Who is the most overrated general ever?

[Xtiaan72]

Well said... I certainly wasn't trying to come off as one of his biggest fans ( Although perhaps I did!).
I was just trying to make a reasonable argument that he is not over-rated!

Let's face it some of the things he did were.....not so nice to say the least ( genocide and political thuggery topping the list!). That is what tarnishes his legacy more than anything else inmo. I wouldn't take issue with anyone questioning his character but his success (as you said) is pretty hard to argue with.

Although, there is probably a case to made that a 'nice' guy could not have won a battle like Alesia. I'm not a fan of Caesar but as a figure he is very compelling and certainly complicated.

[Macilrille]

Two things:

1. Caesar was a man of his time, I have said it before; do not judge the past by today's standards.
2. Notice that I, a military historian, have not commented on this subject, it is a moot and redundant debate I am sorry to say. It would never pop up on for example H-War or a University.

If you push me for my opinion I would say Zhukov or Monty, or possibly even Rommel, Hannibal for ancients- for the same reason as Rommel, tactical genius, strategical blunderer.

That said, the discussion is still moot.

[Ludens]

First of all he had a poor plan for getting Roman allies to detatch. He wanted them to view him as a friend rather than an enemy, so he often promised no harm would come to them if they did not join him. This meant that if they stayed loyal to Rome, it was better than if they went over to Hannibal, and then Rome won, because Rome would come back and punish them.

That's a pretty bold statement to make. Slaughtering thousands of countryman, friends, family, colleagues tends to make people emotional, so it's not sure that it would have convinced the Italians to defect. Possibly, Hannibal's strategy was to show the Italians that he was not like Rome and would offer them better terms than the total submission required by the Senate. It didn't work as well as he hoped, but that doesn't mean the opposite would have worked better.

Another example of Hannibal's poor planning is his enourmous blunder of failing to properly use the battle of Cannae. He had just crushed the Roman army, leaving them practically defenseless; many of Rome's allies detatched, feeling that Rome was doomed; all Hannibal had to do was march on the city. He may not have thought he could take it, but just the presence of his army outside the city could have forced the Romans to terms.

I've argued against this idea before: Rome was slap-bang in the middle of enemy territory, Hannibal didn't have siege equipment and not enough men to invest the city. Leading his battered army (legendary victory or not, they would have taken a beating at Cannae) would have stretched his supply lines. With 20.000 survivors from Cannae, whom had refused to surrender, reforming in his rear, another 20.000 Romans coming from the north (they would be destroyed by Gauls pretty soon after, but Hannibal couldn't know that) and 10.000 new troops levied in Rome herself, it would be Hannibal's army that went hungry, not Rome. Yes, the Romans panicked. But they wouldn't have given up.

Also, remember that the Italian theatre was not the only part of Hannibal's strategy. Carthaginian armies were busy kicking the Romans out of Spain and Sicily as well. Hannibal's Italian campaign was at least partially intended to allow other Carthaginian commanders to strip away Rome's provinces. However, maybe because of Hannibal's success in Italy, the senate decided to send reinforcements to Spain. After all, they couldn't go on the offensive in Italy, so those troops would be more useful elsewhere.

[artaxerxes]

I've argued against this idea before: Rome was slap-bang in the middle of enemy territory, Hannibal didn't have siege equipment and not enough men to invest the city. Leading his battered army (legendary victory or not, they would have taken a beating at Cannae) would have stretched his supply lines. With 20.000 survivors from Cannae, whom had refused to surrender, reforming in his rear, another 20.000 Romans coming from the north (they would be destroyed by Gauls pretty soon after, but Hannibal couldn't know that) and 10.000 new troops levied in Rome herself, it would be Hannibal's army that went hungry, not Rome. Yes, the Romans panicked. But they wouldn't have given up.

Also, remember that the Italian theatre was not the only part of Hannibal's strategy. Carthaginian armies were busy kicking the Romans out of Spain and Sicily as well. Hannibal's Italian campaign was at least partially intended to allow other Carthaginian commanders to strip away Rome's provinces. However, maybe because of Hannibal's success in Italy, the senate decided to send reinforcements to Spain. After all, they couldn't go on the offensive in Italy, so those troops would be more useful elsewhere.

Hey, I've wondered about those things a lot of times. Very nice to get an explanation. Thank you! :D

[Mulceber]

but an innovator, he was not.

I wouldn't go that far - to my knowledge, his double-wall from Alesia had never been done before, and the tactic he used for routing Pompey's cavalry at Pharsalus (having his legionaries retreat and replacing them with auxilaries using their pila as spears) was pretty innovative. I agree that he didn't revolutionize battlefield tactics, but he had a couple of interesting innovations that helped him gain his victories. -M

[Ardri]

From what I gather wasn't that something almost every general at WW1 did?

Although I am not very familiar with specific WWI commanders/generals, I would be willing to go out on a limb and say there were good generals on both sides. General Pershing on the American side did more than "sit in the sun and enjoy a nice glass of scotch." Also, whichever general first implemented the use of tanks (not sure who or what army) revolutionized warfare, however, as has been pointed out with Caesar, creating revolutionary tactics neither makes or breaks a general, but the implementation of tactics (new or old) plays a larger part in their success or demise IMO.

[saxonbattlemask]

it was haig that first used the tank at passiondale i think could be wrong also for what its worth i reckon nepolen was the most overrated

[Krusader]

Although I am not very familiar with specific WWI commanders/generals, I would be willing to go out on a limb and say there were good generals on both sides. General Pershing on the American side did more than "sit in the sun and enjoy a nice glass of scotch." Also, whichever general first implemented the use of tanks (not sure who or what army) revolutionized warfare, however, as has been pointed out with Caesar, creating revolutionary tactics neither makes or breaks a general, but the implementation of tactics (new or old) plays a larger part in their success or demise IMO.

What we learned in history class in Norway at least was that generals squandered their men, because they weren't up to speed on how modern warfare was conducted. Sending massive formations of men against enemy lines could be good earlier, but with gatling guns it was waste of men.
Also add in documentaries, movies and perhaps the best "documentary" IMO, Black Adder Fourth Series. There were good generals yes, but the majority it seems (to my eyes) were still employing tactics from the previous century.
And for new tactics, there is the battle of Amiens where combined arms tactics were employed.

[Mulceber]

Also add in documentaries, movies and perhaps the best "documentary" IMO, Black Adder Fourth Series.

Loved that show! -M

[Africanvs]

I wouldn't go that far - to my knowledge, his double-wall from Alesia had never been done before, and the tactic he used for routing Pompey's cavalry at Pharsalus (having his legionaries retreat and replacing them with auxilaries using their pila as spears) was pretty innovative. I agree that he didn't revolutionize battlefield tactics, but he had a couple of interesting innovations that helped him gain his victories. -M

Circumvalation had been done before, but probably not to the extent Caesar did it. As I've said, he knew how to get the most out of what he had and I believe he was damn good. When I say he wasn't innovative, I mean he didn't make any changes to the army to imrpove their efectiveness, he didn't come up with any revolutionary new tactics, but then again, he really didn't need to. His army was top notch. Innovation is usually a product of necesessity.

[Mulceber]

Circumvalation had been done before, but probably not to the extent Caesar did it. As I've said, he knew how to get the most out of what he had and I believe he was damn good. When I say he wasn't innovative, I mean he didn't make any changes to the army to imrpove their efectiveness, he didn't come up with any revolutionary new tactics, but then again, he really didn't need to. His army was top notch. Innovation is usually a product of necesessity.

Okay, I think we've basically been saying the same thing but in different ways - I can definitely agree with that assessment. -M

[Africanvs]

That's a pretty bold statement to make. Slaughtering thousands of countryman, friends, family, colleagues tends to make people emotional, so it's not sure that it would have convinced the Italians to defect. Possibly, Hannibal's strategy was to show the Italians that he was not like Rome and would offer them better terms than the total submission required by the Senate. It didn't work as well as he hoped, but that doesn't mean the opposite would have worked better.

You make a great point here, and it is my opinion as well that that is what Hannibal was trying to do. Unfortunately, in war, a general doesn't get points for trying, and being a nice guy. The fact that it didn't work as well as he hoped, doesn't excuse the fact that it was an improper assessment and a failed plan.

I've argued against this idea before: Rome was slap-bang in the middle of enemy territory, Hannibal didn't have siege equipment and not enough men to invest the city. Leading his battered army (legendary victory or not, they would have taken a beating at Cannae) would have stretched his supply lines. With 20.000 survivors from Cannae, whom had refused to surrender, reforming in his rear, another 20.000 Romans coming from the north (they would be destroyed by Gauls pretty soon after, but Hannibal couldn't know that) and 10.000 new troops levied in Rome herself, it would be Hannibal's army that went hungry, not Rome. Yes, the Romans panicked. But they wouldn't have given up.

Also, remember that the Italian theatre was not the only part of Hannibal's strategy. Carthaginian armies were busy kicking the Romans out of Spain and Sicily as well. Hannibal's Italian campaign was at least partially intended to allow other Carthaginian commanders to strip away Rome's provinces. However, maybe because of Hannibal's success in Italy, the senate decided to send reinforcements to Spain. After all, they couldn't go on the offensive in Italy, so those troops would be more useful elsewhere.

I don't know. You make a good case but it's a little hard for me to believe that Hannibal was simply a decoy to help other generals take Rome's provinces. Also when talking about numbers, just because Rome has 20,000 here and 10,000 there doesn't mean much. You're talking about levies, many of them probably fresh recruits, or dishonered and disunited men in the case of the veterans of Cannae. Hannibal had a battle hardened army and had completely won the war of psychology. In any case, if it were me in Hannibals shoes, two things are for sure. 1) I would have felt like I just destroyed all the men in Rome after Cannae. If I'm not mistaken, Cannae was the biggest battle to have ever happened at that time, and the biggest loss of life in a single day on any ancient or modern battlefield. 2) I wouldn't have imagined that any nation could be that tenacious and resourceful.

Ultimately we cannot know why Hannibal did what he did. He may not have had a successful plan, but the kindness he showed to the Italian allies is at least proof that Carthagians weren't necessarily the barbarians they are often made out to be. His victories have stood the test of time and continue to be taught as tactics today, and many people regard him as one of the greatest generals in history. In any case, we have the value of examining him and his campaign from a safe distance. Who's to say what it looked like on the ground. A coward, he definitely wasn't.

[Ludens]

What we learned in history class in Norway at least was that generals squandered their men, because they weren't up to speed on how modern warfare was conducted. Sending massive formations of men against enemy lines could be good earlier, but with gatling guns it was waste of men.
Also add in documentaries, movies and perhaps the best "documentary" IMO, Black Adder Fourth Series. There were good generals yes, but the majority it seems (to my eyes) were still employing tactics from the previous century.
And for new tactics, there is the battle of Amiens where combined arms tactics were employed.

It's not true that the generals of the WWI didn't change their tactics, the changes just didn't work. They tried mass bombardments, they tried aerial attacks, they tried gas warfare: nothing was able to break the stalemate until the British introduced the tanks in 1917 and the Germans developed infiltration tactics in 1918. Yes, the military academies still taught 19th century tactics, but then no one had seen a war like this before.

That's not to say WWI leaders were good, but I doubt they were particularly more stupid than generals of other times. In the end, however, they were held collectively responsible for the failure of WWI, and that is probably the cause for their bad reputation nowadays.

You make a great point here, and it is my opinion as well that that is what Hannibal was trying to do. Unfortunately, in war, a general doesn't get points for trying, and being a nice guy. The fact that it didn't work as well as he hoped, doesn't excuse the fact that it was an improper assessment and a failed plan.

It certainly failed, but that is hindsight talking. Hannibal wanted to woo away the Italian cities from Rome, and decided that slaughtering Italian captives was not the way to do it. I can't find anything wrong with his assessment here.

You make a good case but it's a little hard for me to believe that Hannibal was simply a decoy to help other generals take Rome's provinces. Also when talking about numbers, just because Rome has 20,000 here and 10,000 there doesn't mean much. You're talking about levies, many of them probably fresh recruits, or dishonered and disunited men in the case of the veterans of Cannae. Hannibal had a battle hardened army and had completely won the war of psychology.

Fair points. However, I still think that Hannibal's campaign in Italy should be seen in the context of the greater war. Hannibal didn't win in Italy, but he didn't exactly lose either. It was the failure of Carthaginian armies in other theatres that allowed Rome to win the war.

As for attacking Rome, it's not a question of numbers but of supplies. Hannibal didn't have siege equipment, so a direct assault was out of the question. Without siege equipment, storming fortifications is a dicey proposition. The 10.000 Roman defenders also maybe levies, but there's nothing like defending your home to raise men's morale, so they would have given him quite a fight. Neither could Hannibal have invested Rome. It was in the middle of hostile territory, and those 20.000 survivors of Cannae plus the consular army from cisalpine Gaul would be more than enough to cut his supply lines. Like I wrote: it would Hannibal's army that went hungry, not Rome.

[Fluvius Camillus]

The tank mission may be led by Haig, the tanks shocked the germans and created a gap in the line, this gap was not exploited very well and the terrain won was largely lost soon.

Germany had quite good generals for their time, France had very bad leaders, worst example was Nivelle, he sent their men to their deaths and on top of it fired his artillery in the back of his own troops.

At the start of the war the Allies approached the war like the century before, a noble gentlemans engagement. The Germans relied on speed and effectiveness. Like at the Somme, the british took a "leasure walk", how that ended is something you all know.

There are reports that in the first days of the war even spear cavalry was used against the german machine gun batteries.

(Sorry for the OT)

[Maeran]

In the first days of WW1 horses were the fastest reliable way to cross a field. And a cavalry lance is no more archaic an idea than a bayonet. A carbine would lack accuracy in a charge, so you'd have to stop if you wanted to hit anyone in that small bunch of men around the gun. Not a good idea.

Not that the machine gun was likely to lose this encounter, but a better solution didn't exist.

The final successes of 1918 built on years of trial and error. In any case, I would say that generally the generals of that war have a worse reputation than they deserve rather than a better one. So you can't say that any of them are overrated.

There are probably a great many overrated generals. I think that Henry V of England was one of them. The siege of Harfleur -the very first action in his war against France- was such a Pyrrhic victory that he had to change the entire campaign into a symbolic march to Calais. He could not do anything more.

He may have shown great skill in choosing his ground at Agincourt, but so much luck came into the circumstances of that battle that surely only Shakespeare could make him the heroic warrior king he is remembered as.

[Owen Glyndwr]

About WWI, it's really important that you take into account what was going on back then. In the lead up to that era, most generals were still studying for the most part Napoleon, and most still believed that his tactics could be applied to war, as evident by the gradiose of the Schlieffen Plan, which is very Napoleonic. Also, the main French theory revolved around something called le cran (sp?) which basically stated that if the soldiers had the will to win, then they were going to win (mixed perfectly with machine guns, didn't it?)

In many ways that war turned out just like the US Civil War. Most generals were still fighting like Napoleon, only a few (Jackson, for example) realized that times had changed, the name of the game was no longer offense, but defense, and the leader's unwillingness to accept a breach in strategy made the battles exceedingly bloody and exceedingly indecisive.

In regards to Washington, I really think you guys are wrongly downplaying his abilities. He was more than just a charasmatic guy. He may not have been a genius, but he certainly was pragmatic. He knew he couldn't beat the regulars on the open field, and so often avoided that all together. When you point out his failed battles, you have to remember that he was fighting with what was essentially a militia, and he was fighting the most well trained army in the world at that time. I doubt Cornwallis or any of the other British generals could have done even half of the things Washington did with his troops, I mean crossing a frozen river barefoot in Christmas, that's pretty crazy if you ask me. The fact that he held his army together that long alone should be a testament to his ability.

As for Rommel, once again, you have to remember that he was pretty much abandoned by Hitler, he didn't recieve much help from the Italians he was supposed to be aiding, and almost never recieved support from Berlin. I can't remember, I but I think that his utilization of the 88s as anti-tank was pretty out of the ordinary.

What Rommel did was simply realized that he could not go toe to toe with the unending British supply of Armor, so instead played to his advantages; his 88s and his faster tanks. Is that not the markings of a great general? The ability to assess your army, and manipulate your opponent into playing into your strengths, and steering them away from your weaknesses?

Just my 2 cents

[jsadighi]

There are probably a great many overrated generals. I think that Henry V of England was one of them. The siege of Harfleur -the very first action in his war against France- was such a Pyrrhic victory that he had to change the entire campaign into a symbolic march to Calais. He could not do anything more.

He may have shown great skill in choosing his ground at Agincourt, but so much luck came into the circumstances of that battle that surely only Shakespeare could make him the heroic warrior king he is remembered as.

I agree with the first part of this. Henry's aim was to march to Paris, the fact that the siege of Harfleur was so costly for him shows that he wasn't the greatest of generals. However, I wouldn't go as far as to say that he was overrated.

Agincourt was proof that he did have some skill at being a competent general. He didn't just defeat a superior enemy, he decimated them. Sure, Shakespeare did add to the Henry's mystique, but the fact that Henry stood side by side with his men to the very end (not just run off to Calais while his soldiers did all the fighting), against an enemy who, on paper, seemed invincible has earned him the right to be called the "Warrior King."

Was Henry's campaign a failure? When you look at what he was trying to achieve, of course it was a failure. But I don't think I can label him "overrated."