WW2: The Composition and Capabilities of the Japanese Military

[PanzerJaeger]

I'd say Bodenplatte showed Luftwaffe for what it was in early '45: an empty shell of what it had been earlier in the war.

Well, yes and no.

Baseplate was certainly not short on the errors and inexperience that would be associated with the attritional nature of the latter part of the war that you mentioned. The precision of the planning and the skill of many of the pilots involved could definitely be described as a shell of former Luftwaffe operations, as well.

However, Baseplate was a tactical success. Was it the kind of massively lopsided victory the German air corps had grown accustomed to in their heyday? No, but it was a success nonetheless. Despite its numerous problems at this stage, the Luftwaffe was able to plan and execute a powerful strike against the far superior Allied air forces. IIRC, the Allies lost around 500 planes while the Germans lost only half that number, and a large portion of that was due to friendly fire losses due to a failure to alert the flak batteries that German planes would be flying over them. Had American manufacturing not have been so overwhelmingly superior, such a loss would have been a major blow to the Allied air corps - achieved 4 months before the war in Europe was over.

Contrast that to the Japanese operations at the time, which seemingly revolved around the best ways in which to hurl their planes into American ships. That relates back to my original sense that the Japanese deterioration was suprisingly acute.

The point, however, is this: when it comes down to it, Russia is simply too big. Let's Japan occupies half of Siberia. And? How does this knock the Soviets out?

Well, conceivably the effect would be cumulative. Russia was not the monolithic giant with endless supplies of men and material that it is sometimes portrayed to be. Just like any nation, the USSR had its limit - as has been discussed recently in relation to Lend-Lease. In 1941, its breaking point was surely smaller than in the years after.

It can be argued that had Japan applied pressure in the East at that critical time, allowing Germany to take Moscow and the other major cities and push the Russians behind the Urals, they're capabilities would largely be diminished.

Surely Stalin may have been able to use the vastness of the environment to elude total defeat for a time, but even with as much Russian industry as he was able to move - being trapped in the middle of undeveloped Russia would have him strangled for resources and the ability to launch offensive operations.

In any event, I believe better coordination between the two powers leading to a Japanese attack on Russia would have been a far better decision for the overall Axis effort than bringing the US into the war. Of course, taking their entire fleet into the middle of the Pacific and scuttling it would have also been a far better decision than bringing the US in, so hindsight is 20/20.