The Anabaseis of the Kings of Makedonia

[Centurio Nixalsverdrus]

Part 3 – The Ptolemaic War: The Campaigns in Syria (234 – 230 BC)

Whoever thought that the Ptolemaic War would soon come to an end in 234 BC after the Makedones had conquered southern Mikra Asia, Kypros and even the seas – he was astonishingly mistaken. The Pharaoh at Alexandreia did not think of giving in to the Makedones now that he had reached so much and had beaten back the Seleukides as far as the land between the twin rivers. The Makedones in Tarsos and Kappadokia posed a threat to Ptolemaios’ holdings that he could not tolerate. Every military move against the Seleukides by his side encompassed the danger of an attack on his own back by the Makedones. The Pharaoh was forced to react and asked for a peace treaty with the Seleukides to which these gladly agreed. Ptolemaios Ευεργετης (Euergetes, “the Benefactor”) travelled himself to Syria and took over command over his forces, determined to get rid of the Makedones.

On the other side of the Pyramos river, at Tarsos, the Makedonian prince Perseus thought the same. He had not advanced thus far just to make a halt before conquering Antiocheia, the city that his much adored Antiochos had once built, and that was since decades in the hands of the Ptolemaioi. The outbreak of the First Seleukid War must have come very unpleasant for Perseus, since it forced him to take care of the new threat and move north into Kappadokia, abandoning Tarsos and leaving command over the reserve contingents in the area to Heragoras Thessalonikeus, the man that had started the Pontic war on his own. Perseus was well aware of the insolence of his behaviour and did not trust him very much.

A map of the campaigns 235 - 230 BC.

Heragoras should soon live up to his fame. With a light force of less than ten thousand he marched south-east and crossed the Orontes. Camping only few miles northeast of Antiocheia, the city and former capital of Antiochos could be seen from the distance. But Heragoras not only showed insolence, but also instinct. Inside the city was Ptolemaios Euergetes with a small force, no more than five thousand. Apparently misjudging the Makedonian strength, Ptolemaios left the city, attacked Heragoras and promptly fell. Another attack by a relative of the Pharaoh called Zoalios could be repelled. The way to Antiocheia was open, and Heragoras marched into the polis, displacing many. The deported inhabitants subsequently caused riots in Tarsos and Side.

The battle line at Antiocheia.


Galathraikes charge in.


The battle is won.

Menelas’ Wilderness Campaign
In the meantime, Menelas, Strategos in Pontos and victor over the Pontikoi, had set up a proper Makedonian administration for the subdued country and marched south and then eastward into Kappadokia. He followed the Βεληνεκες Ταυρος (the Tauros Mountains) on their north side until he reached the old Οδος Βασιλικη Περσικη (Hodos Basilike Persike, the Persian Royal Road that was built by the Achaemenid dynasty that once ruled the country). At the city of Melitene, the road crosses the Ευφρατης Ποταμος (the Euphrat). Menelas though turned south and marched over the mountains until he reached Samosata, where he finally crossed the river, only a few hundred σταδια (stadia, one stadion being approx. 177,60m / 586ft in length) north of the Ptolemaic stronghold of Edessa. There, under the command of Lysimachos, another relative to the deceased Pharaoh, were campaigning forty two thousand men, among them Phalangitai mostly, both native and Makedonian, plus a notable contingent of eleven thousand lightly armed soldiers from Africa and Arabia.

From the battle itself not much is left to us. It must have been winter, and the battlefield was apparently heavily forested. The Ptolemaioi don’t seem to have been able to properly orchestrate their attack, whereas the Makedones had nothing more to do than wait and fight back until the attack was over. Seemingly losses of the Makedones did not supersede 10%, with 75% being the respective percentage for the enemy. Lysimachos himself fell, but lots of the troops made it back to Edessa, also because the increasingly deep snow would have hampered the Makedonian cavalry in their pursuit.

The mountainous landscape near Samosata was deeply covered with snow.


Lysimachos shows no cowardice.

As scouts reported that a strong Ptolemaic army under the command of Alexandros Thraikikos, a very influential general at Ptolemaios’ court and possible next Pharaoh, was on the march further to the south of the Euphrates in Syria, Menelas decided it would be best to confront the strongest force of the enemy directly. Instead of wasting time with laying siege to Edessa, he circumvented the city, crossed the river into Syria further downstream and headed south.

The two armies met roughly 500 stadia (ca. 90km) south of the lake that forms the knee of the great river. In a similar distance lay the city of Thapsakos on its southern bank. The only sign of human presence at the later battlefield was an old estate surrounded by wheat fields that the Ptolemaioi had destroyed in the course of their foraging actions. For that reason, the battle should later become known as the Battle of Σιτοπεδιον (Sitopedion - grain field).

Menelas commanded roughly twenty eight thousand, amongst them 3,000 cavalry, Thessalikoi and Thraikioi; 11,000 Phalangitai; 3,000 Agrianes; 3,200 Thureophoroi; 2,800 Galatikoi Kuarothoroi; 1,200 Peltastai Makedonikoi; 1,300 Thraikioi Peltastai and 3,000 Toxotai Kretikoi. Thirty three thousand were marching with Alexandros: among them 5,000 Thureophoroi and Keltohellenikoi; 6,500 Thorakitai; 2,000 Nubian Spearmen; 1,600 Peltastai; 1,200 Galatian Fanatics and finally, more than 14,000 Phalangitai, among them 4,800 belonging to the especially reliable Klerouchikon Agema. In fact, Menelas’ officers recommended to “better search for a fortified position or avoid the battle, since the gods’ goodwill cannot be at all times with the Makedones.”

But Menelas was the wrong character for a withdrawal. The careful advice of his officers is reported to have outraged him. When the Makedonian scouts reported to their Strategos – still on the march – that Alexandros’ troops were nearby and “of best confidence,” he ordered to march at a faster pace to reach the enemy the next day with sunrise, in order to avoid the scorching heat of the Syrian summer. However, when the Makedones reached the old estate, it must have been already around 11AM, and Menelas’ men had been marching the whole night without resting.

Opposite the little hill on which the estate lay and upon establishing a line of sight with the enemy, Menelas ordered his men into battle formation and to rush forward, since the Ptolemaioi were already rushing forward themselves in order to occupy the higher ground. Although being exhausted, the Makedones partially reached the high ground before the enemy, but on the right flank came only second to their adversaries. As a consequence, the Ptolemaioi concentrated their heaviest troops, notably the Klerouchikon Agema, on the spot and forced Menelas to counter these with his Peltastai Makedonikoi.

The Makedones rush in at Sitopedion.

In the meantime, Alexandros’ phalanx concentrated on the right half of Menelas’ phalanx, using the higher ground to their advantage and bringing the Makedones into great danger. The Makedonian left wing was meanwhile occupied by diversionary attacks of Thureophoroi and Peltastai. Menelas ordered the Agrianes to circumvent the right flank and attack the Ptolemaic Thorakitai from the back, whereas the Kretans were told to greet the foe with arrows on fire. Alas, neither the attack from behind nor the hail of missiles could break the morale of the enemy.

The Ptolemaic Peltastai occupy the Makedones.


The lines at approximately midday.


Under arrow fire.


The troops of Alexandros are greeted with fire.


At the right flank.


Agrianikoi Pelekouphoroi charge in.

While the Makedones enveloped the Ptolemaic left, the diversionary attacks on the Makedonian left continued, and Alexandros’ phalanx was winning over Menelas’ Argyraspides. At this time, Menelas was forced to stake everything on one card: he ordered the Pezhetairoi on the left to attack with their swords, backed up by the Kretans who had spent all their arrows. At the same time, he led the cavalry around the right flank and charged the Ptolemaioi into their back.

Thessalians and Thraikians in melee.

On the Makedonian left, Menelas’ order proved to work: the Peltastai and Thureophoroi were routed and cut down; but on the right, the Ptolemaioi proved to be of great spirit. The Makedonian Thureophoroi and even the Argyraspides were sent routing, and the Hippeis Thessalikoi and the Thraikioi Prodromoi had lost nearly all their stamina under the unforgiving sun. Fortunately, a Συνταγμαρχος (Syntagmarchos) of the Pezhetairoi got aware of the situation on the other side of the battlefield. He left the chase after the enemy routers to the Kretans and ordered his men to crack down on the Ptolemaioi from the last open side and thus surround them. Seeing that they were surrounded, and further that they had been abandoned by their leader, the enemy soldiers finally lost their spirit and were cut to pieces.

The Kretans pursue lighter Ptolemaic troops on the Makedonian left.


No quarter is given to the enemy.


The harvest of death.

And so, Menelas had won the battle by late afternoon. Not only the enemy got cut to pieces, but great parts of his own army as well. No unit that hadn’t lost at least a third of its men. The numbers are left to us: four thousand wounded and ten thousand dead for the Makedones, and nearly thirty three thousand losses for the troops of Alexandros. With the massacre at Sitopedion, the spine of the Ptolemaioi in Syria was broken. Effective defence of the possessions in Mesopotamia was rendered impossible – the Ptolemaioi had to concentrate on regrouping forces to ensure the protection of their domains further to the south. The fate of the defeated Alexandros has also come down to us: he had taken the opposite direction and was confronted and killed at a small Syrian town called Beroea. Around the Hellenic world, the news of the battle caught the attention of everyone. So far the war between the Makedones and the Pharaoh had been like a series of skirmishes in comparison to Sitopedion – but now everyone knew that the war was much more serious and bitter than ever thought.

Menelas gathered his troops and marched north, crossing the river again, this time at Nikephorion, pushing aside a Ptolemaic contingent under Leontiskos Thraikikos, a relative of the very Alexandros whom Menelas had just defeated. He marched further north unto Edessa, and to the southeast of the polis, at a town called Karrhai, finally won over Leontiskos and the garrison of Edessa. The hardships suffered by Menelas’ men were so dire that the Makedonian Strategos could not prevent them from sacking the city and killing many of her inhabitants. After so much blood had seeped into the Syrian grain fields, torrents of blood had to run down the streets of Edessa.

At Nikephorion ("the victory-bringing").


At Karrhai, or Carrhae as the Romans would have called it.

Perseus’ and Euphamios’ Levantine Campaigns
The same year Menelas was celebrating his successes in Assyria, Euphamios, the son of Perseus and his mistress, landed in Seleukeia Pieria together with Neikon Sepieus. With the consent of his father, he gathered a notable army numbering well over twenty thousand men. The soldiers where from almost all corners of the Royal Possessions. There were Keltohellenikoi and Galathraikes, five thousand Greeks fighting both in the traditional Hoplite and in the new Iphikratean style, six thousand Celts and the same number of natives to Karia called Uazali. The cavalry consisted of lightly armed Greeks and Celts.

Euphamios had been assigned the task of advancing south and breaking the Ptolemaic resistance in Phoinike, where a sizeable enemy force was stationed to defend the region. East of the Phoinikian city of Byblos, Euphamios and Neikon encountered the army of Protarchos Thraikikos and his brother Dyktis, further members of the influential family that was in command of the whole Ptolemaic Levant. Their army consisted of roughly ten thousand Phalangitai, among them the Klerouchon Agema. The rest of eighteen thousand was made up of mostly Arabian levies, but also heavy Galatian infantry and the pharaonic βασιλικων αγημα (Basilikon Agema, the Royal Guard).

The armies met on a plain along the road that traversed the country from Antiocheia in the north to Sidon and further to Hierosolyma. The heavy Somatophylakes of the Thraikikos brothers charged early in, putting the Uazali on the Makedonian flanks under pressure, whereas the Phalanx was slowly advancing over the field until it eventually reached the line of the Makedones. Since the troops of Euphamios were for a great part lighter than these of Protarchos, the battle soon evolved into a mess which made it almost impossible to tell the two sides apart. The Ptolemaic phalanx dealt heavy casualties to the mercenaries on the Antigonid side.

Greek mercenaries in Makedonian service at Byblos.


The Karioi counter the attack of the Ptolemaic cavalry.


Galathraikes fight against the Basilikon Agema of the Pharaohs.


The battle in an aereal view.

Euphamios intended to envelop the enemy, but that could only be partly achieved. Over the time, the heavy cavalry of the Thraikikos brothers was exhausted though, and Protarchos eventually fell. Euphamios and Neikon gathered their Somatophylakes, circled around the flanks and delivered a charge into the back of the enemy phalanx. Seeing this, Dyktis decided the battle was lost and turned around to flee, taking with him the rest of his army. The lighter armed mercenaries could run faster than the heavy troops of the Ptolemaioi and thus slaughtered a lot of them on their flight to the south. Casualties of the day might have numbered almost thirty five thousand, among them seven thousand on Makedonian side.

Euphamios charges into the back of the enemy.


The Makedones pursue the routing soldiers.

After the dead and wounded were taken care of, Euphamios continued his march but did not came far, only to the town of Berytos were his path was blocked by eight thousand Arabian levy skirmishers. Dyktis Thraikikos joined these troops in a futile intent to halt the Makedonian advance. This time he could not save his life. Only 2,500 made their way back to Sidon, and Euphamios could easily capture the city after a brief siege.

At the time Euphamios was making his way from Seleukeia Pieria towards Sidon, his father and heir to the trone Perseus was advancing on a parallel route southward. The natives were shown the new power in the region, and potential Ptolemaic rest troops could be mopped up. End point of Perseus march was Damaskos, a city so ancient as the Egyptian civilisation. The city was protected by Themistagoras Thraikikos and no more than six thousand men who were easily overcome by professional killers like Perseus’ Thraikioi Rhomphaiaphoroi.

Thraikioi Rhomphaiaphoroi in Damaskos.

This way, the areas of Kappadokia and Greater Syria had come under Makedonian influence in less than five years. Hundreds of thousands had died in this process. Pontos did not exist any more, but the Ptolemaioi were still strong. Palmyra was under the Ptolemaic yoke, and strong forces were already making their way from the Neilos to the north.The natives of Phoinike and Syria reeked their chance to make use of the political and military upheaval and turn it to their favour. In this situation of utmost tension, a herald reached Perseus in Damaskos and brought news from Makedonia: King Alkyoneus, already widely appended with the epithet Ασιοκρατωρ (Asiokrator, ruler over Asia), was dead.