The Iran Option That Isn't on the Table

Below is a piece on engaging Iran by Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh.

Vali Nasr is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and the author of "The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future."

Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of "Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic."

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Engaging Iran

"As Iran crosses successive nuclear demarcations and mischievously intervenes in Iraq, the question of how to address the Islamic republic is once more preoccupying Washington. Economic sanctions, international ostracism, military strikes and even support for hopeless exiles are all contemplated with vigor and seriousness. One option, however, is rarely assessed: engagement as a means of achieving a more pluralistic and responsible government in Tehran.

The all-encompassing nuclear debate comes as Iran's political landscape is changing once again. As America became reconciled to a monolithic Iran, represented by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his brand of rambunctious politics, the results from December's local elections suggest Iranians were doing otherwise. Ahmadinejad's defiant rhetoric and populist posturing did not impress the Iranians who turned out in large numbers to elect city councils and members of the Assembly of Experts. Voters favored pragmatic conservatives and reformers who oppose their president's policies abroad and his economic programs at home. Despite this show of dissent, though, it would be a mistake to assume that Iran's regime is about to fall or that a democratic spring is looming.


Ready For Democracy?

Iran has long appeared ready for democracy. It has a literate, youthful population that is immersed in world culture, is at home on the Internet, is keen to engage the West and is above the anti-American anger that dominates the Arab street. No other Middle Eastern country has as much civic activism or a population that has voted as often in elections at various levels. But positive social and cultural indices have so far not translated into a political opening. Iranian society may be ready to embrace democracy, but Iranian politics is not ready to accommodate it.

Iran does not have an organized pro-democracy movement. The reformers who were swept to power in 1997 never coalesced around a coherent platform, nor did they produce a political party. Their movement inspired activism and student protests, and it changed the style and language of politics, but its lack of organization ultimately cost it the presidency in 2005. Reformism was popular but politically ineffective.

The clerical regime has also proved to be enterprising in facing demands for reform, particularly by using elections to manage opposition within the bounds of the Islamic republic. Economic isolation, supported by international sanctions, has kept the private sector weak, which has in turn denied supporters of change levers they could use to pry open the regime. The public sector accounts for more than 80 percent of the Iranian economy, and the constitution gives the clerical leadership most of the power. The problem facing democracy is not so much the state's theocratic nature as it is the enormous domination it enjoys over the economy, society and politics. For democracy to succeed, the state's domination of the economy and society must be reduced.

For too long, Washington has thought that a policy of coercion and sanctions applied to Iran would eventually yield a responsible and representative regime. Events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe suggest that containment eventually generates sufficient pressure to force autocratic elites to accommodate both international mandates and the aspirations of their restless constituents. Ironically, though, U.S. policy has buttressed the Iranian regime, which has justified its monopoly of power as a means of fending off external enemies and managing an economy under international duress.

More than sanctions or threats of military retribution, Iran's integration into the global economy would impose standards and discipline on the recalcitrant theocracy. International investors and institutions such as the World Trade Organization are far more subversive, as they would demand the prerequisites of a democratic society -- transparency, the rule of law and decentralization -- as a price for their commerce.

Conclusion

Paradoxically, to liberalize the theocratic state, the United States would do better to shelve its containment strategy and embark on a policy of unconditional dialogue and sanctions relief. A reduced American threat would deprive the hard-liners of the conflict they need to justify their concentration of power. In the meantime, as Iran became assimilated into the global economy, the regime's influence would inevitably yield to the private sector, with its demands for accountability and reform.

It is important to appreciate that Iran has a political system without precedent or parallel in modern history. The struggle there is not just between reactionaries and reformers, conservatives and liberals, but fundamentally between the state and society. A subtle means of diminishing the state and empowering the society is, in the end, the best manner of promoting not only democracy but also nuclear disarmament."

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Originally Posted by Pindar

Below is a piece on engaging Iran by Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh.

Vali Nasr is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and the author of "The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future."

Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of "Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic."

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Engaging Iran

"As Iran crosses successive nuclear demarcations and mischievously intervenes in Iraq, the question of how to address the Islamic republic is once more preoccupying Washington. Economic sanctions, international ostracism, military strikes and even support for hopeless exiles are all contemplated with vigor and seriousness. One option, however, is rarely assessed: engagement as a means of achieving a more pluralistic and responsible government in Tehran.

The all-encompassing nuclear debate comes as Iran's political landscape is changing once again. As America became reconciled to a monolithic Iran, represented by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his brand of rambunctious politics, the results from December's local elections suggest Iranians were doing otherwise. Ahmadinejad's defiant rhetoric and populist posturing did not impress the Iranians who turned out in large numbers to elect city councils and members of the Assembly of Experts. Voters favored pragmatic conservatives and reformers who oppose their president's policies abroad and his economic programs at home. Despite this show of dissent, though, it would be a mistake to assume that Iran's regime is about to fall or that a democratic spring is looming.


Ready For Democracy

Iran has long appeared ready for democracy. It has a literate, youthful population that is immersed in world culture, is at home on the Internet, is keen to engage the West and is above the anti-American anger that dominates the Arab street. No other Middle Eastern country has as much civic activism or a population that has voted as often in elections at various levels. But positive social and cultural indices have so far not translated into a political opening. Iranian society may be ready to embrace democracy, but Iranian politics is not ready to accommodate it.

Iran does not have an organized pro-democracy movement. The reformers who were swept to power in 1997 never coalesced around a coherent platform, nor did they produce a political party. Their movement inspired activism and student protests, and it changed the style and language of politics, but its lack of organization ultimately cost it the presidency in 2005. Reformism was popular but politically ineffective.

The clerical regime has also proved to be enterprising in facing demands for reform, particularly by using elections to manage opposition within the bounds of the Islamic republic. Economic isolation, supported by international sanctions, has kept the private sector weak, which has in turn denied supporters of change levers they could use to pry open the regime. The public sector accounts for more than 80 percent of the Iranian economy, and the constitution gives the clerical leadership most of the power. The problem facing democracy is not so much the state's theocratic nature as it is the enormous domination it enjoys over the economy, society and politics. For democracy to succeed, the state's domination of the economy and society must be reduced.

For too long, Washington has thought that a policy of coercion and sanctions applied to Iran would eventually yield a responsible and representative regime. Events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe suggest that containment eventually generates sufficient pressure to force autocratic elites to accommodate both international mandates and the aspirations of their restless constituents. Ironically, though, U.S. policy has buttressed the Iranian regime, which has justified its monopoly of power as a means of fending off external enemies and managing an economy under international duress.

More than sanctions or threats of military retribution, Iran's integration into the global economy would impose standards and discipline on the recalcitrant theocracy. International investors and institutions such as the World Trade Organization are far more subversive, as they would demand the prerequisites of a democratic society -- transparency, the rule of law and decentralization -- as a price for their commerce.

Conclusion

Paradoxically, to liberalize the theocratic state, the United States would do better to shelve its containment strategy and embark on a policy of unconditional dialogue and sanctions relief. A reduced American threat would deprive the hard-liners of the conflict they need to justify their concentration of power. In the meantime, as Iran became assimilated into the global economy, the regime's influence would inevitably yield to the private sector, with its demands for accountability and reform.

It is important to appreciate that Iran has a political system without precedent or parallel in modern history. The struggle there is not just between reactionaries and reformers, conservatives and liberals, but fundamentally between the state and society. A subtle means of diminishing the state and empowering the society is, in the end, the best manner of promoting not only democracy but also nuclear disarmament."

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Well written. I would have to say I agree. Putting Sanctions on and threatening Iran has gotten the US nowhere, perhaps even making the situation worse.

Iran can rattle their sword until blue in the face for all I care. But as a nuclear power they should know damn well the ramifications of the power they've inheirited, and the consequences of abusing sed power. If one iota of Iranian nuclear material leaves their country, unless its of a diplomatic nature between two sovereign governments, I think that leaves them an open target for any country that thinks they should be bombed into the stone age.
The Imams and Ayatollahs may have a grand vision for Iran, but the prospect of using nuclear arms to achieve that goal will quickly turn to ashes in their mouths.

I like what they've got to say. I have trouble seeing the value of economic sanctions in general in modern politics. Our primary diplomatic goal of late seems to have been to make everyone worldwide like and appreciate us (though with a dismal success rate so far) so they won't go to war with us or blow our civilians up. Economic sanctions seem an excellent way for despots to blame internal problems on international interference, both strengthening their hold on their nations and putting the US, UN, or whoever is involved in a bad light in their people's minds.

Freer trade seems to have had as big an effect as anything in shifting China away from an isolationist communist stance. Would massive shipments of bread really do that much to help strengthen the hold of Kim Il Jong or Fidel Castro? Or might better relations and a little philanthropy on our part give us a better image and lessen their support from their people? Maybe I'm missing some important principles here that make our current policies more reasonable, but unless they're pointed out to me I'll continue to see more openness and welcome to the people of nations such as Iran as a better alternative to what we've been doing.

Ajax

I think the best thing for Iran would be to get rid of their crazy president; my dad went to India and talked to some iranians while he was there and they said they support america...I also heard on the radio that 80% of the population of Iran doesn't support the president.

I think it'll work a lot better if they get rid of their president than if we try to.

Ajax

I thinks its better if the Iranian people turn their entire country into a paintball arena.

Good article , dialogue without preconditions is the only real option .
They could maintain the insistance on preconditions if they were doing so from a position of strength and the Iranians were in a position of hopeless weakness , but that is no longer the case . Bush in his infinite wisdom has weakened the US and strengthened Iran .

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Originally Posted by ajaxfetish

I think it'll work a lot better if they get rid of their president than if we try to.

Ajax

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I'm sure the Iranians are thinking the same thing. ~;)

Excellent article. But then I would say that, I've been advocating that approach for some time now.

:beam:

It should also appeal to real conservatives: engage and let the market act on an intelligent people and the private sector to bring change.

Or, to rephrase it more cynically, let enterprising human greed run loose and shelve annoying things that get in the way of doing good business.

It's a good idea, and it might work but unless Iran's president changes and the theocracy loosens its grip, even slightly America will go to war with Iran. It's like watching a train reck from a distance, there's nothing you can do. The two powers see themselves diometrically oppossed, even if the two peoples don't.

Anyone seen this old advert from the 70's? Seems that when the torturing, autocractic and corrupt (and of course pro-US) Shah was in control it was all steam ahead for nukes. Sorry for the size:

http://www.indymedia.org.uk/images/2007/02/361257.jpg

Good advise. Unfortunately we will have to wait 2 years until our "Decider" is deposed to see if our next King (or Queen) has the wisdom and political devisivenss to impose such a diplomatic program. After all, we may lose an enemy - the GOP'ers would hate that. :laugh4:

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Originally Posted by KafirChobee

Good advise. Unfortunately we will have to wait 2 years until our "Decider" is deposed to see if our next King (or Queen) has the wisdom and political devisivenss to impose such a diplomatic program. After all, we may lose an enemy - the GOP'ers would hate that. :laugh4:

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That's hilarious.

Idaho, you do realise that the Americans sponsered the overthrow of the Shah, right?

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Originally Posted by Wigferth Ironwall

Idaho, you do realise that the Americans sponsered the overthrow of the Shah, right?

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Uh, we did? Since when? :inquisitive:

Since before the Shah fell. After all, the Shah was a monarch, while the poor guy living in France was a holy man.

The Shah may have been a monarch, but he was 'our' monarch ~;).

Ajax

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Originally Posted by Watchman

Or, to rephrase it more cynically, let enterprising human greed run loose and shelve annoying things that get in the way of doing good business.

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Funny comment

--> good article

:2thumbsup:

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Originally Posted by Ice

Well written. I would have to say I agree. Putting Sanctions on and threatening Iran has gotten the US nowhere, perhaps even making the situation worse.

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One must first decide if they belief Ahmadinejad's rhetoric or if one can afford to disbelieve it. I tend to think he is sincere is his charges. Even so, I don't think Ahmadinejad has the political wherewithal to carry out his threats. I think it is also clear that the controlling Mullah's political position is strained. The best counter to such is economic integration. As economic rule sets tie Iran to the larger world, authoritarianism is naturally undercut. This is the policy being pursued with China and I think it is sound.

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Originally Posted by Wigferth Ironwall

Idaho, you do realise that the Americans sponsered the overthrow of the Shah, right?

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This is quite wrong. The Shah was a valuable U.S. Ally. His fall was another example of the catastrophe that was the Carter Administration. One shouldn't confuse ineptitude with conspiracy.

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Originally Posted by Martok

Uh, we did? Since when? :inquisitive:

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To say we "sponsored" it would be a bit too much.

However, the Carter administration put significant pressure on the Shah to change his repressive tactics. SAVAK was much closer to the Sicherheitdeinst than it was to the FBI. Many hoped that Khomenii's return to Iran would engender a period of progressive reform by the Iraninan government.

Carter's administration truly emphasized human rights as a basic criteria for its diplomatic efforts. A number of the "anti-Soviet" dictators that the USA had been at least tacitly supportive of received far less support from the Carter administration and were called to task much more.

Carter applied pressure against Begin to bring him to the table at Camp David. He applied pressure to the Shah to encourage reform, His administration applied some pressure to the Phillipines under Marcos and even granted refugee status to Marcos chief political opponent.

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Originally Posted by Wigferth Ironwall

It's a good idea, and it might work but unless Iran's president changes and the theocracy loosens its grip, even slightly America will go to war with Iran. It's like watching a train reck from a distance, there's nothing you can do. The two powers see themselves diometrically oppossed, even if the two peoples don't.

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Isn't that the whole point? That through removing the tensions created by threat of war and use of sanctions we remove those things allowing the theocracy to keep a grip on things?

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Originally Posted by Wigferth Ironwall

Idaho, you do realise that the Americans sponsered the overthrow of the Shah, right?

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Originally Posted by ajaxfetish

The Shah may have been a monarch, but he was 'our' monarch.

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The British and US sponsored the Shah in 1951 when the Iranian Prime Minister started nationalising oil industry. Can't have democracy get in the way of Western economic development, after all. Things got out of hand, there were riots and the Shah became increasingly despotic.

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Originally Posted by Seamus Fermanagh

Carter's administration truly emphasized human rights as a basic criteria for its diplomatic efforts.

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The fact Carter abandoned Taiwan and recognized the PRC and did so while Congress was in recess for the holidays would serve as a simple counter-example to this point.

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Originally Posted by Pindar

The fact Carter abandoned Taiwan and recognized the PRC and did so while Congress was in recess for the holidays would serve as a simple counter-example to this point.

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Not so sure of this Pindar. Carter's crew was very much in the "open relations up and talk about the need for human rights" vein. They took a similar approach with the Soviets as well -- part of the reason Carter felt so "betrayed" by Brezhnev's incursion into Afghanistan. To which he responded with a ringing Olympic Boycott.

I believe the Carter Asministration was very consistently in favor of:

Opening dialogue, usually without pre-conditions, with any nation. Making Human Rights and the pressure to improve same a consistent element of those dialogues. Using military "show the flag" efforts only sparingly. Downplaying our support for traditional allies in the Cold War in favor of broader and more benign relations with all.

I also think the relationship gains made were outweighed by the debacles generated -- the mess created by removing the Shah in Iran, which helped create the conditions for the Soviet effort to take over Afghanistan, the deal with Sadat that made the USA a primary target for the wahabists as well as the Shia Khomenists -- so I am not a fan of Carter's efforts.

He did create a sense of the USA being consistent with its stated moral purpose in the minds of our Eurpoean allies. Since that dovetailed so nicely with their moral/global outlook, it has also made virtually any other stance by a U.S. leader inherently unpopular. Carter was creating the kind of consistency that Europe liked.

Not enough value generated there to make me a fan.

Then again, I've heard a few Middle-East scholars say that the reason things are going against the Iranian government now is exactly because we haven't been trying to toy around with their politics... I don't know how much truth there is to that, and I also don't know if now is the time for intervention.

Unless someone has more to say addressing that, I think we're just talking about something that makes us feel good.:balloon3:

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Originally Posted by Seamus Fermanagh

He did create a sense of the USA being consistent with its stated moral purpose in the minds of our Eurpoean allies. Since that dovetailed so nicely with their moral/global outlook, it has also made virtually any other stance by a U.S. leader inherently unpopular. Carter was creating the kind of consistency that Europe liked.

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Interesting perspective. It has the ring of truth to it.

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Originally Posted by me

The fact Carter abandoned Taiwan and recognized the PRC and did so while Congress was in recess for the holidays would serve as a simple counter-example to this point.

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Originally Posted by Seamus Fermanagh

Not so sure of this Pindar. Carter's crew was very much in the "open relations up and talk about the need for human rights" vein.

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Explain Taiwan and the PRC.

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He did create a sense of the USA being consistent with its stated moral purpose in the minds of our Eurpoean allies. Since that dovetailed so nicely with their moral/global outlook...

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Europeans have no moral outlook: to be European is to be morally vacuous, you know that.

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Originally Posted by Pindar

One must first decide if they belief Ahmadinejad's rhetoric or if one can afford to disbelieve it. I'm tend to think he is sincere is his charges. Even so, I don't think Ahmadinejad's has the political wherewithal to carry out his threats. I think it is also clear that the controlling Mullah's political position is strained. The best counter to such is economic integration. As economics rule sets tie Iran to the larger world, authoritarianism is naturally undercut. This the policy being pursued with China and I think it is sound.

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Oh I agree. I do believe Ahmadinejad is a nutcase and most likely would do something to doom his country if he had sole possession of nuclear weapons, but he doesn't. Good comparison to China.

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Originally Posted by Pindar

Explain Taiwan and the PRC.

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Recognising facts on the ground? The PRC had been in existence for some 30 years before Carter's administration, and it's not like Taiwan was a democracy.

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Originally Posted by Pannonian

Recognising facts on the ground? The PRC had been in existence for some 30 years before Carter's administration, and it's not like Taiwan was a democracy.

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Is this meant to demonstrate the Administration's emphasis on human rights as a basic criteria for its diplomatic efforts?

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Originally Posted by Pindar

Is this meant to demonstrate the Administration's emphasis on human rights as a basic criteria for its diplomatic efforts?

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I would have to do a good bit of research to confirm this, but my impression was that the Carter administration acknowledged the PRC as the sole China to enhance relations across the board. This would have fit with their human rights agenda in the context of "improved relations will allow us to bring friendly pressure on China to reform." Since the ROC was hardly the paramount example for free and unfettered elections at that point, it also fit the Carter penchant for dumping on allies who didn't live up to the moral tone desired.

Mind you, they were trying the same thing with the Soviets at the same time and I think they got "took" by both of them.

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Originally Posted by Pindar

Is this meant to demonstrate the Administration's emphasis on human rights as a basic criteria for its diplomatic efforts?

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Meaning both Chinas were pretty unsavoury at the time. Don't forget the longest serving political prisoner of the 20th century, what he was in prison for, and what it took for him to be released.

Given a choice between a Communist regime that is in de facto control of the mainland and has done for 30 years, or a hereditary dictatorship that pretends to be the official government despite having been expelled by its people 30 years ago, which would you choose?

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Originally Posted by Seamus Fermanagh

I would have to do a good bit of research to confirm this, but my impression was that the Carter administration acknowledged the PRC as the sole China to enhance relations across the board. This would have fit with their human rights agenda in the context of "improved relations will allow us to bring friendly pressure on China to reform." Since the ROC was hardly the paramount example for free and unfettered elections at that point, it also fit the Carter penchant for dumping on allies who didn't live up to the moral tone desired.

Mind you, they were trying the same thing with the Soviets at the same time and I think they got "took" by both of them.

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If we assume the Administration naively recognized the PRC as the "legitimate" China so as to apply pressure for reform and more human rights that then strikes as counter to your earlier statement: "Carter's administration truly emphasized human rights as a basic criteria for its diplomatic efforts." where human rights standing (X) then lead to diplomatic carrots (Y).

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Originally Posted by Pannonian

Meaning both Chinas were pretty unsavoury at the time.

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If one says both were unsavory at the time then there is no human rights criteria for the opting one over the other and the earlier stance is undercut.

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Given a choice between a Communist regime that is in de facto control of the mainland...

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If control of the mainland is the criteria then the appeal is to a real politic over some moral positioning.

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Originally Posted by Pindar

If one says both were unsavory at the time then there is no human rights criteria for the opting one over the other and the earlier stance is undercut.

If control of the mainland is the criteria then the appeal is to a real politic over some moral positioning.

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Look, what would you prefer? Some form of China has to be recognised, unless you wish to pretend there's a big hole in the map where the Chinese are. There are 2 alternatives to choose from, the PRC or the ROC. Both have problems with reocgnising human rights. Would you prefer to maintain your lofty moral position and say neither is acceptable? Or would you choose the least bad option? Or if you don't like any of these options, please state your preferred alternative.

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Originally Posted by Pannonian

Look, what would you prefer? Some form of China has to be recognised, unless you wish to pretend there's a big hole in the map where the Chinese are. There are 2 alternatives to choose from, the PRC or the ROC. Both have problems with reocgnising human rights. Would you prefer to maintain your lofty moral position and say neither is acceptable? Or would you choose the least bad option? Or if you don't like any of these options, please state your preferred alternative.

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None of the above relates to or supports the notion: "Carter's administration truly emphasized human rights as a basic criteria for its diplomatic efforts." I think you are confusing your own preferences with a historical question.

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Originally Posted by Pindar

None of the above relates to or supports the notion: "Carter's administration truly emphasized human rights as a basic criteria for its diplomatic efforts." I think you are confusing your own preferences with a historical question.

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Perhaps it's a difference in perception between two people across the pond. Over here, we see emphasis as merely emphasis, not absolutes. Principles influence decisions and point leaders towards certain directions, but they do not dictate what that decision is. A government that allows dogma to dictate policy beyond practicality, as you seem to be suggesting, would be regarded as insane. Politics is not law.

So once again, which China would you have preferred the US to have backed? The Communist PRC, the imperial ROC, or some alternative that you've so far avoided naming?

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Originally Posted by Pannonian

So once again, which China would you have preferred the US to have backed? The Communist PRC, the imperial ROC, or some alternative that you've so far avoided naming?

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I don't pretend to speak for Pindar, but perhaps a push for Taiwanese independence would have been preferable. Granted the Kuomintang wasn't interested, but I'm sure there had to be a pro-indepence party.

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Europeans have no moral outlook: to be European is to be morally vacuous, you know that.

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That's rich coming from those who used terror in central America and who disguise their economic and strategic wars under the convinient guise of "bringing democracy to the middle east". Morally vacuous my ass.

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Originally Posted by Pannonian

Perhaps it's a difference in perception between two people across the pond. Over here, we see emphasis as merely emphasis, not absolutes. Principles influence decisions and point leaders towards certain directions, but they do not dictate what that decision is. A government that allows dogma to dictate policy beyond practicality, as you seem to be suggesting, would be regarded as insane. Politics is not law.

So once again, which China would you have preferred the US to have backed? The Communist PRC, the imperial ROC, or some alternative that you've so far avoided naming?

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No, Pan', I understand his point. He's saying that if I make the claim that X factor impelled y policy directive that an example wherein: Y policy was undertaken in the hope of promoting X factor, runs counter to my claim. As a point of argumentation he is absolutely correct.

Nevertheless, Pindar old pal, the decisions of an administration are, I submit, prone to such inconsistencies. If we take X factor -- in this case human rights -- as an underlying aspiration that BOTH impels some policy decisions AND serves as the hoped for end result of others, I think we arrive at a useful point of consideration for evaluating the intentions/goals of the Carter Administration.

You are correct that my previous assertion was logically inconsistent. I hope the paragraph above better expresses my sense of the situation.

Interestingly, you have also called to mind, for me, an implication as to the inherent sense of inconsistency this betokens for the Carter Administration. This is worthy of a bit of pondering.

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Originally Posted by Cataphract_Of_The_City

That's rich coming from those who used terror in central America and who disguise their economic and strategic wars under the convinient guise of "bringing democracy to the middle east". Morally vacuous my ass.

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Go get'em tiger. :duel:

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Originally Posted by Pannonian

Perhaps it's a difference in perception between two people across the pond. Over here, we see emphasis as merely emphasis, not absolutes. Principles influence decisions and point leaders towards certain directions, but they do not dictate what that decision is. A government that allows dogma to dictate policy beyond practicality, as you seem to be suggesting, would be regarded as insane. Politics is not law.

So once again, which China would you have preferred the US to have backed? The Communist PRC, the imperial ROC, or some alternative that you've so far avoided naming?

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See Seamus' post 42.

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Originally Posted by Seamus Fermanagh

No, Pan', I understand his point. He's saying that if I make the claim that X factor impelled y policy directive that an example wherein: Y policy was undertaken in the hope of promoting X factor, runs counter to my claim. As a point of argumentation he is absolutely correct.

Nevertheless, Pindar old pal, the decisions of an administration are, I submit, prone to such inconsistencies. If we take X factor -- in this case human rights -- as an underlying aspiration that BOTH impels some policy decisions AND serves as the hoped for end result of others, I think we arrive at a useful point of consideration for evaluating the intentions/goals of the Carter Administration.

You are correct that my previous assertion was logically inconsistent. I hope the paragraph above better expresses my sense of the situation.

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I think the above is a much more tenable stance. The explanatory you took for the Carter Administration is the standard model, but I think (as I tried to demonstrate with the ROC/PRC example) was far from pristine and unsustainable under the normal presentation. Moreover, the moral impulse to U.S. diplomatic efforts predates the mid-70's: it extends back past Wilsonian politics to at least Jeffersonian Democracy itself. Carter's rhetoric can easily be placed, not only as a reflection of his personal sentiments, but also as a tact in the wake of Watergate, The Pentagon Papers etc. which could only have any political resonance because of a prior established model..

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Interestingly, you have also called to mind, for me, an implication as to the inherent sense of inconsistency this betokens for the Carter Administration. This is worthy of a bit of pondering.

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Quite.