On War: Clausetwitz: Non-linearity and complexity:

[Oleander Ardens]

I recently read once again parts of Clausewitz and came afterwards upon this excellent paper by Alan D. Beyerchen, Ohio State University.


Here is a part of the introduction:

Each of these approaches has merit, yet none satisfies completely. I offer a revision of our perception of Clausewitz and his work by suggesting that Clausewitz displays an intuition concerning war that we can better comprehend with terms and concepts newly available to us: On War is suffused with the understanding that every war is inherently a nonlinear phenomenon, the conduct of which changes its character in ways that cannot be analytically predicted. I am not arguing that reference to a few of today's "nonlinear science" concepts would help us clarify confusion in Clausewitz's thinking. My suggestion is more radical: in a profoundly unconfused way, he understands that seeking exact analytical solutions does not fit the nonlinear reality of the problems posed by war, and hence that our ability to predict the course and outcome of any given conflict is severely limited.

The correctness of Clausewitz's perception has both kept his work relevant and made it less accessible, for war's analytically unpredictable nature is extremely discomfiting to those searching for a predictive theory. An approach through nonlinearity does not make other reasons for difficulty in understanding On War evaporate. It does, however, provide new access to the realistic core of Clausewitz's insights and offers a correlation of the representations of chance and complexity that characterize his work. Furthermore, it may help us to remove some unsettling blind spots that have prevented us from seeing crucial implications of his work.

A fine view on a fine book.

[CountArach]

Thanks for the link. I'm actually reading Clausewitz right now (In order to improve my Napoleonic Battlegaming) and I do find him intensely interesting.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Thoughtful piece. Some very nice insights.

[Csargo]

Read the introduction and will probably come back tomorrow and read the rest. It's late and I'm tired.

[Agent Miles]

"An army of rabbits led by a lion will always overcome an army of lions led by a rabbit." Napoleon

Beyerchen’s paper from 1992 is just another interpretation of Clausewitz. Remember, Clausewitz wrote “about wars” (the literal translation of vom kriege) aiming at a select audience of world leaders, and so is Beyerchen in his paper. Clausewitz describes international conflict as sort of a Gordian Knot and war is perceived as the solution that Alexander used to solve the riddle of untying that knot, i.e., one swift blow of the sword. Clausewitz describes the dangers in this perception and Beyerchen reiterates it in light of chaos theory. Again, the audience for this advice is our national leadership. War is still a dangerous gamble and our success still depends on whether the members of our leadership are lions or rabbits.

[Pannonian]

The complexities can be summed up in Clausewitz's idea of friction, the vaguaries between the general's plan and its execution.

[Oleander Ardens]

The complexities can be summed up in Clausewitz's idea of friction, the vaguaries between the general's plan and its execution.

I would certainly not hazard to summarize it so succintly. Friction is an important factor, but just one of many according to the article and my personal reading.

Beyerchen’s paper from 1992 is just another interpretation of Clausewitz. Remember, Clausewitz wrote “about wars” (the literal translation of vom kriege) aiming at a select audience of world leaders, and so is Beyerchen in his paper. Clausewitz describes international conflict as sort of a Gordian Knot and war is perceived as the solution that Alexander used to solve the riddle of untying that knot, i.e., one swift blow of the sword. Clausewitz describes the dangers in this perception and Beyerchen reiterates it in light of chaos theory. Again, the audience for this advice is our national leadership. War is still a dangerous gamble and our success still depends on whether the members of our leadership are lions or rabbits.

a) Clausewitz is certainly wary of war and all its intrinsic dangers "Of war". In this and other regards both he and "The Art of War" are remarkebly similar.
b) War is always the continuation of politics (interests, the political process) and rooted in the trinity, be it initiated by a renegade guerillia leader in Kongo or in the White House. It is most dangerous if the actors are unaware of their specifc goals and forget to ask simple, but important questions.
c) War is War, and is by definition a terrible affair. Power, ressources and might are necessary to force on your enemies your will, or to be able to do so at wish. The wish is political and dependent on your capabilities and reality.

[Oleander Ardens]

A good read concerning logistics in the era. Note that logistics played also an important part in Clausewitz military thinking. The cumlination point and "defense" being the largest book are testimony to this attention.