3.2 The Mazakan Stalemate – Analysis of the failure.

In 209 BC the city of Mazaka and the surrounding province of Sophene fell to the Eagles - after 15 years of campaign.
By this time, the whole of Egypt was under Roman control, Syria was subdued, and the eastern front bordered on the Tigris. And yet this barely significant Anatolian city still held against the whole might of the Republic. There were four major battles fought for and around Mazaka. All were lost by the Romans. Eventually, the war of attrition combined with complete surrounding of Sophene, was barely enough to conquer the city. And even this was not enough to hold it.
What went wrong?

One of the main reasons for the Mazakan Stalemate was the reliance on auxiliary troops, mercenaries and local levies. The hardened legionnaires were always needed ‘elsewhere’. It wasn’t always so – at first, the Anatolian front was the most significant theatre of war. But after the First Battle of Mazaka the Senate decided to turn their attention elsewhere.
The First Battle of Mazaka was the only battle in the campaign in which native Italian legions were defeated by Ptolemaic army. The losses were terrifying, and the perspective of any more losses of Roman life was too much for the Senate to bear.
The legions were relocated south, to follow the coast into Syria. The conquest of Anatolia was left to allies.

The quality of allied troops varied. At the top, there were Scythian warriors of Kallatis and Pontic coast. They were formidable, but they were always few in numbers, held in reserve. The first line of the Auxiliary Legions was formed of mercenaries, who were able to hold their own in battle, but once depleted, their ranks were not easily replaceable. The local levies formed the bulk of the force fighting in Asia Minor. And they were little more than cannon fodder against the Ptolemaic Anatolian army.

This army, led by some of the best of Ptolemaic generals, was a deadly force. It definitely proved its value in the First Battle of Mazaka. It was formed of elite phalangites and crack cavalry, supported by levies and mercenaries of much better quality than the Romans could raise in the area. In fact, if the Ptolemy high command did not decide to stubbornly keep that army in Anatolia, and instead retreat it to Syria or Egypt, the final outcome of the war could be very well different.

Rome’s only advantage was in numbers and manoeuvrability. They could launch an offensive after an offensive against the Sophene army, watching it wane and diminish with every attack. But it could not strike a decisive blow for years. Only after the Kingdom of Pontus was defeated could the Romans start the great encircling manouver. Several tribunes perished in the mountains of Kappadokia, as their troops fled into the hills. The Allied troops were too weak to inflict heavy enough casualties on the enemy.

Over these fifteen years, there were three more battles in Sophene, and two in Kappadokia. The Kappadokian campaign was eventually successful, but only because of clever manoeuvring and diversion west of Karkathiokerta. The city fell, while the main Kappadokian army was away trying to defeat the Roman army that was just a ruse.
The victorious army, a mixed band of Scythian and mercenary troops, marched happily west, expecting to take Mazaka by surprise from the rear. But the army was divided in two because of logistical problems of marching through the mountains – and there was still a significant Ptolemy presence west of Karkathiokerta, returning from its misguided campaign, that had to be bypassed.
The Fourth Battle of Mazaka was another loss, but no longer a disaster like the previous three. The attrition was heavy against the garrison, and a few weeks later the Sophene army was destroyed in the Fifth and final battle.
Meanwhile, there was a pro-seleukid revolt in Karkathiokerta, as the Romans could no longer spare any troops to keep peace in the conquered city. Thus, a second city in Anatolia was brought under Seleukid government through rebellion.
After a short siege, exhausted and cut-off from any hope of reinforcement, Mazaka finally fell.

The Republic spent a significant amount of money and resources on the Mazaka campaign. Fifteen years of constant warfare, fifteen years of raising troops and hiring mercenaries, only to capture a city that the Senate has labelled as ‘insignificant’ after their first defeat. It was a case of sour grapes, though: with Mazaka in Ptolemaic hands, there was no safe and speedy route across Anatolia. The Scythian auxiliaries would never see any fighting in Syria and Mesopotamia because of that, and the Roman army in the south lacked good archers and horse archers that would be more than useful in the battles there. Furthermore, Rome could not gain any long-term control over Kappadokia and Phrygia, which ended in Seleukid hands throughout the whole war. This was a major strategic setback in the long run, and all because the Senate decided to leave the conquest of Anatolia to auxiliaries.