Loose ends in the 9/11 Commission Report

[Adrian II]

Back...

Good. Interesting views, bro. Your insights surprise me every time.

Wedge is on my buying list as of now.

I have heard many stories about FBI/CIA rivalry, but never seen it treated in systematic fashion, let alone pinpointed as a systemic failure in US national security. Interesting stuff. Though I am somewhat wary of American authors projecting highly idealised visions onto their political apparatus and then finding it wanting on all counts. The flipside of American optimism and can-do mentality is a refusal to accept certain inherent shortcomings of government. The main shortcoming in this instance being bureaucracy. I fail to see how a democratic country with the size, economic weight and military prowess of the of U.S. could improve its institutions in such a way that lapses like JFK or 9/11 can ever be prevented. People who think so live in Lalaland and should never get their hands on any policy buttons.

On the JFK thing, I think it is obvious that nearly all parties concerned felt that thay had something to hide. Hence the Warren Commission's shortcomings. This started at the local level. Dallas was a total zoo, let's be honest. The locals couldn't get anything right and there was a huge potential for conspiracy against the President's life there, even among the police force itself. Kennedy knew this when he told Jackie: "We're going to fruitcake city." In the words of former FBI agent James Hosty who was tasked with observing potential right-wing risks:

Believe me, believe me, there were a lot of nuts in Dallas. You may quote me on that. If we had picked up and watched everybody who had reason or wanted to kill Kennedy, we would've had to hire half the people in Dallas to watch the other half. It was a hotbed of right-wing extremists, and there was all sorts of murder-mouthing going on all around Dallas.

Then there were the FBI, the CIA, military intelligence and the Secret Service who were all deeply embarrassed because they should have had Oswald in their sights.

But I beg to differ with you that this bureaucratic rivalry would explain the Warren Commission cover-up. I believe that the powers that be - Johnson, Hoover, Helms, Angleton, even Robert Kennedy, and of course Warren and his commission - worked together to prevent any Cuban/Soviet leads from becoming public and causing an incontrollable international situation. In order to do this, they had to blame Oswald and no one else. I believe that none of them knew what had really happened, that is why they were afraid to pursue those leads, and that is why they overcame their traditional rivalries in that particular situation.

Whether the Cubans or the Soviets indeed set up Oswald or even send a second shooter to back him up, I have no idea whatsoever. I find that theory the most plausible of all because (a) it is backed up by serious documents and statements, and (b) it explains all of the major hullabaloo surrounding the murder, and this in accordance with Occam's razor.

But plausibility does not equal proof, and any opponent might rightfuly add that 'You, Adrian II, are no Earl Warren.'

For Saudi Arabia it's important to note that we actually receive only a small percentage of our oil from them and it's still a global market.

Whether the U.S. receives major barrelage from Saudi Arabia is not the crux, the control of the flow of oil is the crux. Just ask the Chinese...

Since WWII Iran and Saudi Arabia were the twin pillars of U.S. control over Middle Eastern oil. Iran was 'lost' in 1979, Saudi Arabia is on the verge of being lost since 2001. Against this background the destruction of the Twin Towers by mostly Saudi terrorists was doubly symbolic.

[Vladimir]

But I beg to differ with you that this bureaucratic rivalry would explain the Warren Commission cover-up. I believe that the powers that be - Johnson, Hoover, Helms, Angleton, even Robert Kennedy...

Ugh. I demand you to never utter that name in my presence!

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Anyway, with me you'll find a helathy dose of the "can do" attidude with "you did what!" It's been a year or so and can't remember the general tone of the (rather thick) book but it made me pretty mad at times.

The important thing about the report is what we're doing as a result. CIA isn't doing much but the ONDI is taking a lot of steps in a positive direction; too bad they don't have as much authority as the former.

[Adrian II]

Ugh. I demand you to never utter that name in my presence!

James Jesus Angleton.

There, I've done it. Please tell me why you hate the name? I mean it.

Oh, and is it true he possessed those pics of Hoover and Tolson engaging in, well, you know..?

If so, can I borrow them?

[KukriKhan]

The flipside of American optimism and can-do mentality is a refusal to accept certain inherent shortcomings of government. The main shortcoming in this instance being bureaucracy. I fail to see how a democratic country with the size, economic weight and military prowess of the of U.S. could improve its institutions in such a way that lapses like JFK or 9/11 can ever be prevented. People who think so live in Lalaland and should never get their hands on any policy buttons.

You make a good point there, but I think you may have over-stated it. Setting aside a minority of 'nanny-state' enthusiasts, I think yanks know their government is limited in what it can accomplish - in fact we design it that way, and get suspicious when it tries to expand its reach.

Our hero-myths laud the guys who can get things done outside of, or in spite of, or in addition to, teh gub'mint. Like the Flight 93 passengers.

Immediately after 911, Bush had the support of most of the world, and the whole of his nation. Everybody here stood ready to do whatever it took to fix this problem. Instead of an inspired plan, what we got was: "Go shopping and buy stocks to restart the economy." and "We (gov't)'ll handle it, go on with your life as normal."

And here we are today, broke, with an almost broken Army, with the problem not fixed.

Leadership failure (with some credit given that 911 didn't happen twice - yet).

[Adrian II]

You make a good point there, but I think you may have over-stated it. Setting aside a minority of 'nanny-state' enthusiasts, I think yanks know their government is limited in what it can accomplish - in fact we design it that way, and get suspicious when it tries to expand its reach.

I totally agree, apparently I wasn't being entirely clear. What I said was actually meant as an oblique criticism of Vladimir who seemed to hold up the former Soviet Union as an example of a 'real superpower', at least when it comes to security matters. But emulation of the SU is undesirable for host of reasons (something to Vladimir will no doubt subscribe) and emulation of its security policy with its unitary command structure and total lack of democratic checks and balances is abhorrent. No one in their right mind would envisage such a watertight national security arrangement for the U.S. Given the advanced state of modern means of bureaucratic surveillance and control, it would spell the end of democracy.

That's why I said that a democracy like the U.S. couldn't have a much better system than what it has. The notion that a major reshuffle would lead to both far better security and far better oversight is a pipe-dream. Bureaucracies will be bureaucracies, no matter how long you reshuffle them.

If you guys would would streamline your national security more or less along Soviet lines (or some other draconic example) this would destroy the core values of the nation. The FBI-CIA rivalry is part of a system of checks and balances, some intended, some grown spontaneously over the years, that is necessary and inevitable. This means that (dramatic) lapses due to undue secretiveness, competition, lack of oversight and local incompetence are inevitable, too.

[KukriKhan]

Gotcha. You're right: I misunderstood your thrust. Me thick-headed sumtimes. :)

[Adrian II]

Me thick-headed sumtimes. :)

Far from. I told you before that you are the American Orgah with the best understanding of the differences between American and European political sensitivities, and therefore of the resulting fubars we have sometimes in this forum. You are also the most forgiving when it comes to European prejudices about the U.S. and consequent stupidities in threads. You may want to use your license to kill a bit more in such situations.

[Vladimir]

James Jesus Angleton.

There, I've done it. Please tell me why you hate the name? I mean it.

1965-1975. Whenever you have the term "Dark Ages" applied to your professional history it's not an endorsement of your career. Yea there were other factors involved but I take it kinda personally. Hate isn't the right word, mostly disgust at his later years.

I totally agree, apparently I wasn't being entirely clear. What I said was actually meant as an oblique criticism of Vladimir who seemed to hold up the former Soviet Union as an example of a 'real superpower', at least when it comes to security matters. But emulation of the SU is undesirable for host of reasons (something to Vladimir will no doubt subscribe) and emulation of its security policy with its unitary command structure and total lack of democratic checks and balances is abhorrent. No one in their right mind would envisage such a watertight national security arrangement for the U.S. Given the advanced state of modern means of bureaucratic surveillance and control, it would spell the end of democracy.

The FBI-CIA rivalry is part of a system of checks and balances, some intended, some grown spontaneously over the years, that is necessary and inevitable.

OMG!

**Warning** Recently read several book about these guys hence the overreaction!

John J. Dziak's Checkisty: A History of the KGB. Can't find it on line now but finished it yesterday. If you want to know how a real superpower runs an empire, read it. America was an accidental superpower; a happy accident to be sure. Perhaps it's less an endorsement of the Soviet Union and more of a refection of how I view (expansionist) empires (and imperial presidents). Third Rome indeed.

The latter is mostly the responsibility of one man who forged an empire himself. While also a real empire but in a different sense, it was an empire none the less.

[Adrian II]

**Warning** Recently read several book about these guys hence the overreaction!

I understand. I am far too delighted with the fact that we share some 'exotic' interests to hold such poetic license against you.

The best thing in this vein which I ever read was a 1987 book by French historian Hélène Carrère d'Encausse. She had specialised in Russian and Soviet History (she was née Hélène Zourabichvili, nuff said) and wrote very critically of what she perceived as western laxity with regard to Soviet expansion. Her Ni paix, ni guerre: Le nouvel empire sovietique, ou du bon usage de la detente ('Neither peace nor war: The new Soviet Empire, or of the proper uses of detente') described in detail how the Soviet Union - under the guise of detente - was cutting and nibbling away at western influence in Africa, Asia and Latin America, day by day, step by step, minor crisis by minor crisis, in an effort that required major long term planning and subtle, consistent execution. Her book showcased Angola, Mocambique, the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan. The chapter titles are as brilliant as the book's title (chapter 1 is entitled 'Brezhnev the African' ). Anyway, what it demonstrated was that there was a concerted, long-term expansionist effort from the Soviet Union which required much more than secret service activity; in fact the entire Soviet state and the states of its satellites were mobilised and harnessed for it.*

Indeed, compared to that campaign, western imperialism was a silly picnic.


* Leaving same state open to failure in other departments, notably the economy, which contributed to its undoing a few years after the book appeared.

[Vladimir]

Thank you, for the compliments and the author, I've never heard of her before. Reminds me of (yet) another book I have but haven't read yet: The World Was Going Our Way. It's the second book after The Sword and the Shield. We owe so much to that archivist. Both may be somewhat dry and historical but they are considered ground truth.

I've found some of Hélène's works on Amazon but not the one you mentioned. It should be interesting.

To me and most historians however, Soviet expansion was no surprise. Russia expands, that's what Russia does. However it would have been interesting to see what would have happened to her without WW I. The benefits of conflict aside, that war ended up defining the 20th century.

Hopefully we don't get the because of the foray into OT land.


Wha...Just looked up poetic license and it doesn't sound too flattering.

[Adrian II]

I never read any of the Archivist's publications. The book you mention covers roughly the same period as Zourabichvili's, but from what I (hastily) gauge from reviews on the Web (Foreign Affairs, Woodrow Wilson Center) it mainly states two things: that said expansion was basically a KGB-led initiative, and that it was more a failure than a success. The latter claim in particular surprises me.

Andrew said he gained from the Mitrokhin archive not so much new information but a new understanding about the extraordinary gulf between a highly successful collection effort by the KGB – and the abysmal analysis by Soviet policymakers.

Sunil Khilnani granted the KGB a certain lethal efficacy in certain areas but saw its work largely as a failure – in such cases as China, Iran, Pakistan, and India. Several “foreign hands” were at work in India, and while we have always known about the CIA’s role, though not its full extent, the extent of disinformation filtered into India was remarkable. Nonetheless, many of the operations, Khilnani argued, struck him as more comic than menacing. To be sure, in the 1960s the KGB became even more active in India, but the country was a “deceptively easy target”: one could never be sure of the efficacy of a secret channel due to the utterly decentralized Indian political system. Overall, Khilnani felt, the KGB inflated its impact on Indian society and government.
Linky

I take all the blame for any derailing of this, my own, thread. But since we are discussing intelligence services and national security I don't believe we should fear teh lock.
Oh, and poetic license is commendable. Only those who can't deal with it call it hyperbole and involve you in interminable meta-discussions. Gah.

P.S. It struck me to see that M. describes Vietnam as 'virtually a hostile nation' to the Soviet Union, because it fits with what I was told by Vietnamese middle echelon when I stayed in Hanoi for several months in the late 1990's, when communism had been all but scrapped from the books. The going cliche was that Ho had 'always been a nationalist first and only placated the Russians because he needed their military support'. I had the impression they were speaking the truth.

[Banquo's Ghost]

But since we are discussing intelligence services and national security I don't believe we should fear teh lock.

Some tangents add immeasurably to the Backroom, and this is certainly one of them. Fascinating discussion, gentlemen.

(For the record, derailments are only frowned upon when they drag an interesting topic into silliness, abuse or spam).

[Vladimir]

P.S. It struck me to see that M. describes Vietnam as 'virtually a hostile nation' to the Soviet Union, because it fits with what I was told by Vietnamese middle echelon when I stayed in Hanoi for several months in the late 1990's, when communism had been all but scrapped from the books. The going cliche was that Ho had 'always been a nationalist first and only placated the Russians because he needed their military support'. I had the impression they were speaking the truth.

Here you are incredibly correct. It is also another example of short-sighted American foreign policy. The Truman administration was more concerned with shoring up relations with the French then helping some jungle country escape from colonialism. Hindsight wins again. It seems like there should have been a serious investigation into policy failures leading up to the Vietnam War but I can't recall one.

Two things I've gathered about the KGB regarding your post: They did lead these sort of efforts but their primary concern was the preservation of the party; the sword and the shield. KGB officials were also good at running something akin to information operations against whoever was in charge of the party.

An important thing to note is that Mitrokhin's information comes directly from KGB files...and is yet another example of a stragetic American intelligence failure. The Brits had to pick him up and recover his notes because we turned him away.

[Adrian II]

Oh, the myriad benefits of hindsight. Speaking of which – correct me if Im wrong, but believe there is more than a hint of nostalgia for the ‘great game’ of the Cold War in some of your posts. Am I right?

Anyway, hindsight has great relevance for today. Let me try to demonstrate that with Vietnam and Cuba as ‘case studies’(if that doesn’t sound too presumptuous).

I agree with you that the American-Vietnamese relationship could probably have been a lot better if only certain obsessions hadn’t stood in the way. As late as 1948 the entire American foreign policy establishment regarded Third World nationalism as a huge asset in the confrontation with Communism on the world stage. And it was. The U.S. could and would champion that nationalist upswing. Washington didn't have its hands tied by remnats of empire, dreams of grandeur, dirty little colonial wars, public rancour and infighting over colonial interests. It was the single greatest American trump in international relations at the time, more important than possession of the A-bomb. Yet this trump was never played. Why not?

Because of China.

My favorite source on the Vietnam-episode is Barbara Tuchman’s The March of Folly. She highlights the fact that the American embroglio was certainly not the result of ignorance. The Americans had excellent intelligence and expertise. At every step of the way they knew the hazards, the obstacles and the possible consequences. Yet they persisted, Tuchman wrotes, despite evidence that 'the goal was unattainable, and the effect disproportionate to the American interest and eventually damaging to American society, reputation and disposable power in the world'.

What caused this dogged pursuit? It was the Communist victory in China in 1949, which had an impact on public opinion that was, as she writes, 'as stunning as Pearl Harbour'. From that moment on, every movement with remotely Communist or Socialist characteristics was seen as part of a single monolithic conspiracy against freedom. The attack on South Korea clinched it. Truman spoke on the radio of ‘a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world’. Ignoring this conspiracy would amount to the same fatal weakness displayed by the European powers in Munich in 1938.

The Munich comparison became a staple in foreign policy circles in this period. The rise of Third World nationalism was no longer regarded as a phenomenon sui generis, but as a repetition of the previous war, i.e. a joint military onslaught of Communist forces similar to the Japanese attacks on Korea and Manchuria, the German invasions of Poland etcetera, and the Italian invasion in Ethiopia.

Bye-bye Ho Chi Minh.

Of course there was no such conspiracy, the U.S. stood to gain enormously by recognising the legitimacy of the new nationalisms, assisting them in kicking out their old European overlords and welding them into a new coalition. Alas.

I suppose the American-Cuban relationship after '59 might have been less adversarial as well, and to the great detriment of the Soviets, too. In hindsight the initial, bungled episode of 1959-1961 is just totally weird.

Basically, I believe there were two mistakes made. The U.S. made the mistake of underestimating Castro's potential and Castro, who's military victory had been relatively easy, made the mistake of overestimating himself. The U.S. leadership thought that one day soon they would just kill the funny little beard like they had killed so many socialists and nationalists in Latin America, install someone with a nice smile in his stead, and that would be that. Even before Fidel took over the U.S. ambassador to Cuba recommended to Eisenhower to 'have Castro killed'. And less then a month after Castro took power in January 1959 the first American hitman with a high-powered sniper rifle was arrested during an attempt to shoot him. Go figure. Why the undue haste? Because the American leadership considered the nationalisation of United Fruit Company to be a personal insult. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was a stockholder and adviser for UFC, his brother Allan, director of the CIA, was a former president of UFC. UN Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge sat on its board of directors, Allan Dulles' predecessor General Walter Bedell Smith was its President, etcetera.

Castro, in turn, blundered when he alienated American public opinion and business interests with the flurry of executions and nationalisations right after his take-over. After Castro received Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan in February 1960 and struck the sugar-for-oil deal with him, all doors were slammed shut.

Now today -- to finally inject some relevance into my ramblings -- I think a similar 'folly' reigns again in Washington when it comes to the fight against terrorism or the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is no lack of intelligence or expertise, but there is an ideological hysteria that sees anti-American conspiracies in every islamic agitation and thinks in terms of military solutions. Once again there are personal considerations at work, in the shape of American oil interests in Saudi Arabia that run right to the top of the U.S. leadership. And once again policy makers are preparing for the previous war and refuse to see islamism for what it is: a phenomenon sui generis. Madame Rice is a fine example. She made a great career studying Communism and the balance of power under Detente. In her mind, there can be no such thing as an ideological struggle within Islam, in which the U.S. is merely a lightning rod for local grievances and political infighting. In her mind, militant Islam must be directed against the U.S. and it must have territorial bases which you can attack and control, if not destroy. This is the mantra repeated throughout the Bush years: take out their bases and they are powerless. We have seen the result: they have more power now than before.

The New York Review of Books carries a review of a handful of books on the lastest wars. One is written by a former U.S. military intelligence analyst, Alex Rossmiller, who describes how Donald Rumsfeldt's state of denial about realities on the ground spread throughout the military intelligence community and stifled the best and the brightest.

There is more than one parallel here with the 'China Hands' who were stifled up until 1949 and then discarded, fired or even jailed as dangerous Communists. Only in 1971 were they invited back to testify before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, when Chariman William Fulbright told them they had 'reported honestly about conditions were so persecuted because [they] were honest. This is a strange thing to occur in what is called a civilized country.'

These are terrible dilemma's. Europeans usually explain them away by blaming American 'stupidity' or lack of 'imperial acumen' or something. But the brains are on the American side, the required intelligence, analysis and expertise are there. What Europeans don't understand (or have 'forgotten') is that the best and the brightest rarely get the chance to make or break policies.

Now listen to what Mr Rossmiller has to say. If the U.S. 'loses' Iraq a couple of years from now, maybe 'loses' Afghanistan or (far worse) 'loses' Pakistan, we may remember that Mr Rossmiller told it like it was:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Rumsfeld was not merely wrong; he was self-replicating. The pattern of denial he established in the Office of the Secretary of Defense spread out and down, eventually reaching into the most remote crevices of the Office of Iraq Analysis of the Defense Intelligence Agency, where the young analyst Alex Rossmiller watched the DOD try to get what it wanted in Iraq by hoping, wishing, and predicting that it would happen. Rossmiller's memoir, Still Broken, describes denial triumphant in both Iraq and the halls of the Pentagon. During his six months with the Combined Intelligence Operations Center (CIOC) based at the Baghdad International Airport, Rossmiller's job was to produce "actionable intelligence" on "bad guys" to be picked up by the Army. The job was frequently interrupted by spasms of bureaucratic reorganization and by VIP visits from congressmen who nodded through long briefings.

Those who worked at the CIOC—the FBI, DIA, and OGA (meaning Other Government Agency, which designated the CIA)—referred to it as "a self-licking ice-cream cone." By this they meant that the reports they wrote were read mainly by people down the hall, who sent back reports of their own. But eventually Rossmiller found himself in a Direct Action Cell putting together target packages which led to operations ending with detentions—actual bad guys taken off the streets. "Going after the bad guys," Rossmiller writes, "was at least doing more good than harm, I thought. But my optimism was misplaced; I was wrong."

The lightbulb went on one night in the field when Rossmiller accompanied US and Iraqi special forces to help process detainees seized during an operation. Few details are provided of time, place, or occasion, but Rossmiller relates a harrowing, sixteen-page narrative of bullying incomprehension. The S-2, an Army officer in charge of intelligence for a brigade, explained the drill:

Okay, we're going to bring in these heads on that pad over there, and then walk them over to this field. We'll put them on the ground and tag them, take pictures, and do a field debrief. Then they're off to Abu G where they belong.

Off to Abu Ghraib prison? At that point Rossmiller began to understand that all his care as an intelligence analyst to separate the good guys from the bad guys was academic. The debrief was a barrage of shouted accusations. What Rossmiller saw among the detainees was confusion, fear, despair, anger, humiliation, and tears. It gradually became apparent that one of the detainees, shouted at repeatedly, was a retarded deaf mute. His brothers tried to explain this but were loudly accused of being insurgents and told they were "going away...for a long time." It was simply a question of paperwork. Two affidavits were enough to put a detainee in prison—one saying he was armed, a second saying he resisted detention. "They get an initial three-month stay," the S-2 explained, "and the debriefers there figure out what happens after that." Rossmiller got the point. There were no good guys. "Anybody who's picked up gets sent to prison."

That was Lesson Number One. Lesson Number Two emerged that autumn back at the Pentagon, where Rossmiller was a rising member of the Office of Iraq Analysis. In the months running up to the Iraqi elections in December 2005, Rossmiller and other DIA analysts all predicted that Iraqis were going to "vote identity" and the winners would be Shiite Islamists, who were already running the government. President Bush and the US ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, publicly predicted the opposite—secularists were gaining, the Sunnis were going to vote this time, a genuine "national unity government" would end sectarian strife, the corner would be turned as the war entered its fourth year. Rossmiller soon realized that this was not simply a difference of opinion. Nobody dared to tell the President he was wrong, either to his face or in an official report.

[Vladimir]

Ardian, sir, I don't believe there is a character limit for posts but I'm starting to believe in one!

Here we go, this is something I hate reading but...

Oh, the myriad benefits of hindsight. Speaking of which – correct me if Im wrong, but believe there is more than a hint of nostalgia for the ‘great game’ of the Cold War in some of your posts. Am I right?

The Great Game you say? Which Cold War? Which was the first World War? I can do without nightmares of mushroom clouds thank you. Remember the game never ends and it's one of the few that requires some people die.

As late as 1948 the entire American foreign policy establishment regarded Third World nationalism as a huge asset in the confrontation with Communism on the world stage. And it was. The U.S. could and would champion that nationalist upswing. Washington didn't have its hands tied by remnats of empire, dreams of grandeur, dirty little colonial wars, public rancour and infighting over colonial interests. It was the single greatest American trump in international relations at the time, more important than possession of the A-bomb.

Woah, . As late as 1945 we, as in everybody except Hoover, viewed the Soviets as a valuable and trusted ally. How do you think it was so easy for them to steal our bomb secrets? Look at that lovely lady, Venona,
to get a glimpse on how much we were confronting communism. Thank you for reminding me by the way as I forgot to put it back on the shelf!

Yes the communist victory in China came as a shock to us. However our "acumen" (entertaining because it is a trait in MTW) was actually quite high but was spent on hysterias like the "bomber gap" and other assorted madness. I'm only starting to get into (modern) policy and can't comment intelligently on most of your case study.

Of course there was no such conspiracy, the U.S. stood to gain enormously by recognising the legitimacy of the new nationalisms, assisting them in kicking out their old European overlords and welding them into a new coalition. Alas.

Of course there was. They would be remiss in their ideology if they didn't stick to their founding principles. Don't forget they were on a post war high. Instead of sending their soldiers home in droves they sought to expand their empire and consolidate their gains like a good empire should.

...Castro bla bla bla

I don't know much of the Great Fruit conspiracy. The State Department bungled at least one of the attempts but they were never very good at intelligence. Speaking of which...

Now today -- to finally inject some relevance into my ramblings -- I think a similar 'folly' reigns again in Washington when it comes to the fight against terrorism or the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 1There is no lack of intelligence or expertise, 2but there is an ideological hysteria that sees anti-American conspiracies in every islamic agitation and thinks in terms of military solutions. 3Once again there are personal considerations at work, in the shape of American oil interests in Saudi Arabia that run right to the top of the U.S. leadership. 4And once again policy makers are preparing for the previous war and refuse to see islamism for what it is: a phenomenon sui generis. Madame Rice is a fine example. She made a great career studying Communism and the balance of power under Detente. In her mind, there can be no such thing as an ideological struggle within Islam, in which the U.S. is merely a lightning rod for local grievances and political infighting. In her mind, militant Islam must be directed against the U.S. and it must have territorial bases which you can attack and control, if not destroy. 5This is the mantra repeated throughout the Bush years: take out their bases and they are powerless. We have seen the result: they have more power now than before.

Lots of words. In summary:

1. Curveball
2. What? When did this happen? If some think this it may have something to do with death to America parties and lots of dead people over the years.
3. Dutch, British, etc. At the top? I don't think so.
4. Uh, yea. We always prepare for the last war. of
5. Throughout the years? I thought he was flouting the magic Democracy pill. More power than ever? Hardly. People like saying that but have a hard time proving it. Emotions don't count.

Castro, in turn, blundered when he alienated American public opinion and business interests with the flurry of executions and nationalisations right after his take-over. After Castro received Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan in February 1960 and struck the sugar-for-oil deal with him, all doors were slammed shut.

Huh? That's what communists do, next question.

The New York Review of Books carries a review of a handful of books on the lastest wars. One is written by a former U.S. military intelligence analyst, Alex Rossmiller, who describes how Donald Rumsfeldt's state of denial about realities on the ground spread throughout the military intelligence community and stifled the best and the brightest.

These are terrible dilemma's. Europeans usually explain them away by blaming American 'stupidity' or lack of 'imperial acumen' or something. But the brains are on the American side, the required intelligence, analysis and expertise are there. What Europeans don't understand (or have 'forgotten') is that the best and the brightest rarely get the chance to make or break policies.

Now listen to what Mr Rossmiller has to say. If the U.S. 'loses' Iraq a couple of years from now, maybe 'loses' Afghanistan or (far worse) 'loses' Pakistan, we may remember that Mr Rossmiller told it like it was:

Ok I'm tired and don't have time to address an anti-Rumsfeldt diatribe. Former intelligence analyst, you don't say. Why, he must be a credible, objective source then . America doesn't do HUMINT very well. It's dirty and beneath us. We'd rather spend 100 million on a satellite and listen into phone conversations. More of that acumen stuff. So before you say that we have the "intelligence" make sure the context is clear. Our most intelligent people are rarely in government, for long. Maybe that's the way it should be.

And when will it stop raining here?!

[Adrian II]

Ardian, sir, I don't believe there is a character limit for posts but I'm starting to believe in one!

Won't happen again. It seems I'll be busy today and we'll have to agree to disagree and all that.

[Vladimir]

Won't happen again. It seems I'll be busy today and we'll have to agree to disagree and all that.

No insults intended of course; busy week. From what I'm learning about national level policymaking it's not as well thought out as even your post. Remember that the most common action in government is inaction. This holds particularly true for American policy.

Now if there are any individual issues you'd like to discuss about the report and it's findings I'd love to hear them.

[Adrian II]

Now if there are any individual issues you'd like to discuss about the report and it's findings I'd love to hear them.

I believe the answer to that is in my long post: the U.S. is fighting the previous war.

To be specific:

1. The report acknowledges the linkage between American security and foreign policy, but it does not examine this linkage.
2. The report describes islamism as a 'catastrophic threat' to the U.S. and imits the regional, political and religious history that underlies it.
3. The report basically subscribes to the Bush paradigm that the fight against terrorism is a form of war, not law enforcement.

One sui generis aspect of islamic terrorism is that it thrives on repression. It grows wherever American bombs hit, just like Communism grew wherever American bombs hit during the Cold War.

Blowback should feature more prominently in the analysis. Most islamists are after local governments elsewhere. If the U.S. actively supports those governments, they go after U.S. interests with the motto 'If you bomb us, we'll bomb you'.

Iran: decades of support for the Shah -> attacks on American after 1979

Lebanon: U.S. intervention in 1983 -> suicide bombing leaves 300 dead

Gulf: 1990-91 war -> birth of Al Qaeda

Iraq: intervention in 2003 -> birth of new Al Qaeda


Yes, oversimplified, but you can work it out.

[Vladimir]

The connection between foreign policy and security doesn't need to be explained, does it? Security itself relies on multiple layers of defense: The more layers, the more security.

Think of the UK: Their domestic policy, which IMHO was far worse than our foreign policy, was to let Islamists (or whatever you want to call them) plot openly. That way, like you said, there is no repression and therefore no violence. How well did that work? This isn't freedom of speech, it is inciting violence against others. Yes repression is a cause of terrorism, but not repression caused by us but by their country of origin. I don't think you can believe we were repressing the world during the 90's. Or that the Gulf War was the reason for all the terrorism. Maybe you're suggesting we shouldn't support governments that are considered repressive; perhaps force them to change their government, like we're doing in Iraq?

I don't know what "imits" means but Islamism is a threat to the US. Perhaps the greatest threat we face. That's not to say it's as big as the Soviet threat but it is the biggest one currently.

You can't seriously think that American bombs are the main motivator for terrorism. Did we bomb Libya before or after Pan Am flight 103? You also know that American bombs didn't precipitate the spread of communism. Tell me how the Korean war started. I really don't appreciate the linkage you made which is unsupportable.

Blowback should feature more prominently in the analysis. Most islamists are after local governments elsewhere. If the U.S. actively supports those governments, they go after U.S. interests with the motto 'If you bomb us, we'll bomb you'.

Was this in the 9/11 report? I don't remember it. When is the last time we bombed Saudi Arabia, or Iran? Who were we defending in the Balkans, the Christians or the Muslims?

Iran: Decades of support from England, France, and wars with Russia. So why do they hate us?

I don't call the attack against the barracks in Beirut terrorism. To me it was a legitimate military target. It was our fault they succeeded due to our poor force protection.

Perhaps the attack on our African embassies can be linked to a particular bombing campaign? You're forgetting that part of al-Qaeda is the restoration of the ummah, the US is just the power they need to take out to make it happen. They also viewed the fall of the Soviet Union as a victory for their cause. There's a risk of 'blowback' with everything, even victory. The far greater risk however lies with inaction. This is the problem the UK faces and how the current threat has grown so much.

[Adrian II]

Think of the UK: Their domestic policy, which IMHO was far worse than our foreign policy, was to let Islamists (or whatever you want to call them) plot openly. That way, like you said, there is no repression and therefore no violence. How well did that work?

It worked until British bombs fell in Iraq. Isn't that obvious? The gentlemen whose presence and agitation London tolerated for so long were all tied to parts of the world where bombs fell - Kashmir, Afghanistan, the Middle East. As soon as Britain took part in the bombing, bombs began to go off in London subways.

Like I said, bombs breed islamism. Which is not the same as saying that only bombs do that, but I rather hoped you would work that out yourself. Bombs are a pars pro toto for coercion, i.e. violent intervention and support for repressive regimes and movements.

I don't think you can believe we were repressing the world during the 90's. Or that the Gulf War was the reason for all the terrorism.

I certainly don't. I certainly didn't say it either.

Iran: Decades of support from England, France, and wars with Russia. So why do they hate us?

Why indeed. If it is not because of American intervention in Iranian affairs from 1953 to 1979, I'd be interested to know what you think the reason is. Are you telling me that Iranians got up one sunny morning in 1979 and decided that hating the U.S. would be a good idea?

The Iranian Revolution unleashed a wave of anti-Americanism the depth of which the world had rarely seen. It was there all along, beneath the surface of the Shah's propaganda. Indeed, the new regime thrived on it, succeeded in part because of it, and made it a mainstay of its foreign policy. Now that the hatred has subsided and a new generation is on the rise, there is an opportunity to make a new start. If Washington blows it and instead decides to bomb Iran, the whole circus will start all over again.

Now for a counter-example. In 1956 Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt and attempted to depose Gamal-Abdul Nasser. Washington called them back, maintaining that despite Nasser's unpleasant policies it felt obliged to uphold international law, all the more so because of the saimultaneous Russian invasion of Hungary. Rarely has the U.S. been more popular in Arab states than in that year.

I appreciate your point that the risk of blowback shouldn't condemn the nation to inaction. I hope you also appreciate my point that islamic terrorism is not a war - however asymmetrical - waged against the U.S. by a territorial army. Just like communism, it can not be annihilated by military means or through support for repressive regimes.

You're forgetting that part of al-Qaeda is the restoration of the ummah, the US is just the power they need to take out to make it happen.

Voila, that is exactly Osama bin Laden's view. His strategy revolves not around the U.S. but around Saudi Arabia. The reason why he wants to provoke U.S. armed interventions in Muslim countries is that these will fill his ranks, strengthen support for his movement and isolate Riyadh. He doesn not want to destroy the U.S. or the American way of life, he wants to use the U.S. for his own purposes. And he is not doing badly.

[Vladimir]

It worked until British bombs fell in Iraq. Isn't that obvious? The gentlemen whose presence and agitation London tolerated for so long were all tied to parts of the world where bombs fell - Kashmir, Afghanistan, the Middle East. As soon as Britain took part in the bombing, bombs began to go off in London subways.

Like I said, condemning a nation to inaction. Groups actively plotting the overthrow of a government from within its own borders will seize on any opportunity they can to strike. I believe you'll also find that they acted as a result death and suffering inflicted on muslims, not based on region. The UK has always been mucking around in the middle east, yet only now do they have a real problem.

I certainly don't. I certainly didn't say it either.

You most certainly implied it. If repression breads islamism and terrorism and we weren't repressing islam in the 90's, why where there so many large scale attacks?

Why indeed. If it is not because of American intervention in Iranian affairs from 1953 to 1979, I'd be interested to know what you think the reason is. Are you telling me that Iranians got up one sunny morning in 1979 and decided that hating the U.S. would be a good idea?

Because to have done so against the Soviet Union would have deprived their leaders of their weapons and lives. Also because they're fascists: Strong state control and an ideal enemy to rally their people against.

The Iranian Revolution unleashed a wave of anti-Americanism the depth of which the world had rarely seen. It was there all along, beneath the surface of the Shah's propaganda.

It would be nice if that was true as it would mean things are simple. It simply allowed it to escape largely due to reasons given above.

Now for a counter-example. In 1956 Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt and attempted to depose Gamal-Abdul Nasser. Washington called them back, maintaining that despite Nasser's unpleasant policies it felt obliged to uphold international law, all the more so because of the saimultaneous Russian invasion of Hungary. Rarely has the U.S. been more popular in Arab states than in that year.

That year huh? Sounds like "what have you done for me lately." How did the Arab states react to us defending so many Muslims in the 90's? Why do they hate us if we have done bad and good things for them? Should we continually try to appease the region? Non-involvement isn't an option.

I appreciate your point that the risk of blowback shouldn't condemn the nation to inaction. I hope you also appreciate my point that islamic terrorism is not a war - however asymmetrical - waged against the U.S. by a territorial army. Just like communism, it can not be annihilated by military means or through support for repressive regimes.Voila, that is exactly Osama bin Laden's view. His strategy revolves not around the U.S. but around Saudi Arabia. The reason why he wants to provoke U.S. armed interventions in Muslim countries is that these will fill his ranks, strengthen support for his movement and isolate Riyadh. He doesn not want to destroy the U.S. or the American way of life, he wants to use the U.S. for his own purposes. And he is not doing badly.

Yes, yes it is. It is both a declared and religious war by armies that control territory. Terrorism it the means by which islamists are waging the war. If you're referring to nation states as territory then you're right. However these groups don’t operate within these limits.

Yes it can be annihilated by military means alone. The question is: Should it? One way to eliminate an ideology is to kill the people that believe in it. The details as to how are far more difficult. That’s something the Soviets were good at. The way you phrased it indicates you believe no military action should be taken. I don't believe you think that. Military might is one of the tools of statecraft which *must* be used.

I don't think bin Laden has ever stated that he wants the US to attack Muslims. He wants us out of the ummah and I believe he said he wants us to convert to islam. You may be saying that it is his implied intent but he didn't mention Somalia as a motivator for no reason. He wants us to go home while they do their thing not in Saudi Arabia, but the ummah. There are no nation states in islamism, only islam. We've also pulled most or all of our forces out of Saudi Arabia long ago yet he still wages his jihad.

[Adrian II]

Because to have done so against the Soviet Union would have deprived their leaders of their weapons and lives. Also because they're fascists: Strong state control and an ideal enemy to rally their people against.

Fascinating how you totally miss the point. The U.S. was hated in Iran as long as it suppored the Shah's regime. Therefore, like I said, the new regime cold capitalise on this hatred, thrive on it and make it a mainstay of its foreign policy. In your own words, it used the U.S. as an 'ideal' enemy.

This anti-American sentiment has now waned. Most Iranians are fed up with the regime and appreciate the fact that the U.S. consistently opposes it. Many more don't want war and expect their leadership to prevent it. A September 2002 poll commissioned by the Iranian National Security Committee found that 74 percent of Iranians favor resumption of relations with the United States and 46 percent feels that U.S. policies on Iran are 'to some extent correct'. The mullahs hated the poll. Two months later Abbas Abadi, a reformist, was arrested on a charge that he had been paid by Washington-based Gallup to manipulate the outcome.

Now if you bomb Iran, I am sure these numbers will collapse. Hatred on the rise, more attacks on the U.S. and oil at $250 a barrel. That would be your military solution. And a fine mess it would be.

Yes it can be annihilated by military means alone.

Well good luck, you're on mission impossible. Like some Lewis Carroll character who is surprised that wherever he pulls out plants, weeds return.

[Vladimir]

Hehehe.

I may have something demi-intelligent to say later, just wanted to post this.