The Destruction of the Byzantine Guard Army, Antioch 1326
“@#$%^&!!! hell!” cursed Elberhard. The decision of Matthias Steffen to stay in Outremer had been a total surprise. How could the Kaiser not have seen it coming, after the affair at Adana? But Elberhard had been so sure Matthias would support his move to return to the homelands and try to restore order to the Reich. With a single depleted army, it seemed inconceivable that Matthias could defend Outremer alone.
Elberhard had been in two minds about trying to relieve Aleppo. His dauntless and chivalrous character urged him on. But Linyeve was surely right: to relieve it would cost more lives than would be saved; and he would need a full army to survive amid the backstabbers home in Europe.
Matthias’s obstinacy changed everything. Clearing out the three Byzantine armies between the ford and Aleppo would considerably reduce the odds against Matthias. To let the Aleppo garrison to be massacred was bad enough; to abandon Matthias to the same fate was too much for the Kaiser to contemplate. Enduring Linyeve’s cold fury, Elberhard prepared his army march on Aleppo.
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Strategos Tobromerus Comnenus commanded the Byzantine Guard Army. An elite formation of Varangian Guard, veteran Kataphracts, Byzantine Guard Archers and Vardarioti. The Army had appeared as if out of nowhere to block the Kaiser’s advance on Damascus. Elberhard had hoped to sucker it into attacking across the ford, but it Comnenus had been too wily – merely using his army to block any advance on Aleppo.
With King Jan’s departure, it was possible that both the iron bridge and the ford defences could be bypassed by an army marching south of the river. This raised the nightmare scenario that Matthias had raised in the Crusader Council of the ford being attacked simultaneously from the west and east. Having already performed exactly such a manoeuvre on the Byzantines to devastating effect, Elberhard was anxious not to leave Comnenus free to return the favour.
Consequently, Elberhard marched the Kaiser’s army across the ford, to confront the Byzantine Guard Army in open battle.
As Comnenus’s army quickly seized a large hill dominating the battlefield, Elberhard decided to march his army round the hill and approach it from the rear. The hill sloped more gently to the rear and moreover, cutting the Byzantine lines of communication might unnerve their men – making them easier to rout. Consequently, the Kaiser’s army trekked across the hot battlefield, until it reached the line where the Byzantines had first deployed. Then the army pivoted and began to climb the hill from the rear – leading with crossbowmen in loose formation.
The Germans were climbing the hill from the north east. Elberhard led from the left flank, riding with his elephants to drive the vardarioti up the hill and cut the Byzantines line of retreat towards Aleppo. As the German crossbowmen duelled with the Byzantine Guard archers, he did not see a regiment of Byzantine lancers march on his right flank.
Veteran warrior Sir Charles de Villiers had been given command of the German right and rushed spearmen to counter the lancers. However, Strategos Comnenus sensed a vulnerability and rushed to reinforce the Byzantine attack.
Far away on the German left, approaching the summit of the hill, Elberhard could see the flag of the enemy general marching towards his right flank. Elberhard knew that killing the enemy general was crucial to undermining the otherwise excellent morale of the Byzantine Guard Army and so charged his escort down the hill, hoping to engage Comnenus.
With the Kaiser’s departure, his troop of elephants remained behind to anchor the German left flank. They had performed brilliantly at driving back the Turkopoles and Vardariotai on the Byzantine right flank. But now they came under attack from the foot archers on the summit of the hill who used fire arrows in an attempt to panic the beasts. To the dismay of the Germans, the tactic worked and the elephants began to run amok.
Mobbed by German spearmen and then flanked by the Kaiser’s escort, Strategos Comnenus and his bodyguard were brought down. However, Elberhard’s euphoria was diminished when he learnt the fate of his elephants.
The battle now entered its decisive phase. The German crossbowmen and cannon had been getting the better of the exchange of fire with the Byzantine archers on the hill – in part, because Elberhard had recklessly committed his own escort to harassing the enemy skirmishers. However, whoever was left in command of the Byzantine Guard Army soon seemed to tire of the uneven contest and as a great mass, the lines of Varangian Guard and Kataphractoi began to surge off the summit of the hill and advance down towards the German battleline.
The Germans struggled to hold back the sheer weight of the massed regiments of Varangian Guard and Kataphractoi pressing down on them. The spearmen who formed the bulk of the first line were no match for the elite Byzantine troops. Elberhard’s only advantage was on his left, where his escort and a regiment of Teutons were free to strike at the rear and flank of the now committed enemy army.
On the right, however, the situation was more desperate. Kataphractoi and Vardariotai threatened to turn the German flank. The regiment of Kwazarimans was thrown into to try to stop them, but the mercenaries were outclassed and all but wiped out. Only some valiant armoured sergeants, bolstered by the Great Cross, were left holding the right flank.
As the Kaiser’s escort rampaged among the archers at the Byzantine rear and the Teutons led the turning of the enemy right, the morale of the Guard Army collapsed. The Byzantine archery fire from the summit of the hill and the brief but bitter assault of their heavy troops had exacted a large toll on the Kaiser’s army. A third of its strength had been lost, although Elberhard himself grieved most for the death of his beloved Arnolds. Perhaps more significant, the battle left the Kaiser will almost no heavy cavalry except the men of his own escort.
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