Patton pushes on (what if)

[Fisherking]

Had Patton prevailed upon Eisenhower, Marshal, and Churchill to see Stalin’s Soviet Union as a dire threat to Western Society, what would have been the ramifications of such a war? Who would have prevailed? And why do you think so?


__________________________________________________________________________________


My opinion is that while it would have been anything but an easy win, had the British Commonwealth and the United States, along with other Allied nations with a vested interest, pursued that course they could eventually have prevailed.

While the Soviet empire possessed vast recourses it lacked in infrastructure. The Allied nations possessed strategic advantage in Naval Forces, Air Forces, & Logistics. The Soviets held a technical edge in armor but one which was dwindling.

At the close of WWII the American invasion of Japan was scheduled to commence on 1 Nov. 1945
The invasion force was the largest ever assembled and all tolled was made up of 39 US Divisions. It does not take a huge leap of faith to see that these could have been used to invade the Soviet mainland in the Far East.

The Chinese Civil War was on hold during WWII, to a large extent due to the lack of supplies coming from the Soviet Union. China had had the resistance on the run before the war and had a vested interest in seeing the Soviets weakened or destroyed.

By the Autumn of 1945 it should have been painfully obvious that relations with the Soviet were never going to be what was envisioned by FDR in the mid war years, and that the Western Democracies were going to have to resist in some fashion. Had they had the stomach for a longer war, I believe they would have prevailed.

[Flavius Clemens]

I'm no expert on the era, but a few questions spring to mind.

a) Was Britain in a state - materially and in morale - to keep fighting, or had six years of war left everyone more than ready for peace?
b) Given the state Germany was in, especially its infrastructure, would running supply lines across it have been easy?
c) Would the independence movements in the British Empire - particularly India - have been willing to wait while a renewed European war was conducted?
d) Would the communist movements in Western Europe have been an effective resistance?

[Pannonian]

As I said in the TWC discussion, the Allied troops would not have been in any mood to fight against their erstwhile allies, certainly if they initiated the war. Unless the Soviets very clearly were the aggressors, and they were in no fit state to try anything against the Allies, the most likely result would be a refusal of Allied troops to fight, perhaps mutiny, and revolts or at least protests at home perhaps bringing in new governments. The RAF mutiny of 1946 showed just how fed up the British were of war, and that was just a delay in demobilisation so as to keep them around for colonial policing duties. If the troops were actually told to push on against the Soviets, the mutiny might have started earleir and been more widespread.

[Sarmatian]

Pretty much what Pannonian said. Britain was in best "shape" in Europe at the time. In countries like France or Italy, there would have been even less support for the attack on the Soviets and I think it would in general strengthen communist movements around Europe. It wouldn't be any more pleasant for the Soviets if they were the aggressor.

Invasion of Japan, devoid of anything but a will to resist (and even that was dwindling), and invasion of Soviet Pacific coast are two totally different things - mounting an invasion that needs to be resupplied from thousands of km away, against a country with strong air force and army, on a coast that is frozen most of the year etc etc... is impossible, plain and simple.

During the civil war, there was no China. The civil war was about what would China become. Animosity between SU and China that would appear later certainly doesn't mean that Chinese communists become allies of the West instead of their fellow communists, especially when West is waging war on SU just because they are communists. In fact, I hardly think that West would even try to support communists in China as the only reason for starting the war would be to get rid of communists. They would naturally offer support to those fighting the communists.

When people think that it would be sure, albeit with heavy losses, win for the West, they are not thinking about situation in 1945. They're thinking about a generic NATO vs Warsaw Pact conflict. The situation in 1945 was very different than in, let's say, 60's or 70's. War weariness was unbelievably high, no one had the desire to fight another war, especially aggressive war against someone who's been their ally. Not to mention that, save Britain and Spain, no country in Europe had an army and none but a few European countries had a functioning economy. The attack on SU would most probably backfire and very possibly bring communist in power in more European countries. Let's not forget that right after the war Soviets, and communism in general, didn't have such a bad rep that they would acquire later, and the notion that they have done more than fair share of fighting against Hitler was very much alive...

So, it's all nice talking about who had superior tanks or planes but it isn't important. Economic, political and social aspects are much more important to consider here...

I still think that due to so many variables it is impossible to predict what would happen, but if I had to pick, I'd say the Allied attack on the Soviets would have been disastrous for the West.

[Tribesman]

At the close of WWII the American invasion of Japan was scheduled to commence on 1 Nov. 1945
The invasion force was the largest ever assembled and all tolled was made up of 39 US Divisions. It does not take a huge leap of faith to see that these could have been used to invade the Soviet mainland in the Far East.

Yes , if you re-equip them and retrain them then putting 39 divisions into the vast wastes of Siberia in winter is a great idea .

[Meneldil]

An attack against the SU in 1945 would have meant a communist revolution in France and Italy.

Since the Brits were not in a great shape as well, it would basically have meant a war between the US and SU (+ various communist armed forces).

Then again, I don't know what it would have taken for the US to build a few more A-Bombs and to toast Russia.

[PanzerJaeger]

Subtracting nuclear weapons from the equation (because I just don't think they're very sporting), Patton and the 'Allies' - or what was left of them - would have been sliced, diced, and completely pushed out of Western Europe due to the reasons I mentioned in the earlier thread.

The big Allied advantages listed were:
a-Air Power, specifically strategic assets
b-Naval Power
c-Pacific Divisions

To those I would respond...

a) First of all, air power during WW2 is portrayed as far more influential than it actually was. Look at the numbers..

The Allied bombing campaigns against Germany were as 'successful' as they were because Germany simply could not field enough fighters to turn away the air fleets and German industry was fairly dense. On the other hand, Russia had a very large air force by the end of the war, with powerful and sophisticated designs, and experienced pilots. Russian industry was also spread out far more than that of Germany.

Had the American bombers made it through the far more numerically competent Russian fighter screens, fuel and payload restrictions would have made their damage far less meaningful. Also, by '45, the Germans had become very effective at moving their industrial capacity underground, a tactic which would have certainly been copied by the Soviets.

Just like paratroops, I think strategic bombing would have become cost ineffective. Russian cities were already bombed out and the industry gone...


b) Naval power is important, but not exceedingly so during a European continental war. Surely it would have kept America from being invaded, but such a scenario would have likely not happened anyway. Unlike Germany circa 1918, Russia had far more resources from which to draw upon, so a naval embargo would not have had as much of an effect. The war would be decided in Western Europe, so not much role for the Allied navies.

Of course it would afford the Allies with some invasion options, but the Red Army had enough divisions to keep those bases covered, leading to the next point...


c) The Russians also had a large Army on that side of the world. It had no problems decimating the Japanese in Manchukuo.


Finally, I just don't think the Allied soldiers were up to the task. Despite the hero worship they receive in modern culture, they just weren't that good. Brave? Sure. Skilled? Eh... They had terrible difficulties with relatively weak and under strength German (and Italian ) armies, and their leadership was piss-poor. I've never been quite able to figure out why Patton is lauded the way he is, other than the fact that he was the only Allied commander of rank who had an accurate sense of modern armoured strategy and tactics, had any personality, and wasn't a complete screw up (Monty anyone?). There are literally dozens of Russian commanders who eclipsed his performance during the war.

Conversely, the Red Army fought the finest divisions of the best military around at the time and prevailed. The knowledge, skill, tenacity, and willingness to take casualties these fights instilled in the Russians are incomparable to the Allied experience. The Eastern Front was a far tougher affair, and bred far tougher soldiers.


(BTW, Korea is worth comparing to this scenario for obvious reasons... )

[CBR]

One morning in the sombre atmosphere of the Cabinet War rooms, Churchill ordered his staff to "think the unthinkable". The result was Operation Unthinkable: a putative attack on Russia by a British and American army. Churchill's War Cabinet staff officers set to work.

Too long to quote all here I think. Not sure if they had correct information on the Soviet army but their conclusion was not to do it.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/htmlConte...1/nwar101.html


CBR

[Cambyses]

Well that report pretty much ends the argument I would think. A short war with limited tactical objectives might be winnable but an sort of WW III would have been a disaster.

For me the only way the western allies would have won is by mobilising the whole world against the Russians - which would have been very hard to do in the circumstances.

Equally its hard to see how the Russians could have won a worldwide war if they had been the agressors and had so many consequently opposed to them.

My conclusion is that whoever had attacked would have lost.

[Brenus]

It would have been a disaster for the Allies.
Imagine asking the French soldiers, Italian, all Continental Europe soldiers to forget and forgive their burned villages, raped women, deported and slaughtered population and now fight alongside the SS against the Heroes of Stalingrad…
As mentioned, if the Allies would have been the aggressors, the Communists in all country would have at minimum sabotage all war effort as they did during the Indochina war in France…
In 1945, France started the Indochina war. De-colonisation was on.
The soldiers were tired of war and wouldn’t understand why to fight former allies. We are not any more in the 16th Century when shifting alliances was possible by the King’s will.

In pure military aspect:
The JS1 & 2 would have pulverised the Patton and other Comet. The Soviet had as well their own jet fighter, as it was revelled a later one in Korea (Mig 15 every one) better than their western equivalent and absolutely independent from the Me 262 design. We know now they started their experiment in the 40’s.
In term of military might I would agree with Panzer. The Soviet fought against full SS Corps (Budapest) and won. Not against Wolkstrum and 2nd or 3rd rank divisions.
Naval superiority against USSR would have been a waste of money.
Division from the Pacific front: So at what date do you want to attack: After the Japanese capitulation? Guys, we won this war and let start this one?
If before what would happen with the soviet Forces which attacked the Japanese in China Manchuria.
I can imagine the Soviet Air Force attacking the B29 over Japon…

[Vladimir]

It would have been a disaster for the Soviets.
Imagine asking the Polish soldiers, German, all Continental Europe soldiers to forget and forgive their burned villages, raped women, deported and slaughtered population and now fight alongside the SMERSH against the butchering dictator that was Stalin…

A bit choppy but you get the point. You are right though. It would depend on whomever was perceived as the aggressor. Nukes could have won the military battle for the New Allies but I believe we used the only two we had at the time on Japan.

[Kralizec]

It would most likely have been disastrous. The only way I can see the Allies winning would be if they managed to drop nuclear bombs on many of the Soviets' population centres. The USA managed to do this to Japan because they had near-total air superiority by the time, but the Soviet air force would be likely to intercept incoming bombers.

Public opinion wouldn't approve of backstabbing an ally that way, and nor would they like the prospect of another war with additional millions of casualties.

Just like paratroops, I think strategic bombing would have become cost ineffective. Russian cities were already bombed out and the industry gone...

Paratroops were considered cost-ineffective? I recall reading once that Hitler discontinued the use of paratroops after a particulary bad experience with them due to misuse (in Malta, I think) but that some speculate that they could have been of great use on the eastern front, especially in the early months.

[Sarmatian]

While we're at it, maybe some of you more military inclined guys could tell me - would it be practically possible for Americans to drop nuclear bombs on Russia in 1945 (and several subsequent years)?

From what I've been able to get, atomic bombs were still very bulky, heavy, crude and demanded total air superiority to be dropped efficiently. In case of bombing Russia, bombers would have to fly from West Germany or France across several thousands km evading Russian fighters and AA guns to get to Russian population centers. It would have been probably been possible to drop it on Russian army in Germany and Poland, but that would likely turn the population of those countries against the Allies. Rocketry technology still wasn't advanced enough to mount nuclear bombs on rockets. Also, how safe were the bombs? If a bomber flies from France and is taken down over Germany, is there a chance that the bomb would explode? It seems to me that technology still wasn't advanced enough at that time to be effectively used against Russia. Am I right here?

[Seamus Fermanagh]

While we're at it, maybe some of you more military inclined guys could tell me - would it be practically possible for Americans to drop nuclear bombs on Russia in 1945 (and several subsequent years)?

From what I've been able to get, atomic bombs were still very bulky, heavy, crude and demanded total air superiority to be dropped efficiently. In case of bombing Russia, bombers would have to fly from West Germany or France across several thousands km evading Russian fighters and AA guns to get to Russian population centers. It would have been probably been possible to drop it on Russian army in Germany and Poland, but that would likely turn the population of those countries against the Allies. Rocketry technology still wasn't advanced enough to mount nuclear bombs on rockets. Also, how safe were the bombs? If a bomber flies from France and is taken down over Germany, is there a chance that the bomb would explode? It seems to me that technology still wasn't advanced enough at that time to be effectively used against Russia. Am I right here?

The atomic bombs were "dumb" bombs using standard gravity drop for deployment. They were delivered to their target area by B-29 "superfortresses." These bombers had a combat range of more than 5,000 km (standard there-and-back sortie). They had good speed (topping 350mph unloaded)and a service ceiling in excess of 10km. Thus, the B-29 could have delivered the atomic bomb to the USSR, penetrating past Moscow from bases in occupied Germany (and possibly reaching some of the Ural factories?). Soviet fighters would have been hard-pressed to stop them, at least at first, since most of their fighters did not operate at their best at such altitudes and Soviet air doctrine emphasized the low-level and the tactical. How rapidly the Yak's could have been re-worked or new designs deployed as a counter is questionable. We would have been capable of producing roughly 1 a-bomb a month From October 1945 through the end of 1946 (and possibly more as they got better at generating fissionable material).

The early a-weapons might be triggered accidently by impact, so they were armed in flight. Prior to arming, any aircraft shot down or brought down by an accident could do no more than scatter some radioactive material over a fairly small area. Once armed however.....

[Brenus]

“I should have said meaningful paratroop operations”: That is if you speak only about the WW2.
In Indochina, the French used paratroopers in major combat operation and brake at least two major Vietminh offensives in dropping troops in the rear of the enemy even if the last one was a drop to far: Nghia-Là, Bac-Kan, Laos, That-Khé, la R.C. 4, Phu-Doan, HoaBinh, Na-San, Lang-Son and Dien-Bien-Phu.

Now, Helicopters will do the job.

[Sarmatian]

The atomic bombs were "dumb" bombs using standard gravity drop for deployment. They were delivered to their target area by B-29 "superfortresses." These bombers had a combat range of more than 5,000 km (standard there-and-back sortie). They had good speed (topping 350mph unloaded)and a service ceiling in excess of 10km. Thus, the B-29 could have delivered the atomic bomb to the USSR, penetrating past Moscow from bases in occupied Germany (and possibly reaching some of the Ural factories?). Soviet fighters would have been hard-pressed to stop them, at least at first, since most of their fighters did not operate at their best at such altitudes and Soviet air doctrine emphasized the low-level and the tactical. How rapidly the Yak's could have been re-worked or new designs deployed as a counter is questionable. We would have been capable of producing roughly 1 a-bomb a month From October 1945 through the end of 1946 (and possibly more as they got better at generating fissionable material).

The early a-weapons might be triggered accidently by impact, so they were armed in flight. Prior to arming, any aircraft shot down or brought down by an accident could do no more than scatter some radioactive material over a fairly small area. Once armed however.....

Thanks. Basically, it could have been used effectively. 5000 km range is quite enough to reach the Urals from Germany, even from France and Britain... How politically convenient it would be because of relative proximity of other current/potential allies, that's another issue.

Would the weight of the bomb (4-5 tons) have any effect on maneuvering/altitude/range of a B-29? I vaguely remember a documentary saying that getting off the ground was extremely tricky for pilots carrying the bomb dropped on Hiroshima because of the weight, but I somehow doubt that a B-29 would have troubles with 4-5 tons of weight...

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Thanks. Basically, it could have been used effectively. 5000 km range is quite enough to reach the Urals from Germany, even from France and Britain... How politically convenient it would be because of relative proximity of other current/potential allies, that's another issue.

Would the weight of the bomb (4-5 tons) have any effect on maneuvering/altitude/range of a B-29? I vaguely remember a documentary saying that getting off the ground was extremely tricky for pilots carrying the bomb dropped on Hiroshima because of the weight, but I somehow doubt that a B-29 would have troubles with 4-5 tons of weight...

The B-29s "achilles heel" was a tendency for engine overheating. This would cause it to lose an engine (feathered and shut down to prevent fire) every so often. At altitude the sucker could fly on 2 engines. However, if loaded near its full gross (bombs fuel etc.) and it lost an engine on takeoff, there was a pretty good chance it would crash/crash land.

However, with all 4 engines healthy, it could take its normal bombload (9,000kg) up to 10,000m+ (unloaded it could be nursed to 12,000 m), cruise at 360kph and crank it to 500+ kph at need. Total operational weight is always a product of fuel needed, bombload desired, and distance to/speed to target. A 29 could haul 20,000kg of bombs on shorter trips with diminished speed and agility.

The problem with the early a-weapons was their bulk rather than their total weight. The 29 was the only plane in the inventory with a bomb-bay big enough to deploy the "Fat Man."

[PanzerJaeger]

Paratroops were considered cost-ineffective? I recall reading once that Hitler discontinued the use of paratroops after a particulary bad experience with them due to misuse (in Malta, I think) but that some speculate that they could have been of great use on the eastern front, especially in the early months.

Crete is where the Fallschirmjager were grounded. Some of Germany's finest troops were cut down by relatively weak defenders because in many cases they could not reach their weapons, which were dropped separately. Even though they eventually prevailed - which is a story in itself - Hitler was appalled.

Conversely, it took the Allies a bit longer to realize the diminishing effectiveness paratroopers had on the battlefield as the war became increasingly mobile. D-Day did not go well at all. Troops were scattered all over the place and their tactical effectiveness was limited. However, being the Allies elite troops and having fought extremely well vindicated their use to Allied leadership.

It took Monty's masterwork, Market Garden, to truly put an end to Allied paratroop operations. It demonstrated how incredibly vulnerable paratroops were to a mobile response. The early German successes with paratroops were won in a time when war was a much slower affair against nations that did not have mobile reserves. If forced, the Fallschirmjager could hold out for a relatively long time against an enemy with very few armoured resources.

That unmitigated disaster put an end to Allied plans to jump behind the Siegfried line and into Germany. Even today, although the US and other nations maintain paratroops, it is widely acknowledged that - aside from Special Forces ops - their tactical effectiveness is highly limited and that large scale jumps all but off the table.

Jump school is more of a way to filter out all but the most highly motivated soldiers to create elite divisions. Witness the use of the 101st and 82nd Airborne in the toughest areas of Afghanistan. This was true in the latter part of WW2 as well, with both German and Allied paratroops going on to become some of the best light infantry available to their commanders.

[Tribesman]

It took Monty's masterwork, Market Garden, to truly put an end to Allied paratroop operations.

What was operation Varsity then ?
Wasn't Airborne divisions being sent to the far east for more Allied paratroop operations .

Crete is where the Fallschirmjager were grounded.

That was where intelligence screwed up like at Arnhem and the paratroops landed in what they thought was a safe area only to find it was full of ground troops , and like arnhem the relief column was a pipe dream that couldn't make it in time .

[PanzerJaeger]

What was operation Varsity then ?
Wasn't Airborne divisions being sent to the far east for more Allied paratroop operations .

Yes, you are correct. Poor wording on my part. I should have said meaningful paratroop operations.

I excluded Varsity from the operations conducted prior to the Normandy invasion and Market Garden because there was no chance of failure. Conducted in what.. March '45... it was more about grandstanding than any kind of operational advantages. Although IIRC it too demonstrated how vulnerable paratroops had become with higher than anticipated casualties, despite the result never being in doubt. Market Garden scuttled some more ambitious plans to use paratroops behind the Siegfried line, which would have actually been an effective yet risky endeavor. It has been documented that Ike and his commanders had turned against airborne operations when they involved a chance of failure.

The 82nd had it's wings clipped.

Man I am behind! Didn't they do a tiny jump in Afghanistan or something?

[Pannonian]

Vladimir, you forget that Stalin wasn't a butchering dictator, but Uncle Joe who led the brave Russians against the evil Germans. Unlike 1984, the Allies' population wouldn't be able to stomach fighting with the brave Germans against the evil Russians, whom we've always been at war with. Not without clearcut evidence that the Russians started it, anyway.

[Vladimir]

Vladimir, you forget that Stalin wasn't a butchering dictator, but Uncle Joe who led the brave Russians against the evil Germans. Unlike 1984, the Allies' population wouldn't be able to stomach fighting with the brave Germans against the evil Russians, whom we've always been at war with. Not without clearcut evidence that the Russians started it, anyway.

Oops, you're right.

Jump school is more of a way to filter out all but the most highly motivated soldiers to create elite divisions. Witness the use of the 101st and 82nd Airborne in the toughest areas of Afghanistan. This was true in the latter part of WW2 as well, with both German and Allied paratroops going on to become some of the best light infantry available to their commanders.

The 82nd had it's wings clipped.

[KrooK]

Bad predictions:
1. Soviet Union into 1945 had similar level of development of military industry. Russian tanks were better and planes were as good as Western.
2. Soviet Union had much bigger army and supply lines shorter than Western Allies. I don't count GB because they were exhausted of war.
3. Soviet Union had worse commanders (exept General Moroz) but 10 times better soldiers than Western Allies. And what do you think would happen if US Army enter Russia into russian winter. American sources are crying about heroism of paratroopers into Bastogne - for Russians behavior like that was ABSOLUTELY NORMAL.
4. Chinese resistance was weak, corrupted and untrained. Nothing strange that even during 1944 Japanese Army was winning into China.
5. Russia can't be treat like a country - ITS CONTINENT - and you can't forget about it.

[Brenus]

Marshal Stalin’s speech to the Soviet the day after the US attack lead by Gal Patton (the intervention was broadcasted to all USSR and Russian Held Territory):

“One again an eagle rise on the West and attacked the birth place of Socialism.
Once again an eagle wants to feed on the flesh of the men who brought the light to mankind…
Yesterday saw a new day of infamy…
Yesterday, the USA allied with the Nazi SS wearing their true uniforms launched a surprise attacked on our peace keeping forces in Germany.
Once again, the Capitalists try to impose the yoke of servitude on the land of the Free.

Comrades, Workers, Peasants and Soldiers, once again we have to fight a war we didn’t start.
Rise up, join the Glorious banner of the Red Army and we will defeat together the Imperialists.

Soldiers, Sailors and aviators the Rodina expects you to do you duty. You defeated the Nazi Barbarians; you will not be defeat by the Capitalists and their marionettes.”

Deployment of the Red Army:
Manchuria and Asia: Neutralisation of the US Navy in Pacific in attacking Japan.
Deployment of medium and long range bombers IL-2 and IL4 (Range 2,600 km up to three 1,102lb torpedoes could be carried)
Attack on the US fleet with bombers, blockade of Japan
Support to China, Vietnam and communist movements in the region.

Strong message is sent to Turkey to keep out of the mess. USSR is closer to Ankara than USA.

Europe: Reactivation of the Communist guerrilla in Greece.
Tito gives authorisation of the Russian armies to cross Yugoslavia and to use the harbours of Montenegro and Croatia.
Russian tanks are in range of Trieste.
Ever Hodza do the same for Albania.

Pressure put on France (Governement Provisoire Gal de Gaulle who has no love for USA) and Italy to stay out of the conflict (strong communist parties).
In case of involvement of theses countries a long side of the US, the III International and the 21 conditions apply.
Sabotage and attack on the logistic lines of the US.
Sabotage in the reconstruction of the harbours destroyed by the Germans.

Germany: US soldiers facing Katiouchka for the first time and the Massive Tank attack…

[Oleander Ardens]

Actually the Soviets had always the numerical superiority, even at day 1. The greatly superior number of standing troops and material was however split between the frontline and the strategic reserve so that there was a slight German superiority at the areas near the frontline. And of course great operational superiority on the areas where the big breakthroughs were planned.

Figure 2. Scope of Operations

AXIS FORCES RED ARMY FORCES

June 1941: 3,767,000 2,680,000 (in theater)
3,117,000 (German) 5,500,000 (overall)
900,000 (in the west)

June 1942: 3,720,000 5,313,000
2,690,000 (German)
80 % in the East

July 1943: 3,933,000 6,724,000
3,483,000 (German)
63 % in the East

June 1944 3,370,000 6,425,000
2,520,000 (German)
62 % in the East

Jan. 1945 2,330,000 6,532,000
2,230,000 (German)
60 % in the East

April 1945 1,960,000 6,410,000

Total Mobilized 34,476,700

The Lend-Lease program is usually underlined by "American" writers and downplayed by Russian writers. I think David Glantz conclusion - even if debateable, as he also writes - comes far closer to the truth than this two positions, especially the Russian/Soviet one. Most likey the Sovietunion could have won without this support, but it proved to be immensly helpful in many critical areas and allowed the Soviets to concentrate on a highly efficient production in other areas. Note that he doesn't discuss here the importance of the allied air campaigns and later ground offensives 1942, 1943 and 1944 in diverting men and especially material away from the Eastern front.

Bold/Underlined by myself.

Figure 7. Lend-Lease Assistance to the Soviet Union

Lend-Lease Domestic Production

Armored vehicles 12,161 (12 %) 98,300 (7,056 US)

Guns and mortars 9,600 (2 %) 525,200

Machine guns 131,600

Combat aircraft 18,303 (15 %) 122,100
Fighters 13,857
Bombers 3,633
Transport 710
Reconnaissance 19
Training 84

Aircraft engines 14,902 (6.7 %) 222,418

Trucks and Jeeps 409,526 (55 %) 744,400

(reached Russia) 312,600 (42 %)

Explosives (tons) 325,784

Locomotives 1,860 (6.3 %) 29,524

Rail cars 11,181

Field telephones 422,000

Foodstuffs (tons) 4,281,910 (25 %) 17,127,640

Oil (POL) (tons) 2,599,000

Boots 15,000,000 pairs

Without Lend-Lease food, clothing, and raw materials (especially metals), the Soviet economy would have been even more heavily burdened by the war effort. Perhapsmost directly, without Lend-Lease trucks, rail engines, and railroad cars, every Soviet offensive would have stalled at an earlier stage, outrunning its logistical tail in a matter of days. In turn, this would have allowed the German commanders to escape at least some encirclements, while forcing the Red Army to prepare and conduct many more deliberate penetration attacks in order to advance the same distance. Left to their own devices, Stalin and his commanders might have taken 12 to 18 months longer to finish off the Wehrmacht; the ultimate result would probably have been the same, except that Soviet soldiers could have waded at France’s Atlantic beaches. Thus, while the Red Army shed the bulk of Allied blood, it would have shed more blood for longer without Allied assistance

Attention, Sarmantian:

Countless human wave attack is another misconception. Already seen in 1943, but from 1944 Deep Operations were performed with perfection - Operation Bagration, Vistula Oder offensive, destruction of the army group South Ukraine. Manchuria etc... Not to mention it was performed against the best of Feldheer, while Allies, with exception of a few elite divisions in France were up against second or even third rate German troops, reserves and/or garrison troops.

Pefection is a too strong word to describe even Bagration, and Glantz shows just how many soviet offensives in the spirit of "Deep battle" ended in terrible soviet casualities compared to the German ones. What is true that the operational skill of the soviet commanders grew progressively aided of course by the ever increasing crushing superiority especially in military hardware. This was very important as it limited the (still terrible) casualities in the last two years as manpower became a lot thinner.

Heck, even Germans managed to mount the second Ardennes offensive against the Allies practically without air support. It was a dangerous offensive, too as Allies had too urge Stalin to increase pressure on the Germans from the other side, which resulted in Soviet offensive being launched 8 days ahead of schedule.

The importance of the air power in the WW2 is often exaggerated. It depended to much on the weather and the time of day, opponent could transport his supplies or move his troops at night practically unopposed.

Nota bene that the Germans were forced to make the offensive under the protection of the weather - their best flak. Once the weather cleared the situation become very soon very desperate as the supply was reduced to a trickle as the Jabos harried and destroyed everthing moving. Actually better progress by the German army would have been better for the Allies (as Eisenhower, an avid reader of Clausewitz stated). This would have allowed to annihilate the great majority of the mobile forces in the West.

Actually it is almost impossible to overstate the importance of the soviet air superiority (almost supremecy in 1944 and 1945) in the east after late 1942. In conjuncture with the partizans the ability of the Germans to shift troops and supply became ever smaller. As "highly mobile artillery" and "flying tanks" the might Red air force was a most decisive element in the victories, especially in the deep phases of the great offensive operations.

[KrooK]

Comparison of navy and naval air force has no sense. Soviet Union did not need naval air force - what for:) All their state is on one place. Of course its possible that allied punch could conquer 300 -500 km but what then....
1. Allies are entering steppes of Ukraine/Tajga at far east.
2. Winter starts.
3. Allied soldiers ends like German.
4. Russian soldiers, prepared on winter, counterattack.
5. Russians tanks from Iran are attacking Turkey and ends with air bases mentioned into earlier posts.
6. Russians send military instructors and equipment to Chineese communist party and to India, when we have really massive revolts.

[Sarmatian]

Actually the Soviets had always the numerical superiority, even at day 1. The greatly superior number of standing troops and material was however split between the frontline and the strategic reserve so that there was a slight German superiority at the areas near the frontline. And of course great operational superiority on the areas where the big breakthroughs were planned.

True, I've used numbers only for troops in Western Military Districts (on the first day of invasion) and only troops deployed at fronts for later period. Soviets had much more mobilizable troops, but until they're deployed, you can't count them. What many authors, especially German, tend to forget are Germany's allies. Various Hungarian, Slovak, Italian, Croatian, Finnish and, most importantly, Romanian divisions. They contributed with about 1,000,000 troops which change drastically ratio of forces.

The Lend-Lease program is usually underlined by "American" writers and downplayed by Russian writers. I think David Glantz conclusion - even if debateable, as he also writes - comes far closer to the truth than this two positions, especially the Russian/Soviet one. Most likey the Sovietunion could have won without this support, but it proved to be immensly helpful in many critical areas and allowed the Soviets to concentrate on a highly efficient production in other areas. Note that he doesn't discuss here the importance of the allied air campaigns and later ground offensives 1942, 1943 and 1944 in diverting men and especially material away from the Eastern front.

True, Russian historians tend to downplay lend-lease while American/western tend to emphasize it. Glantz tried to be objective but he made a mistake of just comparing numbers instead of actual production. For example trucks - he concluded that 400,000 trucks sent in lend-lease were crucial because they made up a significant portion of the total trucks in the Red Army. Next, he concluded that without those trucks Red Army wouldn't be able to supply their troops properly and many of their offensives would be stopped early. What he didn't consider is that Soviet production of trucks gradually declined - I think I have the exact numbers of trucks produced per year buried somewhere, I'll try to dig it up - as the number of trucks delivered through lend-lease increased. So, his conclusion that Red Army logistics would be severely strained is flawed since they could produce more trucks and they would if they had to. The overall efficiency of the Red Army would decrease because they would have to divert 1 or 2% of their industrial capacity to producing trucks.

Pefection is a too strong word to describe even Bagration, and Glantz shows just how many soviet offensives in the spirit of "Deep battle" ended in terrible soviet casualities compared to the German ones. What is true that the operational skill of the soviet commanders grew progressively aided of course by the ever increasing crushing superiority especially in military hardware. This was very important as it limited the (still terrible) casualities in the last two years as manpower became a lot thinner.

Obviously, I exaggerated when I said perfection. That was a response to "mass frontal assaults" misconception. Actually, it was late night when I wrote it so I have been more blunt than usual. Although Soviet casualties decreased only slightly later (in 1943, '44, '45), their ability to inflict casualties grew exponentially. Many people tend to think that German army in the east was defeated practically in 1943, which is not true. After Kursk, German army was on the defensive and unable to mount a large-scale offensive but it was far from defeated. Red Army fought the best divisions of the best army in the world that were on the defensive. Even though it was an age of mobile forces, the defender always have the advantage and bigger casualties for the attacker are quite normal. Even then, there were examples of Soviets inflicting far more casualties than they suffered, during the destruction of German army group South Ukraine in '44 the ratio was almost 10:1 in favour of the Red army in casualties sustained. I don't have here the exact numbers of casualties suffered during Operation Bagration against army group Center but from what I remember they were comparable and army group Center at the time was in very good shape. It was weakened somewhat to reinforce army group South but wasn't itself part of any major conflicts and had more than enough time to prepare its defences.

Also, it's true that Soviets often underestimate the impact of Allied landing in France just as much as Allies tend to overestimate it. It did weaken the pressure on the Eastern front but the overall quality of German troops in the west (France, Italy) was much worse than the quality of German troops in the east.

Nota bene that the Germans were forced to make the offensive under the protection of the weather - their best flak. Once the weather cleared the situation become very soon very desperate as the supply was reduced to a trickle as the Jabos harried and destroyed everthing moving. Actually better progress by the German army would have been better for the Allies (as Eisenhower, an avid reader of Clausewitz stated). This would have allowed to annihilate the great majority of the mobile forces in the West.

That's what I said, air power of the time was too much dependent on weather and time of the day. Also, Luftwaffe practically didn't exist at the time and VVS was very strong in 1945. It would certainly be able to put up much better fight that Luftwaffe in '44 or '45.

I don't agree with the other part. If the offensive was successful, it would have cut off a large portion of the British to the north. It wouldn't change anything in the long run but cut off British would have suffered terrible casualties.

Actually it is almost impossible to overstate the importance of the soviet air superiority (almost supremecy in 1944 and 1945) in the east after late 1942. In conjuncture with the partizans the ability of the Germans to shift troops and supply became ever smaller. As "highly mobile artillery" and "flying tanks" the might Red air force was a most decisive element in the victories, especially in the deep phases of the great offensive operations.

In '44 and '45, Soviet pushed Germans out of the USSR and lost a good portion of partisan support. I'm not dismissing air power importance but on the Eastern Front it wasn't nearly as important as armour or artillery and it would have been the similar situation in this hypothetical scenario we are discussing. Don't forget that Soviet first successful large scale offensive was in December '41, when Germans had air superiority. Of course, in the Pacific conflict, air power was much more important. So, I'm not dismissing the importance of air power, just downplaying its importance in this specific conflict we're discussing.

[Oleander Ardens]

True, I've used numbers only for troops in Western Military Districts (on the first day of invasion) and only troops deployed at fronts for later period. Soviets had much more mobilizable troops, but until they're deployed, you can't count them. What many authors, especially German, tend to forget are Germany's allies. Various Hungarian, Slovak, Italian, Croatian, Finnish and, most importantly, Romanian divisions. They contributed with about 1,000,000 troops which change drastically ratio of forces.

That's why I used the numbers provided by Glantz.

June 1941: 3,767,000 vs. 2,680,000 (in theater)
3,117,000 (German) 5,500,000 (overall)
900,000 (in the west)

Makes 650.000 allied troops.

So as I stated before the Sovietunion had less troops in the theater but far more mobilized. Actually one can argue that in this very special case of total strategic, operational and tactical surprise more troops on the frontline in shallow depth would have only added to the desaster.

rly. What he didn't consider is that Soviet production of trucks gradually declined - I think I have the exact numbers of trucks produced per year buried somewhere, I'll try to dig it up - as the number of trucks delivered through lend-lease increased. So, his conclusion that Red Army logistics would be severely strained is flawed since they could produce more trucks and they would if they had to. The overall efficiency of the Red Army would decrease because they would have to divert 1 or 2% of their industrial capacity to producing trucks.

I would certainly be surprised if such a small percentage would be needed to produce such a large amount of Trucks. Also the Soviets seemed to think that the Studer was athe superior truck design (mobile, reliable) and also made it the standard truck the Rocket batteries. Your numbers would certainly be very helpful.

ven then, there were examples of Soviets inflicting far more casualties than they suffered, during the destruction of German army group South Ukraine in '44 the ratio was almost 10:1 in favour of the Red army in casualties sustained. I don't have here the exact numbers of casualties suffered during Operation Bagration against army group Center but from what I remember they were comparable and army group Center at the time was in very good shape. It was weakened somewhat to reinforce army group South but wasn't itself part of any major conflicts and had more than enough time to prepare its defences.

I more than a bit sceptical about a 10:1 ratio in favour for the Red Army - could you bring up sources? The brilliant Operation Bagration Operation Bagration which is widely seen as the heaviest defeat of the Heer in the East seems to have a far smaller ratio.

The Soviet casualities


178,507 killed and missing, 590,848 wounded and sick - 765.815 in total

G. F. Krivošeev , Grif sekretnosti snjat. Poteri Vooružennych Sil SSSR v vojnach, boevych dejstvijach i voennych konfliktach. Statističeskoe issledovanie. Voennoe Izdat Moskva 1993, ISBN 5-203-01400-0, ISBN 978-5-203-01400-9. с. 203, 371

According to Zaloga:

60,000 killed, 110,000 wounded, and about 8,000 missing, with 2,957 tanks, 2,447 artillery pieces, and 822 aircraft also lost.[14]

Zaloga, S. Bagration 1944: The Destruction of Army Group Centre, Osprey Publishing, 1996, ISBN 978-1855324787.

The German casualities

399.102 soldiers ( 26.397 killed, 262.929 missed, 109.776 wounded) - with estimated 150.000 POW (part of the missing!) and 9000 who filtered later back there are 140.000 dead

# Karl-Heinz Frieser (Hrsg. i.A. des MGFA); Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg - Band 8: Karl-Heinz Frieser, Klaus Schmider, Klaus Schönherr, Gerhard Schreiber, Kristián Ungváry, Bernd Wegner; Die Ostfront 1943/44 - Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten; Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt München 2007; ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2

300,000 dead, 250,000 wounded, and about 120,000 captured (overall casualties at 670,000), 2,000 tanks and 57,000 other vehicles

Zaloga, S. Bagration 1944: The Destruction of Army Group Centre, Osprey Publishing, 1996, ISBN 978-1855324787.



The superiority of the Soviets was quite sobering:

Germany

800,000 men
495 tanks (900 SP/tanks [1])
(4000 mortars/artillery guns [1])
1,555 aircraft (1324 [1])

Sovietunion

2,331,700 men
4,050 tanks (5200 SP/tanks [1])
24,000 artillery guns (33000 mortars/artillery [1[)
5,327 aircraft (5100 [1])

~ 140000-150000 partisans operated in the rear of the Heer, laying over 10,000 bombs along the Railways

1

So 3:1 in numbers, 3,5:1 in aircrafts, 6-8:1 in tanks, 6-8:1 in artillery/mortars in this long fronts. The Soviet concentrations in the breakthrough areas must have been earth-shaking...

Overview of the casualities:

Frieser is an excellent author, as well as Zaloga. I wonder if the latter has used mostly soviet sources which predate the publication of G. F. Krivošeev. The differences are immense. Overall the modern German accounts are usually very precise about German casualities and G. F. Krivošeev seems to have set a new Soviet standard. The extremely low number of Soviet casualities in Zalogas book compared to G. F. Krivošeev is quite stark. On the other hand the the extremely high number of German casualities, especially killed compared to Frieser is equally stark. So Zalogas numbers seem to have "Propaganda" written all over it.

It would be also very important to know how many of the wounded were permanent losses and how fast the rest could return to the battlefield, if at all.

German - Frieser/Soviet - G. F. Krivošeev

likely killed 140.000 - 178,507 (missed without the POW added for both sides)
captured 150.000 - ~
wounded 109.776 - 590,848 (only the seriously wounded on both sides plus the sicks on the soviet side)

This seems to also to make most sense when one studies the operation(s). Many wounded germans could not evacuated/treated due to the rapid Soviet advance, increasing the dead and captured. A unknow of POW got killed by Partisans. The idiotic "stand fast" of Hitler caused the large amount of pockets and amounted to many prisoners. However in attacking such desperate defensive position the Soviets lost also rather large amount of men, as in the vast majority of such offensives. The large loss in material is also testimony to the heavy partisan activity, but even more so due to the massive and deep reaching use of huge numbers of ground-attack aircrafts (IL-2) against the retreating Germans on the few narrow roads. Broken down/damaged soviet AFV could be repaired, German AFV usually not.

In any case the operation was a outstanding success.


So if we take the captured, missing and killed and afterwards the seriously (not captured, not missing) wounded togheter we come up with ratio a) and b)

German - Soviet losses

a) 290000 - 180000
1,5 - 1

b) 110000 - 590000 (Attention, Soviet numbers contain also the sick, while German numbers don't)
1 - 5 (5,36)

So a 10 to 1 ratio in favour of the Soviets in the Ukraine would be quite amazing...