sorry to let you down, I know how lots of you people tune in to the backroom solely to hear my brilliant arguments and wonderful analogies. so I'll go into detail a little more.
I don't know everything, but what I do know is that the junior officer corps of the army is vastly different from the general and field officers, and the unofficial opinion of a vast number of junior officers is that the new general in theater is no more of a counterinsurgency expert than the last. Keep in mind A lot of the junior officers were former enlisted who went to combat and were so disappointed with the leadership (people who are now field level and up) that they decided to become officers.
The mission has pretty much been the same since day one. The only thing thats different now are the numbers: more troops, more money. It's a damn shame, considering had we spent even a fraction of Iraqs funding on Afghanistan we would have cell phone towers, fluid highways, solid power sources and infrasctructure in place, the list goes on and on and on but we can't change the idiot mistakes of our past leaders which brings us to today:
It's cosmetic. New face brings the illusion of new and immediate change, when in fact both generals have a fairly similar leadership style and command philosophy. Whats happening in theater now is exactly what some at the Pentagon and more than a few forced-to-retire DOD officials who were critics of the Bush administration have been saying since late 2006: the poppy yield in 07 and 08 would be huge, which would provide more funds for the Taliban, which means more Taliban with more weapons and more equipment, which means surge in Taliban activity in 09.
Wild card Pakistan notwithstanding, not a lot is going to change without more troops and more money. The majority of the NATO forces in country have jacked up ROEs which pretty much take them out of the fight, which leaves the burden on a few select participants. We need to flood Afghanistan with troops and money because its turning into a logistics war. The meat and potatoes of the war there is mobility, supply and keeping villages fed and protected. This would be a lot easier with better roads, more airstrips, running water and cell phones.
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