Afrika Korps

[Pannonian]

What exactly were the combined arms tactics where the Germans excelled? The Panzer II’s were fast scout tanks that could actually defeat the thin armor of some of the British cruiser tanks at close range and chew up infantry with High Explosive rounds from its 20 mm main gun. The Panzer III’s were the mainstay and could defeat most of the slower Allied armor by outflanking them. When the panzers were outmatched, the 88 mm flak guns could defeat any Allied tank from a considerable range. The British tanks were equipped with guns that did not fire HE rounds, so the 88’s could fire at them with impunity (until the M3 and M4 showed up). The German Panzer IV’s short 75 mm HE gun on the other hand, was able to take out Allied AT gun crews. In place of set piece artillery, the Luftwaffe provided Stukas to pummel desert fortresses. So the DAK had an answer to most tactical situations that the Allies could provide.

Rommel fought a “guerrilla blitzkrieg”, which his contemporaries in Russia did not employ. He often took his force into deep flanking maneuvers without what most generals would consider adequate logistical support on the premise that he would overrun Allied supply depots and thus use Allied fuel for his panzers and Allied food and water for his troops. Possession of the battlefield was paramount as destroyed panzers were cannibalized to repair damaged panzers and fuel and ammo was always stripped away. Rommel was also not against using captured Allied equipment. Twelve British Matildas were used by the DAK, often to the confusion of both sides. Still, the Afrika Korps often had fewer than 100 panzers operational. Never have so few done so much with so little.

Operation Compass. A British-Commonwealth force of around 35,000, with barely enough fuel to reach the Egyptian border, against an Italian force of around 150,000. Ended up clearing out the Italians from Cyrenaica, and would have continued into Tripolitania if the bulk of the force hadn't been transferred to Greece. A highlight of the campaign was the sending of a mobile column across open desert to cut off the retreat of the Italians, while simultaneously harassing them via the road route. I wonder if Rommel would have had the same success if O'Connor, who used Rommel's tactics before Rommel ever arrived on the scene, hadn't been captured early on.

[PanzerJaeger]

I wonder if Rommel would have had the same success if O'Connor, who used Rommel's tactics before Rommel ever arrived on the scene, hadn't been captured early on.

I'm almost sure of it.

[Husar]

O'Connor can't have been all that clever if he got captured early on.

[KrooK]

Rommels first success was mostly because Britons did not respect his skills.
British generals had to send best units to Greece.
If we are comparing O'Connor and Rommel - O'Connor was better for me. Africa Corps and Britons into Africa had equal strenght at the beginning of that stage of war. O'Connor had to attack few times stronger enemy.

Anyway someone showed polish flag. Thx - looks like you are using tactic "I have no arguments so I will tell that he is Pole and uses polish propaganda". Imagine my friend that polish brigade defended Tobruk against Rommel.
And his great africa corps lost that battle (and appeared to be lower skilled than infantry brigade).

[Agent Miles]

I don’t think that you can reasonably compare what O’Connor did to Il Duce's Italians to what Rommel did to the British Commonwealth forces. The Italians were led by incompetent officers and were poorly equipped. 7th Armoured Division had dozens of Matildas that were quite literally invulnerable to any and all Italian weapons. Rommel never had an advantage like that.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Of course you can compare them.


Rommel faced a higher quality of opposition, but not quite the disparity of numbers.

O'Connor faced lower quality opposition, but quite a disparity in numbers.

Both faced supply issues.

Everyone faced water issues.


EVERYONE, faced with a desert conflict during the era of mobility, has come up with the SAME grand tactic -- whip around wide on the desert flank. Allenby -- O'Connor -- Rommel -- Montgomery -- Schwarzkopf, have all gotten to the same solution.

[Agent Miles]

I think that one must blur a lot of facts to reasonably compare the two. The Greek garrison army defeated the Italians and drove them back into Albania. So one could argue that they accomplished what O’Connor did. The French drove back an Italian army on their southern border while they were being overrun by the Germans. I’m pretty sure that the only people who did not defeat the Italians were the spear-armed Ethiopian tribesmen. Yes, Rommel and O’Connor brilliantly out-flanked their opponent, but one has to remember who their opponents were to scale the accomplishment. House training my puppy is not reasonably comparable to lion taming.

[Mount Suribachi]

Contrary to popular belief, German tanks in North Africa, excluding the Tigers, were not superior to their Allied equivalents in any particularly meaningful ways. It was the skill of the crews as well as their doctrine which resulted in the lopsided results

I'm sorry. but you're taking the michael here. The PzIII & PzIV not superior to the Crusader, A13 and Matlida? British tanks were without exception, underpowered, underarmed, unreliable and (Matilda excepted) underarmoured. Not only was the 2pdr a pop-gun, it was also unable to fire HE ammunition. Then throw in the German 88m AT gun (which to be fair probably destroyed more British tanks than the Panzers) and the British were totally outclassed until the arrival of the Sherman put them back on a level playing field.

[rotorgun]

I apologize to all for not getting in on this thread sooner; my work and social schedule have been rather heavy lately. I have read all of the posts and found the discussion intriguing. The posts about the development of tactics during the first world war are fascinating indeed. In an effort to steer the discussion back towards its original beginning I should like to add that I agree with some that the Afirka Korps was a indeed a regular collection of regular Wheremacht units, given a modified organization to accommodate a special mission. That it was considered a crack outfit is probably part truth and part myth based on its overall performance and the reputation of Erwin Rommel.

As for its superiority during some battles, this was due to the better use of a combined arms approach on the tactical level, and a general superiority of equipment at various times during the many battles it fought. If one considers how much more flexible an organization the average Panzer division was at the time, compared to how the average British or Commonwealth Armored unit was arranged, than it is easy to see how it could respond more rapidly to contingencies. British armored formations lacked infantry support until much later in the war, and indeed many of their AFVs armed with the 2 Pndr had no HE ammunition to deal with enemy infantry. This often lead to the attaching of infantry brigades to the armored brigades to provide this capability, but as they might not have trained with each other prior to this, it was an ad-hoc solution at best.

The dreaded 88mm gun aside, most of the German main battle tanks were Panzer III H or G models, armed with the 50mm KwK 38 L/42. At the time of the battle of Gazala, there were only 19 Panzer III J models available. They had the much improved 50mm KwK 39 L/60. These later became the mainstay of the Afrika Korps during the Tunisian campaign. The British had the Crusader MK II as its main AFV, which despite its good speed, had weaker frontal armor than the German Pz III. There were separate brigades for of Matilda and Valentine tanks that had superior armor than the German tanks, but they were slow and sometimes unreliable. All of these were equipped with QF 2-pounder gun. There were also brigades made up of lend lease equipment. The M3 Stuart or Honey as the British called it, and 167 M3 Grant Tanks. It was these that surprised Rommel along with 112 of the new 6 Pndr anti-tank guns available to the infantry.

Although the new 6 Pndrs and M2 75mm guns of the Grants gave the Afrika Korps serious trouble during parts of the battle, the way in which the German formations dealt with them by the use of better tactics and maneuver neutralized their impact. Whenever possible, they would attempt to lure the heavier armored Matildas, Valentines, and Grants into kill boxes of anti-tank guns, dominated by the 88mm Flak 36 guns aided by the lighter 28/20 and 50 mm PAK. If these were unavailable, the way that Panzer Divisions were able to mass all of its armor rapidly against the often piecemeal deployment of the British Armored Brigades allowed them to defeat them in detail. This was a result of a better doctrine and a more flexible command climate.

Here is an interesting sight about the Afrika Korps that has a wealth of information:

http://www.afrikakorps.org/

I hope it will foster more discussion from this group of Org Members.