Battle of Zama

[gamegeek2]

The machinations of the Antibarcid party kept the HaParasim HaQdoshim (Sacred Band Cavalry) out of the battle. The Romans really won because their cavalry defeated Hannibal's, and if the Sacred Band were present, that probably wouldn't have happened.

[chenkai11]

Thanks for the info, I didn't know the sacred band was not allowed to fight due to politics. Poor Carthaginians, knowing the enemy is at the gate, and some A hole still play politics.

I trying to understand the tactics and stradegy of Hannibal during that battle.

First, the second line of carthaginian citizens didn't support the first line mercenaries, causing the first line to rout (although it's a even fight between mercenaries and hastati) and ended some killing each other between the carthaginians and mercenaries. While the Hastati were supported by the principes. Did not Hannibal order the second line to support the mercenaries?

By the look of Hannibal's formation, he seems to reserve his veterans to the final moment. So he trust his mercenaries and green soldiers to match Roman legions?

By the description of the battle, Hannibal doesn't seems like Hannibal in battle of cannae and other famous victory he gained over the Romans. I mean, I don't see any special tactics used.

The use of elephants is a waste, and he expected that his elephants alone could somehow kill numbers of his enemies? Unlike what Pyhrros did to the Romans.

And Hannibal know he lost his cavalry to the enemies, did he not anticipated it might happened to him what he did on Cannae?

May be he is too convident winning over the Romans that cause some misjudgement? He gained many victories only to threaten Rome, but lost only one battle which lead to the fall of Carthage.

[kekailoa]

What was the Gallic presence in the battle? I read earlier in the thread that the (unsupported by the African militia) Gallic mercenaries and allies took the front line and fled, but also stayed to fight on until the end.

Can anyone enlighten me on this?

[Cimon]

What was the Gallic presence in the battle? I read earlier in the thread that the (unsupported by the African militia) Gallic mercenaries and allies took the front line and fled, but also stayed to fight on until the end.

Can anyone enlighten me on this?

Hmm...you're right that I said both of those. I think I may have misremembered. I am thinking it wasn't the Gallic fighters at the end, but rather some of the Bruttians who had betrayed Rome that fought to the end. The Bruttians did, after all, form a large part of the third line (the veterans). I was typing that all from memory, so I will have to check to verify at home when I have a chance.

By the look of Hannibal's formation, he seems to reserve his veterans to the final moment. So he trust his mercenaries and green soldiers to match Roman legions?.

It's not so much a matter of "trust" as it is a "has to." It's not like he can just go find more veterans to put in the first, second, and third line. Rather, he has green troops and he has veterans. He can put the green troops in front and the veterans behind, or he can reverse that. If he puts the veterans in front and the green troops behind, then what happens when the veterans break? If you are an inexperienced soldier in the second and third line, and you see the best, most experienced soliders on your side in the front line streaming back from the enemy, what are you going to do? Probably run without even engaging. Putting the veterans in the third line avoids this problem by providing a rallying point and a breakfront against a mass rout, as well as a late punch when the Romans are (hopefully) worn down.

By the description of the battle, Hannibal doesn't seems like Hannibal in battle of cannae and other famous victory he gained over the Romans. I mean, I don't see any special tactics used.

Well, it depends on how you look at it. Merely using three lines is a "special tactic" compared to a normal Carthaginian deployment. Hannibal is, again, doing something different than he has done before, trying to keep Scipio guessing while also deploying in what Hannibal considers the best possible way to maximize his chances of victory. If you mean something like a double envelopment at Cannae, well, you need more veteran troops for complicated maneuvers like that.

The use of elephants is a waste, and he expected that his elephants alone could somehow kill numbers of his enemies? Unlike what Pyhrros did to the Romans.

In ancient battle, elephants are not really used to "kill." I mean, yes, they will kill some soldiers, and that is a nice little bonus to their generals, but elephants were primarily used two ways:

1. As a cavalry screen, preventing the enemy's cavalry from going where it wants since horses are scared of elephants. (For an example of this, see the Battle of Ipsus)
2. As a front line hammer used right before the infantry engages in order to a) cause fright and b) disrupt an enemy's formation. When an elephant charges through a block of men, it creates a gap that one's own troops can then exploit.

The second way is how Hannibal intended to use them at Zama. That's why Scipio's deployment was especially useful. By breaking his troops up into smaller units with gaps between them, there's no formation for the elephants to run through and disrupt. After the elephant charge, Scipio reorganized the troops in the more standard Roman manner with larger maniples. It's not so much that Hannibal "wasted" elephants, as that Scipio countered especially well.

And Hannibal know he lost his cavalry to the enemies, did he not anticipated it might happened to him what he did on Cannae?

Well, this gets us back to the driven off versus feigned retreat debate. As I mentioned above, I believe it to that they were driven off, but I think there is room for the argument on the other side. Still, regardless of which it was, I am sure Hannibal definitely did know what could happen. However, and this is the key point here, what is he supposed to do? Disengage? Not a very likely prospect. Keep some troops back in case they return? Similarly unlikely; he needs everyone he can get to fight the Roman infantry. As it was, it is only the timely return of the Roman cavalry that definitively swings the battle. Who's to say what would happen if it had taken another hour or two for them to come back? Maybe by that point, the Romans are running, and the cavalry comes back to find itself all alone. It's impossible to prove a counterfactual, but I don't think it's so crazy to think this is a possible scenario.

May be he is too convident winning over the Romans that cause some misjudgement? He gained many victories only to threaten Rome, but lost only one battle which lead to the fall of Carthage.

I personally don't think he misjudged; his tactics are justifiable. It's impossible to know if other tactics would have worked better, but I doubt it. Hannibal is one of the greatest generals of the ancient world, and while that doesn't mean he is infallible (he did, after all, lose Zama), I suspect he considered his options and went with what he determined to be the best plan. The problem is that, by that point, he is fighting a lose cause. Whether he loses Zama, or the hyptothetical battles of Zama II or Zama III, eventually, it's over. The fact that he "gained many victories..., but lost only one battle..." and ended up losing the war is what makes him a tragic figure.

[Ibrahim]

1. As a cavalry screen, preventing the enemy's cavalry from going where it wants since horses are scared of elephants. (For an example of this, see the Battle of Ipsus)
2. As a front line hammer used right before the infantry engages in order to a) cause fright and b) disrupt an enemy's formation. When an elephant charges through a block of men, it creates a gap that one's own troops can then exploit.

The second way is how Hannibal intended to use them at Zama. That's why Scipio's deployment was especially useful. By breaking his troops up into smaller units with gaps between them, there's no formation for the elephants to run through and disrupt. After the elephant charge, Scipio reorganized the troops in the more standard Roman manner with larger maniples. It's not so much that Hannibal "wasted" elephants, as that Scipio countered especially well.

actually, that was only part of the story. remember, the elephants were poorly trained and inexperianced. It's also an observed fact that elephants do not charge ANY line of troops directly (that's why they were often rendered drunk-so they won't know better). and even if drunk, the elephant will still prefer the easier route, so they'll just travel through the gaps. hence why it was brilliant. the guy controlled not just Hannibal and his men's minds, but even the elephants

at least, so I've observedf about elephants, so I might be off.

[CBR]

By the description of the battle, Hannibal doesn't seems like Hannibal in battle of cannae and other famous victory he gained over the Romans. I mean, I don't see any special tactics used.

Either Hannibal had lost his touch or the sources are just not very clear about his intentions. Afterall we only have Roman sources: Polybius had Masinissa as his main source and he commanded the cavalry and spent most of the time in pursuit so how much did he really see to have a clear idea of what Hannibal did.

Steven James has written a good hypothesis which can be found here http://www.fenrir.dk/history/index.p...ttle_Revisited

His conclusion is that Hannibal was still his good old self and had planned for a double envelopment but Scipio's generalship, the quality of the Roman veterans and a bit of bad luck ruined the plan.


CBR

[chenkai11]

Thanks guys, for your info and opinions. I am enlighten now. And indeed, Hannibal was so great but after Zama, it all went tragic for him.

[abou]

If it was mentioned before, then I missed it, but I think it is important to remember that Scipio didn't play the game the way previous Roman commanders did.

Let's face it, Roman commanders generally lack elegance and tend toward brute force. Polybios even specifically commented on it in his writings as bia. Seriously, just look at the fighting in Sicily during the 1st Punic War. Had the Romans access to a lot of siege engines they would have probably been shooting men from them before they would have stones. Part of Hannibal's successes in Italy was due to the average Roman commander's overzealous nature, which should be markedly contrasted with Cunctator's tactics, who received a lot of criticism until he proved himself correct.

That Hannibal was able to goad and then entrap so many is the real part of his military genius and winning strategy: fighter smarter, not harder. Really, was the battle plan at Cannae any different from general Hellenistic strategy? Granted, his crescent formation was a novel approach, but the hammer and anvil was at the core. Scipio, however, changed that at Zama by not rushing headlong into the fight. Combined with the recently acquired Numidian cavalry, it managed to put Africanus on top in a battle that, given past experiences, should have been a Carthaginian victory.

[Cimon]

What was the Gallic presence in the battle? I read earlier in the thread that the (unsupported by the African militia) Gallic mercenaries and allies took the front line and fled, but also stayed to fight on until the end.

Can anyone enlighten me on this?

Well, I went and did a quick look through Goldsworthy, but it isn't in there. I thought that was where I had read it, but apparently it was somewhere else, and Goldsworthy is the only resource on the subject I have with me at the moment.. Still, the more I think about it, the more I think it was the Bruttians, rather than the Gauls, that fought to the end. If anyone can jump in and verify that, I'd appreciate it.

If it was mentioned before, then I missed it, but I think it is important to remember that Scipio didn't play the game the way previous Roman commanders did.

Let's face it, Roman commanders generally lack elegance and tend toward brute force. Polybios even specifically commented on it in his writings as bia. Seriously, just look at the fighting in Sicily during the 1st Punic War. Had the Romans access to a lot of siege engines they would have probably been shooting men from them before they would have stones. Part of Hannibal's successes in Italy was due to the average Roman commander's overzealous nature, which should be markedly contrasted with Cunctator's tactics, who received a lot of criticism until he proved himself correct.

I don't think it was mentioned before in such specificity, abou, but I agree here. Scipio was an extremely talented commander, and he commanded one of the most disciplined forces ever produced by the Roman military machine up to that time. As an example of both Scipio's judgment vis-a-vis normal Roman commanders, and his troops' discipline, look no further than his command to stop and reform the infantry after breaking Hannibal's first two lines.

Either Hannibal had lost his touch or the sources are just not very clear about his intentions. Afterall we only have Roman sources: Polybius had Masinissa as his main source and he commanded the cavalry and spent most of the time in pursuit so how much did he really see to have a clear idea of what Hannibal did.

Steven James has written a good hypothesis which can be found here http://www.fenrir.dk/history/index.p...ttle_Revisited

His conclusion is that Hannibal was still his good old self and had planned for a double envelopment but Scipio's generalship, the quality of the Roman veterans and a bit of bad luck ruined the plan.

I think James's hypothesis about a double envelopment is an interesting one, but I'm not convinced of its accuracy. First, Scipio had studied Hannibal's tactics and, indeed, been present at several of the battles. He had even rallied roughly 4000 of the Romans that escaped from the Cannae massacre, and surely heard of Hannibal's tactics firsthand. Hannibal must have known that Scipio couldn't be fooled by the same trick twice; even though Scipio wasn't the commander or, necessarily, even present on the battlefield, I think my point still stands. Second, the Roman troops are the more disciplined side. Much of Hannibal's army is not going to be able to perform such complicated maneuvers as suggested by James. Indeed, his army is really composed of three separate armies: his veterans in the third line, Carthaginian/Libyan militia in the second line which had originally been raised for the defense of Africa, and Gauls and mercenaries in the first line left over from Mago's Italian army. There was no wholly integrated command structure, and the troops would have had difficulty operating in unison. It seems like an awfully risky proposition to try such a complicated tactic as a double envelopment with this force. Third, Hannibal has the larger infantry contingent. If he wants to try a double envelopment, then he only needs to extend his frontage from the get-go or, in the alternative, right after an initial clash.

We'll never know for sure, but it seems to me that there are more factors weighing against a double envelopment than for it. Just my opinion.

[CBR]

Hannibal must have known that Scipio couldn't be fooled by the same trick twice..

Which is also why Hannibal tried something extra in the hope of fooling Scipio. In the end he was not successful but if one wants a big victory against a good general one needs to take risks and come up with something special. In this case it was pulling back his second line and have his veterans in two lines.

Much of Hannibal's army is not going to be able to perform such complicated maneuvers as suggested by James.

The only real complex maneuver would be done by his fourth line while covered by his third line. Both of them were veterans. Having his second line pull back a bit after the first line engaged is IMO not that complex as it would be prearranged.

Third, Hannibal has the larger infantry contingent. If he wants to try a double envelopment, then he only needs to extend his frontage from the get-go or, in the alternative, right after an initial clash.

He would lose any surprise if he deployed them too soon. He needed Scipio to release both his Hastati and Principes before trying to envelop them. He most likely concluded (and rightly so) that he could only count on his veterans and the rest could only be used to tire and disorder Scipios main infantry. In the end he was forced to extend the line as his other troops had been beaten too easily and Scipio had not been fooled.

And I think the line extension makes a lot more sense than having routed men from the first and second line rally and suddenly put up a good fight. That and the possible numbers of soldiers and veterans especially, makes for a good case that he had two lines of veterans.


CBR

[Dutchhoplite]

The machinations of the Antibarcid party kept the HaParasim HaQdoshim (Sacred Band Cavalry) out of the battle. The Romans really won because their cavalry defeated Hannibal's, and if the Sacred Band were present, that probably wouldn't have happened.

The matter of the Sacred Band cavalry is controversial. I don't think they are mentioned after the 1st Punic war (or earlier). Source please??

[Iraklis]

Ok, to claryfy about "Sacred Band Cavalry". The "Sacred Band" was an ellite infantry unit using the classical hoplite phalanx formation and was disbanded after the total devastation it suffered in Sicely from the army of Syrakuse. The cavalry named sacred band in EB is most likly an elite hevy cavalry used by carthage made of wealthy carthaginian cityzens.
Ofc, i may be mistaken since like i sayed in my previus post i am not a historyan, but thats what is basicly writen in 2-3 articles i have come across. I hope someone with much better knowledge on the subject will clear things up with this.

Btw, sorry about the typos and english, not only it aint my primary language, but i am also dislexic.

[Sarkiss]

to defeat Romans Hannibal needed to break their main infantry line. if that is broken cavalry could be dealt with. he also remembered Xantippos victory achieved by unleashing elephants and crippling Roman infantry first. his Zama battle plan looks similar to that. perhaps at Zama elephants were also considered to be trained too poorly to be trusted with any other, more sophisticated task, or kept away as a reserve for later stage.

Hannibal tactics at Zama are sound. he tried to decimate Roman infantry line by wave after wave of attacks: elephants first then his inexperienced first and second infantry lines (they were actually forbidden from retreating directly into the line before and had to go over the flanks or being cut down by their own men), doing everything to ensure that when his veterans in the third line engage the balance would tip in their favor. and it did if not for returning Roman cavalry. Hannibal on his part had 2 thousand Numidians too. and this contingent was actually considered the best cavalry in all of Africa. even though outnumbered he might have had reasons to trusted them to hold the ground against Massinisa. they fled shortly after the engagement, however, completely exposing Carthaginian flanks.

we should also never underestimate Scipio. that way he handled elephants charge was brilliant. he also recognized the importance of a strong cavalry wings, thanks to lessons given by Hannibal's in Italy.

[Dutchhoplite]

He also remembered Xantippos victory achieved by unleashing elephants and crippling Roman infantry first.

Scipio probably did remember it too ;)

Hannibal tactics at Zama are sound. he tried to decimate Roman infantry line by wave after wave of attacks: elephants first then his inexperienced first and second infantry lines (they were actually forbidden from retreating directly into the line before and had to go over the flanks or being cut down by their own men), doing everything to ensure that when his veterans in the third line engage the balance would tip in their favor. and it did if not for returning Roman cavalry.

I always thought Hannibal was the defending side ;)

I think Hannibal's tactiek was something more complicated than "wave aftyer wave of attacks. He prevented a encircling movement (like Baecula,Ilipa, and the Great Plains) by holding his 3rd line back and forcing Scipio to fight a frontal battle. Or better: the battle Hannibal wanted.

Hannibal on his part had 2 thousand Numidians too. and this contingent was actually considered the best cavalry in all of Africa. even though outnumbered he might have had reasons to trusted them to hold the ground against Massinisa. they fled shortly after the engagement, however, completely exposing Carthaginian flanks.

There's still the "defeated" versus the "ordered to retreat discussion" ;)