Inspired by a recent post in the Obama thread by Xiahou. Our current President is doubling-down in Afghanistan, replacing the general in charge of the theater with a counterinsurgency expert.

A counterinsurgency expert is thrilled:

Now there is a lot of stuff at work here. First, I heard rumors that McChrystal might replace McKiernan only last Friday, when a senior U.S. policy-maker cornered me and asked me what I thought of McChrystal. That's kinda like asking a rifleman in the French Army what he thinks of Napoleon. Although I indeed served under McChrystal's command in both Iraq and Afghanistan, I do not know him personally and was but one cog in a giant machine at the time.

I do know that many policy-makers and journalists think that McChrystal's work as the head of the super-secret Joint Special Operations Command was the untold success story of the Surge and the greater war on terror campaigns. I also know that McChrystal and David Petraeus forged a close working relationship in Iraq in 2007 and have much respect for one another. (Prior to 2007, the relations between the direct-action special operations task force and the overall command in Iraq were strained at best.)

Second, let's not beat around the bush: Gen. McKiernan was fired -- and fired in a very public manner. Secretary Gates' exact words: "I have asked for the resignation of General David McKiernan."

Damn.

This tells me that President Obama, Secretary Gates, and Gen. Petraeus are as serious as a heart attack about a shift in strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This was ruthless, and they were not about to do the George Casey thing whereby a commander is left in the theater long after he is considered to have grown ineffective.

The sad truth of the matter is that people have been calling for McKiernan's head for some time now. Many of the people with whom I have spoken do not think that McKiernan "gets" the war in Afghanistan -- or counterinsurgency warfare in general. There was very little confidence that -- with McKiernan in charge in Afghanistan -- we the United States had the varsity squad on the field.

That all changed today. I do not know if the war in Afghanistan is winnable. But I do know that Stan McChrystal is an automatic starter in anyone's line-up.
Game on.

Time's Joel Klein throws some cold water:

McKiernan's caution may have been the right impulse. Here is the basic problem: unlike Iraq, where tribal Awakening Councils were stood up to fight the Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) terrorists--who were mostly foreign imports--the local militias in Afghanistan are being asked to fight their own Pashtun brothers, the Taliban. When I was in Afghanistan last month, a Pashtun from Wardak warned Richard Holbrooke and Admiral Mike Mullen that many of the people signing up for the local militia were from the Hazara minority. "It won't work," the man said. "The Pashtun see this as not our government."

In the end, the only possible solution in Wardak and other majority Pashtun provinces is reconciliation with the local Taliban (who are, in truth, a closer equivalent to the Sunni tribes in Anbar who changed sides and became the Awakening Councils). The best possible deal would be acceptance of the Taliban into the Afghan governing structure in return for a pledge--and supporting intelligence--that they will no longer give aid and comfort to Al Qaeda (who are, once again, mostly foreign fighters). This won't be easy to achieve, or enforce, especially not after the last eight years--on the other hand, the Al Qaeda-style religious extremists are compiling an unblemished record of being kicked out of the areas where they've taken control because their brand of Islam is so inhumane and irreligious. If we can't figure out a way to come to terms with the majority of local Taliban, who are religious and Pashtun but not Al Qaeda-style extremists, we will not be successful in Afghanistan.

I'm not sure what to think. Afghanistan may be a much more difficult proposition that Iraq. Many of the people we are fighting are locals; the porous border with Pakistan gives our enemies a safe haven; six years of neglect and mismanagement by the previous administration have given us a lot of ground to make up. Is it winnable? What would "winning" be, exactly?

In many ways Iraq was the graveyard of the Bush administration. It's quite possible that Afghanistan will serve the same function for the Obama administration. I devoutly wish for us to succeed in both theaters, but I fear that success is hazy and shapeless. Thoughts?