By the spring of 1937 the intervention of the USSR and of
the Comintern as such was having profound effects not only upon
the conduct of the war but on the Republican regime. On the
military level, the Comintern organized through national
communist parties the famous International Brigades, which
eventually numbered some 35,000 men, including future leaders of
East and West European communist parties; these "Spaniards" (for
example, Laszlo Rajk of Hungary) were later systematically
purged during the Stalinist show trials of the late 1940s in the
East European countries.
On the ideological level this intervention was represented
by the appointment of political commissars throughout the
Republican (or "Loyalist") forces, by the export to Spain of
Soviet secret police activities and personnel, and by attacks on
Trotskyites and other non-Stalinist revolutionary forces. This
last policy culminated in May 1937, when the Communists and the
Catalan government (clearly under Soviet pressure) first
provoked the CNT Anarchists and the anti-Stalinist militants of
the POUM to armed resistance and then used the excuse to outlaw
and crush them. The leader of the POUM, the former communist
Andres Nin, disappeared, and most historians accept that he was
killed by NKVD agents. Questioned about this case in 1983 by
the exiled Romanian scholar Lilly Marcou, Carrillo said that he
did not know who had assassinated Nin, though he had tried to
find out. One could, he said, advance the hypothesis, no more
than that, that "it was the Soviets present in Spain who decided
on and organized the death of Nin."
The "May Days" in Barcelona in 1937 brought a turning point
in other ways. The left-Socialist Prime Minister, Largo
Caballero, who opposed the action against the poumistas, had
to resign and was replaced by the right-socialist Juan Negrin,
who proved a more accommodating partner for the PCE (and the
Kremlin). This is linked with the fact that the Kremlin's
policies on the civil war were governed by Soviet state
interests and had little to do with support for the cause of
revolution. Similarly, the PCE's domestic policies during the
war were notably moderate compared with those of the
anarcho-syndicalists, the POUM, and the PSOE: the objective was
to win the war, not to bring about radical reforms, let alone
social revolution. At the same time, the PCE, through its
organizational strength and the zeal of its members, was a
leading force in the Republican war effort, even after Stalin
ordered the withdraw of the International Brigades and ended
Soviet arms shipments in November 1938. This dilemma was
expressed by Fernando Claudin, a member of the PCE Executive
Committee until he was expelled in the early 1960s for
expounding prematurely "Eurocommunist" ideas (he now heads a
research center for the PSOE). In his critique of the history
of the world communist movement he wrote:
All the sacrifice and heroism of three years went down with
a policy that, from the first day of the civil war, had
turned its back on the essential demands of Spanish
revolutionary reality in order to adapt itself to the
international strategy of Stalin. . . .
Stalin helped the Spanish Republic in order that it might
prolong its existence and arrive at a compromise solution
acceptable to the "Western democracies," within the
framework of a system of anti-Hitler alliances, and not
that it might win.[4]
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