For PanzerJaeger, comparing the armies of WW2

[PanzerJaeger]

Few days ago I looked up some tanks on wikipedia and while the japanese tanks were apparently pretty bad indeed I found it funny that when I checked some of the later german designs, many of them came close to 10:1 kill ratios and it was also often said that most of them were destroyed and abandoned by their own crews due to lack of support or fuel, one wonders what they could have achieved with more ressources behind them but of course lack of ressources and manpower were unsurprisingly the main failures of the german army while I find some of the technologies quite fascinating even though not all of them were perfect yet.

As good as the late war German armour was - and it was very good - those ratios have more to do with skill and experience than anything else. German tankers were simply amazing, in a class of their own.

The reason the ratios aren't 20:1 is that the USSR actually had some very good tanks. The T34/76 and T34/85 were extremely solid tanks. They came into their own at a time when the Pz.IV was the main German medium tank. I've read a lot about armoured combat in the East and there is a consant refrain of German commanders in Pz.IVs, Pz. IIIs, StuGs, etc outmanuevering their Soviet rivals, only to have their repeated shots bounce right off. Had the Soviets instead produced large quantities of a Sherman copy - things would have been dire indeed.

Tank warfare in the East is often characterized as a David and Goliath struggle, with the lowly T-34 fighting the mammoth Tiger. While this was true in some circumstances, with Tigers pulling off amazing victories against far greater forces, most of the Panzer Korps was fighting in inferior tanks - yet still managed the success that they did.

When it comes to the big cats, such as the Tiger, Panther, King Tiger, and some of the big tank destroyers, their biggest enemies were themselves. In proper working order, they were amazingly effective against far greater forces.

Unfortunately for the Germans, late war pressures meant an increase in production faults and logistical issues. As you mentioned, that meant that these beasts succumbed to mechanical breakdowns or a lack of logistical support more often than enemy fire. Also, the growing Soviet air presence became increasingly deadly to German AFVs of all types. (It was never as big of an issue as it was on the Western Front, where German tanks could barely manuever at all.)

It is also imporant to mention that tank versus tank combat was not as typical as portrayed. While plenty of it went on, assaults against enemy infantry and fortified positions were far more common experiences. Commanders typically wanted to preserve their tanks for armoured thrusts, and prefered to engage enemy armour with tank destroyers, AT guns, or other methods.

Oh and since someone said the soviet army was a very good force since it defeated the german army, well, when one army outnumbers the other 20:1 then even a 10:1 kill ration on the side of the outnumbered army isn't going to help a lot and one has to keep in mind that geographically the soviet union outnumbered germany quite a bit from the start, plus they got a whole lot of equipment and money from the united states

The Russian military became better as the war progressed. It never quite reached the level of German military thinking, but far surpassed the other allies.

The sheer weight of Russian manpower practically eliminated the importance of tactics and manuever in the East. In the begining, the Germans encircled and destroyed enormous armies. Even after Hitler's stupidity at Stalingrad and Kursk, Manstein and other German commanders were able to pull off some amazing tactical victories against huge odds, such as Kharkov.

However, a tactical victory that would have been a huge blow to an equally sized military meant very little to the Russian command. They simply pulled back, wrote another hundred thousand soldiers off the books, and pressed on with their war of attrition.

It should be noted, though, that the Russian military was thouroughly exhausted by the end of the war.

I don't like Italy being on place 2 as they were probably one of the biggest failures in the war or can anyone tell me where they achieved anything without daddy germany coming to help them out? *waits for Tribesman to come and crush his fantasies about italy being bad*

Many people blame Italian incompetence for the Axis defeat.

[Tribesman]

*waits for Tribesman to come and crush his fantasies about italy being bad*

But they were bad , too many political appointees and too many crazy objectives . They managed OK despite all their big losses , but after the 8th army was destroyed morale completely fell apart .
One notable achievement hey did make was putting all the British battleships in the med out of action which led the British to launch a major operation with the heavy escort consisting of an old battleship armed with Quaker guns, needles to say that the British operation failed with big losses .

[Husar]

Thanks for the answers, few more things I came up with:

1. Were the dutch bicycles superior to those the finns used? How decisive were bicycles in the outcome of the war for both countries?
Ok, I can't really see a superior dutch bicycle stopping even a Panzer II but that the Finnish infantry could keep up with their tanks using bicycles could have been decisive, maybe they even used those superior dutch bicycles.*

2. I read the americans especially tried to rely on tank destroyers to destroy tanks, I wonder why so many couldn't really see tanks fighting other tanks? Obviously it did happen, but apparently more accidental than wanted, I wonder why? Today it seems pretty normal and I'm not aware of any modern tank destroyers, dividing things into heavy armour with tiny guns and medium armoured vehicles with big guns seems a bit weird and it seems only logical to me to combine the two to get the best out of both worlds. I wonder what the reasons were not to do that.

3. Firing in movement I read was not really working well back then due to the lack of automatic stabilizers like modern tanks have them, from what I read, even the T-72 didn't have any which was a major disadvantage in the first Gulf War because they had to stop to fire. Is that true or were there any attempts at stabilizing the guns during movement?

4. I'm not really that much into the sea warfare but I always wondered how it came to be that the german navy seemed to do mostly submarine warfare but also built big battleships, which were apparently superior to most of the british ships, but hardly ever used them for anything else but hunting convoys or lying around in some remote port until some commandos or planes destroyed them. Seems like a waste of ressources just like sending the Bismarck into the middle of the Atlantic where the british managed to destroy it, why was there no attempt to gather all ships and sort of finally duke it out with the royal marine to perhaps secure the channel for germany? If that wasn't possible to win then I wonder why they built those big ships in the first place and didn't just stick to submarines? Perhaps one of Hitler's weird commands similar to how they wasted ressources on other huge projects like the V1 and V2 which basically existed because he was acting like a spoiled kid who got a slap in the face?

And finally, what role did south america play in this war? I heard here and there about this or that country aligning with this or that side but I have absolutely no idea what the individual countries did exactly, except that argentinia invited germans to come over after the war.

*taking this too serious could result in major brain damage

[Kagemusha]

Thanks for the answers, few more things I came up with:

1. Were the dutch bicycles superior to those the finns used? How decisive were bicycles in the outcome of the war for both countries?
Ok, I can't really see a superior dutch bicycle stopping even a Panzer II but that the Finnish infantry could keep up with their tanks using bicycles could have been decisive, maybe they even used those superior dutch bicycles.*

To come to think of, im not quite sure where the Finnish bicycles were manufactured. But im positive those were not taken from the Russians, like the tanks were
Actually bicycle wasnt half bad for the supporting infantry for the tanks, to travel with. During WWII there was no such thing as IFV, infantry fighting vehicles, Germans and US preferred armored halftracks, while the armor of those was so thin that a heavy machine gun could destroy one, with the infantry many times with it.
The Soviet mechanized infantry tended to ride on the hull of their tanks into battle, but the negative thing about that is that tanks tend to gather fire when spotted and the poor infantry men tended to be shot or blown to pieces, when battle started,no matter if the tank survived or not. So in the end the bicycle was pretty good poor mans solution since when the sounds of fire in front would start the Jaegers dropped their bicycles in near ditches and started fighting on foot, once the path was clear, they would pick up the damn things and move on. Of course the continuous cycling might have caused the jaegers to have sore arses, but maybe that was one of the key elements behind their ferocity.

[KrooK]

I read the americans especially tried to rely on tank destroyers to destroy tanks, I wonder why so many couldn't really see tanks fighting other tanks?

I think reason is weakness of American and most of British tanks comparing to German ones. Sherman had no chance against Panther on open area. Panther had bigger range, heavier gun, better armour and was was smaller and faster.

[Evil_Maniac From Mars]

That doesn't mean the soviets couldn't hit a thing, they even had the best snipers overall, I just think at some point it becomes hard for the defenders to stop the mighty steamroll.

Not necessarily. Unlike the Finns and Germans, the Soviets are known for recklessly inflating sniper kill totals. Simo Häyhä was the highest scoring sniper of the war.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Of course, I may be biased here - one of my great-uncles was a German sniper.

[PanzerJaeger]

2. I read the americans especially tried to rely on tank destroyers to destroy tanks, I wonder why so many couldn't really see tanks fighting other tanks? Obviously it did happen, but apparently more accidental than wanted, I wonder why? Today it seems pretty normal and I'm not aware of any modern tank destroyers, dividing things into heavy armour with tiny guns and medium armoured vehicles with big guns seems a bit weird and it seems only logical to me to combine the two to get the best out of both worlds. I wonder what the reasons were not to do that.

Inter-war thought on the subject of armoured warfare proscribed two distinct roles for tanks - infantry support and AT. The armoured forces of the major combatants all reflected their adaptions of this basic premise. Later in the war, these roles became far more blended.

As I was saying, the AFVs we traditionally think of as "tanks" today, were most often designed for infantry support, to break the static situation encountered during WWI. For example, the Pz. III and Pz. IV were originally designed to play these roles in tandem.

It also explains the somewhat unfortunate British armoured situation throughout most of the war. Tanks such as the Churchill - an enormous beast that could go no more than 10km/h IIRC, are often mocked for their immobility and strange design. While it is true that they were completely ineffective versus German armour, they were never designed to go head to head against enemy armor. Their designers envisioned them spearheading an infantry advance against a fixed position, and in such a role, a speed faster than that of your average infantryman on foot was not seen as necessary.

To answer your original question, the Americans relied so heavily on tank destroyers, specifically the M10, M18 and M36, out of necessity. They found themselves severely outgunned in Normandy by a German armoured corps that had evolved significantly beyond their own capabilities. The open-topped nature of American TDs allowed for larger, more powerful guns to be utilized. However, there were significant disadvantages to having open-topped AFVs in combat, as I'm sure you can imagine.

As for the Germans, their tank destroyers followed two distinct development patterns.

The first were essentially static AT guns mounted on a chassis and used as a stand-off weapon. They were meant to engage enemy tanks from a distance, with forward support - often working with spotters.

PanzerJager I


Marder III


Nashorn


..and the mighty Elefant



The second type were extentions of the StuG assault gun concept. Originally meant for infantry support, the Germans quickly realized that they were effective TDs as well. This led to a string of turretless tank destroyers based on a multitude of chassis. Removing the turret allowed for both increased frontal armor and easier angling of that armor - both very desireable attributes when engaging tanks. While having a very limited traverse limited their capacity in infantry-heavy engagements, with proper training it did not effect tank to tank engagement at any significant level.

StuG IV


Hetzer, based an effective Czech platform, cutest tank of the war..


Jagdpanzer IV


Jagdpanther, best TD of the war..


and the enormous Jagdtiger..

[Husar]

Yep, those are the ones I read a bit about on wikipedia.

The bit about the american focus on AT destroyers I asked because some wiki article said the american leaders did not want tanks to face other tanks, they wanted to use tank destroyers and that's why it took them so long to field the Pershing. I took that as implying they simply made a "wrong" decision while the british fielded the sherman firefly to counter german tanks IIRC.

Now the germans had their share of tank destroyers but I find it noteworthy that the guns in the Panther, Tiger and Tiger II were pretty much antitank guns put into tanks, just like the guns in their tank destroyers which I guess is one of the reasons their tanks fared so well against the allied tanks while the pure infantry support tanks would have large caliber, low-velocity guns to destroy buildings etc., like the Brummbär for example or the earlier versions of the Panzer IV. The Panther and Tiger seem to me more like intermediate versions in the sense that they could destroy tanks but you can use pretty much any cannon to shoot a hole into a building when necessary, the ones they made were just smaller. The sherman however was apparently rather useless against other tanks, at least from the front so the american forces had more of a gap between tank destroyers and tanks if I understand that correctly.

Still curious about cannon stabilization though, does anyone know about that?

[Kagemusha]

Yep, those are the ones I read a bit about on wikipedia.

The bit about the american focus on AT destroyers I asked because some wiki article said the american leaders did not want tanks to face other tanks, they wanted to use tank destroyers and that's why it took them so long to field the Pershing. I took that as implying they simply made a "wrong" decision while the british fielded the sherman firefly to counter german tanks IIRC.

Now the germans had their share of tank destroyers but I find it noteworthy that the guns in the Panther, Tiger and Tiger II were pretty much antitank guns put into tanks, just like the guns in their tank destroyers which I guess is one of the reasons their tanks fared so well against the allied tanks while the pure infantry support tanks would have large caliber, low-velocity guns to destroy buildings etc., like the Brummbär for example or the earlier versions of the Panzer IV. The Panther and Tiger seem to me more like intermediate versions in the sense that they could destroy tanks but you can use pretty much any cannon to shoot a hole into a building when necessary, the ones they made were just smaller. The sherman however was apparently rather useless against other tanks, at least from the front so the american forces had more of a gap between tank destroyers and tanks if I understand that correctly.

Still curious about cannon stabilization though, does anyone know about that?

Sherman had gyro stabilizers, but it didnt made much of a difference. Even novadays, MBT´s tend to stop when they want to take a clear shot.stabilizing betters the chance of hitting while on move, but the chance never exceeds the chance of a hit when firing while being stationary.

[Sarmatian]

If I may move a bit from tank discussions, I wanted to ask some more knowledgable people here about manpower of Germany and SU. People often emphasize Soviet huge manpower, expecially compared to the Germans.

Now, at the time of WW2, Germany had around 50 million population. Soviet Union had 120 million. If we count all satelite states of Germany (Romania, Hungary etc...) that is probably 10-20 million more. Now, before the war even started Soviets lost enormous amonts of territory, most notably Ukraine and a good deal of European Russia, which was most heavily populated territory. Furthermore, German started sieging even more big population centers like Leningrad for example.

So at the onset of the winter 1941, Germans are in front of Moscow, Leningrad is besieged, much of territory is lost. How much population was "left" in the SU? If I'm not mistaken, most of new soldiers were conscripted from behind the Urals, which wasn't your most densely populated area of the SU. I somehow think that this entire "huge manpower advantage" was a bit exagerated, and that the reason Soviets had so much more men was that they adjusted their entire country to "total war" concept from the start, while Germans haven't until some time later. Any insights?

[PanzerJaeger]

Now the germans had their share of tank destroyers but I find it noteworthy that the guns in the Panther, Tiger and Tiger II were pretty much antitank guns put into tanks, just like the guns in their tank destroyers which I guess is one of the reasons their tanks fared so well against the allied tanks while the pure infantry support tanks would have large caliber, low-velocity guns to destroy buildings etc., like the Brummbär for example or the earlier versions of the Panzer IV. The Panther and Tiger seem to me more like intermediate versions in the sense that they could destroy tanks but you can use pretty much any cannon to shoot a hole into a building when necessary, the ones they made were just smaller. The sherman however was apparently rather useless against other tanks, at least from the front so the american forces had more of a gap between tank destroyers and tanks if I understand that correctly.

Still curious about cannon stabilization though, does anyone know about that?

Well, the Tiger was originally planned as a breakthrough tank - heavy armor, heavy gun, and slower speed. As the name implies, it was meant to lead major offensives, soaking up enemy fire and eliminating whatever it encountered - infantry, guns, or tanks. By the time it was employed, however, it was mainly used to thwart the growing multitude of T-34s.

The Panther was a direct result of the T-34, and embodied the modern day main battle tank more than any other tank. It was heavily armored, heavily gunned, and pretty fast. The Panther was comfortable taking on fixed positions and tanks equally. It most clearly demonstrates the distortion between infantry support and AT AFVs that was so stark earlier in the war.

The King Tiger continued in that vein, as German armoured planning moved to the light/medium/heavy distinctions, instead of the role oriented ones. It was very similar to the Panther, only with heavier armour and a bigger gun.

Only American tanks had stabilizers during WW2. They were so effective that the British removed them and the Americans usually did not maintain them. They were removed from American tanks after the war. IIRC, the British were taught to fire on the move early in the war, but it was shown to be completely ineffective and discarded. As Kagemusha said, its still not an optimal situation today, although the Abrams, for instance, has a very good system.

[KarlXII]

I think reason is weakness of American and most of British tanks comparing to German ones. Sherman had no chance against Panther on open area. Panther had bigger range, heavier gun, better armour and was was smaller and faster.

Actually, the Sherman was smaller and faster. Which is why they traveled in "platoons" to outflank them. And the Panther wasn't used to a great extent (or I don't think so, correct me if I'm wrong)

Still waiting on your reply, btw

[Evil_Maniac From Mars]

And the Panther wasn't used to a great extent (or I don't think so, correct me if I'm wrong)

On the contrary, there were about six thousand manufactured.

[KarlXII]

On the contrary, there were about six thousand manufactured.

Really? I must be thinking of the Tiger.......

[Evil_Maniac From Mars]

Really? I must be thinking of the Tiger.......

About a thousand plus a few hundred of those, and five hundred-odd Tiger II tanks (pretty impressive for a year's production).

[rotorgun]

If I may move a bit from tank discussions, I wanted to ask some more knowledgable people here about manpower of Germany and SU. People often emphasize Soviet huge manpower, expecially compared to the Germans.

Now, at the time of WW2, Germany had around 50 million population. Soviet Union had 120 million. If we count all satelite states of Germany (Romania, Hungary etc...) that is probably 10-20 million more. Now, before the war even started Soviets lost enormous amonts of territory, most notably Ukraine and a good deal of European Russia, which was most heavily populated territory. Furthermore, German started sieging even more big population centers like Leningrad for example.

So at the onset of the winter 1941, Germans are in front of Moscow, Leningrad is besieged, much of territory is lost. How much population was "left" in the SU? If I'm not mistaken, most of new soldiers were conscripted from behind the Urals, which wasn't your most densely populated area of the SU. I somehow think that this entire "huge manpower advantage" was a bit exagerated, and that the reason Soviets had so much more men was that they adjusted their entire country to "total war" concept from the start, while Germans haven't until some time later. Any insights?

Here was an interesting link I came across last night as I was wondering about some of the casualty figures quoted in various posts. It contains some useful information to compare the relative strengths and losses estimated for many countries, even some of the more obscure ones.

http://www.worldwar-2.net/casualties...ties-index.htm

Here is what is claimed for both Germany and the Soviet Union:

Germany - World War 2 Flag Germany
Status: Independent
Type of Government: Dictatorship
Religion: Christian
Population: 73,000,000 (1938)
Germans - 70,990,000
Poles - 1,000,000
Jews - 707,000
Russians - 200,000
Danes - 30,000
Gypsies - 28,000
Wends - 20,000
Frisians - 15,000
Lithuanians - 10,000 Alignment (1939 - 1945):
Axis Partner
1st Sep 1939 - 8th May 1945 Casualties (1939 - 1945):
Soldiers (Axis) - 3,350,000 Killed
Civilians - 3,043,000 Killed
Jews - 205,500 Killed
Gypsies - 20,000 Killed

USSR - World War 2 Flag Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
Status: Independent
Type of Government: Communist
Religion: Atheist
Population: 190,000,000 (1939)
Russians - 100,000,000
Ukrainians - 15,400,000
Uzbekis - 10,000,000
Kazakhs - 5,000,000
Byelorussians - 4,400,000
Azerbaijanis - 2,500,000
Tajiks - 2,500,000
Georgians - 2,100,000
Turkmen - 2,000,000
Jews - 1,907,000
Kyrgyz - 1,500,000
Armenians - 1,300,000
Kabardins - 700,000
Ossetians - 600,000
Chechens - 350,000
Volksdeutsch - 340,000
Tatars - 300,000
Bulgars - 200,000
Greeks - 125,000
Gagaus - 100,000
Others - 38,678,000 Alignment (1939 - 1945):
Neutral
1st Sep 1939 - 22nd Jun 1941
Allied Partner
22nd Jun 1941 - 8th May 1945
Neutral
8th May 1945 - 9th Aug 1945
Allied Partner
9th Aug 1945 - 2nd Sep 1945 Casualties (1941 - 1945):
Soldiers (Allied) - 13,300,000 Killed
Soldiers (Axis) - 408,000 Killed
Civilians - 6,500,000 Killed
Jews - 1,000,000 Killed

As one can see, the Soviets outnumbered Germany by almost 3-1 in manpower. What is interesting is the disparity in casualties, with the Germans dishing out a better than 4-1 outcome in military casualties. Of course many of Germany's losses were suffered in the west, but over 75% were likely from the east front.

PS: I think that this shows that there wasn't a "huge manpower advantage". It was also the vast areas involved in the Eastern campaign and the fact that Germany was fighting in the west, and in Southern Europe and Africa as well that made it impossible for the German Army to keep up with the attrition.

[Brenus]

Had the Soviets instead produced large quantities of a Sherman copy”: Especially when the Soviets were always complaining about the weakness of the Sherman. And the fact that the Sherman was design AFTER the T34, of course…

“It never quite reached the level of German military thinking”: We spoke about that before. The Soviet succeeded to change and improve in their tactics, the Germans never. From the Counter-offensive so costly at the beginning, ten the no-surrender battle, to the “shield and sword” tactic, follow by the huge offensives of 1944, the Soviets showed a constant and stunning adaptation during all the war. And you can add the Partisan Warfare in the back of the Germans. Exploiting the blitzkrieg (attacking the weak points) like in Stalingrad, huge attrition war like in Leningrad, trapping like in Kursk, mobility and aggression in Moscow (in 1942!!!!), the Red Army showed the Germans how to dance.

“Even after Hitler's stupidity at Stalingrad and Kursk” Stalingrad, at the end and the decision not to withdraw –even it is not sure Paulus could have done it- sure. Kursk, no way. It is a German GENERALS defeat. Repeating tactic the Soviets knew and took counter measure to defend, bad planning, all they could do wrong they did. When Hitler decided that was enough, the Russian had still 2 Armies in reserve…

“Kharkov”: And? Defensive like Stalingrad…But unlike Stalingrad, no counter-offensive, withdraw to Berlin, with almost no stop. Out manoeuvred and out classed by innovative general as Koniev, Rokosovsky and Zukov, the German were first stopped, stabilised then push back… Where the Soviets adapted, the Germans were never able to find an alternative to the Blietzkrieg.

“The sheer weight of Russian manpower practically eliminated the importance of tactics and manoeuvre in the East.” That is funny. Why this sheer weight didn’t eliminated the tactic and manoeuvre at the start of the Russian Campaign? The Russian had even more “weight”…

“It should be noted, though, that the Russian military was thouroughly exhausted by the end of the war”: That is new… The proof of this can be found in what event? The Russian Soldiers sit and went on strike?, their military production stopped?

“Many people blame Italian incompetence for the Axis defeat”: And many people are wrong. The Axis defeat is due to a lack of adequate material from a prolong war of attrition.
When the Germans failed to destroy the Red Army at the Russian borders, as planned by the Blitzkrieg, when they were obliged to go deeper and deeper in USSR, finally when they were not able to impose the rules any more (5 litres of petrol for one delivered at the front), when finally the lack of strategic bombers, real tanks (the Panther was an ANSWER to the T34) to confront a menace unforeseen, as general like Von Rundstedt predicted and feared, the Germans lost the war.

Like the French in 1940, the Germans lost the 1943-45 war because they were fighting the wrong war…

The Italians (but not only) were blame by the Germans for their own mistakes. Like if all the Allies units had the same qualities and equipment…

[PanzerJaeger]

We spoke about that before. The Soviet succeeded to change and improve in their tactics, the Germans never.

Really? Is that why modern mobile warfare is based primarily on the ideas and tactics developed throughout the war by the Germans?

This ignores the enormous advancements made in command structure, mobile tactics, elastic defense, etc by the Germans. The time from when the OKW made a strategic decision to the time it was carried out was far shorter than in any other military. The Kampfgruppe concept would be a good example.

Compare Manstein's offensives around Zhitomir 1943 against far superior forces to those of Guderian during the onset of Barbarrossa. It is impossible to say that the offensive tactics used had not changed.

The Russians, on the other hand, were never able to coordinate as well as the Germans, and had far less cohesive operations. These issues meant that they very often were unable to bring their severe numerical advantages to bear. That is why they continually lost tactical battles against much smaller German forces, even later into the war.

Examine their attacks against Model's forces during 1944. With the numbers of men, tanks, artillery and airpower involved, what should have been an easy push turned into a nightmare. Or for an easier example, look at Tali-Ihantala, also in 1944. The Soviets seemingly learned nothing from their previous experiences with the Finns.

Russia's war was one of attrition and numbers. This was acknowledged at the highest levels. The Red Army was certainly a far more skilled military than it was in 1941, but I'm not sure how you can objectively claim the German military wasn't.

Kursk, no way. It is a German GENERALS defeat. Repeating tactic the Soviets knew and took counter measure to defend, bad planning, all they could do wrong they did. When Hitler decided that was enough, the Russian had still 2 Armies in reserve…

Oh boy...

Kursk was completely the fault of Hitler, and was opposed by the German commanders. Manstein wanted to completely avoid the fortifications in the salient and attack elsewhere. It is rather difficult to win a battle when the time and place of your attack are forced upon you and well known by your enemy.

And, in fact, the plan concieved by the German command was the best possible for the limits imposed on them, and was far more successful than it should have been, considering the situation. How would you have done it?

I cannot understand how you could possibly blame the defeat at Kursk on anyone other than Hitler. He ordered his commanders, against their will, to assault a far larger force behind numerous layers of fortifications in which they had months to build.

And? Defensive like Stalingrad…But unlike Stalingrad, no counter-offensive, withdraw to Berlin, with almost no stop. Out manoeuvred and out classed by innovative general as Koniev, Rokosovsky and Zukov, the German were first stopped, stabilised then push back…

What? It is still studied today as textbook example of mobile defence. Zukov, Rokosovsky, and Koniev were all competent commanders, but demonstrated nothing particularly innovative on the battlefield. With such huge numbers of men and machines, tactical prowess was unnecessary.

That is funny. Why this sheer weight didn’t eliminated the tactic and manoeuvre at the start of the Russian Campaign?

It did. That is why the Germans lost. They destroyed enormous armies and captured great swathes of land, but exhaustion of manpower and machinery took hold. All the while, the USSR was replacing its losses at a rate far greater than Germany.

As I said, the Germans could pull off great tactical victories, but for little gain.

That is new… The proof of this can be found in what event? The Russian Soldiers sit and went on strike?, their military production stopped?

Why their own military assessments my good man.

The Axis defeat is due to a lack of adequate material from a prolong war of attrition.When the Germans failed to destroy the Red Army at the Russian borders, as planned by the Blitzkrieg, when they were obliged to go deeper and deeper in USSR, finally when they were not able to impose the rules any more (5 litres of petrol for one delivered at the front), when finally the lack of strategic bombers, real tanks (the Panther was an ANSWER to the T34) to confront a menace unforeseen, as general like Von Rundstedt predicted and feared, the Germans lost the war.

I completely agree. Weren't you just earlier claiming Soviet military superiority?

Like the French in 1940, the Germans lost the 1943-45 war because they were fighting the wrong war…

I'm not sure I understand the comparison. The French lost the war because they had poorly trained soldiers led by unskilled leaders and a population with little motivation to fight for their own freedom. The Germans lost due to being completely outnumbered on all fronts.

[rotorgun]

It is true that the Red Army improved greatly after the severe defeats of June 1941 thru the early part of 1942. That they survived to remain an Army was almost unbelieveable. No other nation on earth could have absorbed such a defeat with the exception of maybe China. That the Russians came back in 1943 with much improved weapons, tactics, and generalship is proof of their ability to adapt. To imply that they were superior to the German Army as a whole is somewhat eroneous however.

Even when one considers the disaster at Stalingrad, consider the rescources it required to defeat the 6th Army; something like 5 Tank Armies where required to envelop them. It was only Hitler's determination to hold the city that prevented them from breaking out-and they could have done so if they had immediately taken action before the opportunity for manuever was lost.
.....but I digress.

On anything like equal terms, the average German Panzer or Infantry Division could dish up their Russsian equivlant on any day of the week. Even in 1945, when the Soviets had JS IIs and T34/85s by the score, a German Panzer Battalion could take on any three similar sized Regiments (and a Russian "regiment" was in actuallity only battalion sized) before breakfast, reposition, and take on another such attack in the afternoon. I read, in Kenneth Macksey's Panzer Division: the Mailed Fist, of one German Tiger Platoon destroying around 40 Russian heavy tanks in less than an hour. Of course, when you have 100 more where that came from.....well, you see the picture.

Yes the Germans made some incredible strategic blunders, and true they were capable of making tactical errors as any army is. It must be said that for a Nation of 73,000,000, taking on the allies with a combined population of 300,000,000 plus, with an army that was never larger than 12 million, they certainly gave the allies a good dance at the party.

[cegorach]

On anything like equal terms, the average German Panzer or Infantry Division could dish up their Russsian equivlant on any day of the week. Even in 1945, when the Soviets had JS IIs and T34/85s by the score, a German Panzer Battalion could take on any three similar sized Regiments (and a Russian "regiment" was in actuallity only battalion sized) before breakfast, reposition, and take on another such attack in the afternoon. I read, in Kenneth Macksey's Panzer Division: the Mailed Fist, of one German Tiger Platoon destroying around 40 Russian heavy tanks in less than an hour. Of course, when you have 100 more where that came from.....well, you see the picture.

Too simplified.

Much of the superior score comes from the fact they were usually on defence.

Personally I could find half a dozen examples where German side failed terribly and suffered higher losses.

One of more troubling failures was the German inability to eliminate Soviet bridgeheads - almost every time before the Nazi side bagun their all too eagerly expected attack to eliminate one of those the Soviets managed to prepare themselves and the Germans were achieving another one grand, spectacular nothing.

I don't really know why was that, but more than once mechanical failures eliminated up to 50 % of the forces prepared for such an attack before it even started.

Certainly to the end of the war they were able to cut off and destroy Soviet units thanks to much better coordination (at least three tank armies in 1945 alone), but nothing more than a tactical victory was achieved this way.
Soviets replaced their losses, sent reserves and Germans had hardly any time to evacuate numerous tanks damaged during the victorious fighting - that more than once turned such a success into a defeat - losses couldn't be replaced, valuable tanks couldn't be repaired because it was the Soviet army which ended as a master of the battlefield in the end.



In a way and to some degree it was like the battles between French tank units and German forces in 1940. French divisions usually were able to cause much larger losses than they suffered, but because they were defeated in the end (partly thanks to Luftwaffe) they were losing equipment they couldn't evacuate and repair while the Germans could repair enough of their armoured vehicles to continue without much delay.

IN 1944 we have a nice reversal - individual superiority in tactical scale didn't matter in the end because the Allies and the Soviets could replace their losses quickly, use superior airforce and by exhausting German resources were winning on grander scale cutting off valuable units which couldn't be prevented because the German side ran out of reserves already.


It is so amazingly similar with Luftwaffe in the eastern front.

Sure it had impressive kill rate, sure its pilots were shoting down and destroying dozens of targets in the air and on the ground, but it didn't matter because as early as mid 1943 Soviet airforce could carry on their ground support missions without much problems.
Luftwaffe destroyed more, but it was the Soviet force which did what it was supposed to do and the Germans couldn't find a way to actually stop that from happening.
Soviets simply wrote off some more pilots and planes as the price for successful air missions - all those Hartmanns could note down another victory, but it was the Soviet airforce which was doing what it was supposed to do, not them.

Obviously it didn't happen against the Allies - here the Luftwaffe was just simply, ordinarily losing with increasingly higher and higher numbers of fighters and pilots eliminated from further combat.

[PanzerJaeger]

Too simplified.

Much of the superior score comes from the fact they were usually on defence.

I pretty much agree with everything you said about attrition. However, I would argue this point.

The first years consisted of almost continual offensive activity, with the rush to Moscow in '41 and the Kaukus offensive in '42. Offensives were also conducted in '43, Kursk being the biggest but certainly not the only large one. Even in the last years, Germany continually launched offensives in the East up to Spring Awakening in 1945.

Also, a main tenet of German defensive warfare was the rapid counterattack, both in an operational and tactical sense.

[KrooK]

Rotorgun - small (but important) correction to your data.
USSR was not neutral until 22nd June of 1941. This country was into close alliance with Germany and should be rather called Axis IMO.

I agree with Jager and Cegorach. Russian army was much bigger but not better. Of course into 1944 it wasn't same army like into 1945 but it cannot be compared to any western european army. Their commanders were not as bad as into 1941, but it doesn't mean good. Look at battle of Seelow Hills and battle of Berlin. Or on Russian way to reconeissance...
On the other hand we can't claim German army undefeated and proove that they lost only due to being outnumbered. Germans did many mistakes too and blaiming only Hitler is unfair. Their soldiers were worse than Russians. I don't mean training and experience but typical skills used to survive. For example survive Russian winter....

[rotorgun]

I compliment all on the excellent points brought up. Indeed the reasons for the German defeat were more complex than merely a question of numbers. That they made more mistakes in the latter part of the war was due in a large part to the very attrition that they suffered. Replacements being of a lower quality due to decreased training time, and less experience before being sent into battle. The allies experience level was increasing exponentially as a result.

Cegorach, certainly my example was rather simplified. I shall have to take time to look for more examples to support my claim, but in a majority of tactical situations, the German army performed better than the average Soviet unit of the same size. I would say that this was until after their defeats in the Ardennes and in the East by the Steam Roller winter offensive.
Still, your points are all valid to be sure and I shant take issue with them in the whole.

I would like to address a couple of areas you discussed. First there is this statement:

I don't really know why was that, but more than once mechanical failures eliminated up to 50 % of the forces prepared for such an attack before it even started.

I saw an intersting program recently where a group recovered a German PZV Panther from a Polish River and restored it. It was one that was lost during the fighting retreat of the Germans during the dreadful Russian winter push.
They discovered that it likely was likely initially disabled as it tried to cross the river due to a transmission failure. It seems that the gears in the drive section of the transmission failed because the bolts that held them together to the drive axles sheared. The reason-sabotage . The slave laborers that were assembling these vehicles were sabotaging these bolts, as well as the gear teeth as well on many of the German tanks before they left the assembly line. This accounts for some of the many breakdowns experienced by the Germans.

This is also an good point as well:

Soviets replaced their losses, sent reserves and Germans had hardly any time to evacuate numerous tanks damaged during the victorious fighting - that more than once turned such a success into a defeat - losses couldn't be replaced, valuable tanks couldn't be repaired because it was the Soviet army which ended as a master of the battlefield in the end.

Now the shoe was on the other foot for the Germans. This is what they had been able to do to their enemies previously. It was just one more way in which the allies were able to put another nail in the coffin of the German Army.

I would still say that the Germans must be considered as the best. Had they made a few less strategic blunders, such as invading the Soviet Union until after Great Britain had been nuetralized, perhaps they may have won (Thank goodness that they didn't) Declaring war on the United States prematurley was another mistake IMO.

[Kagemusha]

Rotorgun, call me a stubborn Finn, but please define best, before calling the Germans as best.

[Flavius Clemens]

“It should be noted, though, that the Russian military was thouroughly exhausted by the end of the war”: That is new… The proof of this can be found in what event? The Russian Soldiers sit and went on strike?, their military production stopped?

I don't remember the source, but years ago I read something that suggested this was why the USSR chose to attack Japan at the end of the war rather than increasing their power in the west by invading Turkey. I'm sure this is an idea you guys can pull to pieces...

[PanzerJaeger]

Rotorgun, call me a stubborn Finn, but please define best, before calling the Germans as best.

Heres my opinion, not that you asked for it.

The German military as a whole had highly advanced leadership, doctrines, training, organization, and any other measure you want to use.

To me, what really makes them the best, though, was their ability to coordinate operations. WW2 was a learning exercise in combined arms, and the Germans excelled in that area.

All of the measures mentioned above - leadership, doctrine, training, and organization - contributed to their ability to form complex plans, carry them out efficiently, and defeat far larger forces.

Their ability, especially later in the war, to quickly pull together highly trained soldiers from whatever forces were available, transcend normal chains of command, effectively plan complex operations, and carry them out with very few organizational issues, demonstrates a level of military skill simply not duplicated in the major operations of other combatants.

The Finns showed a certain degree of proficiency in this kind of warfare as well, but their strategic and material situations limited it to some extent, and the sheer scope and complexity of the German operations eclipsed those of the Finns many times over. (When you only have a few AFVs, its hard to gauge how well you would perform in mobile armoured warfare.)

Best is, of course, subjective. So thats just my opinion.

An equally interesting match up would be "Worst Military of WW2" between the major combatants.

[Sarmatian]

Here was an interesting link I came across last night as I was wondering about some of the casualty figures quoted in various posts. It contains some useful information to compare the relative strengths and losses estimated for many countries, even some of the more obscure ones.

http://www.worldwar-2.net/casualties...ties-index.htm

Here is what is claimed for both Germany and the Soviet Union:






As one can see, the Soviets outnumbered Germany by almost 3-1 in manpower. What is interesting is the disparity in casualties, with the Germans dishing out a better than 4-1 outcome in military casualties. Of course many of Germany's losses were suffered in the west, but over 75% were likely from the east front.

PS: I think that this shows that there wasn't a "huge manpower advantage". It was also the vast areas involved in the Eastern campaign and the fact that Germany was fighting in the west, and in Southern Europe and Africa as well that made it impossible for the German Army to keep up with the attrition.

Well, it's not really 3-1. I mean it is on paper but not in practice. If we count only Hungary and Romania together that's 25 million more for the Germans. Before the real fighting even started SU lost Ukraine - that's 15-20 million less (possibly even more, IIRC a good portion of Russians lived in Ukraine). How much of the population was lost in the European Russia that was conquered before Soviets even knew what hit them?

I think in reality the difference in manpower was much smaller than 3:1, in winter 1941 I mean. At that time German pretty much had everything going for them. They practicaly reached Moscow, they cut off large population centers from the rest of SU and if I remember correctly, Germans also had higher production of coal, oil and steel than SU until 1943. It wasn't really David vs Goliath as it is often portrated to be.

[Kagemusha]

Heres my opinion, not that you asked for it.

The German military as a whole had highly advanced leadership, doctrines, training, organization, and any other measure you want to use.

To me, what really makes them the best, though, was their ability to coordinate operations. WW2 was a learning exercise in combined arms, and the Germans excelled in that area.

All of the measures mentioned above - leadership, doctrine, training, and organization - contributed to their ability to form complex plans, carry them out efficiently, and defeat far larger forces.

Their ability, especially later in the war, to quickly pull together highly trained soldiers from whatever forces were available, transcend normal chains of command, effectively plan complex operations, and carry them out with very few organizational issues, demonstrates a level of military skill simply not duplicated in the major operations of other combatants.

The Finns showed a certain degree of proficiency in this kind of warfare as well, but their strategic and material situations limited it to some extent, and the sheer scope and complexity of the German operations eclipsed those of the Finns many times over.

Best is, of course, subjective. So thats just my opinion.

An equally interesting match up would be "Worst Military of WW2" between the major combatants.

I know this could be talked to death, but because in my philosophy there hardly cant be one answer to the question in hand, i would just like to once again raise the summer 1944 up.
When you say that tactically and strategically, Finnish had some proficiency, but it could not match the germans, id like to point it to you that Finnish headquarters was able to deploy half of its army into area which consisted about 1/ 8th of the whole front it defended. In a situation where enemy had almost complete control of skies, Finnish army was engaged on all sectors, lacked motorization and supplies notoriously. In these conditions the poor Finnish military was able to concentrate its forces to a sector, meaning Karelian Isthmus and in battle ready condition, while the fighting units in Isthmus and Eastern Karelia, were fighting a delaying action at the time against enemy which had:

450 000 men
10 500 guns
800 tanks and assault guns
1600 planes

with force of:

75 000 men
289 guns
125 tanks and assault guns
248 planes (the whole Finnish airforce)

The initial forces here to put it another way:

1:6 ratio for Soviets in personnel
1:37 ratio for soviets in guns
1:6 ratio for Soviets in tanks and assault guns
1:6 ratio for soviets in planes

The initial Finnish forces were pushed back to VKT- line, from the main line, between 9.6.1944 when the fourth strategic offensive started and 20.6.1944, for less then 100 kilometers, fighting a tenacious delaying action, without even a single battalion sized Finnish formation surrendering to the enemy. The only major plunder being the loss of city of Viipuri, when Finnish forces panicked and routed from the city afraid of being enveloped by the red army. The loss of city was not much strategically, but emotionally it was huge blow to Finnish.

mappy:

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikiped...sive-lines.png

Now when the Finnish army was deployed into VKT- line, it had been reinforced so that there was about 40% of all Finnish soldiers and guns and all their tanks deployed in the Isthmus, plus German troops: Detachment Kuhlmey: 70 german planes, 303rd assault gun brigade( half strength, 33 Stug III assault guns) and 122nd infantry division (10600 men). Together In total Figuring:

268 000 men
1930 guns
143 tanks
318 planes

agaist the forementioned enemy, which had also replaced its casualties after reaching VKT-Line by sending 6 new divisions and reinforcements:

450 000 men
10 500 guns
800 tanks and assault guns
1600 planes

so now the odds were:

1:2 in men for Soviets
1: 6 in guns for the Soviets
1:6 in tanks and assault guns to soviets
1:5 in planes for the soviets

With these forces started series of Finnish decisive victories, culminating in the battles of Tali- Ihantala, which is largest battle ever fought in Scandinavia and finally Battle of Ilomantsi, where first time since 1941 two Soviet divisions reached the Finno Soviet border of 1940 and were last ones to do so also during the war, before the Moscow armistice, but shortly after that were surrounded and decimated by the Finnish task force Raappana. The last 8 major battles of continuation war ended in Finnish decisive victories, thus giving Finnish army defensive victory over the attacking Red Army, which was halted on all sectors.
So Finnish leadership was able to concentrate 193 000 men and 1641 guns to the Isthmus from other sectors inside 11 days, while enemy had complete air superiority and the means for transportation for to best say, lacking. Also the enemy was active all along the front so the forces had to be taken by thinning deployments heavily in other sectors.

I would really like for you to give me one example of an Operation where a) Germans faced such odds,b) were able to move such percent of their forces across the field of Operations under battle conditions to another sector, c) Were victorious.

Now i can accept that Finnish army lacked resources, weapons and even brute force compared to major armies, because of the size of the country and population.
But when it comes to the art of tactics,skill and strategy, or efficiency with the resources at hand, i cant accept your notion of Germany being superior, because if we want to go deeper into this we have the whole Northern front during Operation Barbarossa to talk about where Finnish and German armies were fighting alongside and comparisons of how normal Finnish infantry divisions performed compared to German Gebirgsjäger and SS formations can be easily made.

[Husar]

Well, it's not really 3-1. I mean it is on paper but not in practice. If we count only Hungary and Romania together that's 25 million more for the Germans. Before the real fighting even started SU lost Ukraine - that's 15-20 million less (possibly even more, IIRC a good portion of Russians lived in Ukraine). How much of the population was lost in the European Russia that was conquered before Soviets even knew what hit them?

I think in reality the difference in manpower was much smaller than 3:1, in winter 1941 I mean. At that time German pretty much had everything going for them. They practicaly reached Moscow, they cut off large population centers from the rest of SU and if I remember correctly, Germans also had higher production of coal, oil and steel than SU until 1943. It wasn't really David vs Goliath as it is often portrated to be.

Well, then how can it be that the german army ran out of men, killed far more russians and was still outnumbered 20:1 toward the end? Did all those germans just surrender by the millions?

[Sarmatian]

Well, then how can it be that the german army ran out of men, killed far more russians and was still outnumbered 20:1 toward the end? Did all those germans just surrender by the millions?

I was talking about situation in winter 1941. Later another front in Italy was formed which tied up some German troops. Some German troops were also lost in Africa. But to be more precise, I was asking more than saying. I'm not an expert on ww2, at least not to an extent some guys here are, like Cegorach or PanzerJaeger.

But it seems to me that in the beggining of the war, Soviets didn't have that that much going for them... Just thought it would be interesting to know just how much population was in the SU, in the part that wasn't occupied by Germany, when Soviets started their counteroffensive. I'm guessing really, since there is no way to know how much population lived in that part of SU that Germany conquered at the beggining. I'm guessing at that time probably no more than 2:1. As the war went on and Germans were losing more and more soldiers in the eastern front but also in other theaters and Soviets were liberating more and more territory it's not so difficult to come to 20:1 Soviet advantage near the end of the war...