Battle of Zama

[chenkai11]

I read several articles on the web describing what happen during the battle of Zama. I still can't understand how did the Great Hannibal lost the battle so badly to the Romans despite he won so many great battles against his enemies before.

The advantages I can see for the Romans are they found a way to defeat the elephants, discipline legionaries, and led by a great general too.

The advantages of Hannibals are 80 elephants, season veterans who defeated the Romans so many times, brave mercenaries, uneven matched cavalries favor to Hannibal side.

Both sides numbers are almost equal.

What happen to Hannibal himself? Why did he chose to deploy his army in the manner where it leads to chaos? Or did he not had anticipated it?

Can someone enlighten me with more details on this? Own opinions are welcome too.

[Megalos Danielos Psychopatos]

In simple few points:
1. Elephantes didn't have battle experience, it wasn't hard for Romans (who know's how to fight against them) to make therm turn back against Carthaginian army.
2. Hannibal's veterans were to far behind main battle line, and threre were to few of them.
3.Probably the most important was betrayal of one of Numidian chieftains (i don't remember name); Hannibal counted on his help.
It's only my opinion of course:).

Sorry for my english:p.

[Iraklis]

From what i read, army compositions where very diferent than before. Hannibal was defeating the Romans by pinning there infatry and using large amounts of cavalry to encircle them. In the battle of Zama, Maharbal (leader of the Numidian mercenerys) joined the Roman side and the sacred Band cavalry was not alowed to participate in the fight (the political enemys of the Barcid aranged that). Lastly, not all the infantry were veterans, on the contrary, most of them where raw recruits and only a small persentage of them fought for Hannibal.
Now, Rome learn from there mistakes, by that i mean that in the battle of Zama, unlike eny other battle before or even after, they had a vast cavalry. Many of those cavalry men where in fact the same Numidians that helped Hannibal in the river Trevian...
Lastly, in order to understand the battle it self we need to understand the state of mind of the generals in question. Skipio was by all means a very inteligent men, i read in a book that he and Hannibal had a talk before the battle and that he actualy managed to "toy" with hannibal buying time for more reanforcements to arrive. Hannibal on the other hand, althow a great tactician, he proved time and again that he can win battles, but not the war.
Ofc, i am not a historian, and all the above are info from books so it would be a good idea to w8 for more responses to be sure. Tbh, i am interested in reading more about it my self.

[Lysimachos]

The main points are probably that the bulk of Hannibal's army consisted of fighters of little value, inexperienced and barely trained and the superiority of Scipio's cavalry, caused by Massinissa's Numidians (the presence of whom Hannibal didn't know of before the battle). Iirc, it was them, returning after routing Hannibal's cavalry, tipping the scales decisively in this battle.
Btw, Massinissa originally supported the carthaginians, but he changed the sides because of his rivalry with Syphax, another numidian king, to become ruler of whole numidia.

[Dutchhoplite]

Hannibal was handicapped by his army at Zama: he had relatively few of his veterans left, it was hastily recruited and many of his troops were fairly "green", i.e. not battle tested.

Having said that: he almost won it...

We have to remember that the last phase of the battle was a slogging match that could have gone either way. The final decision was made by the return of the Roman/ Numidian cavalry taking Hannibal's veterans in the rear and rolling them up.

In my opinion the better general did not win :)

[Cimon]

Why did he chose to deploy his army in the manner where it leads to chaos? Or did he not had anticipated it?

Actually, Hannibal arranged his lines in a relatively effective manner, given what troops he had: i.e. a lot of green troops backed by a core of veterans. He use an almost-Roman type deployment. This is not to suggest that he copied a legion's deployment exactly; however, Hannibal deployed in three lines with his best troops in the third line, similar to the Roman deployment of the triarii, thereby attempting to provide a rallying point for the troops in front that he was sure would flee. Further, having the veteran troops at the back provide a late-engagement punch to the Carthaginian side.

The problem for Hannibal at Zama is that, unlike most of the previous battles, the Romans now have the advantage in cavalry due to Massinissa's defection to Scipio. The battle began with a cavalry clash, with the Roman cavalry on Scipio's left engaging Hannibal's cavalry on Hannibal's right. Each side's respective Numidian cavalry auxiliaries fought on the other side of the lines. The Roman horse succeeded in driving the Carthaginian cavalry from the field, and proceeded to chase the routers, leaving the infantry behind. There is some suggestion that Hannibal wanted his cavalry to feign retreat to lure the Roman horse away in order to remove the numerical advantage, but I don't buy it. Hannibal needed every soldier he could get, and he must surely have seen that with the Romans having the numerical advantage, they could split their cavalry and have some chase the feigned retreat and some stay behind (which didn't occur anyway, but it could have). Seems like a very risky proposition.

When the infantry lines moved toward each other, Hannibal sent his elephants, but Scipio countered by having this troops open lines for the elephants to pass through. Some did and were killed on the far side of the Roman lines. Some balked and turned on Hannibal's lines.

Hannibal's first two lines of 1) Gallic mercenaries/allies and 2) Africans fought the Roman hastati and principes, but were defeated and fled. Hannibal's veteran third line and whatever other troops managed to rally were reformed into a long, single line, which engaged the Roman principes and triarii. Even losing his cavalry and the first two lines of his battle arrangement, the engagement was far from a foregone conclusion at this point. In fact, it was very nearly a Carthaginian victory until the Roman cavalry, finally reined in and reorganized from pursuing routers, came back and smashed into Hannibal's rear and flanks. This was the breaking point, and most Carthaginians fled as best they could, although some stayed to fight until the end, particularly the Gauls who had "betrayed" Rome, if I remember correctly.

Seems to me that Hannibal, given the marked contrast in forces, both in terms of numbers and in terms of quality/experience, took the only strategy possible. Add in the political factors of the anti-Barcid part of the Carthaginian senate not providing support, and it's a wonder it was even close.

For a pretty good and easily accessible book on the Punic Wars in general, with a good description of Zama, read The Fall of Carthage by Adrian Goldsworthy.

[Lovejoy]

"read The Fall of Carthage by Adrian"

My school had that book in the library. I remember how I used to sneak in there, take the book and go to the back of the library and read. I was sooo afraid that some one would see me and ask what i was reading LOL. Why would someone read about history if he doesn't have to right? What kind of wierdo was I right?

[gamegeek2]

The machinations of the Antibarcid party kept the HaParasim HaQdoshim (Sacred Band Cavalry) out of the battle. The Romans really won because their cavalry defeated Hannibal's, and if the Sacred Band were present, that probably wouldn't have happened.

[chenkai11]

Thanks for the info, I didn't know the sacred band was not allowed to fight due to politics. Poor Carthaginians, knowing the enemy is at the gate, and some A hole still play politics.

I trying to understand the tactics and stradegy of Hannibal during that battle.

First, the second line of carthaginian citizens didn't support the first line mercenaries, causing the first line to rout (although it's a even fight between mercenaries and hastati) and ended some killing each other between the carthaginians and mercenaries. While the Hastati were supported by the principes. Did not Hannibal order the second line to support the mercenaries?

By the look of Hannibal's formation, he seems to reserve his veterans to the final moment. So he trust his mercenaries and green soldiers to match Roman legions?

By the description of the battle, Hannibal doesn't seems like Hannibal in battle of cannae and other famous victory he gained over the Romans. I mean, I don't see any special tactics used.

The use of elephants is a waste, and he expected that his elephants alone could somehow kill numbers of his enemies? Unlike what Pyhrros did to the Romans.

And Hannibal know he lost his cavalry to the enemies, did he not anticipated it might happened to him what he did on Cannae?

May be he is too convident winning over the Romans that cause some misjudgement? He gained many victories only to threaten Rome, but lost only one battle which lead to the fall of Carthage.

[kekailoa]

What was the Gallic presence in the battle? I read earlier in the thread that the (unsupported by the African militia) Gallic mercenaries and allies took the front line and fled, but also stayed to fight on until the end.

Can anyone enlighten me on this?

[Dutchhoplite]

The machinations of the Antibarcid party kept the HaParasim HaQdoshim (Sacred Band Cavalry) out of the battle. The Romans really won because their cavalry defeated Hannibal's, and if the Sacred Band were present, that probably wouldn't have happened.

The matter of the Sacred Band cavalry is controversial. I don't think they are mentioned after the 1st Punic war (or earlier). Source please??

[Iraklis]

Ok, to claryfy about "Sacred Band Cavalry". The "Sacred Band" was an ellite infantry unit using the classical hoplite phalanx formation and was disbanded after the total devastation it suffered in Sicely from the army of Syrakuse. The cavalry named sacred band in EB is most likly an elite hevy cavalry used by carthage made of wealthy carthaginian cityzens.
Ofc, i may be mistaken since like i sayed in my previus post i am not a historyan, but thats what is basicly writen in 2-3 articles i have come across. I hope someone with much better knowledge on the subject will clear things up with this.

Btw, sorry about the typos and english, not only it aint my primary language, but i am also dislexic.

[Sarkiss]

to defeat Romans Hannibal needed to break their main infantry line. if that is broken cavalry could be dealt with. he also remembered Xantippos victory achieved by unleashing elephants and crippling Roman infantry first. his Zama battle plan looks similar to that. perhaps at Zama elephants were also considered to be trained too poorly to be trusted with any other, more sophisticated task, or kept away as a reserve for later stage.

Hannibal tactics at Zama are sound. he tried to decimate Roman infantry line by wave after wave of attacks: elephants first then his inexperienced first and second infantry lines (they were actually forbidden from retreating directly into the line before and had to go over the flanks or being cut down by their own men), doing everything to ensure that when his veterans in the third line engage the balance would tip in their favor. and it did if not for returning Roman cavalry. Hannibal on his part had 2 thousand Numidians too. and this contingent was actually considered the best cavalry in all of Africa. even though outnumbered he might have had reasons to trusted them to hold the ground against Massinisa. they fled shortly after the engagement, however, completely exposing Carthaginian flanks.

we should also never underestimate Scipio. that way he handled elephants charge was brilliant. he also recognized the importance of a strong cavalry wings, thanks to lessons given by Hannibal's in Italy.

[Dutchhoplite]

He also remembered Xantippos victory achieved by unleashing elephants and crippling Roman infantry first.

Scipio probably did remember it too ;)

Hannibal tactics at Zama are sound. he tried to decimate Roman infantry line by wave after wave of attacks: elephants first then his inexperienced first and second infantry lines (they were actually forbidden from retreating directly into the line before and had to go over the flanks or being cut down by their own men), doing everything to ensure that when his veterans in the third line engage the balance would tip in their favor. and it did if not for returning Roman cavalry.

I always thought Hannibal was the defending side ;)

I think Hannibal's tactiek was something more complicated than "wave aftyer wave of attacks. He prevented a encircling movement (like Baecula,Ilipa, and the Great Plains) by holding his 3rd line back and forcing Scipio to fight a frontal battle. Or better: the battle Hannibal wanted.

Hannibal on his part had 2 thousand Numidians too. and this contingent was actually considered the best cavalry in all of Africa. even though outnumbered he might have had reasons to trusted them to hold the ground against Massinisa. they fled shortly after the engagement, however, completely exposing Carthaginian flanks.

There's still the "defeated" versus the "ordered to retreat discussion" ;)

[Cimon]

What was the Gallic presence in the battle? I read earlier in the thread that the (unsupported by the African militia) Gallic mercenaries and allies took the front line and fled, but also stayed to fight on until the end.

Can anyone enlighten me on this?

Hmm...you're right that I said both of those. I think I may have misremembered. I am thinking it wasn't the Gallic fighters at the end, but rather some of the Bruttians who had betrayed Rome that fought to the end. The Bruttians did, after all, form a large part of the third line (the veterans). I was typing that all from memory, so I will have to check to verify at home when I have a chance.

By the look of Hannibal's formation, he seems to reserve his veterans to the final moment. So he trust his mercenaries and green soldiers to match Roman legions?.

It's not so much a matter of "trust" as it is a "has to." It's not like he can just go find more veterans to put in the first, second, and third line. Rather, he has green troops and he has veterans. He can put the green troops in front and the veterans behind, or he can reverse that. If he puts the veterans in front and the green troops behind, then what happens when the veterans break? If you are an inexperienced soldier in the second and third line, and you see the best, most experienced soliders on your side in the front line streaming back from the enemy, what are you going to do? Probably run without even engaging. Putting the veterans in the third line avoids this problem by providing a rallying point and a breakfront against a mass rout, as well as a late punch when the Romans are (hopefully) worn down.

By the description of the battle, Hannibal doesn't seems like Hannibal in battle of cannae and other famous victory he gained over the Romans. I mean, I don't see any special tactics used.

Well, it depends on how you look at it. Merely using three lines is a "special tactic" compared to a normal Carthaginian deployment. Hannibal is, again, doing something different than he has done before, trying to keep Scipio guessing while also deploying in what Hannibal considers the best possible way to maximize his chances of victory. If you mean something like a double envelopment at Cannae, well, you need more veteran troops for complicated maneuvers like that.

The use of elephants is a waste, and he expected that his elephants alone could somehow kill numbers of his enemies? Unlike what Pyhrros did to the Romans.

In ancient battle, elephants are not really used to "kill." I mean, yes, they will kill some soldiers, and that is a nice little bonus to their generals, but elephants were primarily used two ways:

1. As a cavalry screen, preventing the enemy's cavalry from going where it wants since horses are scared of elephants. (For an example of this, see the Battle of Ipsus)
2. As a front line hammer used right before the infantry engages in order to a) cause fright and b) disrupt an enemy's formation. When an elephant charges through a block of men, it creates a gap that one's own troops can then exploit.

The second way is how Hannibal intended to use them at Zama. That's why Scipio's deployment was especially useful. By breaking his troops up into smaller units with gaps between them, there's no formation for the elephants to run through and disrupt. After the elephant charge, Scipio reorganized the troops in the more standard Roman manner with larger maniples. It's not so much that Hannibal "wasted" elephants, as that Scipio countered especially well.

And Hannibal know he lost his cavalry to the enemies, did he not anticipated it might happened to him what he did on Cannae?

Well, this gets us back to the driven off versus feigned retreat debate. As I mentioned above, I believe it to that they were driven off, but I think there is room for the argument on the other side. Still, regardless of which it was, I am sure Hannibal definitely did know what could happen. However, and this is the key point here, what is he supposed to do? Disengage? Not a very likely prospect. Keep some troops back in case they return? Similarly unlikely; he needs everyone he can get to fight the Roman infantry. As it was, it is only the timely return of the Roman cavalry that definitively swings the battle. Who's to say what would happen if it had taken another hour or two for them to come back? Maybe by that point, the Romans are running, and the cavalry comes back to find itself all alone. It's impossible to prove a counterfactual, but I don't think it's so crazy to think this is a possible scenario.

May be he is too convident winning over the Romans that cause some misjudgement? He gained many victories only to threaten Rome, but lost only one battle which lead to the fall of Carthage.

I personally don't think he misjudged; his tactics are justifiable. It's impossible to know if other tactics would have worked better, but I doubt it. Hannibal is one of the greatest generals of the ancient world, and while that doesn't mean he is infallible (he did, after all, lose Zama), I suspect he considered his options and went with what he determined to be the best plan. The problem is that, by that point, he is fighting a lose cause. Whether he loses Zama, or the hyptothetical battles of Zama II or Zama III, eventually, it's over. The fact that he "gained many victories..., but lost only one battle..." and ended up losing the war is what makes him a tragic figure.

[Ibrahim]

1. As a cavalry screen, preventing the enemy's cavalry from going where it wants since horses are scared of elephants. (For an example of this, see the Battle of Ipsus)
2. As a front line hammer used right before the infantry engages in order to a) cause fright and b) disrupt an enemy's formation. When an elephant charges through a block of men, it creates a gap that one's own troops can then exploit.

The second way is how Hannibal intended to use them at Zama. That's why Scipio's deployment was especially useful. By breaking his troops up into smaller units with gaps between them, there's no formation for the elephants to run through and disrupt. After the elephant charge, Scipio reorganized the troops in the more standard Roman manner with larger maniples. It's not so much that Hannibal "wasted" elephants, as that Scipio countered especially well.

actually, that was only part of the story. remember, the elephants were poorly trained and inexperianced. It's also an observed fact that elephants do not charge ANY line of troops directly (that's why they were often rendered drunk-so they won't know better). and even if drunk, the elephant will still prefer the easier route, so they'll just travel through the gaps. hence why it was brilliant. the guy controlled not just Hannibal and his men's minds, but even the elephants

at least, so I've observedf about elephants, so I might be off.

[CBR]

By the description of the battle, Hannibal doesn't seems like Hannibal in battle of cannae and other famous victory he gained over the Romans. I mean, I don't see any special tactics used.

Either Hannibal had lost his touch or the sources are just not very clear about his intentions. Afterall we only have Roman sources: Polybius had Masinissa as his main source and he commanded the cavalry and spent most of the time in pursuit so how much did he really see to have a clear idea of what Hannibal did.

Steven James has written a good hypothesis which can be found here http://www.fenrir.dk/history/index.p...ttle_Revisited

His conclusion is that Hannibal was still his good old self and had planned for a double envelopment but Scipio's generalship, the quality of the Roman veterans and a bit of bad luck ruined the plan.


CBR

[chenkai11]

Thanks guys, for your info and opinions. I am enlighten now. And indeed, Hannibal was so great but after Zama, it all went tragic for him.

[abou]

If it was mentioned before, then I missed it, but I think it is important to remember that Scipio didn't play the game the way previous Roman commanders did.

Let's face it, Roman commanders generally lack elegance and tend toward brute force. Polybios even specifically commented on it in his writings as bia. Seriously, just look at the fighting in Sicily during the 1st Punic War. Had the Romans access to a lot of siege engines they would have probably been shooting men from them before they would have stones. Part of Hannibal's successes in Italy was due to the average Roman commander's overzealous nature, which should be markedly contrasted with Cunctator's tactics, who received a lot of criticism until he proved himself correct.

That Hannibal was able to goad and then entrap so many is the real part of his military genius and winning strategy: fighter smarter, not harder. Really, was the battle plan at Cannae any different from general Hellenistic strategy? Granted, his crescent formation was a novel approach, but the hammer and anvil was at the core. Scipio, however, changed that at Zama by not rushing headlong into the fight. Combined with the recently acquired Numidian cavalry, it managed to put Africanus on top in a battle that, given past experiences, should have been a Carthaginian victory.

[Cimon]

What was the Gallic presence in the battle? I read earlier in the thread that the (unsupported by the African militia) Gallic mercenaries and allies took the front line and fled, but also stayed to fight on until the end.

Can anyone enlighten me on this?

Well, I went and did a quick look through Goldsworthy, but it isn't in there. I thought that was where I had read it, but apparently it was somewhere else, and Goldsworthy is the only resource on the subject I have with me at the moment.. Still, the more I think about it, the more I think it was the Bruttians, rather than the Gauls, that fought to the end. If anyone can jump in and verify that, I'd appreciate it.

If it was mentioned before, then I missed it, but I think it is important to remember that Scipio didn't play the game the way previous Roman commanders did.

Let's face it, Roman commanders generally lack elegance and tend toward brute force. Polybios even specifically commented on it in his writings as bia. Seriously, just look at the fighting in Sicily during the 1st Punic War. Had the Romans access to a lot of siege engines they would have probably been shooting men from them before they would have stones. Part of Hannibal's successes in Italy was due to the average Roman commander's overzealous nature, which should be markedly contrasted with Cunctator's tactics, who received a lot of criticism until he proved himself correct.

I don't think it was mentioned before in such specificity, abou, but I agree here. Scipio was an extremely talented commander, and he commanded one of the most disciplined forces ever produced by the Roman military machine up to that time. As an example of both Scipio's judgment vis-a-vis normal Roman commanders, and his troops' discipline, look no further than his command to stop and reform the infantry after breaking Hannibal's first two lines.

Either Hannibal had lost his touch or the sources are just not very clear about his intentions. Afterall we only have Roman sources: Polybius had Masinissa as his main source and he commanded the cavalry and spent most of the time in pursuit so how much did he really see to have a clear idea of what Hannibal did.

Steven James has written a good hypothesis which can be found here http://www.fenrir.dk/history/index.p...ttle_Revisited

His conclusion is that Hannibal was still his good old self and had planned for a double envelopment but Scipio's generalship, the quality of the Roman veterans and a bit of bad luck ruined the plan.

I think James's hypothesis about a double envelopment is an interesting one, but I'm not convinced of its accuracy. First, Scipio had studied Hannibal's tactics and, indeed, been present at several of the battles. He had even rallied roughly 4000 of the Romans that escaped from the Cannae massacre, and surely heard of Hannibal's tactics firsthand. Hannibal must have known that Scipio couldn't be fooled by the same trick twice; even though Scipio wasn't the commander or, necessarily, even present on the battlefield, I think my point still stands. Second, the Roman troops are the more disciplined side. Much of Hannibal's army is not going to be able to perform such complicated maneuvers as suggested by James. Indeed, his army is really composed of three separate armies: his veterans in the third line, Carthaginian/Libyan militia in the second line which had originally been raised for the defense of Africa, and Gauls and mercenaries in the first line left over from Mago's Italian army. There was no wholly integrated command structure, and the troops would have had difficulty operating in unison. It seems like an awfully risky proposition to try such a complicated tactic as a double envelopment with this force. Third, Hannibal has the larger infantry contingent. If he wants to try a double envelopment, then he only needs to extend his frontage from the get-go or, in the alternative, right after an initial clash.

We'll never know for sure, but it seems to me that there are more factors weighing against a double envelopment than for it. Just my opinion.

[CBR]

Hannibal must have known that Scipio couldn't be fooled by the same trick twice..

Which is also why Hannibal tried something extra in the hope of fooling Scipio. In the end he was not successful but if one wants a big victory against a good general one needs to take risks and come up with something special. In this case it was pulling back his second line and have his veterans in two lines.

Much of Hannibal's army is not going to be able to perform such complicated maneuvers as suggested by James.

The only real complex maneuver would be done by his fourth line while covered by his third line. Both of them were veterans. Having his second line pull back a bit after the first line engaged is IMO not that complex as it would be prearranged.

Third, Hannibal has the larger infantry contingent. If he wants to try a double envelopment, then he only needs to extend his frontage from the get-go or, in the alternative, right after an initial clash.

He would lose any surprise if he deployed them too soon. He needed Scipio to release both his Hastati and Principes before trying to envelop them. He most likely concluded (and rightly so) that he could only count on his veterans and the rest could only be used to tire and disorder Scipios main infantry. In the end he was forced to extend the line as his other troops had been beaten too easily and Scipio had not been fooled.

And I think the line extension makes a lot more sense than having routed men from the first and second line rally and suddenly put up a good fight. That and the possible numbers of soldiers and veterans especially, makes for a good case that he had two lines of veterans.


CBR

[Cimon]

It's certainly possible, CBR, and I hope I didn't sound like I was foreclosing the possibility. After all, we are never going to know for sure what the plan was; there's just too many variables that we can't possibly pin down. I merely think that the factors against a double envelopment strategy outweigh those factors that suggest it.

James, by his own admission, ignores the cavalry aspect of the battle. For Hannibal to complete a double envelopment and close the rear of the Roman lines (which is what James is suggesting when he theorizes that the point of Hannibal's strategy is to annihilate the Romans, rather than engage in a war of attrition), he would need his horse to perform a similar function that it did at Cannae, i.e. to come back around and close the circle. However, he is severly outnumbered in cavalry from the outset, and must have seen that it was far more likely for his cavalry to be defeated than the other way around. This obviously arm-chair generalling, but with that in mind, I would think that he would use the elephants as a cavalry screen to offset Scipio's advantage here, and ward the Roman cavalry away. That would allow Hannibal's own cavalry to operate more effectively. Or, do you believe that James agrees with the "feigned retreat" of the Carthaginian cavalry? (This is not a challenge, I am genuinely interested in your take on James's view of the cavalry, even though not specified in the article). I just don't know if I can find the double envelopment hypothesis convincing without knowing how the cavalry fit in, i.e. the integrated battle plan, other than to say that they fit in in the way they were used. Seems too...self-fulfilling, I suppose. I guess it comes down to me mostly not believing in the feigned retreat of the cavalry, in which case I think the elephants especially would have been deployed differently, James's ideas on them notwithstanding.

And I think the line extension makes a lot more sense than having routed men from the first and second line rally and suddenly put up a good fight.

I agree with you here that the first and second line rally has always troubled me a bit. Seems counterintuitive that a line would easily break, then reform and fight valiantly. However, Goldsworthy suggests (The Fall of Carthage, p. 303 (I think - once again I am not by the book, so am operating from memory of reading this section last night, but it is definitely around 300-305)) that most of the 1st and 2nd line actually fled all the way back to camp, and that it was only a few of the African units from the 2nd line that actually rallied and came back to battle. If that is indeed the case, then I can buy a few units coming back and fighting courageously while the majority flees entirely.

It's not that I think James doesn't make some good points; I do. I guess I'm just not fully convinced.

[CBR]

It's certainly possible, CBR, and I hope I didn't sound like I was foreclosing the possibility. After all, we are never going to know for sure what the plan was; there's just too many variables that we can't possibly pin down. I merely think that the factors against a double envelopment strategy outweigh those factors that suggest it.

No worries. It is afterall a battle with very little detail from the sources, as with most ancient battles. Even one of the most well documented Napoleonic battles like Waterloo there are gaps and controversies so why expect any less from an ancient battle

About the cavalry:

It is speculated that Hannibal did not expect to have Masinissa show up so Hannibal would either have had a small advantage of at least parity and the plan was designed for that.

Could he expect to envelop Scipio without the cavalry advantage as seen in Cannae? I would say so for two reason:

1)He had the advantage in numbers of infantry. Enough to pin down a majority of Scipios army while still having troops to pull off the flanking attack.

2)That it seems his plan was to stay back with a majority of his army and thereby pull the Roman infantry forward so he had room for the outflanking while the cavalry were doing their fight further forward on the wings.

Also I do not think he had to surround Scipio completely. Hitting both flanks would provide a rather devastating result by itself.

Since it is pretty certain that his cavalry was both outnumbered and became disordered by the elephants I do not think a feigned flight is needed to explain the quick "rout" of his cavalry wings. Nor is a feigned flight very likely IMO.

IIRC Polybius states that the elephants covered the whole line. Maybe that was Hannibal improvising when he saw his disadvantage in cavalry.


CBR

[Praetor Diego]

I must say that would be really nice to play this battle in EB...

[Dutchhoplite]

Since it is pretty certain that his cavalry was both outnumbered and became disordered by the elephants I do not think a feigned flight is needed to explain the quick "rout" of his cavalry wings. Nor is a feigned flight very likely IMO.

Polybius only mentions that it was Hannibal's left flank that was disrupted by the out of control elephants. Besides, the drivers had the means of killing a rampaging elephant. I don't think the Carthaginian right was terribly hindered by the elephants but still they were send into quick flight. So they must have been horribly outclassed, outnumbered or ordered to give ground.

[gamegeek2]

I'll work on a battle of Zama for you guys.

[chenkai11]

I'll work on a battle of Zama for you guys.

That would be Great! As great as Hannibal himself.

[CBR]

Polybius only mentions that it was Hannibal's left flank that was disrupted by the out of control elephants. Besides, the drivers had the means of killing a rampaging elephant. I don't think the Carthaginian right was terribly hindered by the elephants but still they were send into quick flight. So they must have been horribly outclassed, outnumbered or ordered to give ground.

I just checked Polybius and Livy and both mentions elephants causing disorder on the right wing too:

Polybius 15:12

..while others fled towards the right and, received by the cavalry with showers of javelins, at length escaped out of the field. 5 It was at this moment that Laelius, availing himself of the disturbance created by the elephants, charged the Carthaginian cavalry 6 and forced them to headlong flight.

Livy 30:33

..these elephants also put to flight even the cavalry of the Carthaginians posted in their right wing. Laelius, when he saw the enemy in disorder, struck additional terror into them in their confusion.

But it does seem like the left flank took the biggest hit from the elephants.

It is also interesting to note that from both Polybius and Livy we get an impression not of a low quality first line as such but more of lightly armed soldiers and skirmishers. So perhaps we should not see the first line as a (low quality) heavy infantry line ala Hastati but more of a strong Velites like line meant for making the Romans go forward.


CBR

[Cimon]

About the cavalry:

It is speculated that Hannibal did not expect to have Masinissa show up so Hannibal would either have had a small advantage of at least parity and the plan was designed for that.

Could he expect to envelop Scipio without the cavalry advantage as seen in Cannae? I would say so for two reason:

1)He had the advantage in numbers of infantry. Enough to pin down a majority of Scipios army while still having troops to pull off the flanking attack.

2)That it seems his plan was to stay back with a majority of his army and thereby pull the Roman infantry forward so he had room for the outflanking while the cavalry were doing their fight further forward on the wings.

Also I do not think he had to surround Scipio completely. Hitting both flanks would provide a rather devastating result by itself.

Since it is pretty certain that his cavalry was both outnumbered and became disordered by the elephants I do not think a feigned flight is needed to explain the quick "rout" of his cavalry wings. Nor is a feigned flight very likely IMO.

IIRC Polybius states that the elephants covered the whole line. Maybe that was Hannibal improvising when he saw his disadvantage in cavalry.

That's an interesting take on the cavalry situation. Do you mean that Hannibal didn't expect Masinissa to show up for that battle, or that Hannibal didn't realize that Masinissa would be on the Roman side at all? The reason I ask is that Livy makes it pretty clear that Masinissa was operating with the Romans (particularly Laelius) for a fair amount of time leading up to the battle itself. Livy also says that several Carthaginian soldiers were captured by the Romans shortly before the battle (perhaps a day before? it's not particularly clear), shown around the camp, and released. They reported back to Hannibal that Masinissa had joined up with Scipio. (Livy 30.28) However, to be fair, Polybius's timeline is different and suggests the men were released the day before Masinissa showed up. (Polybius 15.5.5-13)

Certainly hitting both flanks with infantry would possibly win the battle, but the reason I think that he needs his cavalry to close the circle (to really work under James's view) is that his theory is that Hannibal attempted a double envelopment to annihilate the Romans. Lapping at the flanks with infantry doesn't really accomplish that, I think. There would be a huge gap in the rear through which much of the Roman center would be able to escape. The long-term result might be the same (i.e. the Romans make it back to camp and eventually surrender), but then again it might not (resupplied by fleet since the Romans have total naval superiority). Even if the Romans are forced to surrender, it wouldn't really have quite the psychological impact that a true, Cannae-style victory would have required the total defeat on the battlefield in a quick manner. I suspect only that (and maybe even that wouldn't do it) would possibly keep the Romans from landing in Africa again.

I think it's not clear from Polybius that he necessarily spread the elephants along the whole line. He says, "Hannibal placed in front of his whole force his elephants, of which he had over 80, and behind them the mercenaries numbering about twelve thousand." (Polybius 15.12.1) Certainly whole force would suggest that they covered the whole line, but behind them the mercenaries I think cuts the other direction. Unfortunately, I think it might be too vague to decide for sure, although I would probably lean, as you suggested, in the direction over the elephants being spaced out across the line. That said, and I know we differ here, but I think it would be very important to have Hannibal's cavalry close the circle for a double envelopment, and if that was the plan, then I think it would have been far more advantageous to group at least a large portion of the elephants on either wing to screen the Roman cavalry, and prevent it from driving off Hannibal's own. I do agree with you about the feigned flight, as previously stated.

[CBR]

However, to be fair, Polybius's timeline is different and suggests the men were released the day before Masinissa showed up. (Polybius 15.5.5-13)

Yes indeed the sources are not clear so we do not know if Hannibal was surprised or not. All we know is that two good generals both seemed quite willing to fight a battle and therefore must have been pretty confident in winning. I can see why Scipio would be confident with his advantage in cavalry. For Hannibal to use elephants to aid his cavalry makes sense (and the sources gives the impression he did) But we do not know if he spread them out evenly or had larger groups with the cavalry.

It seems like the elephants did some damage against the infantry while those facing the cavalry only caused trouble for his own cavalry. Why the big difference in performance? Lack of numbers, just bad luck combined with the most likely badly trained elephants or confusion caused by having some elephants do a unplanned move to cover the cavalry?

Certainly hitting both flanks with infantry would possibly win the battle, but the reason I think that he needs his cavalry to close the circle (to really work under James's view) is that his theory is that Hannibal attempted a double envelopment to annihilate the Romans. Lapping at the flanks with infantry doesn't really accomplish that, I think. There would be a huge gap in the rear through which much of the Roman center would be able to escape.

And that is where I disagree. If Hannibal managed to put one half army width on each flank they would extend far enough to overlap Scipio's rear. In the chaos of combat and dust most of the Roman soldiers would never know what hit them until it is too late. Unless Scipio gives the "every man for himself" signal early enough when/if he sees the flanking maneuver. But such an action has the word doom spelled all over it.

For an example look at the Spartan flank attack at Nemea (394 BC) and how they crushed the Athenians who were pinned down. Now imagine that on both flanks and with perhaps an even wider force used.

Even if we assume a large part of Scipio's army survived, they would have been a disorganised bunch of stragglers in enemy country that easily could have been hunted down. It would IMO be a total defeat for Scipio. If that would have provided peace is another question though.

And actually there is one more thing if we assume Steven James is correct about the double line of veterans: Alexander used a double line at Gaugamela to deal with the large numbers of Persian cavalry. That would have given Hannibal several options depending on how things turned out but in the end he was forced to use all just to achieve parity with the Roman infantry.


CBR