Persians and Armenians

[artavazd]

Armenian people are a result of the unification of the Armens, and the Urartu confedaration ( Urartu is a semetic mispronounication of Ararat. The Hurrian tribes of the Urartu confedaration called themselves Biani which linguisticaly over time has become Van. one of the centers of Armenian civilization)

The Armens are the tribe who are responsible for the modern Armenian language. They were related to the Phrygians. Infact Armenian and Greek both have a Thraco-Phrygian commonality.

Now the indo-european language of the Armens, infused with the Hurrian language of Biani (Vanic Confederation, Urartu) and the Armenian language was developed. The Hurrian language is neither an indo-european nor semetic language (Ive seen some theories which say that ancient Sumerian spoke a similar language. The ancient kingdom of Mittani also were a Hurrian speaking people. Today Hurrian has been tied with the modern Caucasian languages (the Caucasus region) Infact when Armenian is spoken the Indo-european language is given a Hurrian/Caucasian spin.

The Armenians call themselves Hai which steams from two possible sources. One source is from one of the tribes of the Urartu Confederation the Haiasa. A people located in the area of Armenia that are mentioned by Hittite sources. Another source is from the Legendary Patriarch of Armenians whose name was Haik. (There have been modern research which has tied the Legondary Haik with an actoual chieftain of one of the Hurrian tribes.)

Before the Armens were incorporated into Urartu and thus creating the Armenian people, Urartu had ties with Iranian people. Infact they were allies agaisnt Assyria ( the bigest foe to Urartu) Many administrative characteristics of of Urartu were later on seen in Achamenid Persia.

Now the Armenian people are the coming togather of the Hurrian/Caucasian Urartu confederation, and the Indo-European Armens. The Armenians are mostly Caucasian, but as Dna testings have shown, the elements of the Armens are also profound in the Armenian Dna here is a study that I would like to share with you guys:

The most frequent haplotype in a sample of Armenians was seen against the background of HG1 Y chromosomes. It occurred in all Armenian groups, at frequencies ~5-14%. According to YHRD, the same haplotype defined over more loci (14 13 29 24 11 13 12 11,14) was also the most frequent one, occurring in 3% of Armenians (*). According to Whit Athey's haplogroup predictor, this is suggestive of haplogroup R1b. A search for the haplotype in YHRD produced the following result:


The geographical distribution of this haplotype is such that it is shared by Armenians and two other populations from the Caucasus. Moreover, it is lacking in most other populations from the Caucasus, as well as in the other populations from further east. On the other hand, it is more frequently found in Europe, where as we know, haplogroup R1b tends to have higher frequencies as well.
The Armenian modal haplotype is also the modal R1b3 haplotype observed by Cinnioglu in Anatolia. According to him, apparently it entered Anatolia from Europe in Paleolithic times, and diffused again from Anatolia in the Late Upper Paleolithic.


An alternative explanation may be that the particular haplotype may have been associated with the movement of the Phrygians into Asia Minor. The Phrygians were an Indo-European people of the Balkans who settled in Asia Minor, and the Armenians were reputed to be descended from them. It would be interesting to thoroughly study the populations of modern Thrace, Anatolia, and Armenia, and to investigate whether a subgroup of R1b3 chromosomes linked by the Armenian modal haplotype may represent the signature of a back-migration into Asia of Balkan Indo-European peoples.

[Havok.]

So, basicly, Armenians are Armenians and Persians are Persians, different peoples, but very similar aye?

[Ibrahim]

well, they both speak an indo european language, no? they dress similarly, went through many of the same cultural changes, so they are indeed similar.

[artavazd]

So, basicly, Armenians are Armenians and Persians are Persians, different peoples, but very similar aye?

Yes. one can say the same thing about Greeks and Armenians as well. Now if we are talking about EB's timeframe, than Yes Armenians and Iranians are more similar than Greeks and Armenians. However there have been changes since that time frame. Most notibly starting from the 7th century ad with the arab invasion of Iran. The Muslims considered Christians "people of the book" so therefore were more harsh to pagan cultures. Well the Iranians were Zoroastrian, therefore "not a people of the book" for the invading Arabs. Alot of Iranian culture was destroyed during that time not to mention wholescale slaughter of Iranians who refused Islam.

Now in modern times there are Iranians who even in appearance look very similar to Armenians and there are Iranians who have more Arabic features. In my opinion and maybe I am wrong, I think invading arabs, and later on turks settled in Iran and became "Iranianized"

[Reno Melitensis]

Very interesting history lesson But I would like to ask you a question. how did the Arabs of Mecca and Medina overthrow such a powerful empire like the Sassanids in such a short time?

cheers.

[The Persian Cataphract]

Another simple question which demands a very complicated answer if accuracy is desired. I neither have time nor the desire to go though all of it again. However, if you do want to know what I think about the whole event, check the following debate:

http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=143229

The following entries should neatly encapsulate my assessment of the ordeal, and its macro-historical importance:

http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showp...6&postcount=20
http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showp...6&postcount=25
http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showp...6&postcount=27
http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showp...3&postcount=38

There is more over at Wikipedia discussion page:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Sa...e#Civilization

It's no more than heated words. Needless to say, the invasion lead to an enormous cultural loss. Books were burned, and if no fire could be made they would be cast into water for spoilage. The Pahlavîg script and the Middle-Persian language was outlawed, a decree which lasted for more than two centuries. Zoroastrian temple lords, entire contingents of scribes, and sages were murdered, leading to not only loss of scripture, but also a great deal of oral traditions and religious codes. Two very well-attested events, the sack of Ctesiphon by Sa'ad Ibn Abi-Vaghas and the tyranny of Qutaibah-Ibn Muslim, and his associate, Hajjaj Ibn-Yussuf in Chorasmia paints for us a spectrum of destruction that spanned within the entire area (Sa'ad had followed the "Righteous Caliph" Umar Ibn Al-Khattab's decree). Monuments, and precious regalia were destroyed or desecrated. The banner of Kâvêh "The Great Blacksmith", was captured and sold as if it was a cheap trinket, the great carpet of Bahârîstân was torn to pieces and divided between the soldiers as booty of war, temples were destroyed, and the invaders had almost come close to destroying Pasargadae, had not crafty locals persuaded them that the monuments were erected by Solomon, a trick which quickly spread word as far as Azerbaijan, where the same trick was used to protect Shîz, nowadays known as Takht-î Sôleymân (Lit. "Solomon's Throne") and spare it from ruin.

For a more complete outlook of the entire event, you may refer to Zarrinqub's acclaimed "Two Centuries of Silence". It is a corner-stone in Iranology, and getting a version (Non-edited) published before the Islamic Revolution, a rare edition, would be the best bet.

[Jolt]

Loads of linkies with interesting history.

I've read throughly for the last day what you wrote on the matters of Islam (and other subjects related to the discussions of Persia), and while you present many sources (Both primary and secondary), your arguments tend to turn too much against ad hominem, rather than sticking with the facts, which in the end results in a pointless insult hurling discussion.

Anyways, those conversations eventually led to me reading the "Caesar invading Parthia et al." Thread. While I'm really going off-topic for turning this into something about the Romans (Seeing as that Thread in twcenter has 5 months since the last post), while I was thinking about such a possibility (And I like to think about those "What if" scenarios), I recalled the primary difference between Gaul which was conquered in a decade and Parthia was that the latter was a unified state ad hoc, while Gaul was a land fragmented by tribes, this fact being vital, in Caesar "Divide and Conquer" maxim in Gaul, by gettings Gallic tribes against Gallic tribes (Some supporting him, while others opposing him), and Parthia was less prone to such events, due to it's centralized government. But as I read further the discussion, I recalled that Parthia was actually a feudal system, in which nobles had, supposedly great autonomy (And here, I'm being analogous with the Medieval Feudal system, as I'm not familiar with the specifics and unique aspects of the Parthian one.)

What I wonder (basically for TPC to answer, since he is the primary Iranian source on this matter), is that, imagining that Caesar would be able to score some early victories in Mesopotamia do you think he would have been able to explore the intricacies of the Parthian feudal system to sow dissention among Parthian nobles, and thus gain allies in the region (Who would be vital in case he would ever wish to succeed). From what I read, Caesar was apparently about to bash into a Parthian golden age, but still; wasn't there any known hostility inside the noble clans in Parthia by then? Or were the clans all loyal to the King by this period?

[The Persian Cataphract]

It's interesting that you mention the second "Golden Age" of the Arsacid dynasty, because prior to the succession of King of Kings Orodes II, the empire suffered from its first civil war. It had started when Mithradates II The Great had died (Thus ending the first "Golden Age" as scholars call it), and only truly ended when Orodes' general Surena had successfully besieged Babylon (Later Vologasia) and subsequently Seleucia where he had trapped the claimant, the brother of his liege, Mithradates III. Both Orodes and Mithradates had caused some tremendous ruckus within the royal clan after they had conspired to murder their father, Phraates III "The God" (Who had managed to gain some stability after the weak line of succession with Gotarzes I and the elderly Sanatruces). It was after the death of Mithradates II, where anxiety between the clans and their rights to elect the candidate amongst the royals as well as the confidence of rival claimants rising against a dying High King, that lead to the turmoil of in-fighting. The stakes were high. During the reign of "God Manifest", the Parthians had reached beyond the Oxus, Kura, Indus and the Euphrates, an empire of the "four corners", perhaps the largest empire of its time, completely inherited of the previous Seleucid hegemony. The victor who would emerge from this crisis was to achieve the bulk of it. After almost fourty years, the victor turned out to be Orodes II.

The following years, between 51 BCE and 47 CE saw a highly exciting age of conquest for this newly projected Iranian empire. From 51-38 BCE the Arsacids expanded to the west, where they had overrun most of the Levant and Asia Minor, as far as Lydia and Ionia, and when the Arsacids were halted in 38 BCE at Cyrrhestica by Publius Ventidius Bassus, we see the Sûrên looking towards the East into India, leading to the Gondopharid conquests that would form the independent, but affiliated Indo-Parthian kingdom, known as the "satraps of India" by contemporary Greek sources. If we picture for ourselves this sort of a spark amongst the Parthians, that spanned for almost a century, and with the anti-Roman sentiment across the entire Near East, which Pompey and Lucullus had helped to create, before Crassus' disastrous expedition, I cannot see how Julius Caesar's usual craftiness could be applied to cause rift or dissent. Crassus had made use of the same model of warfare and those "allies", whether they were Syrians, Nabataean Arabs or the formerly Arsaicd vassals of Osrhôëne and Côrduëne, betrayed him, probably a part of a ploy of Orodes' general strategy. The bottom line was that the Romans were by this time equated by the epithet of "transgressors of covenants", a fact which Surena mentioned in his dialogue with Crassus. Even during later times, the Parthians had through the milder policies of establishing client contracts, garnered more trust amongst the natives of Near East, than the intent Romanization of the western rival.

Of course, there was one age of exceptions; After Pacorus had been killed at Cyrrhestica, Orodes fell into depression, which allowed his extremely crafty, but insane elder son, allegedly a bastard son (Pacorus, if I recall correctly was born of an Arsacid princess, and was even allowed the status of co-ruler, a great testament of ability and character), to murder his own father and subsequently commit fratricide upon no less than thirty brothers. If I may draw a broader character analysis, he must have been both bitter and ambitious, probably spiteful of his father, and especially of his half-brother who had enjoyed immensely from his career as a husband to an Artaxiad princess and been acclaimed as "Conqueror of the Romans". Phraates IV. He had caused a lethal rift into the very own royal clan, and made for himself a reputation as paranoid, as he sent even his sons to attend bonds of hostage, especially as far away as Rome. If Caesar had to pick his moment to cause even more dissent within the Parthian empire, this would have been the golden opportunity. However, Caesar was dead, and instead Marcus Antonius had initiated a splendid campaign, which resulted in absolute and utter catastrophe, which ironically portrayed an almost sadistic brilliance to Phraates IV (I don't know if you can feel it, but I have to say that if there ever was a genuinely evil and brilliant Parthian King of Kings, Phraates IV with his bizarre episodes and later controversial marriage with the Italian slave girl Musa and whatnot).

If we hypothetically surmise that Caesar could have been alive and well into preparation of his invasion, this could be either a success or a total flop. The reasons why it could have been a success is because even as far as into the Iranian heart-lands as Atropatene, the king Artavasdes was ready to sign a treaty with Marcus Antonius, and later even fled to Octavian for asylum (Allegedly living the rest of his days in Rome), because of his distrust of Phraates IV. However, we all know how Marcus' invasion ended, and on boot, in that allegedly "advantageous" route which Crassus' originally had been advised to take. I am very sceptical to say the least. In fact, the later success of Trajan and Septimius Severus would rather rely on demilitarizing the frontiers, improving the logistics and striking when the Parthians were occupied with something else. These operations were all very different from Ventidius Bassus' counter-attack. Bassus had won a decisive victory at Cyrrhestica; Neither Trajan nor Septimius Severus met such organized resistance. Instead, it would come later in the last punch that the Parthians delivered in retaliation of Roman incursions during the reign of Caracalla, at Nisibis 217 CE. This is how Rawlinson recounts the event:

Caracallus appears to have passed the winter at Edessa, amusing himself with hunting and charioteering after the fatigues of his campaign. In the spring he threatened another advance into Parthian territory, and threw the Medes and Parthians into great alarm. He had not, however, the opportunity of renewing his attack. On April 8, A.D. 217, having quitted Edessa with a small retinue for the purpose of visiting a famous temple of the Moon-God near Carrhaa, he was surprised and murdered on the way by Julius Martialis, one of his guards. His successor, Macrinus, though a Praetorian prefect, was no soldier, and would willingly have retired at once from the war. But the passions of the Parthians had been roused. Artahanus possessed the energy and spirit which most of the recent monarchs had lacked; and though defeated when taken at disadvantage, and unable for some months to obtain any revenge, had employed the winter in the collection of a vast army, and was determined to exact a heavy retribution for the treacherous massacre of Ctesiphon and the wanton impiety of Arbela. He had already taken the field and conducted his troops to the neighborhood of the Roman frontier when Caracallus lost his life. Macrinus was scarcely acknowledged emperor when he found that the Parthians were close at hand, that the frontier was crossed, and that unless a treaty could be concluded he must risk a battle.

Under these circumstances the unwarlike emperor hurriedly, sent ambassadors to the Parthian camp, with an offer to restore all the prisoners made in the late campaign as the price of peace. Artabanus unhesitatingly rejected the overture, but at the same time informed his adversary of the terms on which he was willing to treat. Macrinus, he said, must not only restore the prisoners, but must also consent to rebuild all the towns and castles which Caracallus had laid in ruins, must make compensation for the injury done to the tombs of the kings, and further must cede Mesopotamia to the Parthians. It was impossible for a Roman Emperor to consent to such demands without first trying the fortune of war, and Macrinus accordingly made up his mind to fight a battle. The Parthian prince had by this time advanced as far as Nisibis, and it was in the neighborhood of that city that the great struggle took place.

The battle of Nisibis, which terminated the long contest between Rome and Parthia, was the fiercest and best-contested which was ever fought between the rival powers. It lasted for the space of three days. The army of Artabanus was numerous and well-appointed: like almost every Parthian force, it was strong in cavalry and archers; and it had moreover a novel addition of considerable importance, consisting of a corps of picked soldiers, clad in complete armor, and carrying long spears or lances, who were mounted on camels. The Roman legionaries were supported by numerous light-armed troops, and a powerful body of Mauritanian cavalry. According to Dio, the first engagement was brought on accidentally by a contest which arose among the soldiers for the possession of a watering-place. Herodian tells us that it commenced with a fierce assault of the Parthian cavalry, who charged the Romans with loud shouts, and poured into their ranks flight after flight of arrows. A long struggle followed. The Romans suffered greatly from the bows of the horse-archers, and from the lances of the corps mounted on camels; and though, when they could reach their enemy, they had always the superiority in close combat, yet after a while their losses from the cavalry and camels forced them to retreat. As they retired they strewed the ground with spiked balls and other contrivances for injuring the feet of animals; and this stratagem was so far successful that the pursuers soon found themselves in difficulties, and the armies respectively retired, without any decisive result, to their camps.

The next day there was again a combat from morning to night, of which we have no description, but which equally terminated without any clear advantage to either side. The fight was then renewed for the third time on the third day, with the difference that the Parthians now directed all their efforts towards surrounding the enemy, and thus capturing their entire force. As they greatly outnumbered the Romans, these last found themselves compelled to extend their line unduly, in order to meet the Parthian tactics; and the weakness of the extended line seems to have given the Parthians an opportunity of throwing it into confusion, and thus causing the Roman defeat. Macrinus took to flight among the first; and his hasty retreat discouraged his troops, who soon afterwards acknowledged themselves beaten, and retired within the lines of their camp. Both armies had suffered severely. Herodian describes the heaps of dead as piled to such a height that the manoeuvres of the troops were impeded by them, and at last the two contending hosts could scarcely see one another! Both armies, therefore, desired peace. The soldiers of Macrinus, who had never had much confidence in their leader, were demoralized by ill success, and showed themselves inclined to throw off the restraints of discipline. Those of Artabanus, a militia rather than a standing force, were unaccustomed to sustained efforts; and having been now for some months in the field, had grown weary, and wished to return home. Macrinus under these circumstances re-opened negotiations with his adversary. He was prepared to concede something more than he had proposed originally, and he had reason to believe that the Parthian monarch, having found the Roman resistance so stubborn, would be content to insist on less. The event justified his expectations. Artabanus relinquished his demand for the cession of Mesopotamia, and accepted a pecuniary compensation for his wrongs. Besides restoring the captives and the booty carried off by Caracallus in his raid, Macrinus had to pay a sum exceeding a million and a half of our money. Rome thus concluded her transactions with Parthia, after nearly three centuries of struggle, by ignominiously purchasing a peace.

From: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/16166...h.htm#2HCH0021

The recent development, in my opinion one sprung out of complete denial, declares the battle a tactical draw, forgetting that the battle went for three days, ending up in Parthian victory by the end of the day. You may want to read the primary sources here:

http://www.livius.org/he-hg/herodian/hre410.html
http://www.livius.org/he-hg/herodian/hre411.html
http://www.livius.org/he-hg/herodian/hre412.html
http://www.livius.org/he-hg/herodian/hre413.html
http://www.livius.org/he-hg/herodian/hre414.html
http://www.livius.org/he-hg/herodian/hre415.html

Here's for instance a passage of interest:

On the first and second days the two armies fought from morning until evening, and when night put an end to the fighting, each side withdrew to its own camp, claiming the victory. On the third day they came again to the same field to do battle; then the barbarians, who were far superior in numbers, tried to surround and trap the Romans. The Romans, however, no longer arranged their divisions to obtain depth; instead, they broadened their front and blocked every attempt at encirclement.

So great was the number of slaughtered men and animals that the entire plain was covered with the dead; bodies were piled up in huge mounds, and the dromedaries especially fell in heaps. As a result, the soldiers were hampered in their attacks; they could not see each other for the high and impassable wall of bodies between them. Prevented by this barrier from making contact, each side withdrew to its own camp.

Macrinus knew that Artabanus was making so strong a stand and battling so fiercely only because he thought that he was fighting Caracalla; the barbarian always tires of battle quickly and loses heart unless he is immediately victorious.

But on this occasion the Parthians resolutely stood their ground and renewed the struggle after they had carried off their dead and buried them, for they were unaware that the cause of their hatred was dead. Macrinus therefore sent an embassy to the Parthian king with a letter telling him that the emperor who had wronged him by breaking his treaties and violating his oaths was dead and had paid a richly deserved penalty for his crimes. Now the Romans, to whom the empire really belonged, had entrusted to Macrinus the management of their realm.

During the reign of Artabanus IV, the Arsacid house was on its last legs. It leads me to not only believe that Trajan's conquests or indeed that of Sepitimius Severus were merely successful because of Parthian pre-occupation elsewhere. It also gives a much more certain picture of what Parthian priorities truly were. To them, the nomads, the Indo-Scythians and the Kushans were considered to be a much greater threat than the usual squabbling over Armenia or the western client states. Counter-factual history in all honour, but the postulate of Julius Caesar gaining anything more than a few fleeting success is to abuse the concept without respect to the natural progression of history.

[artavazd]

Very interesting history lesson But I would like to ask you a question. how did the Arabs of Mecca and Medina overthrow such a powerful empire like the Sassanids in such a short time?
cheers.

A very simplified explanation would be, 1. the Sassanids were war weary from the constant fighting with the Byzantin Empire. 2. religouse fervor of the arabs. 3. The heavy Cataphracts of the Sassanids were not able to fight effectivly against the fast light cavalry of the arabs

[The General]

Very interesting history lesson But I would like to ask you a question. how did the Arabs of Mecca and Medina overthrow such a powerful empire like the Sassanids in such a short time?

cheers.

War exhaustion from the Byzantine-Sassanid Wars, in particular the last (and most dramatic) one.