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...I asked him "If Hannibal defeated the Romans at Cannae in a crushing defeat. Why didn't Hannibal march onto Rome and leave a garrison or even burn it down like the Romans soon after did to Carthage, before heading back to defend Africa? Did Rome still have a considerable amount of power in Italy to defend itself?
My Ancient World Civilization 101 teacher couldn't answer this...
Thanks!
in short.
they cornered him.
ALOT (and i mean it) of manpower.
hannibal could gain victories but didnt know how to use it.
hannibal needed reinforcements to take the large city of Rome.
Roman intercepted a massenger and defeated hannibals brother/reinforcements.
He didn't have enough men and Rome refused to surrender, some how kept most of its allies on its side, and waged a war of attrition.
Cannae almost broke Rome but it had a almost masochistic way of bouncing back from defeats in those days. I mean, they raised a new army of the same size and split it into some smaller armies so Hannibal couldn't seek decisive engagements anymore.
I mean, these are the same people that subdued Iberia by throwing man power at it for 100 years.
If I understand it correctly, he couldn't hold the city with the number of troops he had. I think he could have looted it and burned it to the ground, but he wasn't interested in that. He wanted to keep it.
He did not have the means to take Rome.
Not even to just rape any female that moved , haul off anything that shined and kill anything with a wang ?
A Professor at my University has the Theory that he wanted the Romans to Negioate. The Manpower would have been enough, ~20.000 Men against a City without any Army left, no problem ho much people lived there this time (~300.000 i think?), Hannibal could just have burned ist while plundering it ^^
I always understood it that he didn't want to destroy Rome, he just wanted it to know it's place.
Actually if one looks at the history of Greek/Punic wars, this is just how it was done. Win a decisive victory and offer truce, which the loser would be honour bound to accept. This is how war was conducted in City-state level. In pelopponesos to S. ITaly, to Sicily this is how war was done.Quote:
Originally Posted by -sKy-
Total war was mostly a Makedonian/Roman thing.
It may very well be related to the teachings of "Xanthippos", the Spartan who had saved Carthage 60+ years earlier.
Sparta, for example could burn Argos to the ground after destroying its army in 494 BCE, killing all 6000 of its hoplites. Instead Sparta chose peace and basically let Argos be. In Tegea, Arcadia, after winning the battle against the Tegeans, they made them allies instead.
I think we must enter the mind of Hannibal as he was thinking back then instead of projecting our own mindsets in him.
If the Romans chose to defend their city then Hannibal would not be able to take it with the forces available - he had to constantly move around Italy to plunder supplies to feed and pay his men. He did not have the logistical support from Carthage to sit in place for 6 or 7 months sieging the city.
Rome chose not to surrender and to keep fighting, and whilst they didnt have enough men under arms to fight a open battle they certainly had enough to secure Rome and hold off a direct assault so Hannibal never really had a chance of taking the city. There is the question of what the Roman reaction might have been if Hannibal had set out for Rome straight away - a massive, unprecedented Roman defeat and only a week later Hannibals army on your doorstep - but it would have been a bluff.
And it needs to be remembered that Cannae wasnt kind to Hannibal either - he lost over 4,500 men - over 10% of his force. It took them hours to kill all the trapped Romans and I doubt the army would have been in any shape to immediately force march to Rome in its aftermath.
As for the man power, Rome was frightening foe as countless other generals and kings would learn. In the immediate aftermath of Cannae they raised 14,000 volunteers from freed slaves and criminals who were granted freedom in exchange for service, equipped with weapons taken from temples and siezed from the gauls in past campaigns.
Only a short time after Cannae the Romans were able to a field an army of 25,000 men. The year after Cannae Rome was fielding 14 legions. 3 years after that, 25 legions.
Sand pretty much hit the nail on the head...Quote:
Originally Posted by Sand
Hannibal was in no fit state to besiege Rome. He lacked the supply base (as most of the Roman Italians allies did not desert to Hannibal even after the victory at Cannae) to do so, and he lacked the manpower to storm the city...
The problems that a general/military encountered when besieging a city should not be underestimated. Often besieging a city took as heavy a toll on the besiegers (through disease, starvation), as on the besieged. For most of history, even the most powerful militaries were not able to besiege one major fortress/city a season, if the enemy had a similar level of technology, ohter than attempting to take the places by storm.
200.Quote:
Originally Posted by antisocialmunky
especially if you add that Rome was so big, that it was hard to actually siege it - to siege a city you must position troops around to block incoming supplies. But if you place them in too small groups they will be easily destroyed by sally from inside. This means the bigger (lenght of wall) the city is the more men you need to succesfully cut it from surroundings.Quote:
Originally Posted by Michiel de Ruyter
And if you are not able to cut it completely it will hold forever, as Demetrios Poliorketes learned trying to siege Rhodes.
Very good points all, particularly the one directly above this post.
In summary, Hannibal was in a foreign land and his army would die of starvation long before he starved out the citizens of Rome. That rules out a siege. He also didn't have the equipment to assault the city with a 3 .6 m thick, 11 km long wall surrounding it (the Servian wall). With the benefit of hindsight, it's easy to accuse Hannibal of being a poor strategist, but in reality he was an extraordinarily bold genius who had everything against him. It's as if fate herself would not have him ultimately win, in spite of his obvious greatness.
Very good, thank you everyone. Now I understand!
The tactics of ambushing an army on the field are a lot different than attacking a walled city, that's what I always assumed.
Siege warfare removes all the tactical maneuverability and advantages Hannibal favored. Without those advantages, bad things can happen.Quote:
Originally Posted by Danest
Hannibal may have been great, but the senate and people he served, were not.
When it came down to the 11th hour, mercenaries could not bolster the weak will of a rich and decadent population.
Rome also planted the seed of her destruction, when she allowed the Roman Senate to destroy Scipio Africanus because of jealousy, greed, and envy.
Any state that destroys their best while elevating the corrupt and tunnel visioned, will eventually be destroyed. Rome was saved by their legions, and in the end, it still was not enough with a corrupt Senate and bureacracy.
What are you talking about, the Roman Empire survived for centuries and centuries after Scipio Africanus!
Or maybe you were talking about the Roman Republic which was on its downside? That was indeed inevitable.
People always ignore one important factor: Hannibal's army wasnt a siege army his iberians and gauls despised ground work of sapping and general fortification works...
So he was almost like a mongol army in M2TW undefeated at open ground while weak at sieging...
Thats why Alexander was a faaar superior general...he would have burned Rome to the ground...
Quote:
Originally Posted by hellenes
Someone hasn't faced cannon elephants...
That is a rather ignorant statement made with the benefit of hindsight. Hannibal virtually never made a mistake, with one fatal exception: making Rome his enemy. You don't win a war with Rome, you just can't beat the stubborn bastards. This statement could have easily been made without hindsight--Pyrrhus invaded Italy 65 years earlier with similar results.Quote:
Originally Posted by hellenes
But back to the original point. It is debatable who was the superior general (Alexander or Hannibal), but that discussion has no place here (although I should mention that Hannibal himself later declared Alexander to best general of all time, Pyrrhus second and himself third). It is highly improbable that any general under Hannibal's circumstances (even following Cannae) could have burned Rome to the ground. It was as if the war was decided before Hannibal killed a single Roman or even set foot in Italy. NOTHING would stop the expansion of Rome. I don't believe in fate, but it is clear to me here that there was simply nothing anyone could have done to win the second Punic War in Hannibal's shoes--unless Hanno and his buddies in the Council of One Hundred and Four would have committed all the resources of Carthage to the war and fully backed Hannibal. Then, and only then, could Hannibal perhaps have successfully taken Rome.
Btw, Hannibal was by no means weak at giving siege. You need only look to his success in Iberia to see that.
To address your first point, I think the main reason people ignore that Hannibal's Iberians and Gauls "despised [the] ground work of sapping and general fortification works" (never heard that before but that might make sense) is because, even were that true, there were far more pressing circumstances preventing Hannibal from attacking Rome. Most notably that he didn't have the siege equipment necessary to assault the city, the supplies for a long term siege, or the manpower necessary for either (a prolonged siege requires enough men to circumvent the besieged in order to cut them off entirely from supplies).
Hannibal failed because his strategy failed. According to his strategy, Hasdrubal was to follow him to Italy shortly after he had crossed the Alps, but the Romans kept Hasdrubal busy in Spain, and when he finally arrived - ten years later than planned - it was already too late. If the strategy had worked, Hannibal would have received the badly-needed reinforcements after Cannae.
Also, Carthage - that had in this respect gained an important ally of Syracuse - also attempted to create a sea route from Carthage to Italy to reinforce Hannibal, but this route never materialized.
The thing is, Hannibal was recalled from the Italian port of Croton(a) to Carthage with some of his veteran men. Now if Hannibal could be "recalled" back to Carthage via a sea route, why couldn't Carthage send reinforcements to Capua, when Hannibal still was holding it?
Politics. Some people in Cart Hadast felt they would gain power by letting Hannibal's force fizzle out in Italy. Their stupidity as well as betrayal is beyond reason for us now, but as they say hindsight is 20/20.
And why Karthaginian fleet never supported Philip V in his war? Makedonia was ally of them, and badly needed support of a fleet. If they joined effort with Philip's fleet (7 big ships and 100 lemboi) they will easily destroy small roman squadron in illyria and without it Macedonians would possibly push Romans from Greece.Quote:
The thing is, Hannibal was recalled from the Italian port of Croton(a) to Carthage with some of his veteran men. Now if Hannibal could be "recalled" back to Carthage via a sea route, why couldn't Carthage send reinforcements to Capua, when Hannibal still was holding it?
Just as Keravnos said - Politics.
In the ships that they used it would've been impossible to go directly from Africa to Italy, which is why Hannibal had to cross the Alps in the first place (even the Romans had to meticulously prepare their own invasion of Africa, the one that forced Hannibal to leave Italy). After the first Punic War Rome was in control of the islands between Africa and Italy. A route between Africa and Italy would indeed have been a grave danger to Rome.
Carthage still had the Western half of Sicily, at that time, I recall.
If Rome had any problems on the islands of Sardis and the other one, then Carthage's strategy should have been to get a seabase somewhere from which they could sail to Italy. Wars are not won on the defensive, as Scipio proved and so many other generals in history also.
But then the Carthaginian Senate and their poeni citizens didn't seem much motivated in winning wars outside Africa and Spain. Even without hannibal and scipio, the aggression of Rome outclassed that of Carthage. Carthage used mercenaries and then refused to pay them, thus precipitating the Mercenary War, which turned once usable troops into enemies.
Carthage did indeed seem like the quintessential bean counter Empire. Counting beans was more of a priority than creating and sustaining a matchless army in the field.
The Peace Dividend seen in America after the Cold War, for example.
In any case Hannibal's army proved itself perfectly capable of managing a siege in Souther Italy: it stormed and took the citadel of Taras IIRC.
But to my understanding, one reason why Hannibal would not 'simply' march on to Roma and try to take it/starve it out was the fact that either way to take Roma meant to risk his entire army (more so than in any field battle) at odds that would probably be worse than that of Cannae. Roma still had a large population + the survivors of Cannae, and its leaders were still there.
Recall that a similar well-defended city without much of a garrison held out & repeatedly destroyed an assault for a long time agains the well supplied & highly motivated & numerically faaar superior forces of the Romani (much more than Hannibal ever got) later on.Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
i gotta find the link to preview thread about Hannibal and Rome and stuff...
but I gotta go to work :wall:
Hannibal did not make the mistake. Rome was the enemy, and was hell bent on domination/destruction of the surrounding states. He was one of the first to see that.Quote:
Originally Posted by TWFanatic
As has been amply proved by the Roman policy towards Saguntum and the Roman seizure of Sardinia and Corsica. The latter was a gross violation of the treaties between Roma and Carthage) just as Roman interference in Carthaginian policies in Africa.
The former were encouraged by Rome to attack and harrass the Carthaginians (in retaliation of which Hannibal beseiged the city of Saguntum). There was only one reason for the Romans to ally themselves with Saguntum that had any whiff of rationality: Saguntum was to serve as a trigger for a new war against Carthage, in which Rome could seize more Carthaginian possessions. Which wasonly confirmed by the fact that when war broke out the Romans implemented immediately their pre-planned strategy.... the readiness and quickness of Hannibal's reaction and subsequent march towards Italy only caught them by surprise.
I agree with most of your statements. To clarify on one, the entire city of Rome was by no means imperialist. Just as when Caesar was conquering Gaul, there were many more conservative senators in Rome who opposed expansion. It only takes one family or one man even to start a war, much as Hannibal did even though most of Carthage's Council of One Hundred and Four did not want war.
Which brings me to my second point. A man who swears eternal hatred of something at the age of nine is clearly hell-bent on its destruction. To claim that Rome initiated the Second Punic War is simply ridiculous, Hannibal wanted this war more than anything. The Barcid dynasty of military commanders had been preparing for this war since the last one ended.
Which brings me to my third point. Carthage after the First Punic War is in many ways comparable to Germany after the First World War. The allies, like Rome, were quite aggressive and unfair in their treatment of the Germans. The economic crisis they left behind allowed Adolf Hitler to come to power, just as Hamilcar invaded Spain under the guise of needing money to pay the tribute to Rome (which made Rome happy and kept them out of the way).
I admire Hannibal for his virtues and ability. It is undeniable, however, that he initiated the Second Punic War. On the other hand, it may have never happened if Rome did not treat Carthage so unfairly and leave it in a state of economic shambles.
I can`t think you can compare that.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tellos Athenaios
In the Third Punic War there was no big battle before the Siege of Carthago. The Citizens where at least theoretically a (Hoplite-)Militia, and the City itself was prepared for siege and hold out for 3 years.
Rome had lost his organized Army and there weren´t any (except the Weapons in temples, etc.) large Numbers of Weapons left to arm the whole population like they did in Carthago.
How to compare a well prepared City with a more or less fully armed Militia and a City which Army was crushed and de-organized, defended by former Criminals?
(Hope my English is good enough :laugh4: )
They were opposed to Julius Caesar campaigning in Gaul, as his successes there posed a serious threat to the political constellation in Rome, with Caesar becoming the most dominant power. Many senators were very eager to campaign, quite often with disastrous results (Marius got his prestige by cleaning up the mess made by others in Numidia, Crassus defeat is legendary). Posts that offered great potential for booty were highly sought after all throughout the Republic. And this went on right until the struggle for power between Marc Anthony and Augustus...Quote:
Originally Posted by TWFanatic
Only by the end of the first century BC was Rome running into the limits of expansion. The effort needed was unlikely to be returned by the rewards. But even then the fiction of conquest was an integral part of the mystique of the emperors for centuries. In fact, conquest (or the fiction thereof), either before they became emperor or while emperor was often essential for them remaining in power. Mind you Hadrian was scolded for abandoning territory and abstaining from expansion.
True, and partially for the same reason (political rivalries vs the Barcid family). War with Rome was inevitable (as continuous Roman provocation since the end of the first war had proved). And Hannibal decided to try and fight the war on his terms, as any smart general should.Quote:
Originally Posted by TWFanatic
And here you are falling completely for the propaganda by Livy and Polybius (I am not even certain if the latter reports that particular story). Mind you, Romans always needed justification/explanation for their wars. Rarely, if ever Roman historians admit Roman agression. Throughout the existence of the empire, Rome NEVER officially started wars, but always reacted in defense (at least according to their POV) to attacks, pleas of help by allies or vialotions of political treaties. Caesar's exaplanations for the Gallic wars are a prime example. An oath promising implacable hatred would be a perfectly suitable exaplanation for the actions of Hannibal, who earned a legendary status among Romans (similar constructions do turn up elsewhere as well, IIRC ie Arminius, Julius Civilis, maybe Mithridates. IICR Alexander the Great swore an oath as well!). In Roman eyes, it would even be a legitimate partial explanation for his successes and his endurance!Quote:
Originally Posted by TWFanatic
Hannibal became such a mythical figure, that he is one of the few, if not only, enemy of Rome who was presented in Livy with any positive connotation.
I will not deny that Hannibal was willing to fight Rome, but the Romans were clearly responsible for the Second Punic War. The only logical/rational explanation for the treaty with Saguntum was to act as a trigger for a war with Carthage. Rome actively encouraged Saguntum to attack the Carthaginian holdings in Spain, and in reaction it was besieged. Saguntum clearly was south of the Ebro (so in the Carthaginian sphere of influence), and to my knowledge the Carthaginioans adhered to that line until war broke out.
Quote:
Originally Posted by TWFanatic
Carthage was NOT "well prepared"! Carthaginians surrendered all their weapons to the insidious roman swindlers in vain hope to avoid the war, and were forced to produce it anew. Not to mention they lost a big battle to numidians recently, and the city itself iirc wasn't ready and well supplied either.Quote:
Originally Posted by -sKy-
Hannibal lacked sieging tactics and artillery...you cant win a war without sieges espessially against rome....Quote:
Originally Posted by TWFanatic
Also we shouldnt forget the fact that the souther Italy's Greeks didnt like Karthaginians that much...with the whole fierce wars between Greeks and Karthaginians at Sicily...
Hannibal couldnt even dream taking Tyre or the Sogdian Rock...
The only way Hannibal could take cities was through prolonged siege encriclment which was impossible for Rome at that time...Also sapping was out of question for his army which makes him even weaker...
He also said that, had he beaten Scipio Africanus at Zama, he would have placed himself first--placing Scipio beyond all competition. But the whole episode is probably invented.Quote:
Originally Posted by TWFanatic
No. Rome did not have control of the seas, but she would have had the advantage in any major battle, due to her much larger fleet. At the start of the Second Punic War, there were sixty quinqueremes assigned to the Spanish theatre, one hundred and sixty in Sicily threatening Carthage directly, and twenty in the Adriatic. The Carthaginians did not have anywhere near this number of ships, especially since, by the time Carthage and Philip V made an alliance, the Carthaginian squadron in Spain had already been destroyed at the estuary of the Ebro (in 217BCE). The Carthaginians could boldly raid Italy, because they were better sailors than the Romans. They could even bring Hannibal some reinforcements in 215, and deploy Mago's army to Liguria in 204; and at last evacuate both Mago and Hannibal. But under no circumstances could they risk losing their African fleet in a hopeless battle against superior odds; and whenever the Carthaginian navy sailed in force, it was opposed by just such superior odds.Quote:
And why Karthaginian fleet never supported Philip V in his war? Makedonia was ally of them, and badly needed support of a fleet. If they joined effort with Philip's fleet (7 big ships and 100 lemboi) they will easily destroy small roman squadron in illyria and without it Macedonians would possibly push Romans from Greece.
Just as Keravnos said - Politics.
As to the Makedonians, their Adriatic fleet was of little consequence; Philip burned it himself rather than risk a naval battle. In fact, I'll go so far as to say the Makedones themselves were of little consequence. I'm sure alot of people on the forums will hate me for it, but the truth was that Makedonia and Greece were already on the verge of collapse. Despite all the exaltation of their military tradition, the Greeks and Makedones turned out to be complete pushovers when the Romans turned their attention to them (to the surprise of all invovled, Romans included). Hannibal prevented Makedonia from falling during the First Macedonian War, but during the Second Macedonian War and the Syrian War, the entire Hellenistic world demonstrated a rather disturbing willingness to become clients of Rome; and the vaunted phalanx-armies proved to be among the least troublesome enemies the Romans faced. Only Philip V obtained any successes with them against the Romans, and these were only minor engagements, fought in circumstances much to his favour, when he was trying to contain the Romain in Illyria/Epeiros.
The morning after Cannae Hannibal had acheived his objectives by the conventions of the day, Rome's army was destroyed after three humiliating defeats.
All that remained to do was wait for the Senate's envoys to discuss peace on his terms, sign the treaty go home start trade links with Rome again etc.
Trouble was Rome was playing a different game it was war to the death only one would survive. It was a little like Hitler after Dunkirk, how could the British not come to the negotiating table, Germany had won. And equally both had given much thought on how to deliver the final blow and so lacked the means when they needed them.
Not really. Hannibal didn't wait around to see if the Senate would offer peace terms--he did send an envoy to gauge the Senate's intentions, by offering to sell back the Roman prisoners (the Socii had, as per Hannibal's usual practice, been set free, after being told that Carthage meant to free Italy from the Roman oppressors, not enslave her to a new master); but when the Senators refused to pruchase the prisoners' freedom, on the grounds that, being defeated, they had disgraced Rome, the Carthaginians realised there would be no peace just yet. In any case, after resoundingly defeating the Romans, Hannibal had already moved on to the third phase of his plan: gaining the support of Rome's erstwhile allies and laying the foundations of an Italic federation that would hemm Rome into the Latium.