I apologize to all for not getting in on this thread sooner; my work and social schedule have been rather heavy lately. I have read all of the posts and found the discussion intriguing. The posts about the development of tactics during the first world war are fascinating indeed. In an effort to steer the discussion back towards its original beginning I should like to add that I agree with some that the Afirka Korps was a indeed a regular collection of regular Wheremacht units, given a modified organization to accommodate a special mission. That it was considered a crack outfit is probably part truth and part myth based on its overall performance and the reputation of Erwin Rommel.

As for its superiority during some battles, this was due to the better use of a combined arms approach on the tactical level, and a general superiority of equipment at various times during the many battles it fought. If one considers how much more flexible an organization the average Panzer division was at the time, compared to how the average British or Commonwealth Armored unit was arranged, than it is easy to see how it could respond more rapidly to contingencies. British armored formations lacked infantry support until much later in the war, and indeed many of their AFVs armed with the 2 Pndr had no HE ammunition to deal with enemy infantry. This often lead to the attaching of infantry brigades to the armored brigades to provide this capability, but as they might not have trained with each other prior to this, it was an ad-hoc solution at best.

The dreaded 88mm gun aside, most of the German main battle tanks were Panzer III H or G models, armed with the 50mm KwK 38 L/42. At the time of the battle of Gazala, there were only 19 Panzer III J models available. They had the much improved 50mm KwK 39 L/60. These later became the mainstay of the Afrika Korps during the Tunisian campaign. The British had the Crusader MK II as its main AFV, which despite its good speed, had weaker frontal armor than the German Pz III. There were separate brigades for of Matilda and Valentine tanks that had superior armor than the German tanks, but they were slow and sometimes unreliable. All of these were equipped with QF 2-pounder gun. There were also brigades made up of lend lease equipment. The M3 Stuart or Honey as the British called it, and 167 M3 Grant Tanks. It was these that surprised Rommel along with 112 of the new 6 Pndr anti-tank guns available to the infantry.

Although the new 6 Pndrs and M2 75mm guns of the Grants gave the Afrika Korps serious trouble during parts of the battle, the way in which the German formations dealt with them by the use of better tactics and maneuver neutralized their impact. Whenever possible, they would attempt to lure the heavier armored Matildas, Valentines, and Grants into kill boxes of anti-tank guns, dominated by the 88mm Flak 36 guns aided by the lighter 28/20 and 50 mm PAK. If these were unavailable, the way that Panzer Divisions were able to mass all of its armor rapidly against the often piecemeal deployment of the British Armored Brigades allowed them to defeat them in detail. This was a result of a better doctrine and a more flexible command climate.

Here is an interesting sight about the Afrika Korps that has a wealth of information:

http://www.afrikakorps.org/

I hope it will foster more discussion from this group of Org Members.