiority through empirical reasoning is any less correct. And Orda Khan knows his stuff, I would say he is more educated on this subject than anyone else on the forum, before arguing with him I'd first do some serious research.

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Oh, I'll freely admit I really should go read up a bit more on the topic and am perfectly willing to bow down to his knowledge on the details. But that's not the point here. The issue isn't Mongol ability to out-general and out-fight the Europeans; frankly, almost anyone in Eurasia at the time would've been able to do it, including the Crusader Kingdoms. One thing the European-pattern feudalism wasn't good for was producing reliably capable leadership, or cohesive and maneuverable field armies.

The point is whether they could have mounted succesful campaigns of conquest and keep hold of their gains in the, for all nomads, very uncooperative ecology of the subcontinent and its at the time unbelievably messy, fractious, unmanageable, opportunistic morass of ambitious little lordlings who all had their little two-bit wanna-be kingdoms fortified to Hell and back and had ample practical experience in the rough art of completely frustrating serious attempts at seizing their territories.

Frankly, around that time most European armies were crap for large-scale field battles and serious grand strategy (although they were also quick learners - it didn't take long for the First Crusade to adapt to horse-archers for one example, and the Teutonic Order acclimated right quick to the peculiar conditions of Lithuania). They weren't really even meant for that kind of thing, and the warfare pattern made major open battles rather rare anyway.

What they were good for, however, was specifically the sort of siege and raid and counter-raid and skirmish and devastation and so on essentially rather small-scale, small-unit warfare struggles over territory that were how these territory things actually were sorted out, whatever the court poets might claim and the warrior nobility wish. And aside from whoever lordling the Mongols could bully, bribe or entice to fold on terms, there's simply no way they could have taken over the region without getting stuck in that kind of vicious, frustrating attrition campaigning over endless little forts, towers and castles. Kick over the king, and his barons will probably shrug and you'll still have to deal with them more or less one by one as they never really paid the guy too much heed anyway. Get the king to submit, and the damn barons will still thumb their noses at you if they fell like it (and for that matter at their monarch - getting trounced by a bunch of smelly steppe barbarians doesn't really do much to anyone's prestige and credibility amongst his subjects), as the royal hold of them is tenuous at the best of times. Leave a vassal in charge, and the bugger will turn on you the second he thinks he can get away with it and you'll have to do all of it all over again - assuming you can spare the manpower from other more pressing matters. Heck, even the damn peasants just might decide they dislike those smelly bowlegged archers on ponies enough (or will die anyway, and might as well go down swinging - most peasant revolts actually had this kind of creepily fatalistic undertone) to start playing a round of Contra, and in the right terrain those scythe wielding rustics could make a truly incredible pain in the arse out of themselves. However good soldiers, archers and horsemen the Mongols and their dragooned nomad auxiliaries might be, that doesn't really help all that much when small groups of them get jumped on godforsaken forest paths by gangs of ragged peasants or get their throats cut in their sleep and the bodies surreptiously dumped down some hole. Armies much more formidable than the Horde every now and then found themselves virtually besieged in their strongholds by such uprisings, when travel on the countryside was virtual suicide outside large armed convoys.

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Someone with an avid and universal loathing of all fanboyism, actually.

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For every Mongol Fanboy there is a Mongol-phobe also I guess.

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Ogedei the Drunk doesn't exactly give off the air of a strong ruler of considerable authority, either.

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On the contrary, and in particular his treatment of two princes Buri and his own son Guyuk after their outburst at a victory banquet shows that he was totally impartial. He spelled out in no uncertain terms, that Guyuk was dispensible. During the confrontation between princes, Harqasun (no royal blood) had joined in the insults and Ogodei was quick to point out that his punishment for such forwardness was death. He raged that sparing Guyuk would show partiality and only the intervention of council saved Guyuk. Matters of the steppe were decided on the steppe so Ogodei agreed to put the matter in the hands of Batu who could easily have had them executed. He chose to forget the matter and concentrate on the campaign. Later during the purge that followed Mangku's election, Batu finally had his revenge when Buri was sent before him to answer for his part in the plot to assassinate the new Khan.
Many of the reforms and the consolidation attributed to Mangku were begun by Ogodei and where excessive drinking is thought to be the cause of his death, there is more than a hint of suspicion that he was actually poisoned. The actions of Guyuk after his coronation appear to somewhat confirm this.

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All those internal tensions and erosion of central unifying authority incidentally make your earlier statement "they were not over extended at that time and at that time the empire was a united one" look simply weird. Regional honchos starting to go their own way has always been a pretty sure sign of imperial overreach.

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How? As I explained, the empire was a united one under Ogodei. The confrontation between the princes was settled and did nothing to jeopardise the move into Europe, even if the smouldering embers would be rekindled later. The fact still remains that there were no autonomous regions or rulers within the empire while Ogodei was alive.

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Heck, even the damn peasants just might decide they dislike those smelly bowlegged archers on ponies enough (or will die anyway, and might as well go down swinging - most peasant revolts actually had this kind of creepily fatalistic undertone) to start playing a round of Contra, and in the right terrain those scythe wielding rustics could make a truly incredible pain in the arse out of themselves.

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No rustic had had proved much of a pain up until then and I am certain that if they did indeed decide to try there would have been a way to deal with it. When news filtered through to the 'rustics with a cause' that the last lot who tried brought about the extermination of massive numbers, these scythe wielders would have soiled their breeches and left the 'smelly bowlegged archers' positively fragrant by comparison

.........Orda

I'm not sure your positions are all that far apart.

In any case, it is quite romantic to say that Europe was saved by an untimely death, but we do have to recognize that a Mongol conquest of Europe would have been difficult (not impossible, but difficult), due to the terrain and the heavy fortification of Europe (mostly since the 'feudal revolution' or 'evolution' of c. 1000 CE). Few of us would doubt that in a pitched battle on open terrain the Mongols would most likely have inflicted heavy, if not crushing defeats on European armies. In a forest or mountain pass, however, the Mongols would have had a tougher time, and even tougher the further they got from their supply lines in Pannonia/Hungary.

The best strategy for the Mongols would be for a lighting assault that crushed European field armies and sowed terror amongst the defenders. Once the initial shock wore off and the Europeans could prepare for an assault, however, the Mongols would have had more difficulty. Remember that in the previous century, Frederick Barbarossa, Richard I and Philip Augustus had collectively fielded three major armies with over 100,000 troops, and this for a combined-arms campaign in far-away Asia; for the defense of Europe itself against a pagan invasion, far more troops could have been raised and armed for battle. The Pope would have been distributing crusade indulgences like candy.

One also has to consider that the Europeans would have had virtual dominance of the seas, at least in the Baltic/North Sea and western mediterranean, which meant armies from Scandinavia, Britain, France, Aragon, Sicily, etc. could strike at soft points in the Mongol empire with virtual impunity. It would have taken the Mongols some time to build up their sea power in the Mediterranean, whether they took coastal areas and built ships there or sailed some from south/east asia or the Black Sea. This would have given the Europeans some time to prepare, and also have been very costly for the Mongols.

In sum, I think it is likely the Mongols could have inflicted severe casualties on European armies and taken large areas of Europe for a short time. Within a few years, however, the Mongols would have quickly realized that the costs of sustaining their effort far outweighed the gains they were making, and that there were more pressing quarrels to attend to back in Asia. I think the Mongols would have soon withdrawn.

Might a Mongol invasion have resurrected the Holy Roman Empire and set Europe on the path to unity? Interesting thought.

European armies just happened to have the pesky tendency of entrenching into their fortress networks once they realized they were facing overwhelming odds. They did it with each other all the time, and it wouldn't take them too long to figure they had better not try to take the Mongols on in the open.

Which response would get the Mongols rapidly stuck in the snail-paced siege-and-skirmish pattern of warfare the Europeans were so familiar with. Although they'd have the advantage their soldiers weren't serving on a feudal obligation for limited period, the fact that their horses would be starving en masse alone ought to more than make up for it. Starvation was often an acute problem even for the native armies, and they did not have all those gazillion ponies to feed...

Of course they could "live off the land", ie. pillage foodstuffs from the peasants. That's what everyone did. But if that is to be carried out to any effect, ie. effectively enough for the foraging to help stave off starvation of the main army, that would require the dispersion of rather large numbers of troops away from the main force, which in turn would bring them under constant harassement from the garrisons of all those little support forts and towers and suchlike the landscape was rotten with; they existed almost specifically for that purpose (harassing foragers and distrupting lines of communication), after all. Given the tendency of the Mongols to treat the peasantry with a degree of brutality midly unusual even for steppe nomads (although the competition was fierce...), guerilla warfare by desperate peasants probably quite realistically convinced they'd be going to die anyway (if only out of starvation, given how much horses eat) would also have been a real possibility and a further source of attrition for those foraging bands. Brutal reprisals against the peasantry would incidentally also create other problems, discussed later.

It should also be noted the Ilkhanids seemed to have real problems maintaining forces as large as they'd have liked in Syria, which at least is ecologically capable of maintaining pastoralism (seeing as how Semic nomads had been dwelling there from a very long time ago, and Turkish ones from more recently). Europe, geographically virtually "nomad proof", would have been infinitely worse - much later even much better organized armies tapping much higher developed agricultural infrastructures would have real trouble feeding their soldiers, nevermind now the poor horses, if they had to stay in one region for any longer amount of time.

Devastating the countryside and slaughtering the peasantry (even if only as a side effect of "living off the land") would also have the effect of creating a "scorched earth" area - this would of course undermine the economic base of whoever held the afflicted reagion, which is why the Europeans did it a whole lot too to undermine each other's position. The problem this would cause the Mongols, however, is that the ability of the area to produce supplies for them if and when they managed to take it over, and/or sought to operate beyond it. And in a subcontinent of functionally zero pasture as far as large horse herds are concerned (there's good reasons why pastoralism never spread beyond Bulgaria, western Russia and Hungary - and had trouble even in the last one) the only source of fodder for the (for steppe-type armies all-important) horses is the agricultural base. And if the peasants are dead, well, who grows the crops ?

Moreover, even given the limitations imposed by the feudal system, the Europeans in fact all the tactical "building blocks" they'd ever need to face nomadic forces. They'd just have needed to develop the techniques - somehting sufficiently dire straits always seemed to make a lot easier, if only because the hidebound traditionalists would tend to die off. Look at the Crusader Kingdoms; they had already during the First Crusade figured out how to fight nomad armies (and the Turkish ones were ultimately none too different from the Mongols, whose real advantages lay in organization particularly at the state level) with a combination of spearmen, crossbowmen and heavy cavalry, and did a quite fine job holding off Turkish incursion despite the fact the region was fairly well suited to the sort of high-mobility warfare both the nomads and the native Arabs excelled in (and for which large areas of Europe were much less accommodating). Necessity is the mother of invention, and one suspects the warlords would've gotten the idea pretty soon.

The Italians ought to have been particularly troublesome. Not only were they decidedly more tactically competent than was the average for the continent, they could close the Alpine passages if necessary (and several times held off quite large armies that way; the local mountain folk also occasionally demonstrated the ability to badly maul armies passing through that they didn't like) and had developed a very effective pattern of cooperation between heavy spearmen and crossbowmen. European heavy cavalry, which was specialized in shock breakthrough, commonly broke against these communal militias; and as proven in the Levant the crossbow, when properly employed, was quite capable of taking on archers or at least keeping the nomadic skirmish tactics at bay. How the Mongols, chiefly light horse archers, could have dealt with the northern Italian communal militias on their heavily-fortified home grounds at least without incurring excessive casualties is a bit beyond me. Amphibious invasions would have been Right Out - taken as a whole the Italians practically owned the nearby seas, and one suspects the Byzantines would not have been too cooperative either.

It may sound romantic that Ogodei's death saved Europe, I agree, it does. However the fact still remains that upon news of his death, the Mongol princes (there were 10 of them present) and the Imperial tumens returned for the Quriltai, with the exception of Batu and his personal army and his newly acquired conscripts. You really must try to understand Mongol culture and customs, Batu was livid about the untimely death, was well aware of the wrangling going on back home. He knew that Guyuk's position as successor had been secured and he knew the implications, which is why he made excuse after excuse for not returning. He held up proceedings for almost five years. War between himself and Guyuk was only avoided thanks to Guyuk's timely/untimely death as he marched to enforce his position over Batu.

A bit about the Mongol system that most are unaware, is that the Qaghan was not the all powerful ruler that has been assumed. It was Ogodei that made some inroads to change this or at least secure the Qol or central administration as the overall authority. He nor any future ruler had the arms to dictate this and his administrational efforts made sure that taxes were shared between nominal powers and those of the Qaghan. Any of the other princes had the means, intitially, to ignore his authority since their personal armies, especially those of Tolui were greater than those of Ogodei. It was these reforms by Ogodei that began to swell the Mongol coffers, booty had until then, received little if any administration. That he had a penchant for wine is true, as did most Mongols but had he lived another twenty years, the Mongol empire would have benefited immensely and ( dare I say ) in my opinion, expanded even further than it did

......Orda