
Originally Posted by
Xiahou
I thought this excerpt was interesting:So he's finished, not just in Afghanistan, but in the military altogether. What did he do to make the administration want to force him out? I guess I'll have to wait for McKiernan's tell all book.

Here's a somewhat informed take:
When a Cabinet officer asks for a subordinate's resignation, it means that he's firing the guy. This doesn't happen very often in the U.S. military. McKiernan had another year to go as commander. (When Gen. George Casey's strategy clearly wasn't working in Iraq, President George W. Bush let him serve out his term, then promoted him to Army chief of staff.) Gates also made it clear he wasn't acting on a personal whim. He said that he took the step after consulting with Gen. David Petraeus, commander of U.S. Central Command; Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and President Barack Obama. According to one senior official, Gates went over to Afghanistan last week for the sole purpose of giving McKiernan the news face-to-face.
Gates emphasized at a press conference today that McKiernan didn't do anything specifically wrong but that "fresh thinking" was needed urgently. The United States couldn't just wait until the current commander's term ran out.
An intellectual battle is now raging within the Army between an "old guard" that thinks about war in conventional, force-on-force terms and a "new guard" that focuses more on "asymmetric conflicts" and counterinsurgency.
McKiernan is an excellent general in the old mold. McChrystal, who rose through the ranks as a special-forces officer, is an excellent general in the new mold. He has also worked closely with Gates and Petraeus. (In his press conference, Gates referred to McChrystal's "unique skill set in counterinsurgency.") For the past year, McChrystal has been director of the Pentagon's Joint Staff. More pertinently, for five years before that, he was commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, a highly secretive operation that hunted down and killed key jihadist fighters, including, most sensationally, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq.
Last fall, Bob Woodward reported in the Washington Post that JSOC played a crucial, unsung role in the tactical success of the Iraqi "surge." Using techniques of what McChrystal called "collaborative warfare," JSOC combined intelligence intercepts with quick, precision strikes to "eliminate" large numbers of key insurgent leaders.
This appointment will not be without controversy. McChrystal's command also provided the personnel for Task Force 6-26, an elite unit of 1,000 special-ops forces that engaged in harsh interrogation of detainees in Camp Nama as far back as 2003. The interrogations were so harsh that five Army officers were convicted on charges of abuse. (McChrystal himself was not implicated in the excesses, but the unit's slogan, which set the tone for its practices, was "If you don't make them bleed, they can't prosecute for it.")
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Another take.
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